

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THE *Vol. 10.55*
ARMY QUARTERLY

With which is incorporated
The United Service Magazine

Edited by
Major-General G. P. DAWNAY
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

and
CUTHBERT HEADLAM, D.S.O., O.B.E.
(late Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff, B.E.F.)

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INDEX TO AUTHORS. VOL. III.

AUTHOR.	SUBJECT.	PAGE
ALLEN, W. E. D., F.R.G.S.	The Geography of the Treaty of Trianon	276
ATKINSON, C. T. . .	General Liman von Sanders on his Experiences in Palestine	257
BONHAM - CARTER, Brevet-Colonel C., C.M.G., D.S.O.	The Royal Military College, Sandhurst .	105
DRAKE, Lt.-Col. R. J., D.S.O.	Secret Service Studies: France and England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries	128
EDMONDS, Brig.-General J. E., C.B., C.M.G.	The German II. Cavalry Corps (H.K.K. II.) at Le Cateau	250
ELLISON, Major-General Sir GERALD, K.C.M.G., C.B.	Army Administration	9
FULLER, Col. J. F. C., D.S.O.	Problems of Mechanical Warfare	284
GATHORNE - HARDY, Major-General The Honble. J. F., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	A Summary of the Campaign in Italy, and an Account of the Battle of Vittori Veneto	23
H. B. R.	A Memory of a Side-Show	77
HOLLAND, E. STOPFORD, late Capt. Royal West Kent Regt.	Demobilization	335
HUNTER-WESTON, Lt.- Gen. Sir AYLMER, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.P.	War and Peace at the Dardanelles. An Impression	70
LEE, Dr. J. FITZGERALD	Prisoners of War	348
MAURICE, Major-Gen. Sir F., K.C.M.G., C.B.	Policy and Strategy	357

INDEX TO AUTHORS.

AUTHOR.	SUBJECT.	PAGE
PIERS, Major Sir CHARLES, Bart., late 29th (Vancouver) Battalion, C.E.F.	A Corps in the Making. The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 .	36
SCAMMELL, J. M., Cap- tain Infantry Reserve Corps, U.S.A.	A Day with the Byzantine Army on Active Service	312
SOMERVILLE, Col. J. C., C.M.G., C.B.E., Commandant of the Royal Military School of Music	Military Music, Past and Present . . .	93
TERRITORIAL OFFICER, A	Some Reflections on the Territorial Army	114
WAVELL, Lt.-Col. A. P., C.M.G., M.C., The Black Watch	The Strategy of the Campaigns of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force . .	235
WILKINSON, SPENSER .	An Experiment in Military Education .	51

INDEX TO ARTICLES. VOL III.

	PAGE
Administrative Services of the B.E.F. during the Great War, The	302
Appendix I. The Army :	
Army Council	188, 414
Departments of the War Office	188, 414
Commands of the Army at Home	190, 416
Distribution of Regular Units of the Army	196, 422
Tank Corps	207, 433
Appendix II. The Army in India	208, 434
Appendix III. The Royal Air Force :	
Air Council	217, 443
Air Ministry	217, 443
Air Commands	219, 445
Army Administration. By Major-General Sir GERALD ELLISON, K.C.M.G., C.B.	9
Byzantine Army on Active Service, A Day with the. By J. M. SCAMMELL, Captain Infantry Reserve Corps, U.S.A.	312
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, The. A Corps in the Making. By Major Sir CHARLES PIERS, Bart., late 29th (Vancouver) Battalion, C.E.F.	36
Dardanelles, War and Peace at the. An Impression by Lieut.- General Sir AYLMER HUNTER-WESTON, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.P.	70
Demobilization. By E. STOPFORD HOLLAND, late Captain Royal West Kent Regiment	335
Editorial	I, 225
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, The Strategy of the Campaigns of the. By Lieut.-Colonel A. P. WAVELL, C.M.G., M.C., The Black Watch	235
Ex-Kaiser, A Novel about the	335
Foreign War Books, Notes on	133, 373
German II. Cavalry Corps (H.K.K.II.) at Le Cateau, The. By Brig.-General J. E. EDMONDS, C.B., C.M.G. (retired R.E.)	250
Italy, A Summary of the Campaign in, and an Account of the Battle of Vittori Veneto. By Major-General The Honble. J. F. GATHORNE-HARDY, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	23

	PAGE
Liman von Sanders on his Experiences in Palestine, General. By C. T. ATKINSON	257
Ludendorff on the German Plan of Campaign, August, 1914, General	47
Mechanical Warfare, Problems of. By Colonel J. F. C. FULLER, D.S.O.	284
Military Education, An Experiment in. By SPENSER WILKINSON .	51
Military Music, Past and Present. By Colonel J. C. SOMERVILLE, C.M.G., C.B.E., Commandant of the Royal Military School of Music	93
Parliamentary Notes	179, 410
Policy and Strategy. By Major-General Sir F. MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B.	357
Prisoners of War. By Dr. J. FITZGERALD LEE	348
Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	153, 391
Royal Military College, Sandhurst, The. By Brevet-Colonel C. BONHAM-CARTER, C.M.G., D.S.O.	105
Secret Service Studies, France and England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By Lieut.-Colonel R. J. DRAKE, D.S.O.	128
Side Show, A Memory of a. By H. B. R.	77
Student's Scrapbook, Notes from a	184, 412
Supreme Military Council, The. A Summary of its History . . .	124
Tannenberg, An Echo of. The Dismissal of General von Prittwitz : the 20th of August, 1914	88
Territorial Army, Some Reflections on the. By a Territorial Officer	114
Trianon, The Geography of the Treaty of. By W. E. D. ALLEN, F.R.G.S.	276

The

War 13.55

Army Quarterly

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	1
II. Army Administration. By Major-General Sir Gerald Ellison, K.C.M.G., C.B.	9
III. A Summary of the Campaign in Italy, and an Account of the Battle of Vittorio Veneto. By Major-General the Honble. J. F. Cathorne-Hardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	23
IV. A Corps in the Making. The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919. By Major Sir Charles Piers, Bart., Late 29th (Vancouver) Battalion, C.E.F.	36
V. General Ludendorff on the German Plan of Campaign, August, 1914	47
VI. An Experiment in Military Education. By Spenser Wilkinson	51
VII. War and Peace at the Dardanelles. An Impression. By Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.P.	70
VIII. A Memory of a Side-Show. By H. B. R.	77
IX. An Echo of Tannenberg. The Dismissal of General Von Fritwitz: the 20th of August, 1914	88
X. Military Music, Past and Present. By Colonel J. C. Somerville, C.M.O., C.B.E., Commandant of the Royal Military School of Music	93
XI. The Royal Military College, Sandhurst. By Brevet-Colonel C. Bonham-Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O.	105
XII. Some Reflections on the Territorial Army. By a Territorial Officer	114
XIII. The Supreme Military Council. A Summary of its History	124
XIV. Secret Service Studies. France and England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Drake, D.S.O.	128
XV. Notes on Foreign War Books	133
XVI. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	153
XVII. Parliamentary Notes	179
XVIII. Notes from a Student's Scrapbook	184
XIX. Appendix. I. The Army.—1. Army Council.—2. Departments of the War Office.—3. Commands of the Army at Home.—4. Distribution of Regular Units of the Army.—5. Tank Corps	183
II. The Army in India	208
III. The Royal Air Force.—1. Air Council.—2. Air Ministry.—3. Air Commands	217

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
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


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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. III. No. I.

OCTOBER, 1921

EDITORIAL

WITH the publication of this number the *Army Quarterly* enters upon its second year of existence. We wish to make use of this occasion to express our respectful gratitude for the kind way in which the review has been welcomed by the Press, and by those of the public in this country, in the Dominions and abroad who have made its acquaintance. If we are to judge the results of our labours by the complimentary remarks which have been made with regard to them and by the numerous letters of appreciation which we have received from our readers, we may honestly believe, and say with truth, that the *Army Quarterly* has been an unqualified success.

* * * * *

We have endeavoured to the best of our ability to carry out the aims which we had in view when the *Army Quarterly* made its appearance and which we set out in our first Editorial. We have studiously adopted an attitude of impartiality with regard to all matters of controversy and we have striven to make it clear that, although in the nature of things the subjects with which we deal must appeal more to soldiers than to civilians, the *Army Quarterly* is not merely a budget of technical information designed solely for the use of the military student, but a military review which should also be of interest to the civilian reader. Our object, in short, has been to provide those who are interested in the past, present and future of the British Army with reliable and impartial information on military matters obtained from the most trustworthy sources and given by writers of unquestioned ability and authority.

* * * * *

It may be urged that at a time like the present, when men are tired of war and its horrors and the whole world is longing for an enduring peace, there is no room for a periodical solely devoted to things

military. In reply we would point out that the *Army Quarterly* is not a militarist publication, or is it in any way opposed to the furtherance of the aims and ideals of those who are working for a general disarmament. Soldiers—at any rate those who have had any practical experience of war—are the last persons in the world to stand in the way of any re-ordering of the method of solution of national and international problems which may render impossible a recourse to the arbitrament of arms. At the same time, however, so long as the world's statesmen and diplomatists fail to eliminate the possibility of war, it is clear that no sensible and practical man—least of all a subject of the British Crown—can cease to take an interest in the Army. Its achievements in the past, its efficiency in the present, its purposes in the future, must be the concern of every citizen of the empire. These are the matters upon which he can obtain information in the *Army Quarterly*.

* * * * *

We said at the beginning of these notes that, so far as we could judge, the *Army Quarterly* had proved itself “an unqualified success,” and we used the expression advisedly. We embarked upon our task with a definite purpose and we are assured on all sides that we have been successful in our undertaking. But, nevertheless, we are forced to admit that the public response, as measured by the number of our annual subscribers, has not been so great as we could wish. We realize that it must take time for a periodical of this kind to make its way and that the public is not unnaturally slow at a moment like the present to respond to any new call upon its purse. We have consequently been content so far to allow matters to take their course and to trust that in time, as the character and worth of the review became better known and more widely recognized, it might gain a more adequate number of permanent subscribers.

A year, however, has now elapsed since the *Army Quarterly* was first published and it is becoming apparent that, unless we can obtain more permanent support, it may be difficult to continue its publication. It is not, as the old *Army Review* was, an official publication, and, although its publishers are not counting upon it for any appreciable profits, they cannot be expected to maintain its existence if it saddles them with a financial loss.

* * * * *

The decision of the Supreme Council to hand over the solution of the Silesian problem to the League of Nations is the most important recognition which that body has yet received. It may be considered to mark a distinct stage in the development of the League. It is a

definite acknowledgment by the statesmen of the world that a question has arisen with regard to which the accredited representatives of the various nations are unable to arrive at an amicable understanding, and their unanimous resolution to submit the matter in dispute to an impartial tribunal and to be bound by its decision is a triumph for the cause of international arbitration.

It is to be hoped that, by the time these notes are published, the League will have justified the confidence of its supporters and proved once for all its usefulness by the settlement of a problem which so many people believe to be insoluble.

* * * * *

In November the chosen representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will meet in Washington on the invitation of the President of the United States of America in order to discuss the limitation of armaments and matters affecting the Pacific and Far Eastern Problems. It is not improbable that the *Times* correspondent who stated that "the limitation of armaments is put in the forefront of the official statement, though the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern Problems is really the heart of the matter," is right and that there is no great hope of the Conference being able to come to any satisfactory agreement with regard to the reduction of armaments. At the same time a frank and open discussion upon this thorny subject, such as we hope will take place, cannot fail to be attended with good results, and, if only a satisfactory settlement of the Pacific and Far Eastern Problems can be achieved, one at any rate of the principal reasons for the maintenance of armaments will have been removed. From the purely British standpoint we welcome the opportunity afforded by the Washington Conference of making known to the world in general, and to the United States of America in particular, that we have already set about in earnest the task of reducing our Fleet and our Army. We doubt whether the people of Great Britain themselves, let alone foreigners, fully appreciate the extent of the reductions which have already been made in our naval strength.

* * * * *

Although the question of the future size and composition of the Army in India has yet to be examined by a sub-committee of Imperial Defence, it is clear from statements in Parliament and from periodical notices in the Press in connection with the disbandment of particular units that certain reductions have been and are being made, and fears have been expressed that these reductions may exceed the limits of prudence and safety.

During the war the Indian Army was practically doubled in size, so that even a return to its strength in 1914 will involve the disbandment of some one hundred and twenty cavalry and infantry units, to say nothing of the other Services. For a variety of reasons, however, principally connected with the disturbed state of the Middle East generally, this disbandment, which in normal circumstances would have been effected as soon as possible after the Armistice, has had to be spread over a period of approximately three years, and is only now in process of completion.

The war also revealed certain defects in the organization of the Army in India, the two most serious perhaps being the weakness of the ancillary Services, which had to be improvised on mobilization, and the absence of adequate machinery for the supply of reinforcements. In addition, arrangements had to be made for the inclusion in the permanent establishment of such new Services as the Royal Air Force, the Signals and Mechanical Transport, while certain adjustments had to be made in the composition of formations so as to preserve (as far as local conditions would permit) homogeneity of organization with the other forces of the Commonwealth.

* * * * *

The problem of the reconstruction of the Army on a modern basis has been still farther complicated by the question of finance, and the urgent need for economy. On the one hand the enhanced pay both of officers and men ; the acceptance by the Government of India of full liability for feeding, clothing, housing, mounting and equipping the Indian soldier ; the introduction of modern appliances in the shape of armament, equipment, vehicles and stores generally, combined with the high prices of such articles and of food-stuffs and textiles ; and the necessity of improving the living accommodation of the soldier, both British and Indian, all involved increased expenditure which could only be avoided by a definite reduction in strengths. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the trend of events in the Middle East and on the frontier, and the questionable attitude of some sections of the populace in India, served as a warning against any hasty action in this direction. In fact, policy and finance are once more in conflict, the former exerting a fitful influence only as and when emergencies arise, the latter exercising a continued and relentless pressure which destroys, but does not exterminate. Meanwhile, the military authorities attempt to serve two masters without a hope of satisfying either. By adopting form and eschewing substance they are able partially to reconcile one party without unduly alarming the other, but this procedure in no way relieves them of the

responsibility of carrying out Policy's demands whenever and wherever she may make them. The necessity for the adoption of such expedients is peculiarly unsuited to the East, where rapidity of action is essential to success, and initial hesitancy is so fraught with danger.

* * * * *

Now it is obvious that if the defects which came to light during the war are to be removed ; if the new Services which proved themselves indispensable to an army in the field are to be installed ; if the composition and organization of formations is to follow that of the other forces of the Commonwealth ; if the higher rates of pay are to be given, and without them it will not be possible to maintain a contented Army ; and if modern armament, equipment and stores are to be provided, and nobody can grudge the soldier the means of saving men's lives and of reducing the incidence of casualties ; if all these conditions are to be fulfilled and at the same time strict economy is to be effected ; certain readjustments will have to be made which, in effect, will involve the reduction or amalgamation of certain pre-war units or their conversion into depôt units. An army is a delicate machine made up of many component parts the complete absence of any one of which may render the machine unworkable. It is surely better and more economical to construct a small machine with all its parts complete, or at any rate in skeleton form with the basic portions sound, than to maintain a large machine without the requisite mechanism for lubrication or transmission of power. The question is one of proportion, but unfortunately its recognition affords but little consolation to the individual who in return is deprived of his unit.

* * * * *

From the accounts which have been received of the recent disturbances in Malabar, it is evident that the Moplah rising has a peculiar significance both as regards origin and scale. The Moplahs are a Moslem race of Arab extraction, and, although truculent, easily excited, and fanatical when roused, their interests are, as a rule, confined to local affairs. In fact it was largely owing to the high development of this local spirit that the experiment of enlisting these men into the Army failed, the Moplahs being mustered out in 1906-1907 after an existence of six years.

The two significant features of the present rising are the uniformed volunteer and the display of the green flag, both of which are products of the Khilafat agitation, and it is disquieting to think that such organizations can, with apparent impunity, so much impress their doctrine on a whole section of semi-savages as to induce them to undertake what is little short of organized rebellion.

The incident affords another example of the indispensability, in present circumstances, of the British soldier in India, and of the readiness of the civil community to invoke his aid in times of stress, in spite of their insistent demands in more normal times to reduce military expenditure. We would suggest, however, that this trouble might have been minimized, if not completely averted, and much money might have been saved by a timely display of power during the period of its incubation. As it is, considerable damage to life and property has already been done ; a bad moral effect has been created which may react on other parts of India ; and the process of clearing up is bound to be difficult and lengthy.

* * * * *

Lieutenant-General Sir David Henderson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Director-General of the League of Red Cross Societies, who died at Geneva on the 17th of August, had a distinguished military career and has rightly been described as " one of the great figures of the war." He was born in 1862, and joined the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in 1883 through Sandhurst. Before going to Sandhurst, however, he had been educated to be an engineer, and this early training was to prove of considerable value to him later in his career. He saw active service in the Soudan in 1898 and in the South African War, 1899-1900. In this latter campaign he served with great distinction in the intelligence department and was wounded during the siege of Ladysmith. He was subsequently D.A.Q.M.G. at Aldershot and Director of Military Training at the War Office.

* * * * *

But it is with military aviation that Sir David's name will for all time be gratefully associated by his countrymen. In the summer of 1911, when the use of aircraft was beginning to exercise the minds of students of war, Sir David Henderson was chief staff officer to Sir John French at the Horse Guards. As an old intelligence officer and a man of great imagination, the possibilities of aviation made an immediate appeal to him. He recognized that unless an officer of standing and seniority took a personal interest in aeronautics, it was unlikely that adequate and early development would be achieved in the face of the inherent conservatism of the Army and Navy, especially in view of the difficulties of obtaining money in peace time for any new arm. No doubt also he saw in aviation an opportunity for him to render great service to his country, an opportunity which would appeal to a man who was ambitious and conscious of his own capacity. He recognized also that, if he was to win the confidence of the future pilots, he must himself learn to fly, and

in 1911, although in his fiftieth year, he "took his ticket" at Brooklands in what was then record time.

* * * *

In 1912, when he was appointed Director of Military Training, he found himself responsible for the Air Battalion at Farnborough out of which the R.F.C. was subsequently evolved. About this time the Imperial Defence Committee was considering a scheme for the future Air Service, and, having approved the general principles, appointed a committee, known as the R.F.C. Committee, to organize the Flying Corps, with Sir David Henderson as Chairman. From the first he was the moving spirit in this committee, and at once appreciated the fact that the National Air Force should be one Service and not partly naval and partly military. The R.F.C. in its original form was a common Service with naval and military wings and a central flying school to train pilots for both. Although for a time the separatist tendencies of the Admiralty and the War Office were too strong for him, Sir David remained faithful to this principle and exerted all his influence to persuade others to adopt it. During the latter years of the war this purpose was gradually accomplished through the slow process of the Joint War Air Committee and the Air Board until, at the end of 1917, the Government decided to form the Royal Air Force and to establish the Air Ministry for its control. Sir David, who in 1913, had become Director-General of Military Aeronautics and later General Officer Commanding Royal Flying Corps as well, ceased to hold these appointments in the autumn of 1917 and devoted all his energies to the organization of the new force and the new Ministry, being appointed Vice-President of the Air Council, a post which he held until he resigned in April, 1918, when his direct connection with aviation ceased. It is largely owing to his knowledge, judgment, tact and hard work that the unprecedented formation of a great new fighting Service at the height of a war of the first magnitude was accomplished without loss of efficiency or serious difficulties.

* * * *

It is given to few men to create a new Service such as the R.F.C. and to see it prove itself in war before the first fresh enthusiasm has worn off. This gift was David Henderson's, for he went to France in August, 1914, in command of the R.F.C., whose "skill, energy and perseverance" were, in the words of Sir J. French's Despatch, "beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of operations." He continued in command in France, except for a short interval, until in the autumn of 1915 the rapid

expansion of the R.F.C. required his constant presence in London, when he returned to the War Office. The enormous strides made by the R.F.C. during the first year of the war afford conclusive proof of Sir David's energy and ability, but in the development of a new mechanical arm when hostilities are actually in progress there must inevitably be times when, temporarily at any rate, the enemy may be expected to gain the upper hand. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sir David Henderson's administration of the R.F.C. was subjected to considerable criticism both before and during the war. But the inquiry which was conducted in May, 1916, under the presidency of Mr. Justice Baillache, in order to examine the allegations brought against Sir David by Mr. Pemberton Billing resulted in his complete exoneration. Never were such grave charges more lightly brought against a distinguished public servant; never were they more triumphantly refuted.

* * * * *

Sir David Henderson had the power of inspiring affection in those who worked for him to a marked extent, and the tactful way in which he controlled and guided his subordinates without unduly interfering with them, checking their initiative or depriving them of a sense of responsibility, made it a pleasure to work for him. His evenness of temper, subtlety and sense of humour stood him in good stead when his work for the Air Services was the subject of criticism, much of which was ill informed or inspired by motives other than the good of the Services criticized. His dealings with those who from the first sought to find in the new science of aviation a means of political advancement, or of bringing their names before the public, were always a source of delight to those who worked for him. Quiet, unassuming and amazingly patient, he laboured untiringly in whatever task came his way. His courage was unquestioned, and, although he was ambitious, he showed that he was ready to sacrifice the position which he had won for himself with so much hard work when he believed that the policy of those set over him was likely to ruin the Air Force. A man with his great qualities and versatility would have succeeded in whatever profession he had adopted. As a soldier first and foremost, his ambition was probably to rise to high command of troops in the field, and for a short time at the end of 1914 he actually commanded the 1st Division in France. When he was not allowed to continue in this command, he cheerfully concealed his disappointment and took up again his great work for the Air Service which will be for all time his memorial. Personally, he was one of the kindest and best of men whose death will be mourned by a host of friends who regarded him as a *chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*.

ARMY ADMINISTRATION *

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR GERALD ELLISON, K.C.M.G., C.B.

IN his "History of the British Army," Mr. Fortescue states that probably "no measure brought such hatred on the Army" as the system of military government of the country instituted by Oliver Cromwell. His chapter on this subject concludes with the following sentence: "The Major-Generals have not been forgotten by the country, the memory of their dictatorship burnt itself deep into the heart of the nation and even now, after two centuries and a half, the vengeance of the nation on the soldier remains insatiate and insatiable."

Such a conclusion is undoubtedly somewhat startling, and it is one requiring careful examination. Certainly for two hundred years after the Commonwealth the nation's profound suspicion of a Standing Army and all that related to it proved such a handicap to military efficiency that Mr. Fortescue's statement appears fully justified. It is only during recent years that this suspicion of the soldier has been to some extent modified, as the writer hopes to show when he explains the various systems under which the Army has been administered.

In the course of this article an attempt will also be made to prove that the military system which was gradually evolved in this country as a result of the nation's dread of the soldier had in it many sound elements, and further, that it has been copied by practically every military nation in the world.

Prior to 1660 the Army was commanded and administered at the absolute will of the Sovereign, but from that year onwards Parliament more and more strongly asserted its control over the administration, not of the Army only, but of the nation itself.

Under the easy-going, happy-go-lucky régime of Charles II., no actual struggle arose over constitutional principles. The King,

* The substance of this article was delivered as an Address to the Senior Officers' Course at the School of Military Administration on the 18th of January, 1921, and is published by permission of the Controller of H.M.'s Stationery Office.

in many ways, acted wholly unconstitutionally according to our present ideas, but he took good care not to risk his head as his father had done. But when his successor came to the throne, matters were on a different footing, and a crisis was at last reached which resulted in the Revolution of 1688.

It is not too much to say that the history of modern Army administration dates from this year, for the changes which were introduced as a result of the Revolution were of the most far-reaching importance.

William III., although he soon became aware of the national antipathy to maintaining a Standing Army, was also faced with war on the Continent and, later, with war in Ireland. It was, therefore, vital to him to obtain and maintain a sufficient military force. Parliament, however, was in a position to dictate its own terms as regards the raising and administration of such a force. The King, consequently, had to compromise with Parliament, and the outstanding feature of the bargain was the complete separation of command from the business administration of the Army. Parliament determined the establishment of the Army (up to this time there had been no fixed establishment), voted the money for the maintenance of the establishment and took every precaution it could to see that the establishment was not exceeded, and that the business administration of the Army was carried out under definite rules which Parliament imposed.

The fundamental basis of the compromise between William III. and his Parliament was that the command of the Army should be entirely separated from its business administration. One thing to which the King held firmly was that the command and discipline of the Army once it was raised should be vested in the Crown, acting through one of the principal Secretaries of State.

Various constitutional principles were gradually evolved out of this fundamental conception of command being separated from administration. But these principles were not evolved all at once, in fact it was more than a century before they were fully developed and were fully understood in the constitutional practice of the country.

In 1811, Lord Palmerston, who was then Secretary at War, enunciated the essential principles in the following terms: "Lord Palmerston submits that, according to the principles which regulate the British Constitution, power cannot be vested where there is no responsibility, or responsibility be imposed where authority does not exist." Secondly: "The principle upon which the public

service has been constituted has been to make one department a check and a control on another." Thirdly, as explaining this principle of check and counter-check, it was held that the views of one who has to bear the expense and of others who enjoy the benefits are not certain to be identical.

Sir Henry Harding, a distinguished military officer, who was at one time Secretary at War, amplified and justified these constitutional principles in the following terms : " The separation between finance and discipline has brought the expenditure of the Army to the House of Commons and has kept the discipline and management of the Army in the King's hands and out of the House of Commons, and this in my view is as it ought to be." The Duke of Wellington also spoke much to the same effect, even going so far as to assert in the most positive terms that a Commander-in-Chief " can have, and should have, nothing whatever to do with finance."

The importance which the constitutional authorities a century ago attached to keeping the discipline of the Army and everything connected with military honours and awards out of the House of Commons may be gauged by the following words of Lord Palmerston : " If ever the day comes when the power of rewarding military services should be transferred from the Crown to the House of Commons, those who saw it might say they had witnessed the death-blow of the Constitution."

It is thus interesting to note that soldiers and statesmen alike were agreed that the principle of separating command from administration was sound in itself and that any departure from it would be likely to produce evil results, military, political and economical.

Given that the distinction between command and administration was to be accepted, the object to be kept in view was, or certainly should have been, to set up two co-equal powers which should be a mutual check one on the other. It should have been the business of the Administrator to see that no act of the soldier led to unnecessary or excessive expenditure, and equally it should have been the duty of a Commander-in-Chief to object to any act or any omission of the Administrator which injuriously affected the efficiency of the Army.

Later on in this article an attempt will be made to explain how it was that this theory of the soldier acting as a check on the Administrator, and *vice versa*, was not carried out successfully in this country, at any rate during the eighteenth century.

Before dealing with this subject, however, it may be well to give an illustration which shows that our theory was not wholly

erroneous or incapable of producing good results if it were given a fair chance.

Curiously enough the Prussian Army illustrates the successful working of the system which was evolved under stress of circumstances in 1688, for the modern Prussian system was an adaptation of our Army system.

Some years ago the present writer had an opportunity of studying the German War Office thoroughly from inside, and, when he was there, he was told by a high official that the changes carried out in the Prussian Army about the year 1821 were effected largely as the result of advice given by the Duke of Wellington. In that year for the first time, command in the Prussian Army was entirely separated from administration.

Commanders of troops were, as they always had been, responsible directly to the King, but they had no financial responsibility at all. A semi-civil administrative establishment was set up in each command and it dealt in all financial business directly with the Minister of War, who, in matters of money, owed some sort of allegiance to the Prussian Parliament. But Prussia, and later Germany, was not constitutionally governed in our sense of the word. The soldier at the head of the War Office was a King's man and not really responsible to Parliament.

It was in 1821, too, that the General Staff was created quite distinct from the War Office, its head being responsible directly to the King. The King, therefore, had two sets of purely military advisers—the Commanders of Troops and the Chief of the General Staff—to balance the Administrator at the War Office and to secure that the efficiency of the Army was not injuriously affected by any of his acts. So much stress was laid in Germany on a strict observance of the distinction between military and administrative functions that it was even considered necessary to house the General Staff and the War Office respectively in separate buildings, distant about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles apart.

Here, then, was a carefully considered attempt to institute and preserve the exact balance, the check and counter-check, between two co-equal departments, one purely military, the other purely administrative: a balance aimed at, but only very imperfectly realized under our system. The writer asked his informant at the German War Office what happened when the C.G.S. and War Minister did not see eye to eye on any subject. "The matter," he was informed, "is then referred to the Emperor for decision, and the man against whom he decides usually gets a very fine decoration."

It is not the purpose of this article to uphold the German system as a constitutional model, but it is of interest to know that that system was based on our own, that it produced at a minimum of cost a marvellously efficient fighting machine, and that it also produced two such diametrically opposite types as the elder Moltke, the scientific soldier, to whom administrative detail was anathema, and Roon, the administrator, to whom his work of administration was all-sufficing.

There is one feature of the German administration to which reference must be briefly made, as it bears directly on what is stated later on regarding our own system. The writer went through many office files at the Kriegs Ministerium and was much struck by the degree of responsibility vested in comparatively junior officers. In connection with the administration of personnel, for example, a man of the standing of an A.A.G. with us had his own vote or part of a vote to administer, and responsibility was definitely fixed on him in this way. He had to think, therefore, all the time in terms of money and be prepared to answer for his stewardship through his account. It was very striking how this system prevented the inordinate amount of minute writing on files which unhappily is still prevalent in our own War Office.

In England in 1688, and throughout the eighteenth century, Parliament aimed at strengthening its hold on military administration in every way possible. As a result, a gentleman called the Secretary at War became a far more important functionary than he had been hitherto. In Charles II.'s reign he was nothing more than a private secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, and his pay and that of his clerks amounted only to about £1 a day. Later, however, the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief became the exception rather than the rule, and he gradually built up an establishment of his own, and speedily absorbed many of the functions which properly belonged to the Commander-in-Chief. It is interesting to note that he held a military commission, and continued to do so until nearly the end of the eighteenth century, although the post ceased to be in any way military. His office personnel was entirely civilian. He was not at first a Member of Parliament, but in course of time it became a rule that the Secretary at War should be in Parliament. He approached the Crown through one of the principal Secretaries of State. The main duties with which he was concerned were the personnel establishments, and questions connected with marches, quarters, etc., and generally with the cost of the Army. Later, there is little doubt that he became unduly mixed up with questions of

military discipline, honours and awards, which were peculiarly matters for a Commander-in-Chief to deal with.

Another result of the Revolution of 1688 was the increased control exercised by the Treasury in military affairs. The Commissary-in-Chief, who was responsible for the supply of the Army and its transport, was a civilian Treasury official, and his agents dealing with supply and contracts for supply, in garrisons at home and abroad, were also civilians. As further safeguards over military expenditure, the Lords of the Treasury had under them the Paymaster-General and Controllers of Army Accounts, as well as a Commissary-General of Musters, whose business it was to watch the numbers for whom pay was provided.

Then there was, of course, the Board of Ordnance, a very venerable institution dating from the fifteenth century. It had its headquarters at the Tower and was presided over by the Master-General, usually a military officer of high rank, who later had a seat in the Cabinet and in the House of Lords. The Board was responsible for the supply of arms, armament and stores for the Army and the Navy, and had charge of barracks and fortifications. To some extent it corresponded to the Ministry of Munitions during the late war. It also had under it the two corps of Artillery and Engineers, and, as matters now stand, it is difficult for us to realize that, during the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, these two distinguished corps were quite separate from the rest of the Army, having their own regulations and even their own medical department. It is interesting to note, too, that until comparatively recent times Artillery and Engineer officers were not eligible for Army staff appointments. Constitutionally, these corps were as much apart from the Army as is the Royal Air Force at the present time. The subordinates of the Board of Ordnance, both at home and abroad, who dealt with its administrative functions of supply, were civilians holding local appointments and communicating directly with the Board in London. The Master-General and Board furnished detachments of engineers and sappers and miners for service with troops on the demand of the Commander-in-Chief.

There were, in addition, other officials concerned with the Army who were independent of any of those already mentioned. There was, for instance, the Judge-Advocate-General, an officer of Parliament, who reported directly to the Crown. In course of time he became virtually an assistant to the Secretary at War. Then there was also a Surgeon-General with an establishment of his own, who provided medical personnel, and presumably medical

stores, on the requisition of the Commander-in-Chief or of the Secretary at War. Finally, there were the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital, who dealt with pensions.

The entire Administrative Services of the Army, other than the Board of Ordnance, were thus wholly under civilian control. Clearly, there was one way, and one way only, whereby such a curious system of divided control could possibly be made to work in the interests of military efficiency, and that was by the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief having under him a strong military establishment. Had there been a Commander-in-Chief, and had he had under him anything like our existing General Staff, it is quite conceivable that the various civilian departments could have been made to realize their responsibilities, especially as regards preparation for war.

But for over a century after the Revolution, there existed no department of the Commander-in-Chief, no Horse Guards as was known later, and Commanders-in-Chief were only appointed at long intervals, and then for special purposes and for limited periods. At one time three Commanders-in-Chief existed at the same time. They were in fact what we should now understand as Commanders-in-Chief of Expeditionary Forces, but as a recognized unit of the military system the Commander-in-Chief was non-existent.

The basic idea of William III.'s bargain with Parliament, of one department being a check and a control on another, was thus entirely vitiated. The only marvel is that any single campaign conducted under such a system, or rather want of system, met with any success at all. In point of fact, the only hope of success that a British Army working under such a system possibly could have, was the lucky chance of finding a Commander-in-Chief in the field of outstanding capacity and personality, who could impress his will on the various civilian departments at home and gradually build up in the field an efficient instrument for war. The two outstanding types of such commanders were of course Marlborough and Wellington.

As an illustration of the difficulties with which a commander in the field was faced, the following extract from a little work called "On Commissariat Service," written by the Commissary-in-Chief, Sir John Bisset, who served under Wellington in the Peninsula is worthy of attention. Bisset's remarks deal with a period when we had been for some fifteen years at war with France, by which time it might be supposed that the authorities at home would have realized to some extent what the needs of an army in the field implied. The

duties with which Sir John Bisset was entrusted were practically those which are now dealt with by the Royal Army Service Corps — in fact, they were even wider, as they were concerned with the whole financial transactions of the Army in the field. Sir John Bisset writes as follows :—

“ Now, at the period of Sir John Moore's first entry into Spain, when such a cry existed against the inefficiency of the British Commissariat, it must be recollected that arrangements had not yet been made in respect of the discipline of the department, and the appointments to it, with a view to furnishing a set of officers trained in some measure to the duties to be required of them ; such training could not be the work of a day ; also, that prior to this, many gentlemen got commissions in the higher ranks of the Commissariat, who had not passed through the lower gradations, or acquired any of the practice, which a regular probation would have produced. The numbers, too, were defective, and I remember perfectly that, in the absence of the Commissary-in-Chief (whose principal deputy I happened to be at the time), I was sent for by the late Mr. Perceval, then Prime Minister, because the Treasury had some doubts as to the necessity for sending out so great a number as twelve additional clerks, for whom Sir Robert Kennedy had applied, though they were immediately sanctioned on the explanations I was enabled to give of their being requisite. Had Mr. Perceval lived to the close of the war, he would have seen ten times the number borne on the return of the Peninsular Commissariat. Still the clerks, when so sanctioned, had to be sought for, and sent out with their duties to learn ; and they are not quite so easily learnt as is generally supposed, whilst for their errors or irregularities the country pays heavily.”

Confronted with such a statement as this, one is forced to agree with the late Lord Salisbury's contention that the British Constitution, as it worked out in practice, is not an instrument suited to the conduct of war, whilst one's opinion is enhanced of a man like the Duke of Wellington, who by his own personal influence fashioned a really efficient Army practically in the presence of the enemy.

Such was the state of affairs throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century it was at last realized that one of the objects kept in view by the reformers of 1688 had not been attained. It was then found, as was only natural, “ that the patronage of the Army had practically fallen into the hands of the Secretary at War, who was subject to parliamentary influences inimical to the well-being of the Army.” It was realized that the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief was essential to constitutional practice, and in 1793 Lord Amherst was appointed, to be succeeded in 1795 by the Duke of York, who held the appointment for many years. This was the beginning of the Horse Guards, as it existed down to quite recent times.

This system remained in existence practically unchanged until the Crimean War. In 1836 a Royal Commission was set up to inquire into Army administration generally, and a recommendation was made to combine the various departments of the Secretary at War, the Ordnance, the Commissariat and other branches into one office under a Secretary of State, but for various reasons the Duke of Wellington opposed the change and nothing was done.

The Crimean War was before all else an administrative disaster. The civilian departments administering the Army had learned nothing, and were unready in 1854 as they had always been in the past. The nation at last learned its lesson and determined that a change should be made, and that the change should be in the direction of militarizing the administration of the Army. From the time of the Crimean War this process of militarizing Army administration has been steadily but slowly proceeding.

By the year 1890, the process of amalgamation which was discussed by the Commission of 1836 was practically complete. The Commander-in-Chief, with the old Horse Guards establishment, was located in Pall Mall, as well as the various departments administering the Army. The Army Service Corps had absorbed most of the functions formerly carried out by the Commissariat Branch of the Treasury, and the Army Ordnance Corps, with the Director of Artillery's Branch, performed the supply duties of the old Board of Ordnance.

But there were still many traces of the past. There was a pretty wide gulf between what was called the military side of the office, representing the old Horse Guards, and the civil side, which stood for the old Secretary at War's office. The Duke of Cambridge always entered by one door, where there was a Guards sentry, and the Secretary of State and the chief civilian officials by another door. The military side had a red cameo on their note-paper and the civil side a blue cameo. The Artillery and the Engineers each had a considerable office of their own under their own D.A.G., and there was an important officer called the Inspector-General of Fortifications and Works, with his office and staff at the Horse Guards.

At this period, with the exception of senior officers at the head of departments, the establishment was almost entirely civilian. It was only during the nineties that military officers began to take their place at the head of sections, even in the A.G.'s department. In 1890, the office of the Director of Military Intelligence in Queen Anne's Gate, and the small Mobilization Section which, at the

instance of Sir Henry Brackenbury, was constituted a year previously, were the only purely military branches.

The really important thing to note, however, in connection with the militarization of the Administration was the effect it was having on the Army itself.

No one who remembers the state of affairs in the eighties and nineties of the last century will deny that Military Science and Military Training were at that time at a very low ebb. The Staff College was, it is true, doing excellent work under men like Generals Clery and Hildyard, and Colonels Maurice and Henderson, work which was to produce most valuable results in years to come.

At Aldershot, too, Sir Evelyn Wood was making strenuous efforts to level up the training of the units in his Command.

But, speaking generally, both at the War Office and in the Commands, training and military education played quite a secondary part to administration and routine duties. Both generals and staff officers were judged much more by their capacity for office work than for their field aptitude.

It is impossible to emphasize too strongly the importance of studying closely this particular phase of our Army's history, because the state of affairs then existing was due directly to the virtual disappearance of all distinction between Command and Administration.

Further, the same thing is bound to recur, if ever again the line of demarcation between these functions is obliterated. Once you put them both in the same channel, so to say, only one will in peace time ultimately emerge.

Command and all it stands for—the higher training and education of the troops, plans of campaign, scientific organization and preparation for war—in a word, Military Art and Military Science—must wilt and wither in an atmosphere charged with administration. They are delicate plants which need a *milieu* of their own.

Prior to 1899 the Army was in a state of mental and spiritual lethargy, and it required war experience like that obtained in South Africa to shake it out of that condition. In the light of 1914, Paul Kruger was the best friend the British Army ever had.

The renaissance might have come in any case, but it would have taken a long time ; and without the South African War we should certainly never have been where we stood in 1914 or where we stand to-day. In fact, it is doubtful whether under the guidance of a generation of officers who had grown up almost wholly under administrative influences any real improvement would have been

possible, had not the Army been subjected, between 1899 and 1902, to the acid test of war.

The South African War was quite as important a landmark in our progress as was the Crimean, but for different reasons. Should any reader of this article wish to pursue this matter more closely, he should read Section IV. of Part II. of the Esher Committee's Report, where the need for a General Staff is argued. That Committee in 1904 gathered up the lessons of the South African War and applied them logically to our Army system.

In its report occurs the following sentence :—

“ The principle of the division of training from administration, which we have sought to apply throughout our scheme, appears to us to be fundamental.”

The principle laid down by the Committee is indeed fundamental. It is, in fact, the old principle of the separation of command from administration first evolved in 1688, a principle, which, as has already been explained, has been adopted and developed in practically every modern army.

Thanks to the Esher Committee, we now have a General Staff which stands for all that is implied in the higher leading of an Army, and may the day never come when that Staff will neglect its vastly important rôle in an attempt to grasp at functions which properly belong to the Administrator. Should it ever do so, it may continue to be called a General Staff, but its fate will surely be that of our Army staff in the days before the South African War.

One question—a question of vital importance—now remains to be answered, and that is : Have we at present an effective Military Administration ? Before attempting to answer this question, there are one or two other questions which should be considered : Are we applying to-day the principle which Lord Palmerston laid down as fundamental ? Is power vested where there is responsibility, or is responsibility imposed where authority does not exist ? Or again : Are our General Staff and our existing Military Administration a sufficient check and counter-check on one another, to ensure that efficiency is not impaired by undue economy, and that efficiency is obtained without unnecessary expenditure ?

Such questions, again, lead to another : What is an Administrator and what is his responsibility ?

An Administrator's responsibility rests first and foremost on financial considerations. He is agent and trustee for moneys entrusted to him by the State, and he is bound to think in terms of

money all the time. Unless he does so, his administrative responsibility is a farce, and an irresponsible Administrator is a positive danger.

The State's money is estimated for and granted in Votes, and real administrative responsibility is, therefore, defined in terms of Votes or parts of Votes.

The position of an Administrator, if he has such responsibility imposed on him, is unassailable. Assuming that he knows his work, he is bound to be an effective check and control, both in gross and in detail, on waste and extravagance. Periodically he is called on to give an account of his stewardship, and by the results of his work he should be judged.

In one respect the pre-Crimean system certainly fulfilled Lord Palmerston's requirements. Power, responsibility and authority went hand in hand.

The Secretary at War, the Master-General of the Ordnance and the Commissary-in-Chief were answerable for their actions directly to Parliament, and their subordinate agents at home and abroad were financially responsible to them for their actions. But the same thing can hardly be said of the heads of the Military Departments which now carry on the duties formerly performed by those high officials.

It is not many years since the Esher Committee remarked of the system then obtaining that: "It is based upon the assumption that all military officers are necessarily spendthrifts, and that their actions must be controlled in gross and in detail by civilians."

The system so described has, since 1904, been modified to some extent, and it will be further affected to an incalculable extent by the introduction of cost accounting into the Army, but no one pretends that even to-day the military Administrator is vested with power commensurate with his responsibility.

The main purpose of this article has been to try and elucidate the facts which explain this anomaly. According to the Esher Committee the present system "has its origin in a distant past," and the writer has attempted to make this past plain to the reader.

It may be that the unwillingness to trust the soldier in his capacity as an Administrator is due primarily to the innate suspicion of a Standing Army dating from Cromwell's time, and that, perhaps unconsciously, the nation is in this way still wreaking its vengeance on the soldier.

If this be the cause, may we not hope that the events of the past six years will once and for all close the breach between the Army and

the nation, which in the past has proved so serious a bar to military efficiency and has been the direct cause of untold loss in lives and treasure ?

May we not now expect the nation to give the Army—Regulars, Militia and Territorials alike—a sporting chance of working out its own salvation ? Once the nation grasps the facts of the situation, there is little doubt but that it will readily respond.

But there is one other aspect of this problem, the purely economic and personal point of view which cannot be ignored. Parliament will never consent, and rightly so, to entrust vast sums to soldiers to handle and administer until it is satisfied as to their business capacity. In this connection it is worth while mentioning the views of one of the highest Treasury officials who was asked to state his objections to entrusting soldiers with financial powers.

In effect he said :—

“ Our objection to doing so is that the Army does not and will not take administration seriously. Admittedly there are many noteworthy exceptions, but too often the military view is that an officer becomes fit for administrative work only when on account of age, or for some other reason, he is no longer considered fit for command. Men who have had no sort of administrative training or experience, and who admittedly have no aptitude for administrative work, are often, towards the close of their career, selected for administrative appointments which we, in the Treasury, regard as being of first importance. So long as such a state of affairs exists, can we be expected to repose implicit trust in the soldier Administrator or vest him with large financial powers ? ”

These remarks were made many years ago, and much that has happened during recent years should have removed the objections, admittedly serious objections, then raised to giving the soldier Administrator financial power commensurate with his responsibility.

The School of Military Administration which has recently been established at Chiseldon, in Wiltshire, should meet an undoubted need where administration is concerned. Hitherto, the officers of the Army, and especially regimental officers, have had little opportunity afforded them of studying the science and the theory of business methods. Even administrative practice is largely denied them, as such practice is apt to be regarded as a mystery which can be comprehended by, and which concerns, the regimental quartermaster alone.

The teaching of a school is bound to prove barren of results unless its students are, at various stages of their career, afforded ample opportunity of practising what they have learned in theory,

and it is unquestionably in the unit that such practice should be begun.

The late Sir Redvers Buller was wont to attribute his success in life as an administrator to the fact that, early in his career, he acted for many months in China as quartermaster of his battalion. But how many officers, outside the Indian Army, ever have had, or in present circumstances are likely to have, such an opportunity of being brought, early in life, into close touch with the actual facts of regimental administration?

The existence of an administrative school will not, in itself, solve the problem of administrative education in the Army. If it is to succeed, its students must be placed in a position, not only on the staff but also in regimental units, where they can ensure that the doctrines of the school are fully understood and developed. In musketry and in other branches of military science a close connection between the school and regimental training is rightly observed and maintained and, assuming that the same principle is applied in the domain of administration, there is good reason to hope that the reproaches levelled in the past against the soldier Administrator will in the near future have lost all significance.

Given conditions favourable to the growth of its doctrines, the new school at Chiseldon should, in course of time, be the means of developing throughout the Army such a knowledge of business principles and practice, that the nation will in future have good reason to regard with confidence and pride the military administration of its Army.

A SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF VITTORIO VENETO

(With Map)

BY MAJOR-GENERAL THE HONBLE J. F. GATHORNE-HARDY, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O.

PREVIOUS to the battle of Caporetto the general public in England took little interest in events in Italy. The efforts of the Italian Army undoubtedly deserved fuller recognition, and the neglect of their Allies to appreciate their services led to some heartburning amongst the Italian people.

Italy's alliance with the Central Powers was defensive, and, in August, 1914, convinced of the aggressive intentions of Germany, she firmly refused to enter the war on the side of the Triple Alliance. In May, 1915, when Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente, she must have anticipated a long and arduous campaign. Though the German invasion had failed to overwhelm the Anglo-French Armies on the Western Front, most of Belgium and a large portion of northern France were in the hands of the enemy. Russia had moved slowly and was on the eve of a great defeat. Trench warfare was an established fact. The future was pregnant with possibilities, but Italy allowed nothing to stand in the way of whole-hearted co-operation with her new Allies.

Her geographical frontier could scarcely have been less suited for an offensive campaign. North and north-east, endless mountain ranges stretched far into the enemy's territory, placing a rapid decision outside the range of possibility. Under such conditions offensive operations could only be carried out with the greatest difficulty.

Unsuited as were the frontiers for offensive action from the Italian point of view, the situation was, to a great extent, reversed as regards her enemies. East of Udine the boundary line between Italy and Austria lay at the foot of the mountains. An advance from the west became at once entangled in the Julian Alps or the Carso Plateau. An advance from the east debouched on to the Friulian plains, the richest province in Italy. North of Verona, the long

tongue of the Trentino Valley brought the Austrian frontier to within twenty miles of positions vital to Italian security. This valley formed a covered approach, in which an attack might secretly be prepared. The possibilities open to such attack were only limited by the carrying capacity of the Trentino railway. A study of the map of northern Italy will at once show the danger to which an army operating on the Isonzo would be exposed, should a hostile army reach the plains in the neighbourhood of Vicenza or Verona.

Many critics have considered that a wider defensive zone, on the northern front, was an essential preliminary to the Italian operations against Trieste: that Cadorna should have gained control of the Val Sugana before he embarked on the eastern offensive. The anxieties and dangers to which Italy was exposed by the success of the Austrian offensive of 1916 on the Asiago Plateau gives considerable support to these contentions.

The Supreme Command decided otherwise, and, in the opening phase of the campaign, concentrated the main Italian forces behind the Isonzo. Presumably it was considered that the geographical difficulties of the Isonzo and the Carso Plateau were not as serious as those of the Trentino, and that a vigorous and sustained offensive towards Trieste would form the best defence of the northern front.

Once having decided on a plan, the scheme adopted was carried out with all the energy and determination which the resources of the Italians would allow.

Those who have not studied Italy can hardly realize what an all-important part this question of resources played. Her recent campaign against the Turks had seriously depleted her reserves. She possessed no mineral wealth; not one ton of iron, coal or steel is produced within her frontiers. Either the material for manufacture, or the finished article, has to be imported from abroad. In the early days of the war few of her Allies had much material to spare. Later, with the intensification of the submarine campaign, the problem of transport became increasingly difficult. By energetic management and careful organization Italy, to a great extent, overcame these difficulties, though, up to the very end of the campaign, the question of ammunition reserves caused constant anxieties and delays.

From the spring of 1915 to the summer of 1917 no less than eleven separate offensive operations on a large scale were undertaken on the Isonzo front. The casualty lists prove that these offensives were no half-hearted efforts.

A twelfth offensive was already in course of preparation when

Cadorna received information of the arrival of German divisions on the Italian front. The proposed offensive was postponed and dispositions made to meet the anticipated attack.

On the 24th of October, 1917, the Austro-German offensive was launched, and the subsequent battle became known to the world as the battle of Caporetto. Without going into the causes of the failure of the Italian defence, it is sufficient to remember that the Central Powers gained an unexpected and overwhelming success. One Italian Army was wiped out of existence and others lost heavily both in men and material.

Allied reinforcements were hurried across the Alps from France, but, before a single man of these reinforcements had entered the firing-line, the unaided efforts of the Italian Armies had succeeded in stemming the Austro-German advance on the line of the Piave.

The railway communications between France and Italy were not sufficient for the rapid transport of large forces. The difficulties met with in moving the required reinforcements demonstrated the folly of the Entente in not improving these communications the moment Italy entered the war.

The Italian people were stunned by the disaster of Caporetto, but they rapidly recovered from the first shock. Failure increased the determination, not only of the war party, but also of the pacifists, to fight on to victory. On this point Italy became completely united. General Diaz succeeded General Cadorna in the chief command, and at once set to work to reorganize his forces and replace his lost material.

During the winter of 1917-18 a new offensive programme was planned and preparations begun. General Diaz was convinced of the necessity of more elbow-room on his northern front and decided on the Asiago Plateau for his initial effort.

Early in 1918 it became clear that the main German effort of the spring was to be made in France. At the beginning of March two of the British and three of the French divisions in Italy were withdrawn, and, on the 10th of March, Sir Herbert Plumer handed over the command of the British forces in Italy to Lord Cavan.

On the 29th of March the British divisions on the Piave took over a portion of the mountain sector. In the proposed operation the capture of Asiago itself was allotted to the forces under Lord Cavan.

Orders were received that all preparations for the offensive were to be completed by the end of May. Before a definite date for the attack had been decided on, it became evident that the Austrians were also making preparations for a fresh effort. The increase of wireless

activity, the formation of new and the expansion of existing dumps, as well as information extracted from prisoners and spies, indicated an attack on a broad front. Not the least interesting feature of campaigning in Italy was the certainty with which information of the enemy's intentions could be obtained. The diversity of nationalities of which the Austrian Army was composed resulted in a constant stream of deserters. At no period did the stream flow as freely as immediately prior to an offensive. Shortly before the offensive of June, 1918, three Austrian officers entered the British lines, accompanied by their servants carrying their portmanteaus. Further and detailed information was always available through the British listening sets. Experience had in no way restricted the enemy in the use of his field telephones. From the latter source alone, the most minute details of the coming bombardment and assault were in the hands of the Italian Command previous to the attack of the 15th of June.

By the first week in June the Italian Supreme Command was called upon to decide whether to anticipate the Austrian offensive by at once developing its own offensive, or to await the enemy on the defensive. The latter policy was adopted. Many of the guns, which were already in position overlooking Asiago, were withdrawn into reserve or placed in new positions on the Piave front. The offensive was, for the moment, abandoned.

On the 15th of June the Austrians opened their attack from south of Treviso to west of Asiago. In spite of the detailed information previously received, the attack met with considerable initial success. On the Asiago Plateau the British front was pierced in the neighbourhood of Cesuna. Several anxious hours were spent before this line was finally restored. On the Piave the attack gained ground on a wide front, especially on the Montello. Energetic measures were taken to meet the situation, but many days passed before the enemy was finally forced to withdraw across the Piave. As a result of prolonged and heavy fighting, the Austrians eventually suffered a complete and decisive defeat. The losses on both sides, especially on that of the attack, were heavy. The inroads made into the Italian reserves, both of men and ammunition, were considerable.

Questions have frequently been asked about the passive attitude adopted by the Italians in 1918, both before and after the battle of the Piave. Subsequent events suggest that Austria might have been brought to her knees at an earlier date, but it is easy to be wise after the event. To support the Italian attitude it can reasonably be urged that the Austrian forces showed no clear signs of demoralization

either before or during their June offensive. Further, the Italian Command possessed no definite superiority either in men or guns. Finally, faced with an apparently similar situation on the French front, the Supreme War Council had decided on a defensive policy for 1918. On the other hand, subsequent to the defeat on the Piave, the Austrian moral began seriously to deteriorate. This fact was evident both from information received through the intelligence department and as a result of a series of raids carried out by the British forces on the Asiago Plateau. It is beyond dispute that the British Command was firmly convinced that a decisive victory might have been gained at any moment after the beginning of July.

Subsequent to the Austrian defeat on the Piave, preparations for the original offensive in the mountain sector were renewed, but time passed and no definite orders for an attack were issued. With the advent of September it appeared reasonable to suppose that no big offensive operations would be undertaken in Italy during 1918.

Owing to the exhaustion of the troops at his disposal, Sir Douglas Haig was meeting with some difficulties in the vigorous prosecution of his offensive. General Diaz was approached with a view to exchanging the three British divisions in Italy for three tired divisions from France. To this proposal the Italian Commander-in-Chief offered no decided objection. As a preliminary step, the three British divisions in Italy were reduced from thirteen battalions to ten, and the nine battalions thus rendered available were moved to France on the 13th and 14th of September. At the same time the 7th and 23rd British Divisions were brought into reserve to rest, with a view to their transfer to France in due course. Luckily at the moment there was no rolling-stock available for their transport. At the end of September Lord Cavan, the British Commander-in-Chief in Italy, proceeded home on leave.

Meanwhile, the Italian Supreme Command had been considering and preparing a more ambitious offensive, to be launched in an unexpected direction when they considered the general situation justified it. The collapse of the Central Powers on the Bulgarian front, the successes of Sir William Allenby in Palestine, as well as the victories of the Allied Armies in France, now made it essential to forbid the transfer of Austrian divisions in Italy to other theatres of war.

General Diaz had throughout expressed his determination to prevent such transfer at any cost. His plans were ready and his secret had been well kept.

Hardly had the Commander-in-Chief landed in England than he

was recalled by telegram. On the 6th of October Lord Cavan proceeded to Italian Headquarters, where General Diaz explained to him his general intentions and, at the same time, offered him the command of a mixed Anglo-Italian Army, to be called the Tenth Army, which was destined to take a prominent part in the proposed offensive.

As already stated, the 7th and 23rd Divisions were at rest in the plains, while the 48th Division was still holding a sector on the Asiago Plateau. General Diaz laid the greatest stress on secrecy, and, when attaching the 7th and 23rd Divisions to the new Tenth Army, urged that the 48th Division should not be withdrawn from the line, but should remain in position and be attached to the XII. Italian Corps, commanded by General Penella. To this request Lord Cavan readily assented.

The defence of the Venetian plains lay in the hands of the Fifth and Sixth Austrian Armies, their point of junction being opposite the eastern end of the Montello. The main line of supply of the Sixth Army ran down the Valmarino valley. The intentions of the Italian Commander were to distract the attention of the defence from the real point of attack by a violent offensive carried out by the Fourth Italian Army in the Grappa sector ; to drive the Fifth Austrian Army eastward by the advance of the Tenth Italian Army from the neighbourhood of Treviso ; and to force the Sixth Austrian Army northward by the attack of the Eighth and Tenth Italian Armies from the Montello. In this plan the Eighth Army was directed on Vittorio Veneto, which town gave the subsequent victory its name.

At the beginning of October there were still approximately sixty-three Austrian divisions in Italy, of which thirty-nine were in the front line and twenty-four in reserve. General Diaz could count on fifth-eight divisions. The Austrians had a slight superiority in men, the Italians in guns.

The point at which the Tenth Army was to cross the Piave was just east of Maserada. The task was not easy. At this point the river was one and a half miles broad and intersected by islands. Immediately opposite the point selected for crossing was Grave di Papadopoli, an island three miles long and one mile broad, held by the enemy as an advanced post. The current of the river, at all times rapid, reaches a velocity of as much as ten miles an hour in times of flood. Such floods not only make bridging a matter of the greatest difficulty, but frequently completely alter the course of the river. Previous reconnaissance, therefore, may prove exceedingly misleading. The country on both sides of the river is flat and closely

intersected with vineyards. Aeroplane observation was the only possible method of directing artillery fire, and it was clear that, should the attack succeed, artillery support could only be provided by bringing field guns up close behind the infantry. This was eventually done.

On the 21st of October the XIV. British Corps, consisting of the 7th and 23rd Divisions, took over its new battle front. The XI. Italian Corps (the other Corps allotted to the Tenth Army), consisting of the 23rd and 37th Divisions, was already on the Piave.

To maintain the secrecy, on which General Diaz had laid such stress, all British units visible to Austrian observation posts were dressed in Italian uniforms. Further, no British gun on this portion of the front opened fire previous to the commencement of the general bombardment on the night of the 26th–27th of October. The necessary registration was carried out with complete accuracy by the Field Survey Company, R.E. British guns covering the 48th Division increased their activity.

It is now known that, up to the end of September, the Austrians had been expecting an attack in the mountains. Early in October they received information of preparations on the Piave. In mid-October they moved a portion of their Trentino reserve into the plains.

On the front of the Tenth Army the XI. Italian Corps was allotted the sector from the Treviso—Oderzo railway to Salettuol, the XIV. British Corps from that point to Palazzon.

On the 21st of October the Piave was in full flood and reconnaissance of the river bed was out of the question. Possibly the sight of the foaming torrent gave an exaggerated idea of the difficulties of the coming operation.

Reconnaissance soon convinced those concerned that to cross the channels west of the Grave di Papadopoli, to capture the island itself, and finally to cross the eastern channels, would be an operation which could not be successfully accomplished in one night. Both Lord Cavan and Sir James Babington, commanding the XIV. Corps, were of opinion that, even should the preparatory action disclose the presence of British troops, it was essential to occupy the Grave previous to the main attack. The attack of the Fourth Army on the Grappa was timed to begin on the morning of the 24th of October, and the crossing of the Piave on the night of the 24th–25th of October.

On the night of the 23rd–24th, in spite of the flood, the 2/1st Battalion of the Honourable Artillery Company and the 1st Battalion

of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, both of the 7th Division, were ferried across the western channel. The point selected for this crossing was near the northern end of the Grave di Papadopoli, where a smaller island, called Lido, offered some assistance to the operation. The garrison, which consisted of the 7th Austrian Division, was surprised, and the northern half of the island occupied. A simultaneous attack was made against the southern end of the island by troops of the XI. Italian Corps. This attack secured the island of Caserta, half-way between the mainland and the Grave, but, owing to heavy machine-gun fire, failed to secure a footing on the Grave itself.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the success gained by the 7th Division in the face of the greatest difficulties. The crossing was made in small boats in a current running at racing pace. Unsuspected shoals upset many of the boats and necessitated the transhipment and portage of more. The crews were Italians, few of whom understood the language of the soldiers they were carrying. A thick mist increased the inherent difficulties associated with night operations, though, on the other hand, it facilitated surprise. Failure would have been no disgrace.

The success achieved was largely the result of careful arrangements made by Brigadier-General J. McC. Steele, commanding the 22nd Infantry Brigade, the intrepid leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel R. N. O'Connor, commanding the H.A.C., and the energy of Captain Odini, of the Italian Engineers, who had the boats under his charge.

The task of capturing the island was still only half completed, but now the weather intervened in favour of the Tenth Army, disappointing as was the change to the Italian Supreme Command. Heavy rains fell on the 24th, causing a considerable rise in the level of the Piave. General Diaz reluctantly postponed the operations fixed for the night of the 24th-25th until the night of the 26th-27th.

On the night of the 25th-26th, the capture of the island was completed by a combined offensive of the 7th British Division from the north and the 37th Italian Division from the south.

A secure jumping-off place had now been obtained, and bridging operations could be commenced. The main operation which had been awaited with some anxiety, was, from this moment, anticipated with complete confidence.

At 9.30 a.m., on the 26th of October, the Austrians made a determined attempt to recover possession of the Grave. An attack in force was launched at the point of junction of the two Divisions. This attack was repulsed and two hundred prisoners captured.

A thick fog, on the 26th, permitted bridging operations to be carried on in daylight. As a first step, bridges for wheeled traffic were commenced at Caserta and Salettuo, and a footbridge at Lido. The Salettuo bridge was completed before dark.

At dawn on the 24th, the anniversary of Caporetto, the Fourth Italian Army attacked on Grappa, as arranged. The enemy offered a determined resistance. Both on the 25th and 26th the Fourth Army renewed its efforts. In these attacks the Fourth Army suffered extremely serious losses and gained little ground, but, in spite of a tactical failure, gained a strategical success. Before the operations on the Piave had commenced, two Austrian reserve divisions and portions of a third were brought into line to resist the onslaught of the Fourth Army. Another division was moved from Belluno westward in reserve.

At 11.30 p.m., on the 26th of October, a concentrated bombardment was begun on the Austrian positions on the east bank of the Piave.

The decisive moment had arrived.

Under cover of this bombardment the Tenth Army deployed for attack, the XI. Italian Corps on the right and the XIV. British Corps on the left. Each Corps attacked with its two divisions in line. The 23rd Division was on the right and the 37th Division on the left of the XI. Corps. In the XIV. Corps, the 7th Division was on the right and the 23rd Division on the left.

The infantry attack was launched at 6.45 a.m. on the 27th of October.

The eastern channels of the Piave, though a serious obstacle, presented less difficulties than the western ones. The infantry found it possible to cross these channels without boats or bridges. Unfortunately, before the opposite bank was reached, a number of brave men were swept away by the force of the current and drowned.

The enemy had established his main line of resistance on the bank of the river, and heavy fighting took place before this position was captured. The 22nd Battalion Manchester Regiment and the 11th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers were both obliged to cut the wire under close machine-gun fire, but successfully accomplished their difficult task.

Information of the success of the XIV. Corps reached Army Headquarters at an early hour. On the other hand, the first reports suggested that the XI. Corps had found the defences of the river line too strong for it.

The Supreme Command had placed reserve corps in close support

of each attacking Army, ready to exploit success wherever it might be gained. The XVIII. Corps was in the neighbourhood of Treviso. Immediately the news of the check of the XI. Corps was received, the 56th Division of the XVIII. Corps was allotted to the Tenth Army. It was intended that this Division should cover the flank of the XIV. Corps should the XI. Corps fail to gain ground. By 9.30 a.m. Army Headquarters was satisfied that the XIV. Corps was advancing rapidly and up to time on the objectives assigned to it. By this hour it was also clear that the XI. Corps had overcome the resistance which had originally checked its advance and was making up the ground which it had lost.

The Tenth Army had already achieved a considerable success.

Reports from the Montello group were not by any means so satisfactory.

In the neighbourhood of Nervesa the right Corps of the Eighth Army had failed in its crossing. At Fontigo, the centre Corps had crossed with a portion of its forces, but had not gained sufficient ground to free the bridging operations from destructive and observed artillery fire. The left Corps had also failed in its crossing.

The Twelfth Army had effected a crossing in the neighbourhood of Valdobbiadene, but here again little ground had been gained and bridging operations were impossible.

The situation was critical. It was essentially a position in which rapid decision was necessary. General Diaz was equal to the occasion.

The success of the Tenth Army had opened the door to a great victory, provided troops were available to keep that door open. Before midday, on the 27th, the remainder of the XVIII. Corps was allotted to the Tenth Army, and by 1.30 p.m. this Corps had received written orders for the operations of the 28th.

The general idea for the 28th was to continue the attack eastward and north-eastward with the XI. Italian and XIV. British Corps; to deploy the XVIII. Italian Corps in rear of the XIV. Corps, and to operate northward with the former towards Conegliano. A successful advance of the XVIII. Corps would, it was anticipated, clear the front of the Eighth Army and allow it to continue its operations. Meanwhile, the Eighth and Twelfth Armies were to press their original attacks.

By nightfall, on the 27th, the Tenth Army was established on the line Stabiuzzo—S. Polo di Piave—Tezze—Bgo Malanotte—C. Tonon. The bridgehead was nearly five miles broad and two and a half miles deep. Great numbers of both prisoners and guns had been taken.

The success of the operations of the 28th depended largely upon the security of the bridges thrown across the river. These were a constant source of anxiety and were frequently damaged by the force of the current, by gun-fire and by attack from the air.

Heavy calls were to be made on these bridges during the night of the 27th-28th. Not only had the reserve troops, some of the guns and all the necessary supplies of the XI. and XIV. Corps to cross by them, but the Commander of the XVIII. Corps wished to move the whole of the infantry of his two divisions to the eastern bank before daylight.

Crossing by the bridge at Salettuoal was continually interrupted. As a result, most of the troops of the XVIII. Corps had to use the Lido footbridge. When daylight broke less than two brigades, instead of two complete divisions, of the XVIII. Corps were on the far bank of the Piave. Luckily, in General Basso, the Corps possessed a determined and far-seeing Commander. The Como and Bisagno Brigades were ordered to the attack without waiting for the supports with which it had been intended to provide them. This attack was launched at 9 a.m., under a close barrage of British guns, and complete success justified the audacity of the decision.

The remainder of the Tenth Army renewed its attack at noon on the 28th. The resistance was far less than that met with on the 27th, and, when darkness fell, the Army had reached the line Roncadelle—Ormelle—Tempio—Rai—Vazzola—S. Lucia di Piave—Barco.

The operations of the 28th achieved the results which General Diaz had confidently anticipated. During the night of the 28th-29th the Eighth Army crossed the Piave at Nervesa, and, on the 29th, both the Eighth and Twelfth Armies made important advances. From this moment a great and decisive victory was assured.

On the 29th, the resistance of the Austrians visibly weakened. Dense columns of all arms moving north and east on the Conegliano—Vittorio and the Conegliano—Sacile roads, as well as numerous fires in the back areas, suggested that the enemy had begun a general retreat. By the evening of the 29th, the Tenth Army had reached the line of the Monticano river between Fontanelle and Ramera. Acting in advance of the infantry, the British mounted troops had been able to seize a bridge over the Monticano, north-east of Vazzola, before it could be destroyed. On the 30th, the capture of this bridge proved of considerable importance, for the demand for bridging material had by now far outrun the supply.

On the 29th, the Third Army, operating south of the Tenth Army,

forced the passage of the Piave from the sea up to the point of junction with the Tenth Army.

On the night of the 29th-30th, a raid was carried out by the 48th British Division against the trenches covering Asiago. As a result, it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated his front line system and had retired to a strong position behind Asiago; the victory in the plains was beginning to react in the mountains.

On the 30th, the Austrian rearguards fought a vigorous action on the line of the Monticano. The village of Cimetta changed hands three times before it remained finally in the hands of the XIV. Corps. The fighting on this day was far more severe than that of either the 28th or 29th. The enemy's defence of the Monticano was intended to cover the retirement of his main forces and fresh reserves were brought into line to secure it. Once the river was crossed, however, the Austrian resistance broke down and the operations developed into a triumphal procession, delayed only by the repair of broken bridges.

From now onward the question resolved itself into one of collecting and counting the number of captured prisoners and guns. Nothing of vital interest is to be gained by following further the operations in detail.


On the 31st, the Austrians in the mountain sector, who had already shown signs of yielding, broke completely.

When the Armistice came into force at 3 p.m. on the 4th of November, the Tenth Army had reached and crossed the Tagliamento, while the 48th Division was on the outskirts of Trent.

It is doubtful whether in any theatre during the Great War the Royal Air Force obtained such targets as those which were offered to them in Italy on the 29th and 30th of October. It is certain that they took full advantage of the opportunities presented to them. On these two days the Conegliano-Pordonone road was black with columns of all arms hurrying eastward. On to these the few British squadrons poured 30,000 rounds of S.A.A. and $3\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bombs from low altitudes. Subsequent examination of the road almost forced the observer to the conclusion that this form of warfare should be forbidden in the future.

Sufficient time has now elapsed to enable us not only to realize the magnitude of the victory gained, but also to appreciate the Austrian attitude towards the final Italian offensive.

To deal with the latter first. We have now in our possession ample evidence to prove that the Austrians were anxiously seeking an armistice previous to the 27th of October, and that they were



hoping to arrange this armistice before the Italian offensive developed. The evacuation of surplus stores in the back areas had already begun. The evidence shows that they were prepared to retire, if necessary, behind their old frontiers, but the very essence of their plan was that they should retire with an unbeaten Army. The first overtures came to nothing and they faced the Italian offensive with confidence in the strength of their defences.

Events of the 28th, however, convinced the Austrian High Command that this confidence in the strength of its positions had been misplaced and made it realize that its defence was tottering. It decided, therefore, to carry out a general retirement. Even at that date it hoped to be able to bring away its Armies intact. Fresh divisions were told off to act as rearguards, and particular stress was laid on the defence of the Monticano.

The mentality of the Austrian leaders is clearly shown in a document, copies of which were issued on the evening of the 28th and widely distributed among the troops. This document, after explaining that an armistice would shortly be concluded, contained the following words: "If the front does not remain firm, it is doubtful whether the Entente will negotiate. They would then occupy Trieste and Trent and dictate the peace. It would be an unparalleled disgrace if the Italians were allowed to conquer."

In spite of their utmost efforts the front was broken and the Austrians were forced to suffer the "unparalleled disgrace" which they were struggling to avoid.

The victory gained was one of the most decisive in the whole history of war.

The early days held out small hopes of such a surprising success. The attacks of the 24th, 25th and 26th of October were tactical failures, that of the 27th only a partial success. Yet, in twelve days, without any numerical superiority on the side of the attackers, the Austrian Army had ceased to exist.

One-third of the Austrian infantry, and practically the whole of the artillery, was in the hands of their hereditary enemy. The remainder was fleeing, a demoralized rabble.

The three British Divisions engaged captured over 50,000 prisoners and 700 guns.

A CORPS IN THE MAKING

THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1914-1919

With Sketch showing the Approximate Positions of the Canadians
from February, 1915, to the 11th of November, 1918

BY MAJOR SIR CHARLES PIERS, BART., Late 29th (Vancouver)
Battalion, C.E.F.

THE outbreak of the war found Canada as unprepared as any part of the British Empire. The Dominion, still young, was engaged in the task of self-development ; and with 2400 miles of sea between her shores and the Old World, did not take the same vital interest in European politics that she now does as a participant in their events.

However, the spirit of the race which the Germans overlooked was there ; so—although the strength of her Permanent Force was only 3000 men—still backed by an effective Militia, it formed the nucleus on which a Corps was successfully maintained in the field from September, 1915, to May, 1919.

As an appreciation of this spirit, the statement made in the autumn of 1918, by one of the leading English daily newspapers is instructive :—

“ Canada entered the war with a Regular Army of 3,000 men. At the beginning of last month (September, 1918) it had sent 390,000 soldiers overseas and 60,000 were in training. Canada has had 43,000 killed, 113,007 wounded and sick, 2,224 prisoners and 384 missing. Of the wounded some 40,000 have been returned to the front, and 50,000 have been sent to Canada. Of 10,000 decorated 30 have the Victoria Cross.”

In the first days of the war when the issue, so far as Great Britain's participation was concerned, lay in the balance, the people of the West watched with anxiety the trend of diplomatic events. The righteousness of the cause in their eyes was never for one moment in doubt ; and men openly expressed the opinion that we

should be lastingly condemned if we did not redeem our pledges. So, when the issue was at last decided and Great Britain elected to stand by France and Belgium, the men of the Dominion, with almost a sigh of relief, made their offer of help to the Mother Country and then turned to the preparation for war.

With such a spirit there was no lack of men to bring the Militia regiments up to strength, and then to fill them again as reserves for the Division which it was proposed to send to Europe as soon as it could be mobilized. In the organization of the forces great credit is due to the late Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia, for his foresight and grasp of the magnitude of events.

The units for the Division, destined to become the famous 1st Canadian Division, were collected from all parts of the Dominion and assembled at the camp of Valcartier near Quebec.

There the task of mobilization, so far as possible, was completed. The unfit were weeded out; different Militia regiments were grouped and formed into Service battalions; and from these three brigades, each with a strength of four battalions, were formed; the infantry was put through a course of musketry and given such field training as could be given on the spot.

The 1st Division of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 33,000 strong, embarked at Quebec at the end of September, and, when all the transports were collected, sailed on the 2nd of October from Gaspé Bay under naval escort. The voyage was slow but uneventful, and on the 14th of October the Division landed at Plymouth and proceeded to Salisbury Plain to complete its training in weather conditions little different from those prevailing in the trenches in Flanders.

In February, 1915, after refitting, the Division, under the command of Major-General Alderson of the Imperial Army, embarked for France and landed on the 9th of that month at St. Nazaire, where it entrained for the British front. It went into the trenches at Ploegsteert for training about the 14th of the same month, and from there moved down to Fleurbaix, where it remained until about the end of the month when it went north into the Ypres area.

Here, on the 21st of April, the Canadians took part in the second battle of Ypres, and received not only their "baptism of fire," but also their first dose of gas, on that memorable occasion when the Germans first sprang this new horror on the Allies. The Division stood the test, showing by its magnificent conduct the sterling worth of its citizen soldiers and laying the foundation of its future reputation as a fine fighting division under conditions which were more than

enough to try the endurance and courage of the most hardened veterans.

This fine spirit it maintained at Festubert on the 15th of May, and at Givenchy on the 3rd of June. The Division then returned north and was holding the Ploegsteert sector, with headquarters at Nieppe, when at the end of September it was joined by the 2nd Canadian Division on its arrival from England.

The call in Canada for men to form a second division was started as soon as the first Division was assembled at Valcartier, and was so well answered that by the 1st of November, 1914, the officers and men for battalions and other units were assembling at the places appointed for their preliminary training.

In this case, owing to the severity of the Eastern winter, it was not possible to use the camp at Valcartier as a place of training ; but each unit had to work out its own being at its home place of assembly with the assistance of whatever trained officers and men were available, and the occasional supervision of a staff instructor of the Permanent Force.

When the units were considered sufficiently trained, the infantry having been put through a course of musketry, wherever possible, in their own districts, they were dispatched to England, in many cases separately as units ; for these Service battalions averaged about 1100 men, and were composed of the same stamp as the "First Hundred Thousand" raised by the Mother Country.

By the end of May, 1915, the units of the 2nd Division had mostly landed in England. There they were assembled at and around Shorncliffe, where they were steadily trained, the infantry being put through a special course of musketry at Lydd. Finally, after refitting, the Division in the middle of September was dispatched by brigades to France under the command of Major-General Richard Turner, V.C.,* who returned from France to take over the command from Major-General Sir Sam Steele, after relinquishing the command of the 2nd Brigade in the 1st Canadian Division.

Meanwhile, at Bailleul in Flanders, the formation of the Canadian Corps was in progress under the command of Lieut.-General Alderson, who had handed over the command of the 1st Canadian Division to Major-General Arthur Currie, C.B., the Commander of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.†

The Canadian Corps at the period of its formation consisted of two divisions composed of three infantry brigades of four battalions

* Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Richard Turner, V.C., K.C.B.

† Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Currie, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

each; divisional artillery, engineers and transport; besides the Corps heavy artillery, engineers, transport and Corps troops. The cavalry consisted of three regiments under the command of Brigadier-General J. Seeley, D.S.O. (lent by the British War Office). Machine-gun companies and trench mortar batteries were in the process of formation.

Corps Headquarters was composed as follows :—

Commander	Lieut.-General (afterwards Sir E. A. H., K.C.B.) Alderson, <i>p.s.c.</i>
A.D.Cs. to Commander		Major C. H. L. Beatty, D.S.O., late 6th Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) A. C. P. Butler, K.R.R.C.

GENERAL STAFF BRANCH

Brig.-Gen. General Staff		Brevet Lieut.-Col. (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. H. Harington, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , King's Liverpool Regiment.
G.S.O. (2)	Major (Temp. Lieut.-Colonel) R. F. Hayter, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Cheshire Regiment.
G.S.O. (2) Intelligence		Major (Temp. Lieut.-Colonel) C. H. Mitchell, Corps of Guides.
G.S.O. (3)	Captain R. P. Clarke, 5th Regiment, C.G.A.

A. AND Q.M.G. BRANCH

D.A. and Q.M.G.	Brevet-Colonel (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) T. B. Wood, <i>p.s.c.</i> , R.A.
A.Q.M.G.	Major (Temp. Lieut.-Colonel) E. de B. Panet, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , C.R.H.A.
D.A.A. and Q.M.G.	Major (Temp. Lieut.-Colonel) W. B. Anderson, <i>p.s.c.</i> , R.C.E.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DEPARTMENTS

A.D.S.	Captain (Temp. Major) R. H. Willan, K.R.R.C.
D.D.M.S.	Colonel G. L. Foster, C.B., Canadian Medical Corps.
D.A.D.M.S.	Major A. E. Snell, Canadian Medical Corps.

A.D.O.S.	Lieut.-Colonel J. A. S. Murray, Army Ordnance Department.
D.A.D.A.P.S.	Captain A. K. Murray, Canadian Army Postal Corps.
Field Cashier	Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Hamilton, Canadian Army Pay Department.

SPECIAL APPOINTMENTS

A.P.M.	Major A. McMillian, D.S.O., R.C.D.
Camp Commandant	Colonel V. A. S. Williams, R.C.D.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY OF THE CORPS

Commander	Colonel (Temp. Brig.-Gen., afterwards Sir Henry, K.C.B.) H. E. Burstall, C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i> , R.C.A.
Aide-Camp	Lieut. W. B. McTaggart, C.F.A.
Staff Officer	Captain E. F. Norton, R.A.

ATTACHED

Chief Engineer	Lieut.-Colonel (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. J. Armstrong, C.M.G., C.E.
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The Canadian Corps at this time formed part of the Second Army under the command of General Sir H. C. O. Plumer, G.C.M.G., whose headquarters were at Cassel. The 2nd Canadian Division was holding a front in the line extending from the village of Le Clytte in the north to the ruined hamlet of Wulverghem opposite Messines, which was the divisional boundary. While the 1st Division, which had moved up from Ploegsteert, prolonged the line south as far as the river Douve.

Corps Headquarters was in the Mairie of the old town of Bailleul, famous for its grapery, at that time covering several acres with glass; of this, like most of the town, nothing now remains; for Bailleul was practically destroyed during the German offensive of April, 1918.

To most of us who spent the winter of 1915-1916 in this quaint old French town it has pleasant memories. For the period was a quiet one, and, except for the successful innovation of trench raids by the 7th Canadian Infantry Battalion, later followed by other battalion raids, there was nothing much to disturb the ordinary routine of trench warfare; so that trips to Bailleul when out of the line were looked forward to as certain pleasures.

Divisional Headquarters, 1st and 2nd respectively, were in the

villages of St. Jean Capelle, close to Bailleul, and Westoutre farther north.

Owing to want of training, the 2nd Divisional Artillery had been left behind in England, and its place in the line was taken by the Lahore Artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. S. Hoare-Nairn, R.A., which had been left in France when most of the other units of the Lahore Division returned to the East.

In February, 1916, the 3rd Canadian Division commanded by Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) H. S. Mercer, C.B., units of which had commenced to arrive in September, 1915, was completed, less artillery, by the arrival of the 9th Brigade.

The 3rd Division was joined by Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battalion, which had been raised in Eastern Canada in the autumn of 1914 as a special Service battalion, and sent to England before the formation of the 1st Canadian Division. The P.P.C.L.I. was attached to a British Division; it was the first Canadian unit to land in France, and in November, 1914, was engaged in the fighting in the Ypres area, where the Battalion distinguished itself at St. Eloi.

As the 2nd Divisional Artillery had now joined for duty, and the 3rd Divisional Artillery had not yet arrived in France, its place was taken by the Lahore Artillery.

Early in March, 1916, the Canadian Corps with a strength of three divisions and Corps troops moved north into the Ypres Salient, where it took over the trenches in front of Hooze in the north, to St. Eloi in the south, with Corps Headquarters at the village of Abeele.

The spring was a wet one, so the men in the trenches had a bad time, especially in the St. Eloi sector, where the mud was abysmal and the trench system, owing to the number of craters, a most difficult one to define clearly. This led to considerable confusion as to the actual front held when the Germans in April, after a heavy night bombardment, seized some of the craters which our men were supposed to be holding, but which it is doubtful if they ever held.

On the 3rd of June, when the Germans made a surprise attack and captured the trenches held by the Left Division (3rd) in front of Hooze and Mount Sorrel, the Corps front was held as follows :—

Right Division—2nd, with two brigades in the front line.

Centre Division—1st, with one brigade in the front line.

Left Division—3rd, with two brigades in the front line.

Corps Reserve—One brigade from the 1st Division as it had only one brigade in the front line.

Unfortunately the Divisional Commander, Major-General Mercer, was that morning up in the front line with the 9th Infantry Brigade making a tour of inspection. He was caught by the bombardment and killed while trying to get back to headquarters ; and at the same time Brigadier-General V. Williams was cut off by the Germans and taken prisoner.

General Mercer's death caused genuine feeling, for he was most popular with all ranks ; the Division was lucky to have such a fine soldier to succeed him as Brigadier-General L. J. Lipsett, C.B., Royal Irish Regiment, who had been in command of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade. He commanded the Division until the 13th of September, 1918, when the command was taken over by Brigadier-General F. O. W. Loomis, with the rank of Major-General.*

The loss of these trenches was made good on the 13th of June, when they were recaptured by a composite brigade of the 1st Division in the most wretched weather conditions. The Germans had not tried to push their first advantage, and on the 13th, when driven out, made no counter-attacks. Altogether there was something mysterious about this attack, which was not cleared up until later, when our people captured some papers from which it appeared that it was a little side-show on the part of the German Divisional Commander in the sector opposite our 3rd Division, for which he had obtained permission from his Corps.

In the middle of June, General Alderson resigned the command of the Canadian Corps and was succeeded by Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Julian Byng, K.C.B. ; Brigadier-General Harington went to the Second Army ; and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) P. de B. Radcliffe, D.S.O., became B.G.G.S. remaining with the Corps until 1918, when he was succeeded by Brigadier-General N. W. Webber, D.S.O. ; at an earlier date Brigadier-General Farmer, D.S.O., from the Second Army, had become D.A. and Q.M.G. vice Colonel Wood ; he remained with the Corps until the Armistice.

General Byng soon had the Corps well in hand, and started a thorough system of training for both officers and men, which included courses at Divisional, Grenade and Trench Mortar, Trench Warfare and Gas Schools. A Corps School for officers, under command of Major A. C. Critchley, was formed in an old farmhouse not far from Corps Headquarters which the Corps Commander visited regularly. He inspected all brigades and other units, wherever

* Afterwards Sir Frederick Loomis, K.C.B., C.M.G.

possible, when out of the line, and generally woke every one up by his insistence on efficiency and discipline.

All ranks in the Corps soon realized that this strict training was for their benefit and entered heartily into the work set them by the Corps Commander who never spared himself. Soon, such was the spirit, that the men proudly referred to themselves as the "Byng Boys."

Light and heavy trench mortar batteries were organized ; cyclist, tunnelling and light railway battalions were formed ; and the Motor Machine-gun Brigade, which was to distinguish itself in the dark days of 1918, was formed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Brutinel (afterwards Brig.-Gen., D.S.O.), the future author of the "Machine-gun Barrage."

About the 11th of August, the 4th Canadian Division, under the command of Major-General D. Watson, C.B. (later Sir David, K.C.B.), landed in France and joined the Corps in the Ypres Salient.

At the end of the month the Canadian Corps was relieved by the Australians, and less the 4th Division which remained in the Second Army, moved south to the Somme, where it joined the First Army.

Early in September the Corps was engaged round Pozières and Courcellette, where it proved the efficiency of its late training, and as a Corps added to the fine reputation for hard fighting already won for the Canadians by the 1st Division.

The 4th Division rejoined the Corps at the beginning of October, and, on the 10th, the Corps, less the 4th Division which remained on the Somme, moved up to the Arras front, where it was not rejoined by the 4th Division until the middle of November.

This sector of the line was held until the following spring, when the Canadian Corps, on the 9th of April, 1917, successfully took part in the British offensive by carrying the Vimy Ridge and capturing Vimy village.

The Corps now entered into a new phase of its existence as a Canadian Corps commanded by a Canadian ; but, although all ranks were justly proud of being able to stand on their own legs, they said farewell with sincere regret to General Byng when he handed over the command of the Corps to Major-General Sir Arthur Currie, K.C.M.G., who was promoted Lieut.-General. It was about this time that Major-General Sir Richard Turner, V.C., K.C.B., relinquished command of the 2nd Canadian Division, in order to proceed to London, with the rank of Lieut.-General, to form the Canadian War Office and to take over the command of the Canadian forces in England, where a 5th Canadian Division was

forming under the command of Major-General Garnet Hughes, D.S.O. Brigadier-Generals MacDonell and Burstall, each with the rank of Major-General, succeeded to the command of the 1st and 2nd Divisions respectively.

Sir Arthur Currie soon proved his ability as a Corps Commander, for in August, 1917, the Canadian Corps, which was then opposite Lens, distinguished itself by capturing Hill 70 and taking all its objectives.

In October the Corps once again moved up into the Ypres area, where it captured the Passchendaele Ridge and village in the face of determined resistance by the enemy and in the worst climatic conditions.

The Corps Commander proved himself to be as big mentally as he is bodily, for he showed that he had the knack of surrounding himself with able men, and then, whilst assuming the responsibility, of making the most of them.

In December the Canadian Corps returned to the Arras front and passed the winter on familiar ground. Here, throughout the first momentous days of the great German offensive in March, 1918, the Corps remained ready, watching and waiting to be attacked. The Germans, however, contented themselves with heavy bombardments and did not attack the Vimy Ridge where the Canadian Corps had just reorganized the whole of the defensive system, having completed in rear of the main front-line system, to quote from General Currie's report—"250 miles of trench, 300 miles of wire entanglement and 200 tunnelled machine-gun emplacements."

A proposal was made at this time to increase the number of Canadian divisions in the field from four to six, by adopting the recent British reduction of the battalion basis for brigades, from four battalions to three. This scheme was wisely abandoned, as it was considered that any increase in the number of divisions in the field would make them extremely difficult to keep up to strength; whereas under existing conditions there were ample reinforcements for that purpose. As it was, under the great pressure of the German offensives and consequent extension of the Canadian Corps front in order to relieve British divisions for use elsewhere, the fighting strength of the Corps was severely strained to hold the 29,000 yards of front (including the 2nd Division with the VI. Corps) and back areas. So great indeed was the strain that these back area defences could only be manned by the organization of two special brigades composed of men drawn from tunnelling and army troops companies, divisional wings, and engineer and pioneer reinforcements.

The Corps had been further weakened by the withdrawal, on

the 23rd of March, of the Motor Machine-gun Brigade, which was sent south to assist the Fifth Army in stemming the German onrush. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade had also been sent south to assist the French in holding the Germans on the south bank of the Oise east of Noyon. Here the Cavalry Brigade distinguished itself by holding the road through the wood from Suzoy and Scaucourt. The Motor Machine-gun Brigade took an important part in the fighting on the Amiens—Roye road and just west of Peronne, where they held the Germans at bay while the British tanks and heavy guns were being withdrawn from Maricourt.

The Canadian Corps remained north of Arras until the immediate danger of attack was passed and then went into G.H.Q. Reserve, from which at the end of March the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were moved into the Third Army; the 1st into the Couturelle area under the XVII. Corps; and the 2nd into the Neuville-Vitasse sector of the line under the VI. Corps. The 1st Division rejoined the Canadian Corps on the 8th of April, but the 2nd Division remained in the line at Neuville-Vitasse until relieved by the 3rd Canadian Division. The Canadian Corps, less the 3rd Division, was again in the line north of Arras on the 1st of July.

During the time the Corps was out of the line great attention was paid to the training of brigadiers and staffs in open warfare, and to individual training, especially in musketry.

The time had now arrived for the British counter-offensive in which the Canadian Corps was to take its part with the Fourth Army south of Amiens; in order to deceive the enemy, therefore, two Canadian infantry battalions were sent north into the Second Army and placed in the line at Kemmel. These two battalions subsequently rejoined the Corps on the night of the 7th–8th of August, on which date the move of the Canadian Corps to the Fourth Army was completed, and the Canadians were in position for the battle of Amiens, their right flank being astride the Amiens—Roye road, with a French Canadian battalion in touch with the left of the First French Army and their left flank astride the Amiens—Chaulnes railway in touch with the right of the Australians.

Space forbids our following closely the advance of the Canadian Corps in the successive attacks which finally drove the Germans back to the Armistice line. It is sufficient to say that, by the 22nd of August, the Canadian Corps had engaged and defeated ten German divisions and had advanced about 14 miles towards Roye, when its transfer north to the First Army, which began on the 15th of August, was completed.

At the commencement of the Arras—Cambrai battle on the 25th of August, the Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was in position astride the Arras—Cambrai road. By the 30th of September, the Corps had broken through four German lines of defence including the famous Drocourt—Quéant and Canal du Nord lines; Cambrai was in flames with English and Canadian troops in possession of its western suburbs.

On the 11th of October, the Canadian Corps was in position north-east of Cambrai for the advance on Douai and Valenciennes, and, on the 19th, entered Demain amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants. Here the Canadian troops marched through the principal square before the Prince of Wales, who, with Prince Arthur of Connaught, was with Corps Headquarters, and after a thanksgiving service in the Cathedral, the Corps Commander was presented with a flag by the inhabitants.

By the 22nd of October the Fifth and First British Armies were pressing the Germans back to the Scheldt from the north of Tournai—which town was encircled—to Valenciennes, the outskirts of which town had been reached by English and Canadian troops, on the 1st of November. Eight days later the Canadian Corps was close to Mons. This town was captured by Canadian troops early in the morning of the 11th of November.

Thus the Canadian Corps, in November, 1918, appropriately ended the war on the Western Front at the very place where the British Expeditionary Force was first seriously engaged in the autumn of 1914.

The Canadian Corps remained in the positions it held at 11 a.m. on the morning of the 11th of November until the 21st, when Corps Headquarters with the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions commenced the march to Cologne as part of the British Army of Occupation, while the 3rd and 4th Divisions remained quartered in Belgium.

In these positions the Canadian Corps remained until the spring of 1919, when its units returned to England for repatriation.

GENERAL LUDENDORFF ON THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN, AUGUST, 1914

THE German plan of campaign which was put into execution in August, 1914, and its development have been dealt with at length by two articles in this review.* In them it was shown that the idea of the great wheel which was to sweep round Paris, enclose the French Armies and drive them up against the Swiss frontier, was evolved by the Chief of the General Staff, Count Schlieffen, and adopted as the official plan in 1905. When he retired in 1906, his successor, General von Moltke, adhered to the plan. In the course of time, however, the German Army increased in numbers and nine divisions more than existed in 1905 became available. Of these von Moltke allotted eight to the left wing (the Sixth and Seventh Armies) in Lorraine, and one, with another withdrawn from the force originally destined to act against Russia, to the right wing. Thus the right, the striking wing, was two divisions stronger than von Schlieffen originally designed it to be.

In tabular form, neglecting cavalry divisions and Ersatz and Landwehr formations, the figures were, counting in divisions, active and reserve :—

			1905	1914
France	Right Wing (First to Fifth Armies)	53	55
"	Left Wing (Sixth to Seventh Armies)	9	17
Russia..	10	9

The substantial addition to the left wing was doubtless made because the Great General Staff had at least some inkling of the French plan, and some one in authority wished to spare German soil from the horrors of invasion. Regardless of what might have happened in Lorraine if the extra eight divisions had not been there, it is now argued in Germany that von Schlieffen would certainly have allotted them all to the striking wing and would have won the war. Actually, up to and including the 1st of September, all went

* *Vide* "The German Campaign in the West, 1914" (April, 1921), and "The Development of the German Plan of Campaign, August–September, 1914" (July, 1921).

exactly according to the plan of 1905, except that the Germans were a trifle ahead of the line fixed for the thirty-first day of mobilization. Then apparently they thought that they had won the war, and made grave mistakes. These do not, however, affect the value of the initial plan.

In the March number of the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, Herr Eugen Zimmermann, the former Under-Secretary of State, in an article entitled "About Schlieffen's Plan," goes so far as to examine the question "who is to blame for Schlieffen's ingenious plan not being carried out, which was expected to ensure victory to Germany?" He is mainly concerned in attempting to show that the leaders of the Government did not bring pressure to bear on the General Staff to increase the forces for the defence of Alsace and Lorraine and for covering Baden. The opinions of Herr Zimmermann on military plans and their execution appear to be as valuable as those of our own home-grown politicians, and we need not waste time over them. He puts the whole of the blame for failure on von Moltke and offers Germany the consolation that "it was very bad luck that Count Schlieffen was not born twenty years later than he was." *

Herr Zimmermann, however, quotes opinions which he solicited from various eminent men, and these are of interest as showing that the dispute as to who lost the war still continues between the civil officials of the Government and the soldiers.

General von Freytag-Loringhoven, the historian, and General von Bernhardi both have a great deal to say, although nothing to the point. The former general protests that the failure to win the war was not the fault of the General Staff; the latter says that the alteration of the plan—for the better protection of Baden—was the fault of Bethmann-Hollweg. Von Bernhardi's paper was evidently shown to the ex-Chancellor before his death, for in a letter to Herr Zimmermann he writes:—

"The question of an alteration of the Schlieffen plan of campaign was never discussed between me and the General Staff during my time as Chancellor. Whether, and on what grounds, such alteration was made is wholly beyond my knowledge. General von Kuhl's very interesting account of the genesis of the Schlieffen plan, to which I refer you, was therefore quite new to me. The observations of General von Bernhardi are entirely wrong. The artificialness of his suppositions will not have escaped you. Actually, they have no foundation whatever."

* He was 73 years of age when he retired in 1906, died in 1912, and would have been 81 in August, 1914, had he survived.

LUDENDORFF ON GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 49

Prince Bülow also disclaims any share in the development of the plan. He writes—

“ I never meddled with military details, and Count Schlieffen just as little tried to influence my conduct in affairs of State.”

General Ludendorff's letter, which is the principal reason for drawing attention to the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, is as follows :—

“ I still believe that the right wing was never weaker than Count Schlieffen made it. We had a heavy increase in the reserve formations and then again the XX., XXI. and Bavarian III. Corps.* But the proportion was altered to the disadvantage of the right wing. That is correct. I expressed my concern about this to Moltke on a General Staff tour. He considered, however, that he must protect Baden, and that the XV. and XIV. Corps would still reach the right wing in time. That was correct. In our numerical inferiority we had to increase our forces by mobility.

“ It must be added that in Moltke's time a raid of the French VII. Corps into Alsace became more and more probable. Here was opportunity offered for a nice little minor success at the opening of the war—which we must not undervalue.

“ If we study the events and the dates in 1914, we shall find that the corps which were left in Alsace could easily have got up to the right wing in time. Only power of leadership was required. The Supreme Command in 1914 did not possess this.

“ It was the same in Lorraine. There, too, a brilliant victory was to be gained, and the troops were up to time everywhere, but leadership was lacking. The left wing, according to Schlieffen, was to be very, very weak, and an enemy's attack might have had a success there too easily : we should then have been rolled up like the Bolshevik Army from Warsaw. (1920, German Editor.)

“ There is a tendency to get lost in theories and to forget that in the decisive moment the power of leadership is everything. Moltke's fault lies in the lack of this power, not in the alteration of a plan.

“ Moltke's deployment was also correct, if in his advance he had pushed the troops farther north or north-west.

“ Schlieffen—and Moltke also—stuck tight to Thionville.† As in the execution of the plan Moltke did not reinforce his right wing, he did not swing sufficiently clear of the fortress, and, so far as that goes, Schlieffen did not either. If the operations were carried out after the battle of Lorraine as Moltke devised, then the Armies had to be pushed westward from Thionville, that is, had to leave go of Thionville ; that was the right and proper course. Then the right wing could have been stretched out as far as required. Even the Schlieffen plan breaks down in this clinging to Thionville.

“ I have not until now spoken out in this matter, but place the above at your disposal.”

* Added to the German Army after 1905.

† The pivot of the wheel according to the plan.

Postscript.—"If Moltke had not sent the Guard Reserve Corps and the XI. Corps to East Prussia, all would have gone well. If he wished to send something, he should have taken the corps from the left wing. Thus again, 'leadership.'"

General Ludendorff's views seem very much to the point, and there is only one criticism to make: the Army next to Thionville, which would have been responsible for the gap and its own left flank had the German right wing been shifted clear of the *Feste*, was the Fifth. This was commanded by the German Crown Prince and it went very near defeat and had to be drawn back, even though it had Thionville to support it. Only the withdrawal of General Maunoury and his three reserve divisions to go west to form the Sixth Army saved the Crown Prince's force from being rolled up on the 24th of August, 1914.

Thus the solution suggested by Ludendorff would not have ensured victory; it might even have led to a disastrous defeat. The Germans lost the war, and the final result would no doubt have been the same whatever their generals did. They lost from the moment they violated the neutrality of Belgium.

Among the statements made by Herr Zimmermann, the following are of interest. When von Schlieffen retired the names of the following officers were put before the Kaiser by the Chief of the Military Cabinet as qualified to succeed him: General von Bülow (then commanding the III. Army Corps), General von Bock und Polach (formerly commanding the Guard Corps), General von Hindenburg (then commanding the IV. Army Corps), General von Bessler (Inspector of Engineers, Pioneers and Fortresses), General von der Goltz. The Kaiser, however, selected von Moltke "because he believed the name would have a terrifying effect on hostile countries." Of all the prominent German generals in 1914-1918, only von Moltke and von Kluck were not Staff College graduates.

AN EXPERIMENT IN MILITARY EDUCATION

BY SPENSER WILKINSON

FORTY years ago a group of Manchester volunteer officers set to work to give themselves a military education, being determined, if possible, to fit themselves to instruct their men in peace and lead them in war. The history of their effort exemplifies the spirit which animated the Volunteer Force.

By way of prelude it will be well to recall the characteristics, now almost forgotten, of the popular citizen army of forty years ago. The Volunteer Force grew up out of the impulse, which in 1859 inspired a large number of men throughout Great Britain, to wish to prepare themselves to be defenders of their country in the event, at that time commonly thought possible, of an invasion of Great Britain. The organization took definite shape through the Volunteer Act of 1863, which made it lawful for the Sovereign to accept the services of any persons desiring to be formed into a volunteer corps. The corps so formed could, in case of imminent national danger or great emergency, be called out for actual military service within Great Britain; its members would then become subject to military law. Every volunteer was entitled, except after his corps had been called out for actual military service, to quit his corps after giving fourteen days' notice in writing. Neither officers nor men received pay. The expenses of a corps were defrayed from an annual grant of 30s. paid by the Government to the commanding officer for each efficient private, together with a somewhat larger sum for each efficient officer. An efficient volunteer was one who attended at the headquarters for drill, and at the range for musketry, as often as was required by regulations issued by the Secretary of State for War. The grants so earned were barely sufficient and were usually supplemented by subscriptions from the officers, each of whom also paid his own personal expenses. No provision of any kind was made for the instruction of officers, except in drill and musketry, and in these branches the only professional instructor was the adjutant, in those days usually a retired army officer, partly paid

by the corps. In 1881 the "coming of age" of the Volunteer Force was celebrated by a review in Windsor Great Park, where Queen Victoria inspected some 50,000 volunteers from all parts of the country.

The strongest battalion present on that occasion was the 20th Lancashire Rifle Volunteers, then known as the 2nd Manchester (now the 8th Ardwick Territorial Battalion, the Manchester Regiment). A twelve company battalion, it regularly sent in every year a return of 1200 efficient. Its finances were exceptionally well managed, so that, without any other income than the capitation grants, the Commanding Officer always had a substantial balance in the bank. The privates and non-commissioned officers were all of the working class, a large number of them being mechanics. The officers were for the most part engaged in business in Manchester; three or four were lawyers; only three were University graduates. In those days all the officers used to spend two or more evenings a week at headquarters. There was among them a strong feeling of comradeship and *esprit de corps*; their intimacy was like that of the members of a family. In summer they spent on the range at Astley those Saturday afternoons when there was no parade; as Astley was nine miles by rail from Manchester the musketry of the men could not be brought to as high a standard as was desired. At drill the average attendance was much higher than was required by the regulations for efficiency. The Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. Samuel Scott, was a strict disciplinarian, very quick and skilful at drill, for which the battalion had a deserved reputation, and in which all the officers were required to be thoroughly competent. It was the custom for each company to have an annual social gathering at which the captain presided, and for which he usually paid.

In February, 1881, Captain J. B. Lloyd held his annual company dinner and dance, at which were present as guests Major H. L. Rocca, Captains J. Lees Aspland, T. W. Brown, J. Peacock, Spenser Wilkinson and Lieut. A. P. Ledward. The conversation at the officers' table was of regimental affairs, and in particular of the need for officers making themselves capable of something more than the then old-fashioned and out-of-date formal drill. It was thought that officers ought to learn how to handle their men in the conditions of a modern campaign and of a modern battlefield, and the question was raised, how this could be learned. How could the officers best get themselves ready for war? It was suggested that something could be learned from the *kriegs-spiel* or war game,

provided that those who took part in it should first master the theory of tactics.

A proposal was then made that the officers present should form themselves into a club or society for the purpose of learning tactics. After the dancing had begun, the officers adjourned to the card room and there the proposed society was formed of the seven officers present. Major Rocca was elected President and Captain Aspland Secretary. Captain Brown undertook to arrange for a dinner at the Clarence Hotel on the 21st of March.

On that day, therefore, the Society held its first formal meeting and drew up its first code of rules. It called itself "The Manchester Tactical Society," and defined its object as "The Study of Tactics." Membership was to be by election, one black ball to exclude. The purpose of this rule was partly to secure good fellowship, and partly to guarantee the Society against members who would not or could not work or who might not be first-rate officers. It was resolved that, until otherwise decided, no new members should be admitted. It was decided not to invite the Commanding Officer to join the Society as his age was inconsistent with learning lessons and his rank and seniority would give too much formality to the proceedings. The Society also determined "to recognize in the conduct of its business no precedence arising from military rank." This practice was found conducive to work and to friendship; it never occasioned any difficulty. It was resolved to begin work by the study of Shaw's "Elements of Modern Tactics," of which the first three chapters were to be read for the next meeting. This being settled, the meeting ended with a rubber.

At the second meeting an exercise was devised which each of the members was to work out before the third meeting. A force, assumed to be at a given point on the map accompanying Shaw's text-book, was to send an advanced guard in the direction of an enemy assumed to be approaching from a point some distance away on the same map; each officer was to write the orders for this advanced guard of which he was supposed to be in command. The exercise set, the members cross-examined one another on the chapters they had prepared of Shaw's work; chapters which had been diligently studied since the first meeting.

At the third meeting five members brought the orders which they had written for the advanced guard, and these were read and discussed. It was decided to devote the fourth meeting to the study of the 25-inch map of two areas near Crowden, on which two of the captains, with the Commanding Officer's permission, had

arranged for a field day with their companies. The field day was held on the 18th of April, and took the form of a series of sham fights between advanced and rear guards, under the supervision of Major Rocca. Most of the other members were present as spectators and critics. At that time there was no allowance for field days and the two captains paid the expenses of the railway transport of their companies to and from Crowden, and of feeding the men during the day.

At the fifth meeting, on the 2nd of May, a rule was adopted, and was enforced for some three years, that a fine of five shillings be imposed for absence without adequate reason. The study of Shaw's Tactics was resumed, and it was resolved that the Society should go on the 7th of May to Colwyn Bay, the site of the annual encampment of the 2nd Battalion of the Manchester Regiment, returning on the 9th of May. The adjutant and quartermaster of the battalion were invited as guests of the Society. At Colwyn Bay on the first evening a committee prepared a scheme for an advanced guard and another for outposts, on the basis of which the commander of the outposts and the officers told off to command the picquets and supports wrote their orders. The next day, first the advanced guard scheme, and then the outpost scheme, were worked out on the ground. In the outpost work each officer planted a flag on the spot which he had chosen either for a support, a picquet or a sentry ; and then all the members together inspected the whole of the outposts. On the second evening the day's work was discussed in detail. A full report of these exercises was prepared by the secretary, with suggestions for improvement in the method of conducting such practices, and with further criticism by the president.

On the 25th of May the Society devoted an afternoon to a tactical exercise at Bowden. On the 2nd of August a similar excursion was made to Worsley, and on the 5th of August to Mottram, when a sham fight without troops was carried out and afterwards criticized in a report by the secretary, which, with other reports, is among the Society's transactions. In September a three days' visit to Shap was arranged, but only two members were able to go. They devoted the time to a road reconnaissance, and to working out the details of the march of a division along the portion of road surveyed.

In November the Society examined its members on Shaw's Tactics. For this purpose, the book was divided into as many sections as there were members ; each member was to set two

questions on his own section and bring them to the meeting, where each was to answer all questions except those which he had himself set. He was then to correct all the answers to his own questions. The minimum marks for a pass were to be 50 per cent.

The examination took place on the 23rd of November, and when the reports were collected, it was found that all the members had passed easily. Two members who had been ill on the day of the examination were subsequently examined and passed. The average marks obtained had been 70 per cent., a high percentage.

On the 17th of December the first war game was played. The war game is a manœuvre or sham fight in which the theatre of war or the battlefield is a large scale map of a tract of country, and in which bodies of troops are represented on the map by blocks of wood, metal or porcelain, each of which covers on the map the same area which the troops represented would occupy on the ground. An umpire or director imagines or borrows from history the positions of the opposing forces on a given day, and sends to the two officers who are to be the commanders of the respective forces a general account of the conditions of the campaign, and to each commander separately a list of the troops under his command, their positions at the time, the purpose of attack or defence which he has to fulfil, and such information as in the conditions would probably reach him concerning the enemy's strength, position and intentions. The umpire might, for example, take the campaign of Austerlitz, putting one of the players in the position of Napoleon, and the other in that of the Russian Emperor a day or two before the battle. Each commander would then write and send to the umpire the orders which in that situation he would, if commanding, issue to his army. The game could then begin. The umpire in his own room places on the map the troops of both armies and moves them from time to time in accordance with the orders issued by the two commanders. Each commander, in a separate room, places on his map his own troops, and those of the enemy whose location he knows. The umpire from time to time communicates to each commander such information as that commander would be likely to receive of the enemy's movements, and, whenever a collision takes place, decides on its results: which of the two armies may hold its ground, may advance or must retire. In this way the commanders on the two sides gain practice in analyzing and judging a situation, in framing orders, and in the application of the principles of strategy and tactics. This game or practice has, for a century, been thought to be one of the best modes of learning and practising

the art of command. It is evidently of little use as instruction except to officers familiar with the principles of war, accustomed to handling troops, and at home on a good map. It is for this reason that the Society, before undertaking war games, gave itself a thorough course of elementary tactics, and as much practice as possible in studying situations, both on maps and on country, in reading maps on the ground which they represent and in the method of writing orders. The map used for this first war game was a sheet of a six-inch map of Berkshire, representing the country between Bradfield, Yattendon and Basildon.

The members of the Society, even in its early months, found its work so interesting and their powers as officers so much strengthened and enlarged by it, that they were impelled to attempt, within specific limits, a propaganda in behalf of the study of tactics in the Volunteer Force. In July, 1881, a memorandum was drawn up and submitted through Mr. Summers, then M.P. for Stalybridge, to Mr. Childers, then Secretary of State for War, suggesting that the instruction of volunteer officers would be much improved by the establishment of a voluntary examination of an elementary nature in the theory of tactics. On the 19th of July Mr. Childers, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, undertook to consider the proposal, and on the 1st of January, 1882, a general order instituted the suggested examination, which was first held in June, 1882, when seven members of the Society passed, three of them with distinction. Meanwhile, after its own examination, the Society resolved that new members might be elected if qualified by an examination in the elements of tactics and topography. The first two new members elected were Major R. K. Birley and Captain Charles Savile of the Manchester Artillery, both of whom passed an examination conducted by the Society. After the institution of the War Office examination in tactics, no further examination was required for membership from officers who had passed it. But no officer ever became a member who had not qualified by examination in tactics.

Thus, in 1881, the Society had held thirteen meetings in Manchester, of which two were devoted to the business of forming and organizing the Society; seven to the study of Shaw's Tactics including a lecture on infantry tactics and the examination; four to tactical problems worked out on the map, and the last to a war game. All these meetings involved considerable preparation. Six instructional journeys had also been made to various points in Lancashire and the neighbouring counties, two of them for three days at a time, either for tactical exercises without troops or for practice in recon-

naissance. Various fields of work had thus been opened out in all of which work was continuously carried on for many years.

In 1882 the first work undertaken was to master "Clery's Minor Tactics," on which, as the reading progressed, a series of examination papers were set and answered. Then the battles of Nachod and Trautenau in 1866 were studied in Kühne's critical account and in Verdy du Vernois' "Studies in Troop Leading." A series of problems dealing with situations arising in these battles were set and worked out. In these studies the Society derived advantage from the accident that two of its members were good German scholars.

The Society had so far relied solely on its members, but in this year it sought the help of Major-General W. G. Cameron, who had assumed command at York of the Northern district. He was a keen officer and a fine tactician who took an active and friendly interest in the volunteers under his command. He readily responded to the Society's appeal, and in June, 1882, arranged and conducted as umpire a war game on the Aldershot map, the assistant umpires and the combatants being members of the Society. The General expressed great satisfaction with the tactical proficiency of the members. In December the Society, finding the War Office rules for the conduct of the war game by no means suited to its purpose, drew up and provisionally adopted: "Instructions and rules for the conduct of manœuvres on large scale maps," based on a comparison of the War Office and the Aldershot systems with those of Trotha, Meckel and Naumann. At this time also the Society began to form a library.

Early in 1883 Captain Savile left Manchester to live at Bristol. The Society made him a corresponding member, and in after years elected as corresponding members General Cameron, Captain F. E. Cooper, R.A., Captain J. L. Gawne, Royal Lancaster Regiment, and Colonel Richard Peacock, the Manchester Artillery. Three new ordinary members were elected in 1883, among them Captain J. Horner, 20th L.R.V., afterwards, from 1887 onwards, Secretary of the Society. This year's work began with a series of Exercises in Strategy and Tactics translated for the Society's use from a series published anonymously at Hanover. In April Major Aspland gave the Society a copy of the 25-inch map of the country about Shap, which he had completed with contours at 5-foot vertical intervals. This map was for some years used for minor war games, involving small bodies of troops. At the same time General Cameron expressed his willingness to conduct an exercise at some place in the

country, provided the Society would make the necessary arrangements and undertake the preparatory staff work. The place chosen was Shap and the exercise was carried out in June. It consisted of placing outposts on a front of several miles to cover a division expecting attack from the south. On the first evening the officers told off to commands wrote their orders. Next day the members of the party posted themselves each at the spot assigned to him in the orders, and General Cameron inspected the whole. The second evening was spent in criticism and discussion.

War games were regularly played in Manchester throughout the year.

In 1884 the subjects of study were Home's "*Précis of Modern Tactics*," and the regulations concerning the tactics of the larger units and concerning cavalry reconnaissance. Papers on these books were set from time to time by the President, Major Aspland. A class of associate members was formed, and Major Garstang of the Manchester Artillery (elected January, 1884), undertook to prepare them for the tactical examination in order to qualify them for membership. This experiment was only partially successful. Several of the associates passed the War Office examination in tactics, but never became members of the Society. The object of the Society was expanded from the "study of tactics" to the "study of the operations of war." In 1885, under the presidency of Major Birley, Hamley's "*Operations of War*" was read and an examination paper set and answered upon each part in succession. Lectures were also given on special subjects by several members. During the years 1884 and 1885 fifteen new members were elected, among whom were Captain Arthur Galloway, 2nd Battalion of the Manchester Regiment, and Lieut.-Colonel K. Eaton, 3rd V.B. Manchester Regiment. During the spring of 1886 lectures were given by Major Birley on "*Fortification*," by Captain Ledward on "*National Defence*," and by Captain Wilkinson on "*The Principles of Strategy*." Road reconnaissances were conducted on the 27th of February by Major Brown, and on the 6th of March by Major Birley.

The expansion of the Society had unexpected results. At the first meeting in 1886, one of the new members moved to alter the rules so that any officer should be eligible for election without any tactical qualification. This motion was rejected by the casting vote of the President, Major Birley. In June a number of the new members requested the committee to reintroduce the proposal. The committee circulated a memorandum drawn up by Major

Birley, in which it was pointed out that the Society had been formed for the study of tactics and strategy, and for the practice of the war game, and for no other purpose ; and had therefore limited its membership by requiring a tactical qualification. Since its formation other societies having the name "tactical" had been formed, which opened their doors to all volunteer officers, irrespective of qualification, and admitted papers and discussions on a great variety of topics unconnected with tactics and strategy. For several years the Society had worked steadily and well on the lines which it had laid down for itself, with the most satisfactory results to its members. The proposed alteration in the rule would not reform the Society, but would transform it from a purely tactical society to a Volunteer Service Institution, which would be contrary to the wishes of the original promoters, who wished to avoid papers and discussions on miscellaneous subjects.

The committee, therefore, made proposals which were adopted at a special general meeting on the 4th of November, 1896, when it was resolved : "that in view of the irreconcilable difference of opinion between members of the Society, and with a view to an amicable division, all members wishing to resign for the purpose of forming a new society shall be repaid the amount of £2 2s. each," equal to two years' subscriptions, and "that members who wish to separate from the Society shall give notice to the secretary within seven days, and that the treasurer be hereby authorized to pay the amount fixed by the above resolution to the treasurer of the new society." Major Garstang and nine other members altogether out of twenty-nine took advantage of these resolutions and resigned to join the new society, and the treasurer paid over twenty guineas to the treasurer of that body, which was called the Volunteer Officers' Association. The remaining members of the Tactical Society, including all the original members, were determined to maintain its constitution and the scope of its work. But they became members also of the Volunteer Officers' Association, and many of them took an active share in its work so long as it lasted.

The secession had the effect of invigorating the Tactical Society. For some time previously members had been encouraged to write essays on such subjects as specially interested them, and the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* had been willing to publish these essays in that paper. Immediately after the withdrawal of the dissentients it was determined to reprint these essays in pamphlet form. Two of them dealt with infantry drill ; Lieut.-Col. Aspland gave a history of English drill from 1678, reviewing each succeeding

drill book issued from that date until 1877, and pointing out that for volunteer officers it was desirable to have a system more likely to develop intelligence and initiative than in a drill book intended for regular officers, who belonged to a class early trained in character, ingenuity and determination. It was also urgent, in the opinion of the author, to eliminate evolutions not likely to be employed in war. In "Suggestions for a New Field Exercise for the Volunteer Infantry," Captain Wilkinson made a close examination of the drill then practised, with a view to its being adapted to the conditions of modern war and simplified for the use of the Volunteers, who had little opportunity to acquire great skill in complicated evolutions. Some of the suggestions were adopted in the revised Field Exercise of 1889, though the four company organization advocated for the battalion was not adopted until 1913.

Lieut.-Colonel Birley wrote on "Volunteer Artillery," pointing out that field artillery was beyond the scope of volunteers, as they had not riding schools, or the means of training horses; that their war function would probably be coast defence, and that it would be well to adapt their training to that end. An essay by Captain Wilkinson gave a short history of the war game, and an account of the method of conducting it practised by the Society. The Society also published the exercises in strategy and tactics which during the winter of 1886-1887 had been translated from the German of Gizycki and worked through by the members. Of these works the late General Sir Frederick Maurice, then Professor at the Staff College, wrote: "I do not think a more valuable series of papers has for some time been issued from our military press."

The Society's work produced unmistakable results in the military efficiency of its members. In the early 'nineties a brigade of volunteer battalions was encamped at a seaside watering place, under the command as brigadier of a retired colonel of the Regular Army, a good regimental officer, but hardly a tactician. He had prepared an exercise to be tried by each battalion in turn. The scheme was that the battalion had been disembarked on the beach and was at once to place outposts on the range of sandhills, half a mile wide, which separated the beach from the country inland, the purpose being to cover against the defenders of the country the landing of more troops. The point of landing on the beach was ten minutes' walk from the brigade camp. This scheme was explained one Sunday to Lieut.-Colonel A, the volunteer officer commanding the senior battalion, and the Brigadier asked him at what hour on Monday he could have the outposts ready for his inspection, the

normal hour of parade being for all battalions 10.30 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel A replied that he would order his battalion to parade at 10 and that the outposts would be ready to be inspected at 12. Accordingly on Monday at 10 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel A marched his battalion from camp along a lane which followed the inland edge of the sandhills ; halted in front of them and then set to work, with the aid of his adjutant, himself to post each of the pickets, sentries and supports, starting from the inland or enemy's side of the ground. Every sentry, picket and support was placed in a conspicuous position on the top of a sandhill. After an hour and three-quarters all were posted to Lieut.-Colonel A's satisfaction. At noon the Brigadier rode out from camp along the lane until he caught sight of the beautiful diagram of outposts, every man being plainly visible from the direction of the supposed enemy's approach. The Brigadier was delighted and congratulated Lieut.-Colonel A. In the evening the Brigadier gave the same theme to Lieut.-Colonel B for Tuesday, and asked when he should come to inspect the outposts. Lieut.-Colonel B replied : " We parade at 10.30 a.m. Ten minutes march to the beach, a quarter of an hour to place the outposts. I shall be ready for you at 11 o'clock." On Tuesday morning at 10.30 Lieut.-Colonel B marched his battalion to the beach, formed it at the water's edge in two half-battalion quarter columns, called out the officers and said " Gentlemen, the battalion has been disembarked here and is to place outposts in the sandhills to cover the landing of more troops. Line of observation the row of sandhills farthest inland ; centre of outposts in front of the battalion centre, extension half a mile to right and left ; right outposts right half-battalion, left outposts left half-battalion. Fall in and place your outposts." The two half-battalions moved off into the sandhills and Lieut.-Colonel B stayed chatting with a friend for a few minutes and then rode off to supervise the operation.

At 11 o'clock the Brigadier came riding along the lane which skirted the land side of the sandhills. He could see no troops and was puzzled, so he turned on to one of the sandhills. The horse reared as it almost stepped on to a rifleman lying in the grass, scanning the country beyond the lane.

" What are you doing here ? " said the startled Brigadier.

" No. 1 sentry, sir, No. 1 picket," replied the sentry.

" Where's your picket ? "

" Behind yonder sandhill," said the sentry, pointing to a sandhill a hundred yards behind him.

" I can't see any picket," said the Brigadier.

"It's not meant to be seen from here," said the sentry.

"Where's Colonel B?"

"Just been round to inspect," said the sentry, "and ridden back to the support."

These were outposts as for war. There was no pretty spectacle. The Brigadier was annoyed. He preferred the smart appearance of the day before.

On Wednesday it was the turn of Lieut.-Colonel C, a shrewd fellow who was not going to be caught. He said his outposts would be ready at 11.30 a.m. But when parade time came he reported himself sick, and left the parade to the adjutant, a good fellow and, as it happened, a competent tactician. But the regimental officers, like their commanding officer, scorned tactics. The adjutant marched the battalion to the seashore and gave the proper orders, upon which the battalion moved forward into the sandhills. There it fell into confusion, for none of the officers knew what to do or how to do it. The adjutant caught sight of a friend in mufti who knew all the officers well and knew about outposts.

"Here's a fix," he said. "These officers can't do it, and I can't straighten the lot. Do be a good fellow and help me."

"What shall I do?" asked the man in mufti.

"You straighten the left half-battalion while I straighten the right."

"Very good," was the answer.

By the time the Brigadier appeared all was in order. But the outposts were posted as for war and the Brigadier was again disappointed by the absence of a spectacle.

Lieut.-Colonel B and all his field officers, as well as the man in mufti, were past presidents of the Manchester Tactical Society.

In 1888 the Society undertook the independent publication of a further series of papers, to which Captain H. T. Crook, the 1st Lancashire Engineer Volunteers, who joined the Society at this time, contributed an essay on "War Game Maps," in which the unsatisfactory nature of maps of an imaginary country was demonstrated, and the suggestion made that the Ordnance Survey should produce fully contoured maps of districts suitable for tactical exercises. A second series of exercises in strategy and tactics, which had been translated by Colonel Rocca from the German of Gizycki and worked through by the Society, was also published. In 1889 Colonel Birley returned to his special subject in an essay entitled "Field Artillery for Home Service," in which, after examining the

mode of using artillery in the field and the function of guns of position, he gave reasons for believing that Volunteer Artillery could be trained as field artillery, provided that each regiment had its own riding school and was empowered to arrange for the hire of horses. Captain A. G. Haywood, the Liverpool Artillery, who was elected a member of the Society in 1888, wrote an introduction to the war game entitled "Map Manœuvres." Captain Ledward translated that part of the French musketry regulations of 1888 which treated of the direction of infantry fire in action. Captain Wilkinson translated Major-General Hofbauer's essay on the command of artillery in the army corps and the infantry division. In 1892 was published Major Formby's translation from the French of "A System of Instruction for Small Patrols."

In 1891 the Society authorized Major J. M. Gawne, King's Own, Royal Lancaster Regiment, and Captain Wilkinson, to undertake the translation of the German regulations for field service. This was completed and published in 1893 at a cost of £80 10s. for printing. These regulations, issued in 1888, contained in their introduction a remarkable account of the importance of the professional education of officers and of the best means of conducting it. They laid down that—"as the officer is in all matters the soldier's instructor and leader, he must be superior to him in knowledge, experience and strength of character." The officer's practical training depended, of course, on the faithful performance of his regimental duties, but great importance was also attached to theoretical training, of which the principal forms were "the war game, lectures, essays and instructional journeys." This account of the training of officers, set forth by high authority in 1887, is a concise summary of the work undertaken by the Manchester Tactical Society in 1881, and developed in all its branches years before the first issue of the German regulations from which the account is taken. In 1894, after conference with General Chapman, Director of Military Intelligence, it was arranged that the Society should give the Intelligence Division 150 copies of this translation, and that Captain Wilkinson (in the absence of Colonel Gawne in China) should translate for the Intelligence Division the alterations which had been made in 1894 in the German text. The translation of the alterations and additions was completed in 1895, and 200 copies were given by the Intelligence Division to the Society.

The publishing activity of the Society in no way interfered with its other work. In the autumn of 1886 weekly meetings were held at which tactical problems alternated with lectures on "Modern

Military History." On the 18th of December Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, R.A., acted as umpire at a war game on the Aldershot map. He afterwards wrote to congratulate the members on the keenness, knowledge and ability which he had observed in their work.

In 1887 twenty meetings were held alternately for tactical problems and war games. On the 17th of December took place the first of a series of war games with the West Riding Tactical Society. The others were played at Bradford on the 10th of March, 1888, the 13th of April and the 21st of December, 1889. At the second and fourth of these games the umpire was Colonel Cooper King, R.M.A. In January, 1888, a committee was appointed to consider the best means of providing maps suitable for tactical exercises. This committee examined first the district round Kirby Lonsdale, which it reported unsuitable for the Society's work, and then the Craven district of North Lancashire, including Gisburn, Hellifield, Skipton, Bolton Abbey and Gargrave. Early in 1888 Major Aspland completed the contouring of a 25-inch Ordnance Map of a part of the Vale of Clwyd, which from that time on was frequently used for tactical exercises and war games. About the same time one of the members presented the Society with the German *kriegs-spiel* map of the Creisau district of Silesia. In August, Colonel Birley, at this time commanding the Manchester Artillery, reported that his brigade had received batteries of position, and that he wished to study their use in connection with the infantry arm, and would be glad of the co-operation of the Society in that study. Accordingly the committee arranged for a series of original exercises in strategy and tactics on English ground with English army establishments, as well as for a special war game on the Creisau map with German establishments, which was carried on for several weeks by three of the members; a special war game, dealing with the invasion of England by a French Army, occupied the attention of some of the seniors.

The committee recommended that for the better execution of these exercises members should study Jomini's "*Précis de l'art de la Guerre*," Hohenlohe's "*Letters on Strategy*," and Clausewitz on War, of which the library had translations. Members unfamiliar with French and German were directed to Henderson's "*Fredericksburg*," to Badeau's "*Life of Grant*," and the "*History of the American Civil War*" by the Comte de Paris.

In 1888 the election of Captain Crook was followed by that of Captain Haywood, 6th Lancashire Artillery Volunteers, an active member of the Liverpool Tactical Society, which had been formed

in 1883 after consultation with members of the Manchester Society. In 1890 was elected Captain H. D. Sichel, 3rd Battalion Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment, who had formed the West Riding Tactical Society. With both these societies the Manchester Society maintained close relations, and from time to time played war games.

For some years no special or extra work was undertaken beyond occasional lectures and war games with other societies as often as it was found possible to obtain the help of an umpire of admitted authority. Thus in January, 1891, Captain Cooper, R.A., acted as umpire in a game with the Volunteer Officers' Association. In February, 1896, General Sir William Cameron acted as umpire at a game played by the Society, and in 1897 Colonel Lonsdale Hale, R.E., was the umpire in a game played at Chester with the Liverpool Tactical Society. In 1893 Captain Sichel, president for that year, read a paper on the "Mobilization of the Volunteer Force." In 1894 Moltke's "Tactical Problems," of which an English translation had appeared, formed the special subject of the Society's studies. In 1895 General Sir William Cameron, the Society's old friend and helper, was elected president, and held the office till his death in 1913. In 1897 the Society had to lament the death of Colonel Aspland, its secretary until 1887, and one of its best workers. The Society possesses from his hand the reports of much of the earlier field work, the maps of Shap and the Vale of Clwyd, and careful reports of some thirty war games played between 1886 and 1895.

In 1897 Major Crook reported that he had prepared for the Society a special map of the Craven District—that selected by the Committee of 1888 as best suited for tactical exercises. It was based upon sheets of the six-inch Ordnance Survey. From this time onward the Craven map was adopted for tactical exercises, field days and war games. Visits were paid to the district by Majors Crook and Horner, as well as by other members of the Society. In March, 1899, a war game was played on the Craven map preparatory to an exercise on the ground, and in that month the Annual Meeting was held at the Swan Hotel, Gargrave. Much work was done on the Craven map, under the direction of Major Crook, who from time to time read topographical or tactical essays on this and the Clwyd districts. These were collected for publication for the Society, but, as a number of Ordnance Survey maps were required to illustrate them, some time elapsed before the work was ready. It was published in 1909 under the

title "Studies in Practical Topography, by H. T. Crook, Colonel, East Lancashire Royal Engineers." The first study is an exposition of the dangers arising from the use of inaccurate maps or of maps not representing real country; the weakness of such maps is illustrated from examination papers set upon the basis of inaccurate sheets of the six-inch Ordnance Survey. The second study deals with a tactical problem in the region of the Clwyd Valley, the third and fourth with problems in the Craven district, founded upon a careful account of Cromwell's operations of 1648 in that region. Colonel Crook's are among the best strategical-tactical studies which have been published in the English language, and have the advantage of being accompanied by a set of the Ordnance maps required for the study of the exercises and of the campaigns on which those exercises are based. This work was the last enterprise of the Society's Publications Committee, of which the task had been materially helped in 1886 by subscriptions from several gentlemen not members of the Society, Mr. James Watts, Mr. James Oliver, Mr. James Jardine, Mr. Benjamin Davis, Mr. Duncan Metheson and Colonel Sir T. Sowler.

The Tactical Society, while keeping steadily to its purpose, the education of its members, from time to time necessarily considered those questions which affected the training of the Volunteers for war. Of these, finance and organization were among the most important. In March, 1886, a committee was appointed to report on these subjects. Colonel Birley was chairman and the members were Lieut.-Colonels Rocca and Aspland, 20th L.R.V., Lieut.-Colonel J. Eaton, commanding 7th L.R.V., Lieut.-Colonel F. Haworth, commanding 3rd V.B., the Lancashire Fusiliers, and Captain Ledward, formerly of the 20th L.R.V. The secretary was Captain J. E. K. Hall, 3rd V.B. Lancashire Fusiliers. The committee recommended increases of the capitation grant—"to relieve officers of the present burdens on their private purses;" to provide necessary articles of equipment for the men and ranges for musketry practice, and to cover the cost of encampments. It also recommended—"an intelligible independent organization, consisting in the grouping of battalions into brigades, of brigades into divisions, and of divisions into army corps; each of the higher units to have its permanent commander and trained staff of regular officers." Lastly, it recommended that the artillery and special arms should have facilities for instruction with the regular forces.

Interest in questions of organization and training was stimulated by the events of the war in South Africa, and in February, 1900,

upon a hint conveyed from the War Office that suggestions would be acceptable, the Society appointed a committee to draw up suggestions for the improvement of the organization and training of the Volunteer Force. The Committee's memorandum on the subject was presented and discussed at the Annual General Meeting on the 23rd of February, 1901, at which the chair was taken by the president, General Sir W. G. Cameron. After discussion and amendment, the memorandum was adopted, and in due time, at the request of the Society, submitted by the president to the Commander-in-Chief. In 1903 a Royal Commission, of which the Duke of Norfolk was chairman, was appointed to inquire into the Militia and Volunteer forces, and to report on the measures necessary to secure their efficiency and strength. The Royal Commission based that part of its report which dealt with the Volunteer Force upon the Society's memorandum. Meantime, Colonels Rocca and Brown had been requested by the Society to make a further memorandum upon volunteer finance, and to prepare both memoranda for publication. In 1904 both these reports were published by the Society under the title "Suggestions of the Manchester Tactical Society for the Improvement of the Organization and Training of the Volunteer Force." A number of the Society's suggestions had been adopted by the War Office before the appointment of the Royal Commission, but upon the report of the Norfolk Commission no action was taken by the Government, for between its appointment and its report there was a change of persons in the office of Secretary of State for War, and not long after the issue of the report there was a General Election and a new Ministry, in which Mr. (now Viscount) Haldane was Secretary of State for War. Under Mr. Haldane's administration the Volunteer Acts were repealed, the status of volunteers was abolished, and the Volunteer Force was converted into the Territorial Force. Among the changes which formed part of this conversion were some of the principal measures suggested by the Society, in particular the formation of permanent brigades and divisions, and the separation of the Government grant into an establishment grant and a capitation grant. The Territorial scheme, with its divisional organization, implicitly placed upon divisional and brigade commanders and their staffs a responsibility for the military education of Territorial officers. This left little scope for such a spontaneous organization as the Tactical Society, which by this time, after twenty-five years, had accomplished the work which it had undertaken. Its members had made themselves tacticians. The institution of the tactical examination in

1882 had popularized the study of elementary tactics among the officers of the Volunteer Force, and had given a stimulus to the formation of numerous tactical societies. From that time the work of the Volunteer Force had tended more and more to approximate towards an attempt at training for war. Accordingly, at a General Meeting on the 2nd of December, 1905, it was resolved—"That ordinary meetings should be suspended, and that no new members should be elected." Yet the members were unwilling to end a companionship in which they had been associated for a quarter of a century. It was determined, therefore, to maintain the annual meeting and social gathering, which has been held every year except in 1917 and 1919. In 1905 the University of Manchester appointed a Lecturer in Military History.

The Society then gave £50 to the University as a contribution towards the formation of a library of military history. In 1914 a silver salver was presented to Major Horner in recognition of his long and devoted services to the Society as honorary secretary, and of the affection of his fellow-members. In January, 1915, the Society voted £10 as a contribution towards reprinting the translation of Gizycki's "Exercises in Strategy and Tactics," of which Professor Spenser Wilkinson made use for the instruction at Oxford of a class of candidates for commissions.

In February, 1909, the Tactical Society resolved—"that the books and maps of the Society (except the Craven district map, which is to remain in the possession of Colonel Crook), be presented to the General Officer commanding the district to which the Manchester Territorial troops belong, to be in perpetuity the property of that division or of any unit that may hereafter replace it." The library and maps were accordingly transferred to Brigadier-General Fry.

Time has made gaps in the fellowship of forty years. Colonel Ledward, who devoted himself for many years to the Manchester Cadet Corps, of which he was the founder and first Commanding Officer, died in November, 1911. In June, 1913, the Society had to lament the death of its president, General Sir William Cameron, and of one of its original members, Colonel J. B. Lloyd. In December, 1914, Colonel R. K. Birley and in December, 1916, Colonel Rocca, the first president, passed away. The surviving members at the annual meeting of 1920, in renewing the work which has been one of their chief interests in life, thought that a record of work done might be of use in view of the problem which now confronts the nation and its Government of training the youth of

England, without a compulsory system, to be ready for a future emergency. The record proves that volunteer officers, unconstrained and unpaid, can not only learn the ordinary work of regimental officers, but can make themselves competent tacticians.

The secret of the Society's success is simple. All the members had one aim only—to make themselves good officers. No personal motives and no jealousies ever existed, and the surviving members are still on the same terms of intimate friendship which existed in 1881 and which bind them together with their comrades who have gone to their rest.

WAR AND PEACE AT THE DARDANELLES

AN IMPRESSION

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR AYLMER HUNTER-WESTON, K.C.B.,
D.S.O., M.P.—ONE OF THE OLD TWENTY-NINTH.

THE Dardanelles after six years ! Six years that have contained more events of importance to the World than six ordinary lustra, aye, more than twice six ordinary decades.

On this the sixth anniversary of the historic landing, at the same hour and at the same spot, I find myself once more on one of His Majesty's ships off Cape Helles, overlooking " V " and " W " Beaches, rendered for ever immortal by the blood of our Glorious Dead.

How much the same it is, yet what a contrast ! The beautiful natural setting and scenery are the same, but now all is solitary and at peace. Six years ago the Peninsula was surrounded by battle-ships belching forth a storm of shell and the sea was alive with steamboats full of troops and stores, and with rowboats packed with soldiers being pulled to the shore by their comrades of the Royal Navy. Now, solitude, quiet, repose and beauty. Then, crowds of warring men, the thunderous roar of naval artillery, the shrieking of shell, the ceaseless rattle of machine guns and the whizz of rifle bullets ; action, noise, the strenuous struggling of men at death grips ! But the hate and horror of war made and make no difference to nature ; the appearance of sky, sea and land is the same to-day as then.

Looking at this scene to-day, how vividly the scene in 1915 comes back to memory. Above, the wonderful clear blue sky ; below, the darker blue of the sea, its surface undisturbed even by a ripple, so smooth as to look almost as if covered with oil ; in front the warm-coloured sandy cliffs, of a light reddish yellow-brown hue, splashed with dark or lighter green by scrub or grass. Over the bows the white ruins of Helles lighthouse ; to the right and left, respectively, " V " and " W " Beaches.

The resemblance of these beaches to Greek amphitheatres is

as striking to-day as it was then. The narrow strip of sand by the sea is the stage, whence, all round in a hemisphere rise the slopes of the cup-like depression eroded from the original line of sandy cliffs during the course of ages. From every part of this rough hemisphere, as from every marble seat of a Greek amphitheatre, a splendid view of the stage is obtained, the only interruption to view and fire in either amphitheatre being the short stretch of vertical sand about three feet high, where in the centre of "V" Beach the sea sand meets the cultivatable, but uncultivated land. At the sides of each of these theatres of death rise cliffs of crumbling sandstone, unscalable by armed and heavily equipped soldiers. On the right-hand side of "V" Beach the place of the cliff is taken by the vertical walls of the old Turkish castle, whose massive masonry, built by the Turks three centuries ago, withstood penetration even by the shell of the heavy guns of the Fleet. As was the case with the splendidly-built old brick ramparts of Ypres, the impact of heavy projectiles scaled off the facing layer of masonry, but left the solid core undisturbed, adding to the beauty by revealing the warm shades of the inner masonry in contrast to the greyer, weather-beaten colour of the exterior of the walls. Then, as now, the slopes of these amphitheatres, covered with rough grass and brilliant wild flowers, led up to the concealed, but still just visible, parapets of the Turkish trenches. The most conspicuous features in the landscape are the white strips of sand, the stages of those arenas on which took place one of the grimmest, one of the noblest, dramas which has ever been enacted in this world. Then, they were covered by men whose bravery has never been, and never can be, excelled. Now, they are silent and lumbered only with broken "properties": sunk ships which once formed the breakwaters of busy harbours; broken piers once thronged with willing workers; wrecked cutters which ran ashore, rowed by dead men and steered by corpses; sparse litter of our evacuation, not considered worth destruction by us and not deemed worthy of removal by the Turk.

Looking at these Beaches now, with accurate knowledge of what the defences were and who the brave and skilfully-led enemies were who held them, it seems incredible that a landing could have been effected on such constricted and carefully defended areas. It was an impossible task for any but highly disciplined, well-trained, skilfully led, heroically brave, grimly determined Britishers, animated by high ideals and upheld by the traditions of their battalions and of their race. It may truly be called the achievement of the impossible. Fortunate it is that in the vocabulary of the best of our race

there is no such word as "impossible," even as in the bright lexicon of fame there is no such word as "fail."

Imagine those Beaches, about four hundred and three hundred yards long respectively, the slopes behind forming the amphitheatres which I have tried to describe. Imagine the unseen barbed wire just below the water's edge, the land mines under the beach, and then the broad belt of wire entanglement some half-dozen yards from the sea. Those who have not seen a well-made entanglement can best picture it to themselves as a continuous thicket of thorns about five feet high, and in this case about five yards broad, with never a gap in it. Its colour grey-blue instead of glossy green, and with rust-red iron standards instead of brown-barked stems; its branches steel wire; its thorns long, closely placed, cruelly sharp steel barbs. Well was wire entanglement—*reseau de fil de fer*—described by the French in those early years of the war as "*Le roi de guerre*"! Without tanks or an immense expenditure of ammunition it defied destruction and was King of War and master of the situation. Above this impenetrable obstacle came two other similar belts, the top one following the line of the upper tier of the enemy's trenches. Those upper trenches, taking the place of the gallery of the "gods," were in each case well concealed, deeply dug, and so sited as to give a perfect view of the beach and the entanglements to the strong force of Turkish riflemen who manned them. In carefully concealed positions on each flank; in holes in the cliffs, in the mud-walled houses of Sedd-el-Bahr, and in recesses in the crenellated walls of the old Turkish castle, were many machine guns, and on the left of "V" Beach a couple of "Pompoms," one inch automatic cannon afterwards captured by us.

These were the Turkish positions at "V" and "W" Beaches, respectively half a mile east and half a mile north-west of Cape Helles. The defences at "X" Beach, about a mile north of "W" Beach, at the other side of Cape Tekke, were similar though less formidable. At the two subsidiary flanking landings at "S" and "X," respectively two and a quarter miles east and three and a half miles north of Cape Helles, the defences were much less elaborate, but at neither of these two places was there a suitable beach.

At sunrise to-day, there is no vessel to be seen except our own. At sunrise six years ago, a formidable armada of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, transports, trawlers, picket-boats and row-boats covered the sea round the Peninsula. The armada stretched from far north near Bulair at the head of the Gulf of Enos; past Anzac on the open

western sea ; past us on H.M.S. *Euryalus*, south of Cape Helles ; to De Tots beyond Morto Bay inside the Straits to the east.

The *River Clyde*, with its armament of machine guns on its sandbagged forecastle, had just been run aground on the right of " V " Beach. The lighters which were to have formed the landing causeway between her and the shore had caught on sunken rocks, and Captain Unwin, V.C. and his companions were doing all, and more than all, that was humanly possible to repair the mischief ; while heavily equipped heroes struggled ashore off her under a hail of rifle and machine-gun bullets which made movement almost certain death. Towards all Beaches ships' cutters packed with men were being towed in columns of six behind lines of picket boats. As the water shoaled, the picket boats cast off their tows and turned out into deeper water, while the sailors in the cutters, taking to their oars, pulled their hardest to the shore. Before the leading boats touched the strand a murderous fire was opened by the Turks, giving to the blue carpet of the sea a fringe of white where the bullets churned it into froth. Sailors were falling forward dead over their oars in the boats ; soldiers were falling at the edge of the sea as they jumped out of the boats, either killed by bullets or tripped by the concealed wire under the water. Undeterred by their comrades' fate, the men kept pouring out of the boats on to the shore, rushing forward to force their way through the wire. There was soon a line of khaki figures lying along the front edge of the entanglement, some cutting the wire, some firing, but most, alas ! dead.

At " V " Beach further movement soon ceased, and all that remained on shore, till night gave cover from the deadly fire, were two little detachments of survivors on the right and in the centre. Everywhere else a long array of corpses, among which could be seen wounded men lying where the hail of bullets prevented any human aid from reaching them. The survivors on the right, close under the old castle, consisted of some men who had got ashore from the *River Clyde* and had worked east, and some who, though foiled in their attempt to land in boats at the little harbour under the cliffs crowned by the mud-walled houses of Sedd-el-Bahr village, had managed to work west to join their comrades from the other side in the dead ground under the castle walls. The detachment in the centre was formed from those who, after running the deadly gauntlet from the row-boats or the great grounded tramp, had managed to reach the precarious security afforded by the short stretch of yard-high bank in the centre of the Beach.

Great successes were gained at " V " Beach next morning, under the leadership of Doughty-Wylie, Beckwith, Walford, " Hampshire " Williams and others, but on that first morning six years ago the landing at " V " Beach had failed.

Fortunately it was far otherwise at " X " and " W " Beaches. At the former, afterwards rightly known as " Implacable Landing," London's Royal Fusiliers, under cover of the well-directed fire of H.M.S. *Implacable*, were the first to get ashore and to push well out on all sides, especially to the south, where, on the high ground above Tekke Burnu, London's and Lancashire's Fusiliers joined hands during the morning.

The story is told that this grand battalion of the Steady Seventh, to give the traditional regimental steadiness to its youngsters at this their " baptism of fire," formed up all but the advanced guard companies in close order and told off the battalion and handled arms as if on peace parade, notwithstanding the bullets and shells. The effect of this exhibition of discipline was to give to all self-confidence, a contempt for bullets and a complete control of their nerves. In time most men get accustomed to the sound of bullets, but at first their characteristic " pss " is apt to be distinctly disturbing to equanimity, and few can concentrate their attention on other things when bullets all around are knocking up little spurts of sand.

The hardest task of all lay at " W " Beach, and on the success and failure of this landing depended the fortunes of the day and of the expedition. It seems impossible to believe that any troops in the world should have suffered such losses as were suffered by the Lancashire Fusiliers in the first few moments of disembarkation and yet be able to carry on and win through to victory. We admired the marvellous endurance of losses by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War and believed that no European nation, enervated by civilization, industrialism and a life in towns, could display such " Bushido " or such stoicism and contempt for death as they then did. But our own lads on this occasion, as on other occasions in other lands in this great world war, showed that, though the moral and physical fibre of some of us nowadays is far from what it should be, the best of our race are still unsurpassed for grit, courage, endurance and determination.

Of the men in the row-boats who landed first on " W " Beach, afterwards called " Lancashire Landing," fully three-quarters must have been killed. Men were shot in the boats, but their comrades, undeterred, pushed forward. Men were wounded and drowned as

they disembarked, but still their comrades pressed on. One long line of huddled khaki figures lay along the water's edge. Another long line lay at the front edge of the first broad belt of wire, but still their comrades pressed on and through them. Corpses, all twisted up, were hanging in the midst of the entanglement, but living men still continued the work of wire-cutting which their dead comrades had begun, and all undismayed by the death around them, still pressed on towards their goal.

In the centre of the beach men were struggling on, destroying the wire and taking advantage of almost imperceptible inequalities of the ground to worm themselves forward and to reinforce by their fire the storm of shells and bullets which was being poured on the Turkish trenches from the Fleet. On the flanks quicker progress was being made, for there the cliffs gave some slight cover from fire, and strong and active men could force their way upwards notwithstanding the great weight which it was necessary for each of them to carry, for the enterprise on which they were engaged demanded that every man should be equipped with the food, water, ammunition, entrenching tools and other paraphernalia essential to enable him to hold his own during the long hours that must elapse before support could reach him. To places thus proved practicable, boat loads arriving later were directed, and the men from these, following the earlier pioneers, clambered upward and onward into the ends of the Turkish fortifications. Then followed sharp and bloody work with bayonet and butt, and the Turks were forced back along their deep and well-made trenches until at length the beach and its vicinity were ours.

The men who reached the high ground on the west were able, after hard fighting, to clear the Tekke Burnu headland and to join hands late in the morning with the Royal Fusiliers from "X" Beach. Those who made their way up on the east worked along to the ruins of Helles lighthouse, where they established a signal station for communication with the ships, and pushing north-east, took Beyaz Tepe, the well-fortified eminence which was afterwards known as "Hunter-Weston Hill."

By nightfall the south-west corner of the Peninsula, with two good landing places at "X" and "W" Beaches, was secured to us. Heavy counter-attacks by the Turks had been repulsed, and it needed but the morrow's capture of "V" Beach and our advance over the plain to the north to assure to the British bulldog the grip and bite that bled white the German-led Turkish Army. For though the immediate objects of that "Great Adventure" were not

attained, though the passage of the Dardanelles was never secured, and though the survivors of those wonder-working warriors had to evacuate the ground which they had so gloriously gained and so magnificently maintained, yet their sacrifice was not in vain. It was their deeds which made possible the historic victories gained by Britain at Baghdad, at Jerusalem and in Syria. The tenacity and pugnacity of our troops at Helles and Anzac killed off the German-trained regulars, broke up the Turkish Army, and made it incapable of further well-organized offensive action, either against Egypt, or against our troops in Mesopotamia, or in Palestine.

In a world war no episode stands alone. Each incident has its inevitable, but often indeterminable, effect on events occurring at times and places far distant from its own. Small deeds and great deeds, successes and apparent failures, all help to the final victory. The only thing which matters is that each individual should do his bit to the best of his ability.

Great comrades whose spirits to-day crowd those Beaches ! You did your bit. You freely and cheerfully gave yourselves for your country and you have a very real part in the final victory.

Unseen spirits of dead heroes ! Though invisible to the physical eye, you are yet very present to your old Commander and Comrade this memorable morning. You will be with us when, in the name of all your living comrades, our little party of sailors and soldiers lays on each Beach a wreath of wild flowers, gathered by our blue-jackets from ground made for ever sacred by the blood of our Glorious Dead : at Helles to the sailors and soldiers of Britain ; at Anzac to our cousins from Australia and New Zealand ; and at Kum Kale to our great Allies and dear friends, the splendid soldiers of France.

To those who survive and read these words :—Greetings ! And our old motto : “ To do our bit and to do it cheerily, for others not ourselves.”

To our Dead :—Honour ! They have gained each to his own memory praise that shall never die. And with it the noblest of all sepulchres, not the place where their bodies are laid, but an everlasting place in the minds of men.

A MEMORY OF A SIDE-SHOW

By H. B. R.

DURING the first two years of the war it was on France and Flanders that the attention of the audience, and the art of the actors, were concentrated : here was the Principal Theatre in which that great drama was staged. To the audience the scenery and the management were familiar, the performers were " star " artists whose names and histories were well-known, the theatre had a long-standing reputation for similar productions : as for the actors, here they went about their business beneath the dazzling limelight of history, to the applause of a packed house. It was evident that to secure the highest honours of their profession they must qualify in the Principal Theatre and before the principal audience.

There were other theatres, of course—side-shows in side-streets. Here the performances were more of the " knock-about " variety, the scenery was unconventional, the staging incomplete and cheaply effected, the actors, on the whole, obscure persons : in short, these minor theatres were not very reputable places of entertainment, and failed consequently to attract the best kind of public. But later on—after perhaps two or three years—they had learned some lessons in the presentation of the drama ; the influence of the Principal Theatre was, I believe, responsible for many improvements. The performances certainly became more " legitimate," more conventional : the art of stage-management had, in many cases, been thoroughly mastered, and starred names, even, appeared upon the bills. Although these minor theatres never moved from the side-streets, they became efficient and eminently respectable : at the close of the period under review they were undoubtedly drawing a very much better class of audience.

Efficient and eminently respectable ! And yet . . . for many of us they had lost their charm. For there was an attraction in the unconventional and unsophisticated : we found a surprising humour in the old unrehearsed effects, in the chaotic staging ; there was a bizarre beauty in the garish, tinsel scenery, human interest and

sympathy in the doings and sayings of those knock-about artists in their queer rigs. It was not great drama ; on those stages no world-wide reputations were made, no memorable speeches spoken. But there were incidents, humorous and tragic, " gags " and catch-words which provoked to laughter and to tears, entrances and exits where actors and audience mingled, players whose names were scarcely known, but who, perhaps for one performance only, walked on and spoke their lines most manfully. It is rather a pity to forget it all ; so at the risk of a yawning audience, the curtain shall rise once more upon a side-show in a side-street in the unregenerate days of 1915.

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At the beginning of May, 1915, the situation in Mesopotamia was, briefly, as follows : I.E.F. " D," which as a force of two brigades had in November, 1914, landed at Fao and, after defeating the Turks, occupied Basra, was by now increased to two divisions, the Sixth and Twelfth. These two divisions, with army troops, were dispersed between the neighbourhood of Basra, at Kurna, 40 miles upstream at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates, and near Ahwaz, 120 miles up the Karun River in Persian Arabistan.

In the previous month, a determined attempt by the Turks to retake Basra had been defeated near Shaiba, about ten miles to the west of that town, all available troops having been concentrated to meet this attack and only small forces retained at Kurna and Ahwaz. The Turkish main force, defeated and disorganized at Shaiba, had retreated to Nasryeh on the Euphrates and was for the time being out of the picture. There remained the subsidiary forces opposite Kurna and Ahwaz. Until these were disposed of any farther advance on our part was precluded, for the Turks just north of Kurna were in position across the Tigris and our only line of communications, while the force at Ahwaz was directly on the flank of any advance northward.

Sir John Nixon had arrived in the middle of April to assume command of the Force, with Generals Townshend (Sixth) and Gorringe (Twelfth) as his two Divisional Commanders ; and as soon as the situation round Basra had settled down, he determined on an advance to Amara, ninety miles up the Tigris from Kurna. With this object in view, the Twelfth Division was to make a wide turning movement, via Ahwaz, through Arabistan, directed on Amara, while the Sixth Division was to advance directly against the Turkish positions astride the Tigris. It is of the preparations for this latter operation, or rather of the occasions which made it both

necessary and possible, that it is proposed to give an account, and for this purpose some retrospection is necessary.

Imagine a narrow tongue of land between two rivers and upon it a squalid village ; the most prominent buildings are a few low brick houses of a pale and sickly complexion and of uncertain stability, which some gaping shell-holes can scarcely have improved. The rest of the village consists of mud and reed hovels, narrow lanes and by-ways, ditches and scummy pools, where most surprising and distressing odours are to be encountered on every hand ; but these less reputable quarters are veiled in the fortunate obscurity of the date plantations which cover this apex of land between the rivers, and also the further shores. Looking upstream, the right-hand river is the Tigris, the left-hand the Euphrates ; the former, a turgid, tawny stream, flows with a swift current from the north-west, meeting the clear, sleepy waters of the Euphrates immediately below the point. Where they meet there is a "boil" over a sandy bar, and the blended waters—now the Shatt-el-Arab—continue their journey of a hundred odd miles to the Persian Gulf. Across the Tigris in a date garden is the collection of huts known as Mazera, and across the Euphrates, also concealed in a belt of palms, lies Sherish. Such are—or were early in 1915—Kurna and its immediate surroundings.

At the beginning of the year Kurna and Mazera had been held by two brigades of the Sixth Division, the 18th at Kurna and the 17th at Mazera, but, towards the end of February, the 18th had been recalled downstream and the 17th—less one battalion remaining at Mazera—had moved across the Tigris and taken over the Kurna defences.

Whatever moves the strategic situation might demand, it had been evident for some time that Mazera would shortly be no place for an infantry brigade ; for a sad change had lately come over the country. On our arrival in January a level plain spread before us, on both banks of the Tigris, almost as far as the eye could reach, though in the far distance the tall reeds of marshland could be made out ; but between our positions and the Ratta Canal, six miles upstream, behind which the Turks were lying, it was all sound going. But gradually the marshes had encroached, and water gleamed in unexpected places ; then a rivulet made its sudden appearance, to meander aimlessly across the middle-distance, throwing out pools by the way ; finally, all the plain where we had ridden pig and shot sand grouse and the enemy's patrols had walked nightly like Agag, became "impassable for infantry." The finishing touch was provided by the bursting of the "bund"—which protected the

low-level ground from the high-level river—so that one morning we awoke to hear the lapping of the waves against our parapets. For a week or more we struggled in a sea of mud and dammed, as men had never dammed before, to stem the thousand insidious trickles ; but the pace was altogether too hot to last, and just in time we withdrew our persons from the slough and sought sanctuary across the river in Kurna.

But long before things had come to this pass it had been foreseen—by those whose business it is to foresee such things on such occasions—that in all probability there would be a considerable amount of surface water about ere long ; indeed, every Arab in the place said that it had happened so every year since the days of Noah, and the “ Military Report on Irak (or Lower Mesopotamia) ” seemed to confirm this story. Consequently, by the exercise of this foresight, it had been decreed that each regiment in the brigade should train four crews—one from each company—to propel and navigate the local boat, a canoe-shaped vessel with curled ends and a flat bottom, capable of carrying about ten men.

The first ventures of these crews were said by idle spectators to be excruciatingly funny and to provide an excellent entertainment ; but they were scarcely so appreciated by the performers themselves. After all, “ shovels G.S.” do not make very effective paddles in a five-knot stream, and many members of the Indian crews had never been in any form of boat before they embarked upon the transport at Bombay. The process of learning the ways of a ship upon the waters was painful ; the men sat hunched and cowering upon the thwarts, making pathetic little jabs with their hopelessly inadequate paddles at the swirling waters, while all in concert lifted up their voices to explain to the Havildar in charge exactly why it was that their ship (whose female relations were guilty of unspeakable offences) persisted in drifting broadside to perdition. It must be confessed that the British crews were not, at first, much more proficient, but the absence of any desire to debate problems of navigation with the coxswain was a factor distinctly in favour of greater efficiency. By the time the 17th Brigade crossed to Kurna great progress had been made, and the brigade contained at least a nucleus of officers and men who understood the odd ways of the local craft, while even among the uninitiated there was a truly remarkable intimacy with all matters connected with mud and water, which was to stand us in good stead later.

The Kurna defences had been shaped by our predecessors from material provided by the industry of some former race of inhabitants.

That the solid earthen banks and the sturdy brick kilns upon them could have been the handiwork of the present-day inhabitants was, judging from the painful sensitiveness of these worthies to any form of hard work, a theory which it was impossible to accept as fact. For six hundred yards on both the northern and western sides, and about half a mile from the village on the point, these banks extended, about twelve feet high and twelve feet broad, meeting in a right angle at the north-west corner. Here, and at four other points, stood remarkably solid brick kilns which had been converted into fortified posts, while trenches connecting these strong points had been excavated in the banks ; directly in rear of these a road had been built which made a circuit of the defences.

The eastern face, that is to say the Tigris bank, was occupied by the few brick houses before mentioned, the southern face—the Euphrates bank—was protected by a more or less continuous wall, and on the point at the junction of the two rivers, a strong redoubt had been constructed. Within this perimeter, two sides wall and two sides river, was an area of less than one square mile. With the exception of the village at the southern end, it was nearly all thickly planted with date trees and criss-crossed by irrigation ditches which, between the road and the trees on the northern and western faces, had contributed to the formation of a stagnant odoriferous lake, the breeding-place of innumerable mosquitoes.

Our quarters, we discovered, were in this date plantation where each tent as it was pitched, acquired the properties of a "moated grange," for there was only room for one tent between each series of ditches ; an arrangement unexceptionable from the point of view of privacy, but not conducive to easy communication within the camp. It was found that a single palm log thrown from bank to bank of the moat demanded feats of equilibrium and agility beyond the scope of most.

So it was that we settled down in our little saucer. Beyond the rim the waters spread round us on every side, a steely, shimmering plain, except where the palm trees rose from the floods and threw their green reflections upon the polished mirror beneath. In the distance to the north sundry brown lumps—like the backs of monsters wallowing in some primeval flood—denoted the 'Turks' island positions, whence, when the spirit moved them, the enemy sent down scallywag Arabs to snipe by night, or by day indulged in a lethargic gun-fire which had remarkably little result. All March we looked over the rim of our saucer and saw that the waters increased upon the earth ; soon there were no more rivers, as such ; only, across

the glassy fields, a curling streak of troubled water between the palms denoted the Tigris and, to the south, a band of deeper blue—the Euphrates. Though the floods would not reach their maximum height for at least another six weeks, we, who lived in the bottom of the saucer, were already well below water-level ; we wondered how long the rim would stand the strain before it caved in—and what, precisely, the result would be when it did ?

However, such vain speculation was as useless as it was unpleasant, and, indeed, there was no occasion for idleness, if we would “save the ship.” All day and every day it was a case of stopping leaks and cutting drains (there were two powerful pumps at work by now), of building and revetting, tamping and puddling, and taking mud from one place to slop it into another ; it was an amusement which long, long ago had lost that ephemeral popularity it had once enjoyed. The Israelites were quite right in that matter of making bricks without straw.

Winter experiences in cotton-drill clothing had not inclined most people to take very seriously the stories of the devastating summer we might expect, but by the end of March the midday heat gave more colour to these stories, and it was decided to build reed huts for all ranks, to take the place of tents. In this part of the world reed houses are the fashion for all but the most prosperous, and have been from time immemorial. That strange amphibious people, the Marsh Arabs—with whom we were to have dealings in the near future—live, many of them, in the permanent marshes between the Euphrates and Tigris, while all are accustomed to the possibility of having their villages flooded for six months out of the year. Consequently, they have evolved a simple and inexpensive form of housing, suitable to a country devoid of building-timber or stone in any form, where it may, also, be convenient, in view of local feuds, to pull down one's house, pack it in a boat and transport it elsewhere for re-erection. So it was that certain professors from among the Marsh Arabs were engaged to instruct us in the art of building these reed huts, and it was interesting to watch the business—probably one of the oldest in the world. Operations were begun by spitlocking out the ground-plan ; this was performed with the nasty-looking curved knife which most of these men carry, said to be an instrument of husbandry used in date growing, but in appearance, and often enough in employment, a thoroughly unpleasant weapon. As soon as the plan is marked out, bundles of stout reeds, each bundle about six feet high and a foot thick, are deeply planted at intervals to serve as uprights, and, across these, bundles of slenderer reeds are tied ; into the frame-work

thus made more reeds are woven, vertically and horizontally, forming quite solid walls in which the necessary windows are cut later. The roof is built in the same way, the roof-tree, gables and rafters being formed of bundles of reeds and the whole very thickly thatched till a rain- and sun-proof roof results. Such houses, which looked very much like thatched cottages when completed, were, it should be explained, specially designed "Europe-pattern" for our use; the natives combine sides and roof by bending over the upright bundles to meet the ground on the opposite side, in the form of bows, so that their huts are almost tunnel-shaped, with one open end serving as a door, and the other closed by reed mats. It is said that the Arch of Ctesiphon is of the same peculiar shape and pitch as these reed arches of the Marsh Arabs, which would seem to prove that even fourteen hundred years ago they had existed long enough in their present form to have become a habit of mind in the local architect; not by any means impossible, for the local boat is still "pitched within and without with pitch."

By now the floods had risen sufficiently to take the boats, and on their calm surface, undisturbed by any current, the crews made surprising progress in the art of punting, which is the local method of propelling all craft wherever the depth of water makes it possible. The marshes were gradually changing their appearance. Above the water a green haze of young reed-tops was already beginning to show, and soon the whole expanse was covered with a strong growth which varied in height from two to four feet near the Tigris bank, to a maximum of ten feet in the distance, west of the Turkish positions. The semi-open water extended for about 800 yards westward of the Tigris; once beyond this, one entered an immense jungle traversed by narrow winding channels only just broad enough to take a boat. The view was limited to a strip of blue sky above and to ten yards or so of the channel, before it turned again; in places, of course, it was possible to see over the top of the reeds by standing up, but as a rule one was completely shut in by impenetrable walls, and the sultry atmosphere in those narrow passages must have been experienced to be realized. Here and there were open pools, or clearings, where the natives came to cut reeds; if surprised, they invariably took to the water and, swimming like otters, disappeared up some by-channel. Everybody and everything connected with Marsh Arabs swims—men, women and little children, dogs, cows, sheep and pigs, they think no more of swimming if a boat is not available, than we think of walking if a cab be not forthcoming. But the soldier who was heard to remark, "Even the blinkin' chickens can dive, let

alone swim," was, actually, observing a moorhen. Besides cows and water-buffaloes which splashed and wallowed everywhere, the marshes were full of wild animals and birds. Pig, jackals and cats abounded, the latter a big mottled species which lived on fish ; while among the birds the purple coot, with his gorgeous plumage, was the most noticeable, though for beauty the various kinds of kingfishers ran him close. All the duck, which crowd both rivers in the winter, had apparently gone, and the snipe had begun to migrate at the end of January.

But, if there was no more opportunity for the scatter-gun, it was now that the rod came into its own—the rod, often enough, being but a trimmed palm-branch, and the tackle decidedly primitive. In the rivers, particularly the Euphrates, immense fish, bottom-feeders of the carp family, are caught by the natives on lumps of dough and dates ; these fish sometimes run up to 200 lbs. or more—I believe the official record is somewhere about 212 lbs. Although big game such as this was never met with at Kurna, there was plenty of fun to be had with very much smaller fish which rose well to the fly. As the palm branches and home-made tackle were superseded by trout rods and their appurtenances, imported from India, great sport was obtained on the marshes.

It was at the beginning of April that the doings of the outer world distracted us from our various private enterprises. News from downstream gave reason to believe that the promised Turkish attack on Shaiba would soon materialize ; the detachment at Ahwaz was, apparently, being kept busy, and even the enemy opposite Kurna evinced symptoms of the general unrest. From the mud islands in the marshes their guns, the nearest some three thousand yards away, made persevering attempts to disturb us with a desultory and remarkably inaccurate fire, and at night the most shattering explosions marked the progress of mines, floated down-river with the object of blowing up the sloops lying in the stream, or the bridge which connected Kurna with Mazera. For the present they succeeded only in demolishing large slabs of the bank where they ran aground.

But on Sunday, the 11th of April, the " hate " became intensive, and we concluded, rightly, that the big attack at Shaiba was staged. From noon till midnight the Turkish guns did their best to make us uncomfortable, and, though conspicuously unsuccessful, they certainly improved on their previous form, managing to plaster the north face with some regularity and even to lob a few shells well into camp. In the early hours of the next morning a mine at last achieved its mission, and the centre of the bridge went up to heaven, and as soon

as it grew light Arab snipers betrayed their presence among the palms on the Euphrates banks opposite the southern and western faces ; they had come down across the marshes during the night. But it was not long before these gentry were turned out by a gunboat, which made things so hot for them that they were forced to take to their boats, and appeared in full flight northward, across the marshes. It was a remarkable sight. Suddenly out of the flooded palm-belt burst scores of little black canoes, to stream away across the marsh, their crews poling furiously towards the cover of the denser reed-beds. But to reach these they had about 2000 yards of the semi-open water to cross, and during its passage our machine-gun fire and four-inch shrapnel played havoc with the fleet ; watching the hail of shrapnel splashes on the water, it seemed a miracle that any canoes escaped. Later in the day another contingent ran the gauntlet in the same way, and on this occasion the Turkish guns were seen to fire on them as they broke northward ; but for this, the Turks, as far as we could see, took no part at all in this naval attack.

Two or three days more of desultory bombardment and of threatened Arab attacks which failed to materialize, brought an end to the Turkish offensive as far as Kurna was concerned. Our total casualties were, I believe, two slightly wounded, one of whom was a Persian blacksmith who insisted upon standing up to have a " look-see " instead of attending to his business ; but to this list may perhaps be added the mess cow of one regiment which, as a result it is supposed of nervous shock, became incapable of any further milk supply.

The menace to the British left and right flanks having now been disposed of—for the Turks near Ahwaz began to withdraw as soon as the result of Shaiba was known—Kurna was once more to emerge from its obscurity and become again the forefront of the battle ; but, in the meantime, there still remained some odd jobs to be done. The Turkish line of retreat from Shaiba to Nasryeh skirted the Euphrates, and attempts were made, by sending ships up that river from Kurna, to intercept and harass the later stages of the retreat. However, the shallowness of the Hammar Lake, some miles east of Nasryeh, effectually prevented very much being done, though a " Euphrates Blockade Force "—companies of infantry embarked on shallow-draft steamers—was sent on detachment from Kurna. It was the sort of amphibious operation to which we were becoming accustomed, and was an almost perfect example of naval and military co-operation—of a sort. That is to say, the ship would carry the troops for a certain distance—until she went aground. Thereupon the troops would step out and carry—or push—their craft over the

shallows until deeper water was found, and they were at liberty once more to embark and proceed under steam as far as the next obstacle. And so on—but not to Nasryeh.

During the last few weeks the Marsh Arabs had been getting very much above themselves, and, especially in the matter of looting the convoy from Basra to Shaiba, had given considerable trouble. A tribe living on the right bank of the Euphrates some twelve miles above Kurna, whose Shaikh was deeply implicated in this nefarious business, was singled out for exemplary punishment, and, as it chanced that another and friendly tribe had a grievance against him which it itched to work off, joint action was decided on.

Accordingly early one morning towards the end of April, these allied forces rendezvoused upon the glassy waters of the Euphrates ; the one, two companies of British and Indian infantry on a stern-wheel steamer, supported by a naval sloop ; the other, a strange medley of black canoes in which sat and stood and swayed the rag-time army of our ally. A babel of voices rose and fell across the water, banners waved, strange weapons glittered, paddles and poles flashed in the sun ; it was going to be the devil of a business, said our friendly Shaikh, for the opposition were very desperate fellows. So it was arranged that his fleet of warriors should proceed at once to surround the hostile village, and that “ the warship ”—our decrepit old stern-wheeler—should follow at a given signal and awe our opponent into surrender. For that signal we waited in vain ; when at the end of two hot and weary hours, we puffed up the main creek leading to the village, there we found our gallant allies dozing or squabbling in the sun, still waiting for a lead from the warship. After much talk, they were at last persuaded to advance to the attack. That the village had been evacuated by the enemy on our first appearance somewhat restored their confidence, and it was felt that under these circumstances a really fierce, first-class battle might be risked. The black canoes, like a swarm of water-beetles, darted away over the flood, dodging the palm-trees with miraculous skill, while the air resounded with shrill invective and the lusty bangs of Muscat Martinis, discharged towards heaven. There were a few answering pops from the village, but no kind of resistance before immense black clouds of smoke rolled lazily into the blue sky—and anon our allies returned, heavy with loot and victory. The two commanders met upon the deck of the warship ; from one, a speech of astounding fluency, from the other a tribute of tinned mackerel and a jar of pickles—and the day was at an end. A perfect day ; marred only by the thought that one had not understood a single syllable of those

flowery periods, and the other had not the ghost of an idea how to open his tin of mackerel.

It was now early in May, and of late both sun and water had increased to an uncomfortable degree. Within the Kurna perimeter we were living more than two feet below the water level of marshes and rivers without, and it became increasingly difficult to deal with the water-logged state of our small camp, while the defences were disintegrating before our eyes. Day after day dawned hotter and steamier, the sun losing nothing by reflection from the surrounding floods. Though the palms certainly provided some shade, they also effectually stifled any breeze that there might be, while the irrigation ditches bred mosquitoes nearly as big as snipe, with beaks to match. Personal experience proved that they could pierce a pair of flannel trousers and an army blanket.

But at last there were signs that we should make a move ere long—much to every one's relief. Kurna had once more become a centre of attraction to inspecting generals ; but surest sign of all that something was impending, an order had arrived that two hundred men per regiment were immediately to be trained in punting and paddling boats. There was a serious lack of these—only sixteen boats being available in the brigade for the training of eight hundred men—but there was no lack of keenness. It was plain to all that if we wished to move from Kurna we must do as had long ago been done in this part of the world when “ the waters prevailed exceedingly upon the earth.”

AN ECHO OF TANNENBERG

THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL VON PRITTWITZ: THE 20TH OF AUGUST, 1914

AN article in the *Militär Wochenblatt* of the 23rd of April, 1921 (No. 43), entitled "General von Prittwitz after the Battle of Gumbinnen," has raised an interesting discussion on the fate of that Commander in the early days of the war. Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows :—

According to the German plan of campaign, the intention of the German General Staff was to remain on the defensive on the Russian front while the full weight of Germany's armed strength was employed to gain the decision in France. It was expected that the German Eighth Army, co-operating with the Austro-Hungarian Armies, would suffice to hold the Russians in check until the victory in France had been won. Moltke hoped to be able to begin the transport of the German divisions from France to the Russian front by mid-September, when the combined offensive of the Central Powers against Russia would be set in movement.

During the second week in August it was clear that the Russians were concentrating against East Prussia, the north-eastern province of Germany, which juts out towards Russian territory, lending itself to a concentric attack from east and south. On learning the Russian dispositions, General von Prittwitz, commanding the Eighth Army, brought his divisions, which were scattered along the eastern frontier of Germany, northward and assembled them in East Prussia.

On the 16th of August, the First Russian Army (Army of the Niemen) crossed the frontier from the east and marched towards Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia. To meet this offensive General von Prittwitz formed up his Army for battle on a line north and south about the Masurian Lakes, and on the 20th of August the opposing forces met, and fought what is known as the battle of Gumbinnen. During the evening, when the result of the battle was still undecided, news arrived through an aeroplane reconnaissance that another Russian Army (the Army of the Narew) was

advancing against East Prussia from the south and threatening the right flank and rear of the German battle front.

According to General von François,* General von Prittwitz, faced with this situation, decided that same evening to break off the battle and evacuate East and West Prussia, offering no further resistance to the Russians until he had brought his Army back to behind the Vistula. The Supreme Command at Coblenz did not, however, agree to this, and thereupon decided to remove General von Prittwitz from his post, and to stop the retreat of the Eighth Army, ordering it, on the 22nd of August, to turn against the Army of the Narew.

This version of the action of the Supreme Command has been generally accepted as correct, and reported by all the leading military writers in Germany in describing the operations in East Prussia in August, 1914. Lieut.-General Reitzenstein has, however, now taken up the challenge on General von Prittwitz's behalf and maintains that the latter always denied verbally and in private correspondence that he ever intended to retire behind the Vistula; also that he meant to publish his defence as soon as the war was over. Death, however, prevented him from doing so, and on his behalf General Reitzenstein has printed a copy of a document found among General von Prittwitz's military papers. It is the draft of his report to the Supreme Command, in his own handwriting, concerning his actions and intentions in the last half of August, 1914. It was written on the 21st of August, copied fair on the night of the 21st-22nd, and dispatched on the 22nd, at the very moment when the telegram arrived directing the General to relinquish his post. After relating the events leading up to the battle of Gumbinnen and describing the progress of the battle as favourable on both wings but unfavourable in the centre, the report runs as follows:—

“ In spite of the losses of the XVII. Corps, the situation of the battle (of Gumbinnen) seemed to me favourable, when at 7 p.m. an air report came in that left me in no doubt that enemy columns, estimated at three army corps, were advancing from the Narew from the general direction of Warsaw. This information was confirmed by headquarters of the XX. Corps at Ortelsburg. The heads of the two leading columns had already reached the German frontier north-west of Mława, and another column was reported a little farther in rear.

“ I was thus confronted with a difficult problem: whether to continue the battle with the I. Corps, I. Reserve Corps and 3rd

• “Marneschlacht und Tannenberg.”

Reserve Division with the possibility of being successful, and then to turn later against the enemy columns advancing south-west of the (Masurian) Lakes, or to be content with what success had already been obtained and take advantage of the favourable situation of the battle and the oncoming darkness to break off the fight, disengage from the enemy and march to a position on the right flank of the Army for an offensive against the new arrivals from the Narew : the flank march to be covered by holding the defiles between the Masurian lakes. I have decided on the latter alternative, as I gather from a telephone conversation with the XVII. Corps Commander that his losses have been such that he will scarcely be able to continue the offensive on the morrow, and also because, even though the enemy's losses might be still heavier if he remained in position, I should have lost an extremely valuable day for the operations against the new enemy marching against my flank. I should otherwise have only the XX. Corps, the 70th Landwehr Brigade and two weak mixed brigades of garrison troops to employ against it.

" Having made my decision, it was necessary to move the Army as quickly as possible to my right flank. The general reserve at Königsberg has been ordered to march by night to Insterburg. The I. Corps is to march in two columns behind the general reserve, also on Insterburg, and from there as well as from Wenlau, Tapiau and Königsberg, its brigades are to be transported by rail via Dirschau, Graudenz and Marienwerder to Gosslershausen and Bischofswerder. The transport is to begin at midday on the 22nd. I calculate that the last of the fighting troops will leave Königsberg on the 24th, at the latest, and that the Corps will be ready for action on the morning of the 25th. In case the force under General von Scholtz should have to retire, I intend to use this (I.) Corps for an attack against the enemy's left flank.

" The 3rd Reserve Division has also been transported by rail and is at the moment detraining at Allenstein. It will be joined to-morrow morning by the 6th Landwehr Brigade which till now has been guarding the defiles between the Lakes south of Lötzen. The 3rd Reserve Division and the 6th Landwehr Brigade have been placed under the orders of the XX. Corps Commander.

" The I. Reserve Corps and the XVII. Corps are to reach Nordenburg and Astrawischken to-day (22nd) and will march on from there by way of Gerdaven and Allenburg respectively. Both these Corps will be brought up on the left flank of General von Scholtz. I hope, therefore, to be able to take the enemy in flank

with these two Corps as well, should General von Scholtz's troops be compelled to retire."

So much for General von Prittwitz's report. General Reitzenstein, the champion of his cause, writes :—

"Whether von Prittwitz was right or wrong in his decision to leave the Vilna Army (Army of the Niemen) and march against the Army of the Narew, is beside the point. The report does, however, prove without doubt that he not only intended to turn against the Army of the Narew, but that on the 21st of August he had already made full preparations for attacking that Army on both flanks ; moreover, it is an open question whether the victory of Tannenberg would have been possible without those preparations. The report shows no idea of withdrawing behind the Vistula ; the word Vistula is, in fact, not mentioned. Von Prittwitz could never understand how the story had originated, and, in his opinion, it could only have been by a misunderstood telephone conversation or by information from some person or persons who did not know, and could not have known, his intentions. The fact that he took his staff into his confidence in this matter is shown by a letter from one of the senior staff officers of Eighth Army Headquarters :—

"It must be a great satisfaction to you that your plans for the operations against the Army of the Narew have proved so brilliantly successful. It is true that they were carried out with remarkable energy ; nevertheless they would not have been practicable until the I. Corps had been transported by rail."

The conclusions drawn by General Reitzenstein from this report are, however, challenged by Colonel Schäfer in an article in the *Militär Wochenblatt* of the 7th of May, 1921 (No. 45) :—

"It should be remembered," he writes, "that the report was written after the consultation with the Supreme Command (on the evening of the 21st of August), and that it must have been influenced both by such an exchange of ideas and by the general improvement in the situation on that and on the following day. . . . On the 20th of August General von Prittwitz was of a very different opinion. That evening he telephoned to General von Mackensen (commanding the XVII. Corps) that he was going to retire behind the Vistula, and the Lines of Communication authorities were given a similar notification of his intentions. . . . As, however, General Rennenkampf (commanding the Russian Army of the Niemen) did not press forward on the 21st, von Prittwitz became more confident, and this fact, together with the effect of his conversation with the

Supreme Command, led him to the decision to re-group his Army and attack the western flank of the Russian Army of the Narew."

Colonel von Schäfer states further, though he unfortunately gives no authority for it, that—

"General von Prittwitz on the evening of the 21st of August, before writing his report, spoke on the telephone to General von Stein and immediately afterwards to General von Moltke, and described the situation of his Army as extremely unfavourable, and made an urgent request for reinforcements. When von Moltke impressed on him the necessity of holding the line of the Vistula at all costs if he really had to retire, von Prittwitz expressed doubt whether he would be able to do even that with the handful of troops at his disposal. As a result of this conversation, the change of command in East Prussia was proposed to the Emperor."

In spite of Colonel Schäfer's statement, and assuming it to be true, there seems little doubt that the assembly of the German divisions in East Prussia against the Russian Army of the Narew was planned and begun by General von Prittwitz. Up till now, Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who nominally took over the Eighth Army from General von Prittwitz on the 22nd of August, have received all the credit for the movements of the Eighth Army which led to the battle of Tannenberg, while General von Prittwitz has been generally condemned as a thoroughly incapable commander. It remains to be seen whether this judgment will be modified and some posthumous recognition awarded to him for the first German victories in East Prussia.

MILITARY MUSIC, PAST AND PRESENT

BY COLONEL J. C. SOMERVILLE, C.M.G., C.B.E., Commandant of
the Royal Military School of Music

It has ever been an article of faith that military bands are incapable of playing music other than marches, patriotic airs (with cornet solo), a rehash of light operatic tunes, and, on occasion, dance music. There has recently come into the possession of Kneller Hall an ancient musical MS., copied from a still more ancient one dated 1632, signed "Charles, R.," first sight of which made me hope that some air of martial music had blown down the centuries to us. But alas ! even in that year of grace an economy entirely in consonance with the severe limitations of a later date had decreed that it was superfluous to print more than the sternly practical beats of the drum, set in one line of the stave and to the expressive words :—

" Pou tou pou tou Poug ! "

and the five archaic, diamond-shaped notes, which give the exact measure, are all that have descended to us. But the fact is sufficiently established that, for the soldier of those days, mere music was considered a superfluity.

So persistent has been this tradition that it is only of comparatively recent years that its foundations have shown signs of being, to some extent, undermined. In the general musical renaissance, at the threshold of which we now find ourselves, its final collapse should be accomplished, and a new and better tradition founded, upon the everlasting rocks—Bach, Handel, Mozart, Beethoven and all the great Masters of Music !

Possibly this may be considered akin to saying that soldiers should only read Shakespeare, Milton, Walter Scott and Shelley, but it may be urged that, if a foundation is well and truly laid, it is easy to continue on less solid lines without loss either of style or dignity.

What disastrous influences have been responsible for the persistence of so much—to quote Sir Hugh Allen—" beastly music "

in the Army? There are several, of which one of the chiefest has been, and must continue to be, adherence to the old high pitch—that fatal half-tone above the International, which absolutely precludes the possibility of co-operation with the best of the great orchestras, or music outside the Services in general. When the Philharmonic in 1885 adopted the International, or Continental pitch, with the laudable intention of helping to standardize it throughout the civilized world, an effort was made by Kneller Hall to bring the Army into line at the same time. The Powers that Were at the War Office had no objection to the change on principle: all they stipulated was that it should be carried out “without expense to the public.” This meant that the already under-paid officers, by whom regimental bands were then practically financed, would have been solely responsible for their re-equipment with instruments of the new pitch. The result was a foregone conclusion. There was apparently no one to point out to those on whom rested the responsibility of decision the disastrous consequences to military music entailed in adherence to the old high pitch, nor do I suppose that, had this been done, they would have realized the *damnosa hereditas* which they were laying up for future generations—nor even that they would greatly have cared. Considering the state of musical enlightenment at the time, they are not altogether to be blamed. It was estimated that the change of pitch might have been effected by converting the brass instruments and replacing the wood-wind for some £20,000: it could hardly now be done for ten times that amount!

The result has been that civil and military music and musicians have drifted ever more widely apart, the one from the other; and that, while the civil colleges have gone on steadily raising their standards up to their present high level, we in the Army have been content to continue in the old rut, croaking to one another like frogs in a pond—damned impenetrably from the main stream of progress—and continuing to regard the overture to “William Tell,” “Zampa,” and other such rococo claptrap, as the summit of ambition for the band to play or the soldier to appreciate.

Tradition in the Army dies hard, good or bad, and there are other causes that have operated to keep this one alive. The last generation, as I have already said, was fed almost exclusively on a musical diet of “ballads,” turned out in their thousands by *soi-disant* composers, and their taste from childhood was thus vitiated at the source. The young man, on joining the Army, found a similar class of musical ration being served out and, since what are known as “Classical

Concerts " do not appeal to the average budding warrior, he had neither opportunity nor desire for self-culture, or for a change in the fare offered to him by the regimental band. In civil life, both in the colleges and in the concert halls, there was a steady and persistent upward trend in the standard of the music taught and played ; but this passed the soldier by unnoticed, and left him serenely content to follow the line of least resistance, *i.e.* the cheap, easily apprehended, ephemeral tune. It never occurred to him to reflect that, after a few short months, at most, he would have no further use for it, and would probably be throwing boots at the head of a chum whistling it in the barrack-room.

The conservatism of the Service—its strength in some things, its weakness in others—coupled with a dead weight of general inertia, is largely accountable for the persistence of this state of affairs. Even now—even after the experience of the war, which demonstrated beyond the shadow of a peradventure the great psychologic value of music, both for recreation and recuperation—it is still, to some extent, regarded much as the gold lace on the sleeve of a tunic : an ornamental adjunct, but in no way vitally necessary to the wellbeing of the Service.

By those in authority music, in fact, has never been taken sufficiently seriously. It has never been considered as a factor of any real importance in the life of the soldier, and no continuous effort has been made to raise the status of the musicians or the quality of the music. True, the officers have been relieved of financial responsibility for the upkeep of their bands, but this by no means presupposes an intelligent interest in them. It was the tardy recognition of the fact that the pay of an officer was not on a scale to enable him to continue as the sole support of an institution that should from its inception have been financed by the State. The bitter cry of the hard-up subaltern at length penetrated to the official sanctum, and the concession was made, much as one gives a shilling to an afflicted beggar to induce him to conceal his infirmities and cease his complainings.

" But," say some, " neither officers nor men will tolerate your high-brow music : they won't listen to it. What they want is jazz, rag-time and musical comedy selections. It is only necessary to give them that ; they want nothing better."

This view is only partially and, I believe, temporarily true ; and every passing year makes and will make it less and less so. The thing chiefly to be avoided, in whatever effort is made to raise the standard of musical taste of the man in the ranks, is the least

hint that he is being educated ; and the greatest tact, therefore, will be necessary during its inception. Any suspicion that " high brow " music is deliberately being foisted on him would be sufficient to frighten him from attendance at, or participation in, regimental " gaffs." The powder must at first be administered homeopathically in a large quantity of jam, which can gradually be reduced until the arrival of the day when the powder has become transmuted into jam and the jam into powder. Consider what Sir Henry Wood has done to educate the London public—the immense success of his campaign for good music. The crowd that throngs the promenade, more particularly on Wagner nights, is largely composed of the same class as is found in the ranks ; and it is my strong conviction that a parallel result might be achieved in the Army, through tactful manipulation and a gradual improvement in the class of music performed. During the last twelve months I have seen a number of bandmasters who have been in London on leave or duty, and, almost without exception, they have expressed the opinion that musical taste is gradually—very gradually—improving ; and that anything tending to speed it up would be most welcome.

In this connection, it is encouraging to hear, as I frequently have, from those who organized concert parties behind the lines during the war, of their experiences. One lady, a professional violinist, declared that it was invariably the best music which received the most applause. On her second tour, a man came and asked her to play again something of which all that he could remember was a fragment of the air. She identified it as the theme of the finale of the E major Bach violin concerto. The whole problem really resolves itself into familiarizing the men with good music, the complexity of which is its only bar to popularity. Once this has been achieved, they will then automatically reject the shoddy, unoriginal stuff that now so lightly and easily captures their fancy.

Music publishers might do much to help, and would do more than they do at present, if only they would realize that the classics are really a sounder investment than musical comedy, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven. I understand that in present conditions, it costs some £200 to publish a military band score of average length, and this, in the case of the ephemeral stuff, becomes a dead loss after a year or two. The classics, on the other hand, have demonstrated that they are immortal, and that there will always be *some* demand for them—probably an increasing one. It is the test of time that shows whether music is good or bad : there is really no other trustworthy criterion. How is it that " The Swanee River,"

"Annie Laurie" and "Drink to me only" have persisted and are still live tunes, while "The Man that broke the Bank," "Daisy, Daisy, give me your Answer, do" are all but forgotten? Simply, I take it, through their own inherent excellence, which the touchstone of time has proved.

Probably one of the chief reasons why good modern music is not composed for military bands is that there is at present no authoritative pronouncement as to what is the combination of instruments of which such a band should be constituted, and composers are uncertain, therefore, as to the instruments on which they can reckon in order to obtain the effect that they wish to produce. What, again, is the minimum number of performers necessary for giving an artistic rendering of serious music? It is generally put down as from twenty-one to twenty-five; but this should be definitely determined, as well as what instruments should be employed, and the system on which they should be duplicated and different ones added so that the proportion of each to each may not be upset. Hitherto, the balance of the instruments has been more or less a matter of individual taste. Put the question of what a military band is to a dozen bandmasters, and you will receive as many different replies.

The gulf first opened by the divergence in the pitch between music in the Army and music in the colleges and concert halls, is hereby widened. I am convinced, however, that it can to some extent be bridged, even though there can never be much real freedom of traffic between the two banks. Our effort should be to engender on the one side a perception of the superiority of Beethoven and Wagner over Lehar and Ivan Caryll, and, on the other, the great possibilities, still more or less latent and unexplored, in the combination of brass and wood-wind for the performance of classical music. Hitherto, bandmasters have laboured—and in many instances with commendable results—under grave disadvantages. The line of least resistance is ever on the downward grade; and those progressing along it find that it leads to the Augean Stable in which, as might be expected, only the "bestly music," apostrophized by Sir Hugh Allen, is to be found.

In addition to the bandmaster's ostensible duty—the training of his band—he is badly handicapped by having to maintain a wary and unceasing defensive against the activities of the company officers, in order to prevent the rape of his bandsmen—possibly some of his most cherished soloists—from practice, for field training, musketry or some other purely military duty. It is only in the present nature

of things that he should usually come off second best ; and, in order to enable him to train his band unmolested and with satisfactory results, a number of reforms which I give below are, for the most part, both necessary and long overdue. I am well aware that a moment like the present, when economies are being enforced, and the gold lace on the sleeve of the tunic is being ruthlessly ripped away, is not the most propitious at which to advocate any reform which might raise by ever so small a degree the Army Estimates ; yet, when the comparatively small outlay is contrasted with the advantages, from the regimental, as well as from the musical point of view, I cannot but think that the following suggestions are at least worthy of calm consideration.

I.

The time is long overdue when the status of the bandmaster should be raised. As things now are, he touches the summit of his possible ambition on the day when he first receives his warrant—in the vast majority of cases, that is. Out of 198 bands in the Army there are eighteen “ Staff Bands ”—Guards, etc.—appointment to which goes by selection. The ordinary bandmaster can neither rise in rank nor look for any increase in pay ; and all material incentive to improve himself in musical knowledge and technique is at one stroke removed.

Bandmasters, in my opinion, are every bit as worthy of Commissions as quartermasters or warrant officers of the Army Educational Corps to whom they have recently been granted. Not, possibly, immediately an appointment from Kneller Hall, but at the end of a certain probationary period. And with each rise in rank there should, of course, be a corresponding increase in pay. Human nature usually requires something more than “ Art for Art’s Sake ” as a stimulant. That so many bandmasters do retain their freshness and enthusiasm is a fine tribute to their conscientious devotion alike to their duty and to their art. All honour to them.

A Commission, besides increasing his self-respect and raising his prestige *vis-à-vis* his band and the men generally, would put the bandmaster on stronger ground in any questions arising between him and company officers regarding the disposition of the acting bandsmen. If, however, my third suggestion were to be accepted, this fruitful source of trouble would be removed. In all the great European Armies the bandmaster is a commissioned officer, and I yet hope to see the day when he will also be one in our Army.

2.

But there will always be some to whom the attraction of "Art for Art's Sake" does not prove sufficiently potent. Bandmasters there might be who, even with the prospect of increased pay and promotion, would be content to remain in hide-bound lethargy, playing the same old hurdy-gurdy tunes up to the day of discharge. I should like to see a far more effective Discourager of Slackness in operation, and suggest the appointment from amongst the Directors of Music of travelling Inspectors of Bands—say, one for the United Kingdom, Channel Islands and Mediterranean, and one for India, the Straits Settlements and China.

The band is the only department of a unit which is not inspected annually, or ever, for the matter of that, by an expert, and, from a purely musical point of view, few of the reports rendered by commanding officers are worth the paper on which they are written. Without such reports, made by competent judges, on the state of efficiency of a band, it is impossible for the Commandant at Kneller Hall to make intelligent selections when the appointment of a bandmaster to a Staff Band has to be considered. At present he is obliged to trust to the annual reports (the greater number of which are probably far too eulogistic), and has rarely, if ever, an opportunity of forming an opinion personally, nor yet his Director of Music. And, failing a commanding officer with some expert knowledge of music, how is an incompetent bandmaster ever to be got rid of? There is no reason why he should not continue to beat time (I will not say "conduct") until time in its fullness beats him; and he passes, full of years and honour, to the enjoyment of his pension. But, given the two expert Inspectors of Bands for whom I am asking, and he will be obliged either to reform or to disappear without either honour or a full pension.

3.

I have already referred to the internecine warfare which goes on sporadically between the bandmaster and company officers over the bodies of the acting bandsmen, who are what Mr. Kipling would call "Harumphrodites"—both soldiers and musicians. I would advocate their complete abolition, and the substitution of a consolidated unit of thirty-six bandsmen (inclusive of the band sergeant), plus the normal complement of boys allowed by regulations, viz.: twelve, divided between band and drums. The old emulation amongst units to produce the largest number of musicians on parade

entailed a large and quite unnecessary expense both in instruments and music ; with a result which was always unwieldy, and was, more often than not, highly inefficient. An artistic rendering of music was not to be expected from an artificially inflated combination like this, owing to the scanty opportunities of getting it together for rehearsal. It was usually distinguished by a superfluity of wrong notes and a general disregard of the beat—only to be expected from men whose previous opportunities of seeing the score had been so few that all they could do was to keep their eyes immutably fixed on it during a performance.

The maximum band of about forty-two performers which the above suggestion would produce would be strong enough to play effectively under any conditions, indoors or out. It would be an independent unit for all purposes—drill, discipline and interior economy—and be under the command of the band president—or of the bandmaster himself, if a commissioned officer. Hereby the bandmaster would be relieved from the stratagems and diplomacies now required to get his band together for practice ; he would have every opportunity for welding his men into a really fine instrument, and bandsmen on leaving the Service should have become such expert musicians that there should be no question regarding their eventual employment in civil life. This is a reform that has long been crying out for recognition. The present system is an unsatisfactory makeshift, as on the face of it is apparent. The authorized number of bandsmen (twenty-two including the band sergeant) is too small, even when reinforced by the boys, to allow for the inevitable casualties, or to provide an ensemble strong enough to play under adverse conditions. The bandmaster would be relieved from anxiety on either score by the addition of the fourteen more bandsmen for whom I am asking ; and the band would gain out of all proportion in efficiency, *esprit de corps* and smoothness in administration.

The war amply demonstrated the need for a largely increased number of stretcher bearers ; and outside of their musical work, the band might specialize in this and in the rendering of first aid. They might also fire a modified course of musketry and be taught sufficient drill for them to know their place on parade. Beyond this, there should be nothing but music.

4.

Hitherto there has been an almost complete neglect—with a few notable exceptions, principally in Welsh units—of the possi-

bilities now dormant in the Army in the matter of concerted vocal music for male voices. Up to the present time, such efforts as have been made to develop the musical talent of the soldier have been almost entirely confined to cultivation of his instrumental capacities, and it is high time that his possibilities as a singer should be explored and exploited. When this is achieved, music will become an active factor instead of a dormant possibility in the life of the private soldier.

A beginning must, however, be made by training students at Kneller Hall to organize, instruct and conduct a choral class. Hitherto nothing scientific of the kind has been attempted beyond the weekly Church choir practice, from which not much of real value is to be learned. A student, on completing his course at Kneller Hall, should be able to take up his duties as bandmaster with as thorough a knowledge of the vocal, as of the instrumental branch of his art; and, with this object, instruction by a professor of choral music is essential.

It is a matter of amazement to me that concerted singing, the most characteristic manifestation of the English spirit in music, should hitherto have been treated with such scant recognition. Here I may invoke the support of old William Byrd of Elizabethan times—who seems, after the lapse of all these centuries, to be at last coming into his own—for my views on the capital importance of song in the musical life of the Army. Speaking of his own vocal compositions, he says: "Whatsoever paines I have taken herein, I shall think to be well employed if the same be well accepted, Musicke thereby the better loved, and the more exercised." And nothing in its way could be better than his reasons "to perswade every one to learn to sing."

Here they are:—

"First it is a knowledge easely taught, and quickly learned wher there is a good Master, and an apt Scoller.

"2. The exercise of singing is delightfull to Nature and good to preserve the health of Man.

"3. It doth strengthen all the parts of the brest, and doth open the pipes.

"4. It is a singular good remedie for a stutting and stammering in the speech.

"5. It is the best means to procure a perfect pronounciation and to make a good Orator.

"6. It is the onely way to know where Nature hath bestowed the benefit of a good voyce: which giuft is so rare, as there is not one among a thousand that hath it: and in many, that excellent giuft is lost, because they want Art to express Nature.

"7. There is not any Musick of Instruments whatsoever, comparable to that which is made of the voyces of Men, where the voyces are good, and the same well sorted and ordered.

"8. The better the voyce is, the meeter it is to honour and serve God therewith : and the voyce of man is chiefly to be employed to that ende.

"Omnis spiritus laudet Dominum.

"Since singing is so good a thing,
I wish all men would learne to sing."

In short, William Byrd rates the gift of Song as high as might be expected from one of his name, and I think there is little doubt but that he would back my belief that through concerted vocal music lies the road to the musical salvation, not only of the Army but of the nation.

5.

Great benefit to bands, and to the cause generally of music in the Service, would be derived from an annual conference of Directors of Music and representative bandmasters from each Command, elected by the bandmasters of the units comprised in it. This conference would, most suitably, be held at Kneller Hall, under the presidency of the Commandant. It would provide an excellent opportunity for the putting forward of suggestions ; for the interchange of ideas and for the ventilation of grievances ; and would be of very great value to the Commandant, since it would enable him to keep his finger on the musical pulse of the Service and would strengthen his hand in putting forward suggestions for reform. For example : questions such as that referred to above—the determination of the minimum band and its instrumentation—might be most profitably deliberated by such a conference.

The advantages to be derived from an annual conference of this kind appear to me to be far more than commensurate with its cost, which would be comparatively negligible.

6.

My final suggestion is one which I put forward with "an ill-divining soul," and a deprecating eye cast upon the Lords of Finance, being well aware of the reception it is likely to encounter. It is that it would be greatly for the good of both Services if an amalgamation of the musical training establishments of the Army and the Air Force were to be effected, entailing the construction of

new barracks at Kneller Hall. I hasten to add that, on the credit side, a certain economy would be effected, as no great expansion of the existing permanent and professional staffs would be necessary. The men's barracks at Kneller Hall are antiquated, inconvenient and unsuitable, and have recently been officially characterized as "... very old, and construction faulty." I would suggest the erection of modern barracks on the ample space existing in the grounds, capable of accommodating the students of both Services, and providing suitable facilities for the professors, *e.g.* sound-proof rooms. At the present time, many of them are obliged to take their pupils in barrack-rooms. The existing rectangular box of bricks, stuck on to the western end of the original building—in its way an extraordinarily good copy of Jacobean architecture—might with great advantage be removed, and Kneller Hall proper adapted for the accommodation of Commandant, Adjutant and Director of Music. The present Adjutant's quarters are unduly cramped, and the Director of Music is on the lodging list—a precarious position in these days of house shortage, besides the inconvenience and loss of time occasioned by journeys backwards and forwards.

From a purely musical point of view, nothing but good would result from the amalgamation suggested, and the consequent standardization and unification of the course of training throughout both Services. The situation of Kneller Hall is ideal for the work it has to do: near enough to London to permit of attendance at concerts and of keeping in touch with the great civil colleges of music there, and far enough away from it to afford the advantages of the country to the hard-worked students, who have indeed "to live laborious days" in order to qualify in their final examinations.

Having delivered myself of these six counsels of, I hope, not unattainable perfection, I return, finally, to my main thesis—the incalculable importance of music to the Army, and the urgent necessity for an increase in the funds allotted to its support and encouragement. The present is, I am well aware, an unpropitious moment at which to rattle a begging-box; but at what time are beggars made welcome? A beginning must, sooner or later, be made, and once adequately started, it would surely continue, going from strength to strength, until music in the Army at last comes into her own.

Hitherto—as stated in the opening words of this article—it seems to have been accepted as an axiom that, with the exception of a favoured few, military bands are incapable of giving even a

tolerable rendering of serious music, and that their sole *raison d'être*, for all practical purposes, is to play on parades and route marches and form an agreeable background for conversation at mess on a guest night. This may have been, to some extent, a correct estimate in the past, owing to causes already analyzed, but it is one which I confidently expect to see falsified by the future. In recent years many bandmasters have demonstrated the ability of their bands to give artistic renderings of the classics, and there is no reason why all should not reach an approximately similar standard of excellence.

The general consensus of musical opinion, as I have already said, is that we are on the verge of a musical renaissance in England ; and in this we in the Service should play our part. If the interest in, and enthusiasm for, their art shown by Kneller Hall students be any criterion, there should be no doubt about this. The time has arrived when our bands should no longer be constrained to compete with pierrots and goat-carriages for the favours of seaside audiences, by dispensing to them the mean music of the moment, ignoring the magnificent birthright of art which is theirs. What that birthright is we are now beginning to realize, as the long buried musical treasures of the golden Elizabethan age are gradually being brought to light, demonstrating the powers of original composition latent in the race. The movement is bound, sooner or later, to manifest itself in the Service in a more general increase of appreciation of the best in music and a consequent rejection of the worst ; in the production of original compositions for the military band, and in the power of giving artistic renderings of masterpieces, "for the recreation of all such as delight in musicke."

THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, SANDHURST

BY BT.-COLONEL C. BONHAM-CARTER, C.M.G., D.S.O.

WERE any senior officer asked to criticize the military education which he received as a cadet, he might well reply that he was not educated at all, but only instructed. If further questioned as to the reasons for his statement, he might with truth say that he was never encouraged to weld together the various bits of knowledge which he gained, that he learned something of tactics, of topography, of military engineering, but little of war ; that it was only after many years of experience and ill-directed thought that the pangs of labour afflicted his brain, giving birth to ideas, which he believed to be his own, and he began to have glimmerings of what his profession meant.

Twenty-five to thirty years ago, the training of a soldier was a comparatively simple matter ; officers were not called upon to work long hours, but sufficient only to add zest to other pursuits and to make life pleasant. The officers produced by the system of instruction at our military colleges were perhaps sufficiently educated to fulfil this rôle efficiently. But conditions have changed. After the South African War, the life of our officers became more strenuous, and the increased sense of responsibility, engendered by past active service and the menace of a Great European War, acted as a spur to many who might otherwise have found the longer hours and more exacting work tedious.

Development in the number and power of weapons and in the methods of their use during the Great War, have made the task of training a soldier a more difficult and lengthy process than ever before. The demands made on the time and brains of our officers have of necessity become more severe ; and now as a post-war development—a result of war experience—the task of educating their men has been added to their other duties.

It is true that on active service a high standard of education is not required of junior officers. A fair knowledge of his profession,

combined with common sense and a gift of leadership—almost a race inheritance among public schoolboys—is sufficient to ensure success. But in peace, knowledge and character of a vastly different sort must be added to these to enable an officer to carry out his duties year after year without loss of keenness and efficiency, and with an increasing breadth of view.

The majority of future officers who are now passing through their cadet training will probably never take part in a great war or live under its menace, and their continued zeal in the repeated discharge of their duties will depend, in a great measure, on the resources of their own minds.

Some years ago, one of our most eminent military historians, during a lecture given at the Staff College on Wellington's Armies, remarked that the officers of those days were not more illiterate than those of the present time. The criticism was in some degree resented, owing to the touch of sarcasm which suggested the possibility of comparing only the lack, and not the degree, of the educational attainments of British officers. At the same time it was felt to be not undeserved, for many present realized only too keenly the lack of resources of their own minds, and numbered among their friends men who, when deprived by advancing years of the physical joys of games, found themselves condemned to a life of unrelieved boredom, through lack of power either to face their duties with the wide vision, or to pass their hours of leisure with the happiness and profit, of an educated man.

Future conditions will increase the value of education among officers. The most efficient and zealous will be those who are best educated. Sound military education will enable them to weld together the elementary knowledge learned as cadets and to grasp what are the foundations of the art of war, and this—combined with a wide general education—will increase the resources and receptive powers of their minds.

A Staff Officer with unrivalled experience in military training, remarked that the aim of Woolwich and Sandhurst should be to turn out young officers with an appetite whetted for knowledge.

This short definition of the object of education can hardly be bettered, but it must be remembered that, if education be limited to military subjects only and more general subjects be rejected, the outlook of pupils will be less broad and their appetites for knowledge less keen than they might be.

Education on narrow lines is a contradiction in terms.

It may be of interest, therefore, to inquire how far the Royal

Military College is now meeting the demands of modern conditions. That marked progress has recently been made is fully acknowledged, and it is realized that further reforms would have been already adopted but for the severely limiting factor of expense. To suggest the principles on which the education might be further developed may, however, prove useful.

In making detailed criticisms of the present system, or in submitting suggestions for changes, the importance of maintaining the balance between book learning and character must always be borne in mind. There is little room in the Army for the book-worm. Self-reliance, power of leadership, sympathy with the men, common sense, sound judgment and the power of making decisions rapidly, are the supremely important qualities. Outside the Army, there is a tendency to under-estimate their value, and a failure to appreciate to what extent they are held by the subaltern of the British Army. In spite of the fact that the British subaltern may be in some measure less well-equipped technically than his French and German contemporaries, he is nevertheless a product of which we should be immensely proud. Keen, resourceful in difficulties, brimfull of initiative, he is a sympathetic leader of men, whether they be his own or of an alien race ; a lover of fair play with an innate sense of justice and of a charming modesty, he has often shown remarkable powers of administration and even statesmanship in outlying parts of our Empire. But these qualities are better applied by an educated man of broad outlook and varied knowledge than by one of narrow views and limited interests, and the fear that education will destroy the natural powers of leadership and initiative of our officers, and change them to feeble pedants, is groundless.

Before making detailed criticisms, however, one should have a clear idea of what are the qualities desired in a young officer which a Sandhurst cadet fails to show.

In the past, boys from Sandhurst were always welcomed by commanding officers, and they have not lost their good qualities.

On an average they have received a very complete training as private soldiers, have a sound knowledge of their duties in a company and some idea of how to instruct their men ; generally they are hard-working, well-mannered and modest, and enter keenly into the interests and recreations of their men. They are of good physical standard, keen on games and sport. On the other hand, they have little knowledge of the Empire whose servants they are, of its history or its systems of government, of the countries in which they may serve or of the people who inhabit them. The pleasure of reading

is often quite unknown to them. Their appetites, in fact, have not been "whetted" and they do not know how to begin to acquire knowledge for themselves. Few can express themselves in good English either by speech or on paper. In fact, as educated men they compare ill with the average University man, but in modesty and courtesy more than favourably.

Our officers should compare favourably in every respect with men from the Universities, and it is surely not asking too much that Sandhurst should truly educate, and not merely instruct, her students.

A study of the "Syllabus of the Course of Instruction at the Royal Military College"—an official publication—discloses an arrangement which must be a serious handicap to instructors who wish to educate, rather than to instruct or cram their pupils. At the end of each term an examination is held and the marks allotted all count towards a grand total which decides the position of the cadet in the final list when he passes out. The energies of instructors, therefore, are primarily directed to helping cadets to pass their examinations, and their teaching must in consequence be restricted almost solely to the letter of the syllabus. Methods of teaching must vary with each instructor. Pupils, who show the best results in examinations held at short intervals, are not necessarily those whose minds have been most stimulated or whose powers of thinking have been most developed. Education cannot be judged entirely by the results of examinations.

If examinations at the end of each term are a necessary stimulus to work, at least half of them should be qualifying and not competitive.

Some freedom from examinations is essential for an instructor who wishes to educate, rather than to cram his pupils.

Great progress has been made in co-ordinating the teaching of the various military subjects into one harmonious whole. Tactics, topography, military engineering, law and administration should no longer appear as separate subjects to a cadet, who should now grasp the fact that tactical principles cannot be skilfully applied without a knowledge of ground and of field fortification, and that an army must be ruled and administered on sound lines, if it is to exert its full strength on the day of battle.

But more than this is required. Cadets should be shown a general picture of what their profession means, and what is the position of an army in the machinery of government, how the methods of carrying on war have developed from early times, what

war means and what part is taken by the fighting forces in a struggle between great nations.

War may be compared to a jigsaw puzzle, of which the work of the army, of the navy, of the air force, of the civil population, of the government may be imagined to be represented by different sections. A cadet should be given a glimpse of the complete picture and shown how the various sections of the puzzle are fitted together. He will then work all the more keenly at his own small section and will be brought to realize how grave are the issues which may depend on his efforts. The picture could be explained in a series of lectures following the development of war from early times, drawing attention to the great principles of which the application has brought success and the disregard has been punished by failure, and showing how the causes for which wars have been fought have influenced the manner in which they were carried on, and why the war from which we have just emerged involved the whole of the resources of the belligerent countries.

It has already been stated that young officers join well-equipped to command their units. This is a proof of the care and skill exercised in the choice of the military subjects of the syllabus. There are, therefore, few helpful suggestions which can be made regarding them. One point, however, should be noticed. The time of a cadet is so fully occupied from reveille to lights out, that, although he is supposed to devote the last hour of the day to study in his own room, he is then so exhausted physically, that he is quite unable to extract any good therefrom and has little inclination to read. In fact, he usually goes straight to bed.

If cadets are to be educated rather than instructed, time must be given them to read. It is fully realized that many, possibly the majority, would not accomplish much of value, but the best would, and the number of these would increase as their interest in the profession and in subjects of general education was aroused.

The necessity for continuing the general education of cadets has now been officially recognized, and from the term which began this September a considerable number of hours are to be spent each week in the study of subjects which cannot be called strictly military.

The new syllabus includes three subjects, of which two are obligatory. All will read the history and geography of the Empire. The two years' course will be divided into four parts—

- (1) The general principles of geography.
- (2) General principles as applied to the geography of the Empire.
- (3) The history of the Empire.

(4) Civics—the principles of governments and their development in various parts of the Empire.

The second compulsory subject is French—only those cadets who already have exceptional knowledge of that language being allowed to substitute another language in its place.

In addition to these two subjects, cadets will study a third subject, being allowed to make a choice either of further study of one of the obligatory subjects, a second language, or science natural or mechanical.

It has been wisely decided that cadets shall not be allowed to take up Hindustani. In fact, the study of a language which has no literature has been forbidden.

The reason for this is clear. French, German or Italian are languages, the study of which is valuable educationally as well as being useful. Hindustani, on the other hand, has no literature; any subaltern joining in India, can learn in a few weeks as much as he would during the whole of his two years at Sandhurst, and, as a vehicle for education, it is almost valueless.

With regard to the manner in which French is now taught, it is worth while suggesting one change. The instructors are officers of the French Army. To enable pupils to improve their power of writing good English at the same time as they learn the language of their instructors, the latter should be assisted by an Englishman. One of the best ways of learning one's own language is to translate a foreign composition into good English.

To those who believe that the future efficiency and welfare of the Army depend in a great measure on the standard of education attained by its officers, this is good news indeed. Infinite credit is due to the originators of this almost revolutionary change and to those who are carrying it out.

General education could be much helped by encouraging cadets to educate themselves as well as by the addition of the subjects to the official syllabus. The establishment of debating societies would give opportunities to acquire fluency of speech, clearness of expression and quick brains; a dramatic club might spread a knowledge of some of the masterpieces of our language; musical clubs would encourage those so gifted to cultivate their talents to the lasting benefit of those with whom they would afterwards serve.

But few suggestions to increase the educational value of the course can be adopted, unless more time is allowed to cadets for private study and intellectual recreation. If this were given, it might be necessary to invent some inducement for the indolent to work.

But, if it were clearly recognized that those who did not take advantage of the opportunities offered would be considered unsuitable for the position of an officer, and this principle were acted upon, it would probably be found that those who refused to work were of the class whose absence would be of advantage to the Service.

Our young officers from Sandhurst are in many respects all that is to be desired, but they are not educated men. Times are changing; it is now generally accepted that the most valuable period for a boy's education usually does not begin until he is sixteen or seventeen years of age, often later. Before that age, the average boy is gaining information and not learning to apply it. To the wide acceptance of this fact is due the popularity of Mr. Fisher's Education Act and the present crowded state of our Universities. That officers should be one of the few classes in the country whose general education compulsorily ceases on leaving school, in many cases before the age of eighteen, is more than absurd, especially at a time when that of the subordinate ranks in the Army is continued indefinitely. The Authorities will receive, therefore, nothing but praise for the efforts they are now making. If they are to be successful, the system of teaching at Sandhurst will resemble that of a University. There is no other way of reaching the desired goal.

It is not, perhaps, always realized that in the Staff College, the Army already possesses an institution which has an educative effect similar to that of a University. But unlike Colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, where students are reading for degrees in different subjects, at the Staff College all are studying in the school of Military Art and in that way suffer under a disadvantage. However, there exists at the Staff College a similar breadth of interests arising from the varied experiences of the students, a similar outspoken exchange of ideas, a similar keenness to consider and discuss novel suggestions and original thought. Indeed, the Staff College has one great advantage over Colleges at the Universities inasmuch as all its students are keen workers.

Cannot the development of Sandhurst be in some measure modelled on the Staff College system?

One of the dangers in development on these lines is that cadets may lose some of the magnificent grounding in discipline which they now receive. But to overcome this danger should not be an insuperable difficulty. The reforms needed do not include the abolition of compulsion—indeed all studies at the Staff College are compulsory—but it does involve changes in the present system, which tends to produce young officers of a sealed pattern and gives insufficient

encouragement to men with the best brains, sacrificing them in a struggle to raise the mediocre to a fair standard.

The officers who are now charged with the responsibility for the development of our great institutions for training officers, have both the vision to desire progress and the cautious judgment to guard against the destruction of a great asset.

But, if the benefits promised by development on the lines suggested are to be gathered in full, improvements must also be made in other directions.

The staff of instructors has reached a high standard in character, zeal and efficiency as soldiers, but there is much room for improvement in their powers of teaching. Perhaps it may be argued with truth that in this respect the future can take care of itself, for the time will come when all officers will have passed through a course of training in an Army Educational College. But it should be made impossible to hear the criticism of a cadet that his instructors did not appreciate the difficulty of understanding elementary things.

Further, it must be remembered that within certain limits the larger the institution, the greater will be the benefit of development on the lines of a University. At present, we maintain two institutions for the education of military cadets. They are instructed at Woolwich to become officers of the Royal Engineers and of the Royal Artillery, at Sandhurst to become officers of the Cavalry and of the Infantry. Thus we lose the advantage which might be gained from one institution and fail to take the first step which will assist to secure combined team work among all arms in war.

Would it not be wise, therefore, to combine Woolwich and Sandhurst, so that at one great College cadets might be encouraged to become well educated men, fitted to be officers of the British Army?

During the last quarter of a century the story of the British Army is one of steady progress and growth in efficiency, a result which has been attained chiefly by care devoted to the training of officers. In the fiery trial of the Great War, our regular officers were not found wanting. They accomplished a great work, but at the same time their weaknesses became clear. Of these, the most noticeable were a lack of wide vision, a want of knowledge of the lives and point of view of their civilian fellow countrymen, a failure to appreciate the difficulties of government. These defects were the cause of much of the criticism directed against regular officers. They can be eradicated only by education.

The writer believes that the story of the British Army will

continue to be one of steady progress in skill and efficiency and his confidence in the future is founded on his faith in the work and influence of Sandhurst. He believes that she will move with the times and will progress in the future as she has progressed in the past. It will henceforth be her object and ambition to produce among her pupils a uniform school of thought rather than a uniform pattern of officer. She will attain her goal by helping individual development, encouraging original thought, strengthening personal character—and she will do this best if she models her methods on those already existing at the Staff College and at our great Universities.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE TERRITORIAL ARMY*

BY A TERRITORIAL OFFICER

So great, as a rule, was the feeling of *esprit de corps* and good fellowship which existed in territorial regiments and battalions at the close of the war, that had it been possible for men to re-engage as they were demobilized, it is tolerably certain that many of the units of the new Territorial Army would have been up to strength within four months after the Armistice.

It is true that military exigences during the war had done much to destroy the territorial identity of units—the main strength of the old Territorial Force—but the comradeship of active service made up for this to a large extent, and men might well have continued to serve in their units even if they had no local connection with them.

The opportunity was lost, however, and when the authorities had at last made up their minds as to their military policy, they fondly imagined that they could recreate a Territorial Army by a stroke of the pen. They seem entirely to have forgotten how much spade work and propaganda had been required to fill the ranks of the territorials in days when the menace of a great European war was more apparent than it is to-day.

What then, it may be asked, is the explanation for the failure which has hitherto attended territorial recruiting? In the opinion of the writer there are two main reasons for this state of things, and, although they may take a somewhat different form to-day, they are much the same reasons which affected territorial recruiting before the war—first, that from the national point of view the territorials

* This article was written before the Annual Summer Training of the Territorials took place.

Owing to the winding up of the Defence Force the conditions under which the preparations for this training were carried out have been exceptionally difficult. Nothing, however, has occurred to cause the writer to alter or even to modify his views on the question of organization. If one point has been emphasized more than another, it is that, at the present time at any rate, the unit is the really important factor and needs as free a hand as possible, and that the brigade and divisions must come second in practical value.

are said to be of no particular value ; and secondly, that from the individual point of view the patriotic effort is not worth while.

Now from a military point of view there can be few experienced soldiers who are not prepared to give their ungrudging approval to Lord Haldane's scheme which came into force in 1908, as supplying the highest possible efficiency within the limits to which the country was then prepared to go.

Critics of that scheme often appear to forget the fact that the Expeditionary Force was only able to leave the country on the first outbreak of war because of the existence of the Territorial Force which had been mobilized for home defence. Even if it is admitted that the Force was not at that time a particularly efficient military weapon, at any rate it proved itself adequate, and more than adequate, for the immediate purpose for which it was required.

The situation from the military point of view appears to be much the same to-day as it was in 1914, inasmuch as the possibility of moving the Expeditionary Force from this country still depends on the Territorial Army, which is the second line of defence—primarily of home defence. This important fact is liable to be overlooked in view of the number of ex-soldiers with military experience who, it is argued, would spring to arms in an emergency ; but the fact of having a collection of men already organized is a totally different thing to having a collection of men awaiting organization.

But, if from the military point of view the existence of a Territorial Army seems to be a vital necessity, we are up against a somewhat different proposition when we consider the question from the broader national point of view, because the urgent necessity for economy has to be borne in mind. The country to-day is like a harassed father of a family who has to make up his mind as to which of his various insurance policies he can go on paying. He has to insure his house, his employees, his children's education, and so is faced with the question as to whether he can go on insuring his own life. Thus at the present time, although a part of the life insurance of the country in the form of the Regular Army remains more or less unchallenged as one of the first claims on the nation's pocket, many people are beginning to question whether a certain saving might not be effected in it by cutting out part of the scheme—there is indeed a very real danger that the fact that the whole scheme of Army reorganization hangs together is being overlooked. This, however, is no excuse for those who understand the mechanism of the scheme as a whole not doing their best to ensure that the insurance premium

which the country is asked to pay is the lowest possible compatible with the requirements of safety.

Granted that the military view is correct, what reasons are there for doubting that the money spent is a wise investment ?

In the writer's opinion war is never going to be impossible because of its horrors, yet there are many who have this impression. They believe, or pretend to believe, that the Great War really has come up to expectations and made an end of war. They refuse to admit that so long as national ideals and prejudices remain the same, and so long as the general attitude of distrust continues to exist among the nations of the world, a situation similar to that of 1914 may occur again. They consider that the retention of a Standing Army at present may be an unfortunate necessity because we happen to have responsibilities abroad as well as at home, but they are quite prepared to scrap the Territorial Army because they are confident that it will never again be required. They argue, too, that its *raison d'être* no longer exists, as there are so many thousand trained soldiers in the country who would fit into their old places if the emergency arose. The latter argument is a specious one, which at first sight seems fair enough, but, as the writer has already pointed out, its advocates overlook the fact that there will be no places for these veterans to fill, whilst in any case the argument can only be applicable for a few years.

It still remains to be considered, however, whether the Territorial Army, as at present constituted, performs its functions in the best possible manner at the minimum of expense.

There can be no doubt that if the Territorial Army were up to full strength and a national emergency were to arise, the actual organization as it stands to-day would be sufficient to supply a second line of defence and to set free the Expeditionary Force. But the organization does not go beyond this ; it does not provide the framework for the formation of a vast citizen army if such again became necessary, although this was part of the rôle set before the Territorial Army when it was reorganized. And further, because the machinery is effective for its particular purpose, it does not necessarily mean that it is economical.

To take the last point first—the establishment allows a brigadier and brigade major for each territorial brigade, and a major-general and two staff officers for each territorial division. Now it is difficult to maintain that all these officers are required—at any rate as whole-time appointments—and this has indeed been officially recognized by the appointment of a certain number of territorial brigadiers who

have businesses of their own. But still, even these officers are on full pay. It is probably true that, if the secret of all hearts were revealed, it would be found that their appointment is a temporary measure only, and offered (not by the military authorities, but by the politicians) as a sop to the territorials—as a belated recognition of their capacity and value—and that there will be a return to the old practice of giving these appointments to regular officers. This is, indeed, what most territorials would prefer.

A clerical staff is attached to each brigade and to each division to carry out the administrative work, but in addition there is also the county association with a secretary, an assistant secretary and clerks.

In time of peace it would seem that the whole administrative work could be carried out by the county association. This would have the advantage of reducing the amount of overlapping and the endless complications between the training grant which is administered by the divisional general, and the administrative grant which is in the hands of the association. It is possible that the county associations are not the right bodies to control and direct expenditure; but, on the whole, they are probably in a better position from the point of view of experience to spend money wisely and profitably, and at the same time fairly. Regular officers who from time to time hold positions as staff officers in the Territorial Army often have to buy their understanding of an entirely different form of military life rather dearly and at the expense of those serving under them. The dual control is wrong, and a system by which the two authorities were combined would probably be the most effective: the staffs should be in the position to recommend expenditure and the associations to authorize it.

So far as training is concerned, the divisional general could very easily work direct through the three brigade majors, using one of them as his G.S.O. 1, and with the type of regular officers at present available as brigade majors (many of whom were brigadiers during the war) the existing brigadiers or colonels commandant as soldiers on full pay, at any rate, could easily be dispensed with.

This reduction in the staff would, of course, mean that the Territorial Army Reserve would have to be made into a much more effective body, consisting of soldiers of proved worth each earmarked to fill a definite post—and, where possible, filling that post each year during the annual training. In their absence, it ought not to be difficult to call upon officers at the Staff College, or officers serving with regular battalions, to fill those posts during the short periods in the year when their services would be required.

The Territorial Army Reserve has so far been much neglected, although the recently published regulations regarding the Territorial Reserve of officers is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. The Army Reserve is designed to fill up immediate gaps in the Regular Army and together with the regimental depôts to set to work to train new recruits and to maintain a steady supply of drafts for their particular battalions in case of war. Nothing of the kind appears to be being done in the case of the Territorial Army—and, if in the near future there were a rush of recruits to the Territorial Army as in 1914, no arrangements would have been made to facilitate their absorption into battalions. Is it too much to hope that the Authorities will see their way to the formation of a Territorial Reserve of other ranks as well as of officers?

It would be an immense asset to have a real Territorial Army Reserve composed of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers definitely qualified and ready to fill posts on the staff of the Territorial Army on mobilization, and others who could instantly take similar positions, either in new battalions to be created or at depôts where recruit training could be immediately taken in hand.

In order to ensure the best and latest methods of training, it might be necessary to arrange for the permanent staff and certain selected non-commissioned officers from battalions to be transferred at once to these training depôts or second line units. Their places could then be filled by others from the Reserve who were not quite so fully qualified to organize and instruct, but who would quickly find their feet again in the first line battalions.

This Territorial Army Reserve ought not to be confined to territorials only, but should embrace ex-regulars. A retaining fee, even though small, could be paid annually, and the money would probably be much better invested in this way than in keeping fully-paid officers manufacturing work for themselves.

On the administrative side the functions of the county association staff and the "Q" officer on the divisional staff should be amalgamated. In fact, at the present time they are often so difficult to distinguish that this should be an easy matter when once the financial affairs had been combined. The divisional general, working through the brigade majors and the officers commanding battalions, should then be able to put forward a clear statement of the reasonable requirements, both for training purposes and also for the equipment of units, to the association, which would then act as a committee of ways and means. If this system were adopted, it is possible that the county associations might have to be reorganized, probably

on the lines of being divided into two branches, one for executive purposes, the other for the task of organization—the latter to bring its weight to bear in the matter of publicity, influencing the press and employers of labour, and aiding recruiting.

But, even if it is generally accepted that the Territorial Army is a national asset which could be made more efficient at a less cost than is now the case, it cannot become a really effective weapon unless it is made a popular institution—unless it can count upon a steady flow of recruits. Every man has to decide for himself whether or not he shall join the Territorial Army. He has first to take into account his domestic and business interests, and the main consideration which he has to weigh against them is the service that he can give to his country by becoming a territorial. On this point, to speak candidly, many of us are in doubt. In 1914 there were many men with exceptional qualifications in all sorts of trades and professions who were mobilized and were quite obviously wasted in the positions they were called upon to fill. With the creation of the New Armies and the vast Ministries which were formed to keep them supplied, men with far less capacity and experience, who had seen no service and made no previous sacrifice, dropped into jobs that were not only far more important, but also far better paid. It is not unnatural, therefore, for territorials and would-be territorials to ask themselves to-day whether the same thing might not happen again, whether they would not be serving their own ends—and incidentally doing their country better service—by marking time and awaiting their opportunity in case of another national emergency.

During the course of the late war there were so many cases of unfairness and so many unpleasant incidents that the feeling of bitterness which they caused can only be removed by some clearly-explained and far-seeing method of selection by which it is made plain that men with definite qualifications for particular employment will not be lost sight of because they happen to belong to the Territorial Army.

Up to the present time there is nothing to indicate that the authorities have any such scheme of organization in preparation, or that any different method of selection or use of available personnel is going to be made. No man, therefore, can necessarily be accused of failing to face his responsibilities as a citizen if he does not join the territorials.

If, however, the appeal to service has for this reason lost some of its cogency, the work of the territorials in the war has proved their value, which before 1914 was somewhat problematic, and undoubtedly

gives them a stronger claim on public support. Their present standard of training is high enough and their interest in rifle shooting sufficient to ensure that the organized Territorial Army when mobilized, will be able immediately to play the part required of it and to finish its training while so doing.

No additional inducements to join should be necessary, but, if any inducements are offered, they ought to be of the right kind and, above all, suited to local conditions.

A battalion which has always relied on the type of men who, outside the territorials, had their own Association or Rugby Football, Cricket and Tennis Clubs, does not need to be offered facilities for these forms of sport. What men in business require is the opportunity of healthy and interesting exercise in the evenings during the week, and occasional week-ends in surroundings that they will find refreshingly different from their normal mode of life.

There is at the moment a great tendency to think that the form of activities directed by the Army Sports Board can be transferred complete and fitted on to the Territorial Army. But the difference is a wide one between men whose business in life is soldiering and whose spare time requires organization, and men who are, as a rule, as busy as they can be and who are only prepared to give their spare time to soldiering, if it affords them a distinct change and a new and vital interest in life. The point of view of such men is so entirely different to that of regular soldiers that the average regular officer is hard put to it to understand it.

There is no room for elaborate and time-wasting athletic competitions, with their endlessly clogging procession of eliminating rounds, in the lives of those who constitute a normal territorial battalion. Such sport as they require must be combined with their military activities and, unless the Army Sports Board recognize this, at any rate, so far as the urban battalions are concerned, they are asking for failure. If the funds which are now being used to make gratuitous and unwanted gifts of "Orb Footballs," etc., were employed judiciously in conjunction with the training grant, it would be possible to establish outside London and other cities well-equipped and comfortable training centres. These could be made to supply all the requirements in the way of parade grounds, training grounds, ranges, etc., and could also, if well run, offer excellent centres where men could obtain the complete change from their ordinary lives of which they stand in need. There are many camps still standing which could without difficulty be refitted and kept open

at any rate during the summer months. Battalions, companies, platoons and even smaller parties could then spend week-ends in such camps which would be profitable from the military point of view—and facilitate the carrying out of such athletic and sporting events as were desired. If attractive and easily accessible centres were chosen, it is tolerably certain that parties of friends from the various units in the neighbouring towns would use them as permanent homes in the summer months, and in this way a real inducement would be offered to men to join the Territorial Army.

The writer realizes that as an argument against this proposal it may be urged that it is a mistake to offer anything so attractive to territorials—that it implies that they are merely playing at soldiers—and there is no doubt that, whilst a sea-side camp is thoroughly to be commended, it can be advertized in a way which is apt to nauseate a man who grasps the fact that training combined with comradeship in camp comes first and social amenities second. Publicity is wanted, but not misguided and misleading publicity. There is at the present time a serious misunderstanding as to what the territorials are, how they train and what are compensations for the sacrifices (in time at any rate) of “peace-time” soldiering.

The younger generation—the men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one, from whom the recruits must be found—are prejudiced against any form of soldiering by stories of the forced training which was necessary during the war, when raw recruits were made ready for the front in fourteen weeks. The mentality of the youths of the present day has also in all probability been affected unconsciously by the fact that for five years they were brought up almost entirely by women, just at the period in their lives when they would naturally have come under the influence of men. Their ideas of amusing themselves seem to be less virile than was usual in former generations. In addition to this, it must be borne in mind that working hours are shorter and facilities for enjoyment greater than they were before the war, and that consequently men are less inclined than ever to join the Territorial Army, which apparently only gives them an opportunity of spending their holidays in work of a different kind. They know nothing of the keenness and the pleasures of the trainings in the days before the war; they can hardly be expected to grasp the part that was and can be played by a really live battalion in the lives of those who constitute it. The complete change from normal routine and ordinary environment, the extraordinary sense of comradeship, the variety of interests and activities offered, military as well as

social, need practical demonstration or personal testimony to overcome the apathy and misapprehensions of the new generation.

It is to past territorials that we must look for this testimony ; they alone can draw the true picture which will attract recruits by giving some idea of what old training holidays used to be, and how in a territorial unit men can come by a sense of comradeship and something that is far less hackneyed than the word *esprit de corps* denotes.

With all due deference to them, regular soldiers, who have not had the experience themselves, with the best will in the world are bound to emphasize the wrong points and to omit many of the right ones. The dry bones will remain dry unless the spirit is breathed on them.

There is one further point without which practically all the efforts made must fail, namely, that employers of labour must be brought to see that their contribution towards this form of national insurance does not end with the taxes they pay. They must grant facilities to their employees in the matter of holidays—they will not be losers in efficiency in the long run. A real outside interest, and one which is of the healthiest, cannot but react favourably on the work of those who are enabled to join the Territorial Army.

To sum up from the point of recruiting :—The nature of the part that the Territorial Army may be called upon to play must be very clearly explained. In 1908 the Territorial Force was much advertised and a real effort was made to explain its national importance—to prove to men that by joining it they were acting as patriots who deserved well of their country. While the first enthusiasm lasted, territorial regiments and battalions were able to build up a feeling of solidarity and comradeship which served to attract the right type of recruits even when the boom had ended. Some such campaign, if it were properly organized and carried out, might be effective to-day. Employers of labour—and especially Government Offices—must give a very practical encouragement to their men to become territorials. Some firms have adopted a most generous and patriotic attitude and, where publicity given to their action, many more would follow suit.

The activities of the territorials must be of such a nature that the men feel that they are doing something that is worth while. Nothing can be more fatal than to give them the impression that the Territorial Army offers and demands nothing more than men can get by joining other clubs.

And, above all, it will be fatal for the Authorities to give an impression that just anything will do.

The actual essentials for working in time of peace and the method of expansion in case of mobilization need much thought and full use should be made of the experiences of 1914. There is no excuse for the official adoption of the attitude of mind that everything worked out all right then and that we muddled through ; no sensible man or nation can afford to risk muddling through twice. We must not be too lazy to think things out and, in order to save ourselves trouble at the moment, follow a course which may lead to real difficulties and entail a complete reorganization in the future.

THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

A SUMMARY OF ITS HISTORY

THE *Revue Militaire Générale* for February, 1921, contains an article entitled "Historique du Conseil supérieur de Guerre depuis sa création (7 nov. 1917-11 nov. 1918)," by Capitaine C. Bugnet. As the Committee of Patronage of the magazine contains the names of Marshals Joffre, Pétain and Franchet d'Esperey, as well as other distinguished French officers, it may be assumed that the article is authoritative. From the summary of it which is given below, it will be observed how very little the Supreme War Council attempted to interfere with military operations. The decisions of conferences always being arrived at too late to be effective, the Council was apparently responsible for no actual operation of importance, except the extension of the British front before the German offensive of March, 1918. As for the Executive Committee, it had never a chance of ordering anything, for it was abolished directly General Foch came into power.

I. INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCES AND PROPOSALS BEFORE THE INSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

These during General Joffre's period of command seem merely to have given official approval to his proposals.

10th of July, 1915.—Conference at Chantilly (General Joffre's headquarters). Assembled on the initiative of the French Government, M. Viviani being *Président du Conseil*. Its result was the double offensive of the 15th of September, with the battles of Champagne and Loos.

5th, 6th and 8th of December, 1915.—Conference at Chantilly. Assembled by M. Briand, *Président du Conseil*. An offensive on both banks of the Somme by the French Armies of the North and the B.E.F. was decided on.

14th of March, 1916.—Conference at Chantilly. The enemy having attacked first at Verdun, a general counter-offensive was determined on. In principle the Russians were to commence on

the 15th of May (the Brussilov offensive began on the 4th of June), the Italians, British and French to continue the movement fifteen days later. (The Austrian offensive in the Trentino began on the 14th of May, 1916; the battle of the Somme opened on the 1st of July.)

16th of November, 1916.—Conference at Chantilly. Plan of a general battle in February, 1917, decided on. (This was upset by the promotion of General Joffre, the German retirement to the Hindenburg line and other events.)

*Beginning of 1917.**—Political conference at Rome, at which only the members of the French, Italian and British Governments were present. Mr. Lloyd George said among other things :—

“ The material and moral condition of the Allies is much above that of the enemy. The Entente Powers have more men, more guns and more resources; the whole world is at their disposal. Until now they have been unable to overthrow the enemy. Why? It is because the German Emperor controls all the resources of the Central Powers, and is able to employ them in the most effective manner as circumstances require. . . . Each nation has concentrated its efforts too much on its own front, with the result that the advantages of the Allies in effectives and in resources have not been utilized with the maximum of effect.”

26th and 27th of February, 1917.—Conference at Calais. Assembled on the initiative of Mr. Lloyd George. The result was a convention by which the B.E.F. was temporarily subordinated to the French Commander-in-Chief, General Nivelle. (This arrangement was effectively cancelled by the French Government removing General Nivelle in May from the command of the French Armies.)

July, 1917.—The French General Staff put up a note on the constitution of an Allied General Staff.

30th of October, 1917.—Mr. Lloyd George, in a letter to M. Painlevé, *Président du Conseil*, proposed “ a Committee—a sort of Allied General Staff, which will prepare plans of war for the Allies as a whole and will watch the course of events. This council cannot, of course, take the place of the various Governments, it can only guide them. . . . The military representatives should sit permanently . . . and therefore cannot be the Chiefs of the General Staffs.” †

II. SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

1st Conference, 7th of November, 1917, at Rapallo.—In consequence of the Italian disaster at Caporetto (26th of October), the

* The 5th of January, according to Lord Edward Gleichen's “ Chronology of the War.”

† This barred Generals Foch and Robertson.

creation of a Supreme War Council to sit at Versailles was decided on. Its task was to assure better co-ordination of military action on the Western Front ; while the extension of its powers to other fronts was to be the subject of future discussion with the other members of the Alliance. The Commanders-in-Chief of the various Allied Armies were to remain responsible to their own Governments ; but their plans were to be submitted to the Council.

Each Power was to appoint a technical delegate to the Council and the military representatives were to receive all necessary information from their Governments ; and were to keep them informed of the situation of the Armies.

The first military representatives were Generals Cadorna, Weygand and Wilson.*

2nd Conference, 1st of December, 1917.—At Versailles, under the presidency of M. Clemenceau, Colonel House representing the United States of America. The situations in Italy and Salonica were examined.

3rd Conference, 1st-2nd of February, 1918.—A plan of action for 1918 was adopted. The formation of a General Reserve was discussed and decided on. It was to be commanded by an Executive Committee composed of one representative of each Power, General Foch representing France. Its strength, location and transport were to be settled after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief concerned ; but its employment could only be ordered by the Executive Committee. In case of difference of opinion, each representative had the right to appeal to the Supreme War Council.

The extension of the British front was then examined. Mr. Lloyd George was opposed to it ; but it was finally decided on, the execution of the scheme, however, being left to the French and British Commanders-in-Chief.

4th Conference, 14th-15th of March, 1918, in London.—In view of the menace of a German attack, the Council adjourned the organization of a General Reserve. But a nucleus was formed by allotting the French and British divisions in Italy to it, and it was hoped that the Italians would add to it. As American troops arrived and relieved divisions, in the line, the latter were to be assigned to the General Reserve. Japanese intervention in Siberia, reprisals for air raids, coal for Italy, the seizure of Netherlands ships were also discussed.

* The French author notes that General Foch was never French military representative : being Chief of the General Staff, he was excluded by his office, as already noted. Eventually Generals Cavellero, Belin, Bliss (for America) and Sackville-West became the representatives.

Meeting, 3rd of April, 1918, at Doullens.—General Foch was charged by the French and British Governments to co-ordinate the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front.

Meeting, 3rd of April, 1918, at Beauvais.—General Foch—

“ was charged by the French, American and British Governments to co-ordinate the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front ; all necessary powers to do this effectively are conferred on him. For this purpose, the British, French and American Governments confide to General Foch the strategic direction of the military operations.

“ The Commanders-in-Chief will still be fully charged with the tactical conduct of their Armies. Each Commander-in-Chief may appeal to his Government if, in his opinion, his Army will be endangered by the instructions received from General Foch.”

5th Conference, 1st-2nd of May, 1918, at Abbeville.—The Executive Committee of the Supreme War Council, which had never functioned, was suppressed. M. Orlando accepted, on behalf of Italy, the arrangement as regards the powers conferred on General Foch. Measures for increasing the strength of the troops on the Western Front were discussed—the withdrawal of divisions from Salonica and the transport of Czech troops from Russia by the Trans-Siberian railway. General Foch asked the United States of America to send to Europe 120,000 men a month.

6th Conference, 1st-3rd of June, 1918, at Versailles.—This meeting was principally concerned with the transport of American troops. It decided to request Japan to intervene in Eastern Russia, to recognize the Yougo-Slav, Czecho-Slovak and Polish nations, and to accept the principle of intervention in North Russia with a Supreme Commander.

7th Conference, 2nd-4th of July, 1918, at Versailles.—Only the plan of the transport of American reinforcements was discussed. The Allied Governments agreed—

(1) to approach President Wilson to induce him to accept the principle of Allied intervention in Siberia ;

(2) to increase the Allied forces in Northern Russia ;

(3) to direct the military representatives to study an offensive in the Balkans, asked for by the French Government ; and

(4) also, in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief, a general plan of campaign (end of 1918 to beginning of 1919).

8th Conference, 31st of October, 1st, 2nd and 4th of November, 1918, at Versailles.—Dealt with only two questions : the Armistice conditions to be offered to Austria-Hungary and to Germany.

SECRET SERVICE STUDIES

FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL R. J. DRAKE, D.S.O.

THE modern French Secret Service can trace its origins to a period anterior to the days of Louis XIV. Records are, necessarily, scanty ; all that it is possible to glean is that, even at that time, the Service was widespread and, apparently, efficient. It is described by Léon Hennet as well organized on a sound basis.* Apart from this early connection between Secret Service and the Foreign Office, little of interest is forthcoming, except the statement that provision was made for a rapid transition from a peace to a war footing,† and that a tender solicitude for the safety of its agents was exercised by the responsible department of State. Both these precautions might well be imitated to-day, but such simplicity in the transition from peace to war as that outlined above is too much to hope for in the complex civilization of our times.

Marshal Saxe, "the Father of his people," ‡ was also the father of French Intelligence and Secret Service. Not only is he reported as having taken steps to organize an Intelligence Service immediately on being appointed to command, but his negotiations with the Jacobites in 1743 show a conception of the functions of Intelligence ahead of the ideas of his day, and provide an extraordinary analogy to the German intrigues in Ireland in 1914. A study of his campaigns is therefore of interest to-day, to us especially, not only because the efforts of the French Service were directed chiefly against England, but also because it was during this period that

* See "Regards en Arrière": "Fortement organisés—des agents circulaient en Flandre, en Italie et en Espagne. Tout ce monde avisait le Cour de ce qui se passait à l'étranger et fournissait des rapports classés aux Archives sous la rubrique Diplomatie."

† *Ibid.* "Des indicateurs du temps de paix devenaient en temps de guerre des capitaines des Guides des armées."

‡ He is reputed to have had over 300 children.

France brought to a high art the practice, followed by our late enemies, of using diplomacy as a cloak for espionage. Our esteemed foes, Count Bernstoff and the worthy Dr. Dumba, were by no means the first in this field.

Thus M. Tiquet, the French diplomatic representative at Brussels in 1745, was able to discover in one, Grieling, a shop-keeper of Brussels, the identity of the person who had betrayed to the Comte Philippe de Königsberg the plans of the fortresses of Nieuport and Dunkirk.* Grieling, in conformity with the usual practice, had worked in them as a labourer. Similarly, it was through the Comte de Tilly, the French Minister at Mannheim, that the French Army Staff gathered information of vital importance for the plan of campaign in the War of the Austrian Succession ; and it was this information which decided the choice between the Rhenish and the Flemish theatres of war.† The Count appears to have had in his employ Italians, one of whom was named Pasetti, who were actually serving as officers in the Austrian Army.‡ Belgium and Holland were hotbeds of espionage, chiefly directed against England. A certain prominence is given in contemporary records to the activities of two Belgian girls who acted as French agents. They were the daughters of an Engineer officer in the service of the Allies, and perambulated Belgium and the Low Countries in the guise of lace merchants.§

As was natural, the Allies, even the English, were not idle in espionage during this period. French historians record, rather sadly, that in France arrests of (allied) agents were too few, and that those arrested were too easily released.|| Thus we are told that one, Lieut. Notel, of Verdun, " Lieutenant au Regiment de la Marck," whose brother was a contractor to the English, was caught, by means of the interception of his correspondence, giving military information to the English, *via* a neutral country. Although caught red-handed, and although clearly a spy and a traitor to boot, he was let off through some extraordinary clemency on the part of the Minister for War, de Noailles.¶ Another spy, a militia officer, was not, however, so lucky ; caught in precisely similar circumstances, and by similar methods, he was summarily executed.**

The first signs of an intensive Intelligence campaign against England are, however, to be found by a study of the French historians of the Seven Years' War, and of the Franco-Dutch Alliance.

* See " Campagnes de Maréchal Saxe," Colin, p. 253.

† *Ibid.* p. 257.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 284.

§ *Ibid.* p. 314.

† *Ibid.* pp. 255-259.

|| *Ibid.* p. 309.

** *Ibid.* p. 319.

Diplomacy, whether French diplomacy in neutral territory, or neutral diplomacy in England itself, were both turned by the French to useful purpose from an Intelligence point of view, and not without success. Towards the middle of the period 1738-88, there were established in England two agents of the French Minister in Holland, M. de Bonnac, who was not only the ablest, but also the most active, of those engaged in this work. Their names, real or fictitious, are given as Maubert and Robinson, and they had, as a collaborator, unknown to them, a Dr. Hensey, the brother of Abbé Hensey, another French diplomat.* All of these appear to have been active, for a considerable time, and all were posted to London, which at that time would have been not only the safest place, but also the centre of information.

Amongst Maubert's activities was a project for engineering a run upon the Bank of England by the circulation of forged notes,† but this proposal was so contrary to Louis XV.'s ideas of proper conduct that he could not bring himself to employ it even against the British.‡ Beyond this, Maubert is stated either to have had in his pay, or to have been on terms of close intimacy with, one Holderness, a member of the Cabinet of the day, but there is no trace of any information derived from so dangerous a source reaching the French.

As to Robinson, he seems to have achieved nothing beyond getting arrested, and being put in the Tower for six months. As he reappeared later and wrote to Rouille, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, he could not have been a very dangerous agent.§

Simultaneously with Maubert's and Robinson's disappearance from the scene, de Bonnac was recalled from the Hague, and was replaced by a new minister, M. d'Affray. He, like everybody else who undertakes the conduct of Secret Service, had to "cut his eye teeth." His inexperience soon suffered at the hands of one, Falconnet,|| who was probably an English double agent. As a result, M. d'Affray was compromised so badly as nearly to bring about his recall from Holland.¶ Gradually the French Secret Service went from bad to worse. Its agents were again deceived by one, "Philippe,"** who supplied detailed, but bogus, plans and

* See "L'Alliance Franco-Hollandaise, 1738-1788," Coquelle, p. 152.

† *Ibid.* p. 152.

‡ "Toujours chevaleresque et bon joueur, une telle vengeance lui répugnait." British standards fell considerably lower in 1795 when Pitt countenanced the manufacture of forged "assignats" to embarrass the Parisian Government. See "William Pitt and the Great War," by J. H. Rose, p. 261.

§ See "L'Alliance Franco-Hollandaise," Coquelle, pp. 150 and 156.

|| Who is described as "Un hardi fripon."

¶ See "L'Alliance Franco-Hollandaise," Coquelle, p. 155.

** "Un simple fumiste, un aventurier de haut vol," *ibid.* pp. 159, 160.

information of the operations of Lord Lowdon in Canada in 1756, and also produced alleged evidence of the treachery of the French Commandant of the Fort de la Couronne. Even though found out, he turned up again three years later with fresh plans for sale.*

Dr. Hensey thus became the sole French agent operating in England during 1757 and up to the middle of 1758.† Whatever his success or failure in obtaining information may have been, there is no record of it, and in June of the latter year he was arrested by the English police and condemned to be hanged. The sentence was announced in the *Gazette d'Utrecht* of June, 1758,‡ but the French official records state his fate to have been uncertain. As, however, our historian (Coquelle) states that it paralyzed all other agents and frightened them out of business, we may presume that he has other evidence to prove that the sentence was carried out.

Hensey's fate, and Robinson's arrest and imprisonment, are interesting to us as affording direct evidence of the existence of some sort of British defensive organization at that time. Beyond this, evidence of defensive work of a higher order is forthcoming in the activities of the agent sent by d'Affray to replace Hensey, who was clearly a British double agent put purposely into the employ of an enemy diplomatist, still serving his novitiate in Secret Service. Described as a Swiss, named Vautravers, and as the "tutor of several English Lords," he was offered fabulous sums by d'Affray § if he would obtain accurate information as to the objective and point of descent of the next British Expedition to the Low Countries.|| After reporting that he could not get the information owing to the (to him) surprising display of patriotism on the part of the servants of the British Admiralty "in spite of their vices," he wrote advising Louis XV. to make peace. That monarch wrote to him and advised him somewhat tartly to drop the rôle of diplomat and to stick to that of agent, for which he was paid.¶ He then came under suspicion as a double agent and disappeared.

All these failures were an added spur to the regular employment in the French Intelligence Service of the personnel of the diplomatic services of other countries resident in London, especially as Louis XV.'s scrupulous nicety had again deprived the French of the services of a first-class agent. Just as he had turned from the

* See "L'Alliance Franco-Hollandaise," Coquelle, p. 162.

† *Ibid.* p. 163.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 163.

§ "130,000 livres anglais en rentes, etc."

|| See "L'Alliance Franco-Hollandaise," p. 167.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 166.

proposal for the forgery of banknotes, he had forbidden the employment of Ivan Golofskin, the son of the secretary to the Duke of Cumberland. Golofskin was, of course, singularly well placed to obtain early and accurate information, but the suggestion is said to have filled Louis XV. with horror.* This nicety did not, apparently, extend to the employment of foreign diplomats resident at hostile courts, and in 1759 or thereabouts, the supply of duplicate copies of the information sent to his Government by Galitzine, the Russian Ambassador to the Court of St. James, was arranged for † on a friendly basis. After several failures, a definite contract was made with Galitzine which lasted from 1759-61. The information is said to have had the double advantage of having been rapid and exact, whilst costing nothing.‡

In course of time, however, Galitzine was to be replaced as Ambassador. His successor designate, de Gross, was frankly approached, after some hesitation, and was finally bought by the French Intelligence Service. He was offered £50,000 a year, and more, if he would get accurate information about the rumoured British expedition to the Low Countries.§ All went swimmingly for a time, for de Gross was *ordered* by the Czarina Elizabeth to work for the French, and his emoluments were increased by them at the same time to £100,000 a year.||

Just as this splendid scheme was coming to fruition (and there could never have been a better from an Intelligence point of view), the Czarina died. On the succession of Peter III., de Gross' appointment was cancelled, and de Woronzoff was nominated to London. This was attributed, and probably rightly, to British influence. In that event the British Intelligence Service of the day was paid, by implication, a high compliment, which may or may not have been deserved. Possibly it was, but, whatever the cause, French records show that the enemy got very little news from England during the Seven Years' War, and Louis XV. never obtained the special information he wanted.¶

It is of interest to note that the attempt to use diplomacy as a cloak for espionage both by the French in 1777 and by the Germans and Austrians in 1914, met in each case with only qualified success. The idea is, in any case, so foreign to British practice and conceptions of the rules of international conduct that the point is to us of merely academic interest.

* See "L'Alliance Franco-Hollandaise," p. 158.

† *Ibid.* p. 164.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 167.

§ "Cette fameuse expédition anglaise annoncée depuis si longtemps dont il fallait coûte-que-coûte pénétrer le secret." *Ibid.* p. 168.

|| *Ibid.* p. 169.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 170. See note § above.

NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

Italy.

THE most important books of the Quarter refer to the war in Italy. They are General Cadorna's two volumes, "*La Guerra alla fronte Italiana*" (Milan, Fratelli Treves, 35 lire), the second volume of General Capello's "*Note di Guerra*" (same publisher, 20 lire), and General Vigano's "*La nostra Guerra*" (Florence, Le Monnier, 20 lire). For those who wish to hear the other side there are "*Die 12 Schlacht am Isonzo*," by Major Hubner of the Austrian General Staff (Vienna, Harbauer, 25 kronen), and some of the chapters of a book, "*Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage*" (Munich, Lehmann, 21 marks) by General Alfred Krauss, who led an attacking group of four divisions at Caporetto.

General Cadorna's book covers the whole period of his command, until the Italian Army was established on the Piave. It is a commentary and an apologia rather than a history, but gives very clearly the Commander's line of thought. Appointed Chief of the Italian General Staff on the 27th of July, 1914, on the very eve of the European conflict, he found that there was no plan for an offensive campaign, only a defensive one. The general situation was one of unpreparedness for war : the Army reduced for financial reasons ; 13,000 officers (that is about one-third) below establishment on account of the miserable pay offered ; vast shortage of material, all reserves having been used in the Tripoli campaign and not replaced ; incomplete defences ; practically no heavy guns or machine guns. To crown all, Italy had then no national spirit like that of France ; the lowest classes, from whom the bulk of the Army was of course drawn, were frankly anti-military, and only a small minority of the population understood the necessity of entering the war. General Cadorna's task was a colossal one, and we may accept his view that he had to struggle on throughout with insufficient means, both in men and material, in a most difficult theatre of war, and with scant help from Italy's Allies, until Caporetto forced them to send eleven divisions. Had these been available three or four months earlier,

they might have carried the Italians to a substantial success. General Cadorna discusses at length why he selected the Isonzo or Julian front for attack. Shortly his reasons were :—The physical difficulties of attacking on the Trentino ; the great importance of Trieste ; the possibility of co-operation with Serbia and Russia in the east ; from the northern end of the Isonzo he could, if circumstances were favourable, push up the valley of the Drave via Klagenfurt to the plains of Hungary ; fewer troops could hold the Trentino than the Isonzo front defensively. Having 35 divisions (the total was eventually 65) he allotted 14 to hold defensively, with tactical offensives, the long northern side of Eastern Italy, 14 to the Isonzo front, with 7 in reserve.

General Cadorna goes too far perhaps in suggesting that the publication in France, on the 4th of May, 1915, of the terms of the Italian treaty with the Allies robbed him of the advantages of a surprise attack ; for although the Italian Army was not completely mobilized on the outbreak of hostilities three weeks later, the assembly of troops which had been going on must have been fully known to the Central Powers.

The slow advance of the Italians on the Isonzo front is attributed to the enemy having had ten months to prepare defences, lack of technical means of overcoming them and the insufficient training of the troops ; in particular, units were afraid to press on to exploit success for fear of losing touch with other troops.

As regards the Austrian offensive in the Trentino in May, 1916, when the whole of the Asiago plateau was nearly lost, the explanation given is that the line selected to be held at all costs was not the best possible ; that the troops in a defensive sector were naturally kept at a minimum, but that they yielded so quickly that there was not the time available to send reinforcements. General Cadorna reproaches himself for not having inspected the defences ; but that hardly seems the duty of a Commander-in-Chief.

The most interesting part of the book is naturally with regard to Caporetto. General Cadorna quotes the information given him by his intelligence with regard to the Austro-German concentration. It was extraordinarily full and complete, and was confirmed by deserters, officers of Czech and Rumanian blood. But it indicated that although the principal effort was to be made near Caporetto there would be an offensive all along the Julian front to the sea. The Commander-in-Chief dared not move up his reserves to the most threatened point, for the concentration there might be a feint and the real blow delivered near Trieste. He had to wait and be

sure before he parted with all his reserves, though he placed thirty-nine battalions in the Second Army area. The fronts of the IV. and XXVII. Corps, however, collapsed so rapidly and completely that there was not time to get reserves to the spot, and even the Commander of the Second Army judged it wiser to use his reserves to cover the retreat rather than to bolster up the front. With our experience of the 21st of March, 1918, we know the effect of a heavy attack in a morning mist. It would appear that we have to thank the fact that the Franco-British front was a re-entrant for us, a salient for the enemy, into which the farther the Germans penetrated the more difficult became their position; whereas the Italian front attacked was a salient, and, when the enemy broke into it, he was able not only to outflank, but also to get in rear of the troops holding the fronts forming it. The reports of liaison officers made shortly before the offensive, state clearly that the moral of the IV. and XXVII. Corps was most satisfactory. "The commanders said that there were very few deserters to the enemy, no grave cases of indiscipline"; one said his men were "capable of standing a heavy bombardment," and the other that "the idea that the Germans were opposite them seemed actually to have increased their combatant spirit." The astonishing recovery of the Italian Army on the Piave would appear to confirm the justice of the diagnosis.

There was a difference of opinion between General Cadorna and General Capello, who commanded the Second Army, as to the method of meeting the attack. The latter wished to take the offensive on a large scale; the Commander-in-Chief ordered a defensive attitude with local counter-offensives. He prints his letter, dated the 20th of October, to General Capello which gave his reasons. The gist is: "Your Excellency's proposal to parry the enemy attack by a counter-offensive on a large scale (*di grandissimo stile*) is rendered impracticable by the present situation of the force and by the very grave lack of effectives.

"Your Excellency is aware both of one and the other, and knows that for this very reason I have with great regret to abandon the second half of our offensive, although it seemed to promise important results." (The Bainsizza had been secured in the August operations.)

The orders for the days following the fatal 24th of October, 1918, are given and clearly show that in disaster General Cadorna did not lose his head. With 350,000 stragglers and 400,000 refugees in the roads, it is marvellous that any co-ordination of the retreat was possible. So we who were near to a similar defeat, will be

inclined to agree in what is really the General's main theme that he was let down by his Government as regards men and material.

The maps supplied with the book are merely sheets of the 1/200,000 map, without any troops or defence lines marked on them, and are insufficient for the study of the campaign, at any rate by a foreigner.

General Capello's volume is of a different class, it goes more into detail and has excellent sketch maps on which it is easy to follow the operations. After describing the successes of the Italian Army during the summer of 1917, which resulted in an advance four miles on the Bainsizza plateau and smaller ones elsewhere on the Isonzo front, he describes Caporetto, the retreat and the final victory in which he took part in the lower rank of Corps Commander. Putting together his account and the two Austrian ones that are available, a very clear idea of what happened can be obtained. The Italian front in the east, from the sea to Mont Rombon, was some 45 miles in length. In the Third Army area, the first 8 miles opposite Trieste, there were eleven Italian battalions to the kilometre; on the next 7 miles, Gorizia, six battalions; on the next 15 miles, the Bainsizza sector, the scene of the August success, eight to the mile; but on the Caporetto sector, 15 miles, only two. Not only was this sector weak in numbers, but General Capello tells us it was considered a quiet one, where tired troops could be sent for a rest, and that most of the guns had been withdrawn for use on more active fronts. The German-Austrian attack struck this front obliquely and then passed on behind the rest of the eastern front. The Austrians had two great sally ports on the Caporetto front—a bridge head across the Isonzo at the southern extremity at Tolmein, whilst at the northern end, at Flitsch, the Isonzo ran through the front and thus was no longer an obstacle. Favoured by fog, the two attacking groups—one of four divisions under General Krauss (Austrian) at Flitsch, and another of eight divisions under General von Below (German) at Tolmein—had little difficulty in breaking through. Turning inward they intercepted and captured the Italian troops who lay between them and a great gap lay open. The Italian higher commanders cut off from view by the fog, and from news by the usual failure of the telephone, could do little to stop the enemy and arrest the retreat of their troops. General Capello ascribes the extraordinary collapse which ensued after the Austrian initial success to general war weariness, rather than to the effect of pacifist or enemy propaganda. Possibly it was due to the lack of well-defined lines on which to stop and face the enemy.

Those who in 1918 saw British troops walking rearwards without the slightest panic, will appreciate the Italian difficulties in mountainous country. When General Capello revisited the ground in 1920, he found the trenches and wire at Caporetto still in good condition.

General Viganò did not take part in the war, being 72 years of age and having retired in 1911. He served with Garibaldi in Erithrea and had been Minister of War. His book of 450 pages is called "a contribution to the general history of the war," and deals with numerous questions that were of deep interest to the Italian people, and therefore it is a useful commentary and index of public feeling as regards the conduct of the war. The author is a hard critic of General Cadorna, but in many ways his statements go to support that Commander's case.

General Viganò admits that there was no plan for an offensive campaign "because no one had thought of an offensive even against Austria." The approved scheme when General Cadorna took over was for the main Army to occupy a series of defensive posts near the Eastern frontier, and in order to prevent the left being turned, as it was in 1917 from Caporetto, the upper valley of Tagliamento was fortified. The author reproaches Cadorna for taking guns from the Friuli and Tagliamento defences for use in the offensive (as General Joffre, for lack of heavy guns, took them from Verdun and other fortresses), and accuses him of gambling on a dash on Trieste and a short war. This latter reproach, however, appears quite unjustified, for General Cadorna prints a letter he wrote on the 21st of May, 1915, to the Minister of War, in which he says: "It would certainly be a culpable illusion to imagine that the war imminent will be of short duration, in view of the perfect organization, richness of resources and moral solidarity shown by the adversaries in the recent months, especially by Germany."

The Italian Army is represented as having suffered in moral as a result of the wholesale removal of officers (*siluramento*, torpedoing, is the Italian word) and promotion by selection: 217 generals, 255 colonels and 335 battalion commanders were relieved by General Cadorna between May, 1915, and October, 1917. Again, the same reproach might be made against General Joffre. The most serious case is the removal of General Brusati, commanding the First Army in the Trentino, five days before the Austrian offensive, and his replacement by General Pecori Giraldi from the Isonzo front. It is also suggested that the frequent shifting of divisions had a bad effect: this shifting at any rate was not confined to the Italian Army.

As regards Caporetto, the author thinks that the left of the Second Army should have been reinforced, and quotes conversations to show that the divisional commander there had asked for more men and had been refused by General Capello. General Cadorna himself was at Creda, a couple of miles from Caporetto town on the 22nd, and judged it sufficient to send an extra brigade to Saga, where the Isonzo makes a sharp elbow. General Capello was away for medical treatment between the 19th and 22nd, but General Montuori, who was acting for him, also seems to have concurred in the disposition. Thus at any rate the matter of reinforcements was considered, and we may fairly assume that had there been more men in the front positions they would have been equally overwhelmed in the fog.

To sum the matter up : if General Cadorna had been successful everybody would have claimed the credit ; as he had bad luck after two and a half years' struggle against difficulties of every kind, the Government and public gave him all the blame ; this is often the fate of military commanders.

Western Front.

A compendium of information about the operations of the German cavalry in 1914—a book rather of reference than for reading—is provided in “Die deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und Frankreich, 1914” (Berlin, Mittler, 60 marks), compiled by Lieut.-General von Poseck, Inspector of Cavalry, formerly Chief of the General Staff of the I. Cavalry Corps.

It contains, in 230 pages, a summary of the operations of the German cavalry in Belgium and France, 1914, by corps, based on the war diaries, and occasionally supplemented in small type by narratives of officers ; it concludes with “General Remarks and Experiences.” There is a large map showing the movements of the corps, with inset maps for the fighting, and at the end there are orders of battle. The work will be of great value to students ; it seems in every way reliable and there is no attempt to disguise failures. Thus we learn that for the 26th of August, 1914 (Le Cateau), the orders to von der Marwitz were to reach the Roman road, moving due south through Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's force. On the afternoon of the 31st of August, 1914, at 4 p.m., von der Marwitz ordered a “relentless pursuit” (*rückichtslose Verfolgung*) of the British through the night ; two of his divisions were easily held up, and the third was cut up at Néry. The attack on Allenby's two divisions covering Messines on the 25th of October, 1914, was

made by six cavalry divisions, with two more in reserve. It is impossible to condense the mass of information in the book into a review of reasonable length; it will furnish material for many articles.

General Baumgarten has written what is practically a revised edition of his "Marneschlacht, 1914," published two years ago, in which for the first time we heard of Colonel Hentsch. The new work is called "Deutsche Heerführung im Marnefeldzug, 1914" ("The Leading of the German Army in the Marne Campaign," Berlin, Scherl, 31 marks). It is a most valuable summary of the various accounts of the battle of the Marne that have appeared in Germany, with certain new matter from the war diaries in the Reichsarchiv, including long extracts from Colonel Hentsch's report. The general line taken is much the same as in Brigadier-General Edmonds' article "The Scapegoat of the Marne," which was printed in the *Army Quarterly* of January, 1921. The author, after admitting that von Moltke was unequal to his great appointment, and that the retreat was due to the initiative of von Bülow, says: "The causes of the Marne disaster are not exclusively due to any single person. They are to be found, though it deeply pains a faithful old soldier to say so, in the autocratic rule of the Emperor in the 25 years preceding the war. There was no place for Yorcks and Seydlitz in the machinery of state of the pre-war period. It is not wonderful, therefore, that they did not appear in the fateful hour of the 9th of September, 1914, the first serious day for new Germany. They were not to be found at the head of Armies, not even of all corps and divisions." Though many generals judged that the retreat was a mistake, not one of them got up and said, "What, retreat? Rubbish: we must win first."

Hentsch's report fully bears out what was previously known of his action. He says in it: "I expressly directed the attention of the First Army to the full powers assigned to me and ordered the retreat in the name of O.L.H. I was justified in so doing, because (1) the Second Army had already begun rearward movements, and in the First Army, before my arrival, the left wing had received orders to retire to the line Crouy—Coulomb. (2) Because on my journey from the Second to the First Army I got a personal impression of the difficult position of the left of the First Army, and consequently of the threat to the right of the Second Army. (3) Because whilst I was with First Army Headquarters I did not feel that they were absolutely certain of a decisive success on the right wing of the Army."

Personally, the author is of opinion that the great mistake was made by von Kluck ; instead of using only " one and a half infantry divisions " to support the four cavalry divisions against the British, he should have added " another corps, less a brigade detached to the northern flank, all under the united command of von Lochow or von Quast." Against this he admits there is von Kuhl's remark, " There is no question of there being any men to spare on the Ourcq," and in view of von Kluck's urgent messages on the 7th for the III. and IX. Corps to join him there, this is probably true. It is pleasing to find that General Crusius gives the B.E.F. credit for having had six and a half divisions at the Marne, whereas it had the remains of five divisions and one four-battalion brigade.

Von Moltke is blamed for departing from von Schlieffen's plan. Actually he took more divisions to the Western Front and put more on the right wing than that plan calculated upon. But as von Schlieffen had not taken into account that five divisions would have to be left at Antwerp, various brigades in Belgium, and two and a half divisions at Maubeuge, apart from four divisions extra being sent to East Prussia, the " strong right wing " was naturally weaker than he required.

The Crown Prince is quoted as saying, " O.H.L. broke down at the commencement of operations, and lost its head when the crisis came," and " if our enemies dictate peace the last letter of Hohenzollern, Prussian and German history is written."

The author lets his feelings get the better of him when he comes to figures. Although there were between 45 and 50 divisions on each side at the Marne in 1914, he puts the proportion at 40 German to 66 Allied. Then he reckons German divisions were only half as strong as the French and British, and concludes that the proportion of infantry was 1 to 6 !

He admits that over 200 German guns fell into the hands of the Allies, but these must not be counted as " captured by the enemy, because they were damaged and therefore left behind." One sees how bitterly the German resents defeat.

In " *Les Preliminaires de Verdun*, Aout, 1915-Fevrier, 1916 " (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 15 francs), Lieut.-Colonel de Thomasson has published a most valuable collection of documents—the most important orders and instructions of G.Q.G., of the commanders of the Groups of Armies of the East and of the Centre, and of General Herr, the commander of La region fortifiée de Verdun (R.F.V.) from August, 1915, to the 25th of February, 1916. It would seem that the book is intended to show that General Herr did

everything that was possible with the means allowed him to prepare for the great attack.

On the 10th of August, 1915, Verdun ceased to be a fortress and became a "fortified region," merely part of the general front; the Governor lost his special privileges and came under the Commander of the Group of Armies of the East. General Herr was directed to change his all-round defences into several lines conforming to the front, and therefore facing only east and north. He was given little labour for the purpose, and many of his heavy guns and much ammunition were removed for use in the Champagne offensive, that was synchronous with Loos. The British soldier has no reputation for digging, but apparently the Frenchman was no better. The author says: "It is well known that our men never had the taste for shovelling earth, and besides they had never been trained to it in peace time; their instruction in this particular had been lamentably neglected. When they had the quasi-certitude that they were only birds of passage in a sector, and were working for future occupants and not themselves, officers and N.C.Os. had enormous difficulty in getting even minimum results." There was also a lack of stores, particularly of barbed wire. Nevertheless, front positions with plenty of strong points and machine-gun nests, were made by General Herr, though they had not sufficient shell-proof cover. The information as to the German plans was accurate. At the last moment, on the 1st of February, 1916, when the attack was imminent, the R.F.V. was transferred from the Group of Armies of the East to that of the Centre (General de Langle de Cary).

The author relates the fighting of the first five days in detail. When on the 24th General Langle de Cary proposed to evacuate the right bank of the Meuse—"it was the abandonment of Verdun"—General Joffre forbade him: "*vous devez tenir face au nord sur le front entre Meuse et Woëvre par tous les moyens dont vous disposez.*" This order was confirmed even more formally and categorically by telephone by General de Castelnau, who ordered "the north front of Verdun between Douaumont and Meuse, and the east front and the line of the Hauts de Meuse are to be held *coute que coute.*"

The loss of Fort Douaumont—entered by the Germans without resistance—is explained by the fact that the relief of the XXX. Corps by the XX. had just taken place, and General Balfourier, who commanded the latter, thought the fort had a permanent garrison. This it had ceased to possess after the fortress had become a fortified region, and the garrison was converted into mobile troops. There

are good maps showing the defence lines and the distribution of troops.

General Cordonnier, the historian, in "*Une Brigade au Feu*" (Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle, 12 francs) records at considerable length—400 and more pages—the operations of the 87th Infantry Brigade, of the Fourth French Army, which he commanded during the period of "*couverture*" and up to the 30th of August, 1914, when he was promoted to the 3rd Division. It is a mine of practical and historical information as regards the leading of a brigade in war.

"*Lille et L'Invasion Allemande*," by Jean Lorédan (Paris, Perrin, 7 francs), gives a most vivid description of the abandonment of the town, its occupation by the Germans and its deliverance. The official story of the decision of the French Government not to defend a fortress, which at any rate could have held out as long as Maubeuge, was published some two years ago by General Percin in his "*Lille*." M. Lorédan is more dramatic and anecdotic. Two stories he tells seem worthy of quotation.

"Next day (12th of September, 1914) two German officers who came over from Maubeuge in a motor, in bravado, sat on the terrace of the Café Bellevue, and drank a glass of beer under the very nose of the Déesse (the popular name of the statue commemorating the defence of Lille in 1792). Then they went off leaving a poor sergent de ville much astonished and perplexed."

In October, when the Germans took possession of the town, "the Death's Head Hussars entered by the Douai Gate. They dismounted in the Place de la Préfecture, and bowed slowly to the earth three times in succession, giving untranslatable yells. Then they remounted and departed. Was this the result of a vow or merely a theatrical farce?"

Part of Sir George Arthur's *Life of Lord Kitchener* has appeared in French under the title of "*Kitchener et la Guerre, 1914-1916*" (Paris, Payot, 16 francs). It contains a biography and a full translation of Volume III., with prefaces by M. Raymond Poincaré, Maréchal Joffre and Lord Haig. The statements made by the ex-President with regard to events preceding Lord Kitchener's visit to Paris on the 1st of September, 1914, are of considerable interest. On the 30th of August, as a result of Sir J. French refusing co-operation in the battle of Guise, General Joffre telephoned to the Minister of War that he feared that the British were not for the moment disposed to fight and were retiring towards Meaux. Next day he sent a liaison officer begging the President to intervene and ask Sir J. French not to retire too rapidly, and to decide to contain

the enemy on his front. M. Poincaré then went to the British Ambassador who telephoned to G.H.Q. at 10.30 p.m. A British orderly officer brought a written answer to the President from Sir J. French :—

“ Réponse malheureusement peu concluante. Le Maréchal French insistait sur les lourdes pertes en hommes et en matériel qu'avait subies son armée. Depuis qu'elle était éloignée de Mons, elle avait été, déclarait-il, constamment engagée. Elle avait besoin d'une bonne semaine pour se constituer et redevenir une véritable unité combattante.”

That night Lord Kitchener left London for Paris.

“ *L'Effort Militaire des Alliés sur le Front de France* ” (Paris, Payot, 6 francs), by Lieut.-Colonel J. Revol, purports to give from the French official records the strength of the French, Belgian and British Armies, sometimes in divisions, sometimes in battalions, at different periods of the war, with the losses. It can, unfortunately, be hardly regarded as a statistical document of first importance. Thus, for the battle of the Marne, 1914, we are told “ Marshal French, whose effectives had suffered considerable losses, had received a fifth division, a brigade of the sixth, plus a second division of cavalry. On our side we put in the same number of units as on the frontier (82 against 85 German).” All these French divisions, we know, did not fight between Verdun and Paris ; about 40 divisions only were there. As regards the British it is presumed that allusion is made to the 4th Division (which arrived in France on the 22nd of August), the 19th Infantry Brigade (which was at Mons). The 2nd Cavalry Division was formed by taking two brigades from the 1st, and therefore should not be counted as a reinforcement.

For Ypres we are told “ 5 British divisions and 3 cavalry divisions fought alongside our 14 divisions and 8 cavalry divisions.” On the 11th of November, 1918, “ the front was 550 kilometres, thus divided : Belgian Army 30, British Armies 90, American Armies 100, French Armies 330.”

Balkans.

General Jouinot-Gambetta, nephew of the great French statesman, commanded the French Brigade of Cavalry at Salonica. It consisted of the 1st and 4th Regiments de Chasseurs d'Afrique (the 4th was lent to the Serbians for a time) and the Regiment de Spahis Marocains, thirteen squadrons in all. He has written in “ *Uskub ou du rôle de la Cavalerie d'Afrique dans la Victoire* ” (Paris Berger-Levrault, 15 francs), a very interesting and well-illustrated account of the pursuit, or rather great raid, carried out by his troops

after a gap was made for them in the final offensive of the 15th of September, 1918.

It is summed up in his "citation" as follows: "In the course of bold and skilful operations, which showed a fine offensive spirit, he passed through the forests and impracticable rocks of the Golesnitsa-Planina, succeeded in capturing Uskub in rear of the Eleventh German Army; then, after the capitulation of this army, pursuing the enemy without respite, pushed his squadrons to the Danube. He captured numerous prisoners and considerable material." The distance traversed covering the right flank of the Serbian Army between the 23rd of September and the 21st of October, from Florina, south of Monastir, and to Negotin on the Danube, near the junction of the Serbian and Rumanian frontiers, that is the whole length of Serbia from south to north, was some 200 miles. The greater part of the way the brigade moved on mountain paths and tracks, with no other supplies than could be found in a poor and ravaged country. General Gambetta then went on to Gradiste and crossed into Hungary. It is a fine record of mounted infantry work, for there were no mounted combats except of "petits elements."

Colonel Feyler, of the Swiss Army, has continued his "*La Campagne de Macedoine, 1915-16*," by a new volume dealing with 1917-18 (Geneva, Boissonnas, 30 francs). It gives a very clear account of the action of Skra di Gegen, of the final break-through and the pursuit of the Bulgarians. Much of the material is new and is derived from Serbian and Greek sources. It will be a surprise to most readers that of the 121 battalions of the so-called German Eleventh Army only one, the 12th Jäger, was German; but the Army Commander, the two Corps Commanders, most of their staffs and some technical troops were German. The Bulgarian First Army also had one German battalion. As regards the relative strength at the beginning of 1918, Greek sources give 282 Allied battalions against 312, Serbian 289 against 297. The book is illustrated with eighteen beautiful photographs of the theatre of operations.

Strategy.

The first part of Lieut.-Colonel Wolfgang Foerster's "*Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg*," which gave details of the German Plan for 1914, was reviewed in the *Army Quarterly* of January, 1921. He has now published Parts II. and III. (Berlin, Mittler, 13 and 25

marks). The latter is of great interest as it contains the plan for the 21st of March, 1918.

They are practically an examination and criticism of the leadership of Falkenhayn and Ludendorff, respectively. The former comes in for a good deal of hard treatment. He is labelled a man of "half measures and limited offensives, playing for safety when nothing could save Germany but a gamble;" and "the rapid annihilation of her opponents one after the other, so as to avoid the dangerous strain on the endurance of her economic and financial resources in a long drawn out war of attrition." The battle of the Marne left France morally stronger and more dangerous than before, and England secure on the continent and with time to develop her resources. Ypres, 1914, described as a failure (*Misfolge*) was a mere frontal attack, and showed, if proof were needed, that no success lay that way. There was nothing left but to turn all forces against Russia, where open warfare was still possible :—

"Only the annihilation of Russia, first militarily and then economically, could save Germany in this life and death struggle. This in the summer (after the initial success at Tarnov-Gorlice) lay within the realms of possibility so far as forces, space and time went. . . . General von Falkenhayn choose Verdun instead of Kiev."

Although the author praises von Falkenhayn for the selection of Tarnov as the place of attack, the success does not appear to have been as great as Ludendorff's pamphleteer in the General Staff monograph on the operations would have us imagine. He tells us that the first attempt to break through did not get very far, and another was necessary at Radymno. In the end, as we know, the Russians retired with their line intact. After the recapture of Lemburg, von Falkenhayn wanted to bring the Russian operations to a close, and it was only due to the protests of von Seeckt (now head of the reduced German Army) that they were continued as long as they were. Foerster complains that little attempt was made to bring off further successes of the Tannenberg type, advocated in von Schlieffen's "Cannae," but he does not indicate how this could have been done. Not only von Conrad, but von Hindenburg, as he tells us, was constantly demanding reinforcements in 1915. Far from being able to send them, in consequence of the French and British offensives, in September, 1915, in Champagne and at Loos, von Falkenhayn was compelled to withdraw "a considerable number of divisions" from Russia. Interior lines, though they enabled Germany to keep up the struggle, could never bring her a decisive success. The author is possibly right in contending that after the

Marne, it would at any rate have been better to have fought to a finish in one or other of the theatres of war.

Part III., which has the sub-title of "Verdun, 1916. Ludendorff as a Commander. The great battle in France from the 21st of March to the 4th of April, 1918," is an important contribution to the history of the war, containing fewer of the author's opinions and more quotations from documents. There is a short chapter on the Serbian campaign, of which the most interesting section explains why it was not continued into an attack on Salonica. The reasons were partly military and partly political. Austria did not want Germany's interference in the Balkans. Germany did not want to involve Greece, and Bulgaria thought she had done enough. There is an excellent appreciation of the situation by General von Seeckt, then Chief of the Staff to Mackensen. The military difficulties were lack of ammunition and supplies, which would require a considerable time to overcome. The scheme was for Kövess's Army to protect the right flank against Montenegro and Albania, whilst von Gallwitz moved eastward along the Grecian frontier. Then he with two Bulgarian Armies was to make an enveloping attack. The offensive was first postponed and then dropped.

With regard to Verdun, we are informed that the idea of attacking it dated from October, 1915. It seems difficult, as the author points out, to reconcile Falkenhayn's statement that his design was to bleed France white with the manner in which the attack was carried out. The initial operation was evidently an accelerated attack for the purpose of breaking through. Part of Falkenhayn's order of the 27th of January, 1916, to the Fifth Army is quoted, and runs :—

"It is of vital importance for the Verdun operations as a whole, that the attack is never permitted to come to a standstill (*ins Stocken kommen zulassen*), so that the French are given no opportunity to settle themselves again in rearward positions, and to organize resistance again after it has once been broken."

There are four pages of explanation of the failure from the Crown Prince's Headquarters, dated the 31st of March, with protests that the utmost energy was used, with Falkenhayn's marginal remarks : "Not the case," "Error," "False," etc.

The genesis of the great offensive of March, 1918, and Ludendorff's action during the battle are given at great length, and require a special article to deal with them adequately. Various attacks from Belfort to Ypres were planned and preparations for them taken in hand, and it was not until the 24th of January that the final decision for the "Michael" attack by the Eighteenth, Second and

Seventeenth Armies was made. According to O.H.L. Operation Order, which is given—

“ The centre of gravity not only at the beginning, but in the further course of the operations lay with the Eighteenth and Second Armies (the northernmost of the three). After the first great tactical objective, the cutting off of the British in the Cambrai salient, had been gained, the offensive was to be continued against and beyond Arras—Albert, and then the British front opposite the Sixth Army was to be set tottering. The Eighteenth Army (von Hutier) was only left flankguard, and for this purpose was directed to reach the Crozat Canal and the Somme, so that its strongly echeloned right wing could stretch out to the Somme.”

It was not until the 23rd of March, when the two northern Armies were not progressing and a weak spot had been found in General Gough's Army, that permission was given to von Hutier to go on. By the 30th, that is in ten days, the Germans were exhausted, and Ludendorff ordered a rest until the 4th. Colonel Foerster praises Ludendorff for his endeavour to utilize the success of the Eighteenth Army. He does not consider him beaten, for he quotes Captain P. Wright's article in *Blackwood's* to show how much frightened the Allied politicians were, and states, what to German minds is more convincing, Ludendorff stopped the offensive “ of his own account (*freiwillig*).”

Before the war General Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, for some time head of the Historical Section (modern wars) of the German Great General Staff, was better known as a prolific than accurate historical writer. His latest work in two volumes, “ Heerführung im Weltkriege ” (Berlin, Mittler, 25 marks each), is little better than a piece of propaganda. It has sections dealing with strategic deployment, envelopment, break-throughs, operations on interior lines, defence, use of cavalry, the art and means of command, and leading in coalition wars. It is copiously illustrated from the Great War and previous wars, but is mainly directed to show that the Prussian methods have nothing to fear by comparison with others. Practically all the General's examples from 1914-18 are, however, drawn from the German successes against the Russians, Serbians and Rumanians, and even these, except Tannenberg, are not perfect ones of their kind. The poor man is evidently aware of the weakness of his case and the failure of the Germans to obtain a decisive victory against foes of their own calibre, *ebenbürtig* to use a word he was formerly fond of, but does not employ in the present volumes. So he is at great pains to show that the Allies at the beginning of the war had exactly the same proportional numerical

superiority over the Central Powers as the Germans had over the French in 1870, and therefore, not having won the war in six months, must be inferior soldiers to the Germans plus the Austro-Hungarians. Even to secure these figures he has to make the French field troops more numerous than the German, apparently by counting the French reserve formations and omitting the German ones.

General von Freytag-Loringhoven has little to say about the Marne; he estimates the Allied numerical superiority at 2 to 1 (the forces were practically equal in numbers); does not draw attention to the fact that Kluck's 8 active and 2 reserve divisions were neutralized by Maunoury's 2 active and 5 reserve divisions and one Algerian division, and that the 5 French reserve divisions had been very much knocked about in previous fighting. He concludes: "that the (German) First Army began a retreat on Soissons on the 9th of September, because it had not been possible to maintain touch with the Second Army. The British Army drove back the connecting troops, two weak cavalry corps and an infantry brigade, and the heads of its columns had crossed the Marne near Chateau Thierry. Then the Second Army, which besides had a superior enemy in front of it, was no longer in a condition to remain south of the Marne." The two so-called weak cavalry corps contained two Jäger brigades and more machine guns than the whole B.E.F., and the list of "connecting troops" is by no means complete; he omits the 5th Division and Kraewel's composite brigade.

Verdun gets a few lines: "If the weather had not forced the postponement of the attack for ten days, we should have had greater initial successes. The local leading in the further course of the battle of Verdun cannot be regarded as fortunate, it had not taken into account the ever-increasing difficulties which had to be overcome. There was in addition an over-estimate of the effects of the heavy and super-heavy high-angle artillery fire."

The author considers that the Allies would have collapsed and recognized themselves defeated in 1917, but for the unfortunate peace resolution in the Reichstag and the publication of Count Czernin's memorandum on the decaying power of Austro-Hungary. Except on the West Front (which alone mattered) the Central Powers had succeeded everywhere in 1917.

The offensive of March, 1918, receives very few comments: "Our power was insufficient to exploit the initial tactical success into a strategic form." The best part of the book will be found in the earlier pages which deal with the gradual development of the German training manuals after 1812, from shock to fire tactics.

General.

M. Lucien Cornet, Sénateur, formerly secrétaire de Sénat, and secrétaire de la Commission de l'Armée has published Volumes III. and IV. concluding his "1914-1915. Histoire de la Guerre" (Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle, Vols. I. and II., 7.50 francs, and Vols. III. and IV., 9 francs each). The military portion is obscure, there is no mention of the formations or units engaged, and it is little above the value of the war communiqués, although the story occasionally fills a gap. The political part, as might be expected, is excellent, particularly as regards the entry of Italy into the war, the "affaire de Salonique" and the Balkans generally. The author hints that the Dardanelles scheme was known to, and possibly divulged to the enemy by, the Greek Court. The following appreciation of *Kultur* is to the point: "It educated thinkers to prevent them from thinking; it tied them up to parcels of printed sheets; it trained them to specialize *ad nauseam*; and it meditated subdividing them so as to make them organs of an organism."

The publication of "La Guerre racontée par nos généraux commandants de groupes d'armées" (Paris, Schwartz, 32 parts at 20 francs each) has been commenced. General Dubail is to write from 1914 to the middle of 1916, and Marshal Fayolle the remainder. The text is brief and serves merely as a connecting thread to a number of artistic illustrations and portraits.

We picked up "A Guide to the Military History of the World War, 1914-1918," by a captain of the U.S. Reserve, published in Boston, expecting to find a catalogue raisonné of books on the war, perhaps founded on the very complete catalogue of the New York Public Library. The book is, however, only a summary of the war in 358 pages, with a short bibliography of books in English. In general it is a trifle more inaccurate even than some that have been put on sale on this side of the Atlantic. The following passage with regard to the battle of the Marne would be, however, difficult to beat:—

"On September 9 General d'Esperey was able to detach a corps to reinforce General Foch's 'Ninth' Army on his right, which was very hard pressed. By skilfully using this corps to strengthen his army Foch was able to move his own 42nd Division into a sudden attack which pierced the German line, followed by a general attack with his army. This was the manœuvre of La Fère Champenoise, and the German army of Hausen was forced to retire in confusion. The armies of Kluck and Bülow were also compelled to give way, and the day's fighting resulted in the retreat of the German armies to positions previously prepared along the river Aisne, where entrenchments had been laid out to provide a secure retreat in case of emergency."

"Recueil de Documents Militaires Allemands de la Grande Guerre, 1914-1918" (Paris, Chapelot, 12 francs) is a valuable collection of captured German orders and instructions published by Officier-Interprète Griffon, professor at St. Cyr, with an introduction by General de Maud'huy. It is intended to serve the double purpose of giving an insight into German methods and providing instruction in modern military German. There are footnotes and a vocabulary. As nothing of the kind has appeared in England, the book will at any rate be found useful for examination purposes.

Technical.

Colonel Bruchmüller is mentioned by General Ludendorff in his "War Memories" in the following terms: "His great knowledge and capacity, his devotion to his profession and his arm, and his military enthusiasm marked him out as one of the most prominent soldiers of this war. His suggestions formed the groundwork of the employment of the artillery on the 21st of March, 1918." General von Kuhl has referred to his being popularly known in the German Army as "*Durchbruchmüller*," "Break-through Müller," so that the title that he has chosen for his book, "*Die deutsche Artillerie in den Durchbruchschlachten des Weltkrieges*" (The German Artillery in the Break-through Battles of the World War," Berlin, Mittler, 35 marks), is not inappropriate.

Commencing as Commander of the artillery of the 86th Division, he commanded in succession the artillery of a corps, an army and a group of armies, and was "artillery commander at the disposal of the Supreme Command." Ludendorff sent him wherever important artillery work was required. His first war experience was in Russia; he did not appear in France until the counter-attack at Cambrai, and after this was engaged in all the great attacks of 1918, the Amiens, the Lys and the Chemin des Dames offensives, the battle at Noyon (9th of June) and the battle of the Marne. The experience summed up in his book is therefore most valuable, and though much is naturally technical, it contains a great deal of general interest, and gives the artillery orders for various attacks in full.

Colonel Bruchmüller is careful to explain that by "break-through" he merely means capture of the enemy's trench system, not a strategic break-through. He deals in turn with a break-through by a division, first with its artillery "reinforced" (39 batteries), and "considerably reinforced" (300 guns and 100 trench mortars); by a corps, by an army on a narrow and a broad front (Chemin des

Dames); and by a group of armies (21st of March, 1918). They do not strike us as good examples because the success obtained was by no means due to the artillery but mainly to other causes: weakness of the enemy, fog, surprise. Colonel Bruchmüller is, however, fully aware of the value of surprise and was the introducer in the German Army of opening fire for effect without previous registration. He had great difficulty in persuading his brother gunners in the West to adopt this for the 21st of March. We are reminded of some of our own conferences by the protest made by the representative of one Army: "The Army Commander strongly protests against the decision to open fire without registration, and requests that careful registration may be ordered." The measures taken to ensure the concealment of the massing of the artillery for the attack are given at length. Some of them were: All officers who had to be necessarily informed of the scheme—the number was kept as low as possible—had to give an express pledge of unconditional silence. All papers and maps connected with it had to be kept under lock and key. Controls were placed on approach roads to ensure that traffic by day was kept normal. The ground was watched by special police aeroplanes and balloons. Reconnoitring staffs had to do their work at early dawn. Batteries were divided into three classes. First, those whose emplacements were completely concealed, these were got into position as early as possible. Secondly, those kept, until the night of the attack, under cover from sight in the neighbourhood of their emplacements. Thirdly, those for which no cover was available, and which were brought up only the night before they were to open fire.

Of the Austrian artillery the author says the material was inferior to the German, and there was never sufficient ammunition, but that the personnel was well trained. He claims to have invented the creeping barrage (*Feuerwalze*) and used it "in the Narotsch breakthrough in 1915," but gives no example of its employment until November, 1916, that is four months after the British had used it on the Somme. His claim has been disputed in the German Press, General Waechter pointing out that creeping barrages were used at Verdun in February, 1916, and had been originated on the Aisne in September, 1914. As a matter of fact, the Germans up to the end of the war were never able to manage a good creeping barrage. The book contains a very useful list of artillery abbreviations and conventional signs.

We took up "L'Artillerie d'Assaut de 1916 à 1918," by Lieut.-Colonel R. Lafitte (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 6 francs), expecting to

find French views on Colonel Bruchmüller's subject. But the book deals with the employment of tanks, "*l'artillerie d'assaut*" having been the French camouflage name for them. By a decree of the 13th of May, 1920, it was officially changed to "*chars d'assaut*."

Those interested in "flame-projectors" will find a complete handbook of the subject in "*Flammenwerfer und Sturmtruppen*" (Berlin, Landesverlag, 16 marks), by Hauptmann Theune, formerly commander of a Flammenwerfer Company. The three patterns of the apparatus, large, medium and small, are described in detail; then follow methods of use, with the drills, syllabus of training, establishment and equipment of units, and examples of employment in the field. The book is well illustrated.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military).

Vol. III. San-de-Pu, Mukden, The Sea of Japan. Prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. With maps and appendices in separate case. H.M. Stationery Office. £3 10s.

AN official history for naval and military students at £3 10s. rather staggers us even in these days of a halfpenny post card at 1½d. What is there behind it? Is the Treasury trying to assist the Budget, or is some wise man afraid, like "Punch's" rowing coach, that reading will spoil the "edication" of our fighting men, and is, therefore, to be sternly discouraged? True, there are over 900 pages in the volume, not counting the appendices enclosed in the map case, which is even thicker than the volume. But, again, a handy volume which we can put in our pocket or handbag is more likely to be read than such a ponderous tome. For once, we prefer the German practice with its Great General Staff monographs of about a hundred pages at half a crown. Certainly, the seventy odd pages on the naval war might have been issued separately.

Those, however, who expend £3 10s. will be well repaid. The story is exceedingly well and clearly told, and the comments are valuable and illuminating. A slip inserted on the title-page informs us that "the preparation of the volume was completed in 1914, but publication has been unavoidably delayed owing to the late war"; so the comments bear no reference to the events of 1914-1918, to which, as regards the art of war, the Russo-Japanese War was in many ways an introduction. The book is a reminder that we should always read military history with a view to the next war, and not as a mere substitute for fiction.

Volume III. contains a chapter of comments on the siege of Port Arthur left over from the previous volume (published in 1912); then follow the voyage of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East and the battle of the Sea of Japan; Mishchenko's cavalry raid in mid-winter; the

battle of Sand-de-pu, in which the Russians tried to snatch a success by attacking the Japanese left wing before Nogi's Army, released by the fall of Port Arthur, could arrive ; the battle of Mukden (467 pages) ; and the closing operations. It is interesting to notice how much the Japanese were influenced by German methods ; Mukden was typical of them : initial surprise—by concealing the true position of Nogi's Army—and a plan, with insufficient forces, to envelop the enemy on both flanks. But this attempt to imitate Sedan, without a neutral frontier against which to drive the enemy, very naturally failed, just as Moltke's attempts to envelop Joffre failed. For ourselves, there is the special lesson that the most complete naval success—and the battle of the Sea of Japan was far more decisive than Trafalgar, only one Russian cruiser and two torpedo-boats escaped to Vladivostock—will not win a war ; it did not in 1905 even enable Japan to name her own terms. Deeply to her disappointment, she got no indemnity, and only half of Sakhalin. As the history says, "The chief factor predisposing Japan towards a cessation of hostilities was the fact that she was rapidly approaching exhaustion, both in her financial resources and the resources in men."

The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener. By REGINALD VISCOUNT ESHER.
London : John Murray. 10s. 6d.

It is possible that the correspondence and journal, to which Lord Esher alludes in the note at the beginning of this essay and which he proposes to seal up in the British Museum for a period of sixty years, may contain some new information calculated to throw fresh light on the part actually played by Lord Kitchener during the Great War. The published essay, however, really tells the intelligent reader nothing more than he already knew, or at any rate surmised. It may be argued that Lord Esher is not catering for this particular class of reader, but is writing his views on Lord Kitchener and his work for the instruction of "the man in the street"—in other words, that his object in publishing this essay is to try and make the British public re-adjust its conception of one of its great national heroes. We notice, indeed, that some of Lord Esher's critics take this view, and even charge him, somewhat unjustly in our opinion, with attempting to belittle Lord Kitchener's abilities and to under-rate the great work which he accomplished in the war. Such critics may rest easy in their minds, for nothing that Lord Esher, or any other intelligent observer, can write will ever induce the British public to alter its opinion of Lord Kitchener—an opinion

which has been persistently drummed into the heads of all Britons since the late Mr. G. W. Steevens wrote "With Kitchener to Khartum." All of us have been brought up with the idea that Lord Kitchener was "a strong, silent man" and "a great organizer," and it will take a great deal more than Lord Esher's essay to make us believe that he could ever have been "garrulous and self-revealing," or that he was only "a consummate disorganizer and master of improvisation."

Probably, however, both the generally accepted view of Lord Kitchener and also that put forward by Lord Esher are right. In surroundings which were familiar to him, with time on his side, and when he was, to all intents and purposes, his own master, Lord Kitchener proved himself a great organizer and a diplomatist of no mean ability. But in 1914 he was faced with an entirely novel situation. He was unfamiliar with the scheme of military reorganization inaugurated by Lord Haldane; he found himself installed in a War Office at the beginning of a great war from which most of the responsible officers upon whose assistance he would have been able to rely had been carried off with the Expeditionary Force; and he was utterly unversed in English political and official methods of carrying on business. In such circumstances it is not surprising that he found himself alone and out of his depth. The amazing thing is—and it is the proof of his greatness—that he continued to carry through the colossal task which confronted him, and to retain to the end the confidence of the public not only in Great Britain and the Dominions, but also in the Allied countries. His view was a long one. "It is the last and not the first million England can put into the field, that will give us victory." He stood "immovable for war *à outrance*, and for the ultimate triumph of the Allied cause. 'In this war, and in all great national struggles, *il faut avoir des points fixes*,' was the remark of a Frenchman of great influence and sagacity; and he added that the two *points fixes* in France and England were Joffre and Kitchener."

Lord Esher entitles his essay "The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener," and he explains the meaning of this title by suggesting that Lord Kitchener's previous experience and his age made it impossible for him to adapt himself to the position which he was called upon to fill in the Great War. But in our opinion the real tragedy—if tragedy is the right word to use in this connection—was not that Lord Kitchener was unsuited to, or incapable of fulfilling, his allotted task, but that he seems never to have adequately realized the immense influence which he exercised over the British people, and

the consequent hold which he had over His Majesty's Government. In the first months of the war there was literally no sacrifice which, had Lord Kitchener called upon the people to make, would not have been cheerfully made. How much ill-feeling, suffering and unfairness might have been avoided, had Lord Kitchener boldly announced his determination for conscription in the early days of the war. It is impossible, however, to blame him for having failed to make this call on the country's patriotism. He recognized his own ignorance of the prevailing political conditions, and, although he foresaw the length of the war, neither he nor any other soldier appreciated to the full the drain which it would make on our manpower and resources. No other man could have created the New Armies. Whether or not it was a sound policy to ignore the existing territorial machinery is a matter upon which experts differ. Lord Esher seems to think that, on the whole, Lord Kitchener was justified in treating the Territorial Force as a negligible quantity; others, who perhaps are more qualified to form an opinion, consider that the war would have been appreciably shortened had full use been made of the Territorial organization. It is not our intention, however, to argue this point. Whatever Lord Kitchener's mistakes may have been, the fact remains that he gave us the New Armies, and, as Sir William Robertson wrote on the 4th of February, 1916, "we owe more to him than any one." In spite of all the criticism, therefore, which has been levelled against him, Lord Kitchener will probably remain for all time the greatest British figure in the Great War.

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709. By the late FRANK TAYLOR. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1921. Two volumes. 50s.

The posthumous publication of an unfinished work is a venture not to be lightly undertaken, but it certainly would have been a pity if Mr. Taylor's friends had shrunk from it and had not given to the world the completed portions of his attempt to write the life of the first Duke of Marlborough. There certainly was room for a good life of that great soldier, and especially for one written by some one with more knowledge and interest in military matters than was possessed by Archdeacon Coxe. Luckily, too, the portion of Mr. Taylor's work which he had finished dealt with that part of Marlborough's career which Lord Wolseley never reached. He had completed his account of the campaigns of 1702-08, and had written the greater part of the story of 1709, though his chapter on the

siege of Tournai is unfinished, and his account of Malplaquet leaves the impression of being little more than a first draft, which would have been elaborated and improved on revision. Mr. Taylor's book does, therefore, give readers a fuller and more satisfactory account of Marlborough's chief campaigns than any yet in existence. He had researched and read extensively, was inspired by a warm admiration for the subject of his biography, had visited most of the sites of his battles and sieges, and had studied strategy, military history in general, as well as the wars of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as his excellent introductory chapter on War shows. Moreover, Mr. Taylor had a real power of writing. His narrative is lively and vigorous; at times it strongly reminds the reader of Macaulay (whom by a curious irony Mr. Taylor, who hates all Whigs, is never tired of denouncing), and there are many passages of real power and distinction. Add to this the fact that since Coxe's volumes were published much additional material for the story of Marlborough's wars has become available, and the result is a book which, although incomplete, is a real addition to historical literature. Criticism of the posthumous work of a writer, or of the way in which the editor of the book has discharged the difficult task of preparing it for publication, is somewhat invidious, but the book has suffered, of course, in many ways for want of its author's final revision. There is no map of Lille and its surroundings, no adequate map for the passage of the Lines of Brabant in 1705, and no light is thrown on the vexed question of the doings of the third of the brigades of British infantry at Blenheim, though Mr. Taylor has brought out the importance of the new light thrown by Lord Orkney's account of Ramillies on the part played in that battle by the British foot. There are a good many minor errors as to regiments, especially in the index, and the chapter on War is almost wholly concerned with considerations of strategy, and does not discuss the scarcely less important matter of the tactics and weapons of the day and their influence on what was then possible. But the book gives a clear picture of Marlborough's greatness as a soldier, his freedom from the limitations which fettered so many of the abler men of the day, his readiness to "take the great line," his grasp of strategical conditions and possibilities, his tactical daring and resourcefulness, his eagerness for battle—wherein he differed so greatly from the majority of his contemporaries, his realization that without success in pitched battles no decisive results could be reached. Mr. Taylor's account of the political complications and difficulties which hampered Marlborough is also excellent; like

other recent writers, he shows that Marlborough was no Whig, and was much handicapped in consequence by having to satisfy the demands of a party whose partisanship often outstripped its patriotism. It was the Whig "Junta," for example, who were far more responsible than Marlborough for the excessive demands which caused Louis XIV. to break off the peace negotiations of 1709. Similarly, Mr. Taylor's refutation of the accusations of inordinate love of money against Marlborough is effective and convincing, and he confirms the more reasonable view of Marlborough's personal character which has of late begun to prevail among historians against Macaulay's exaggerated denunciations. That Mr. Taylor is himself rather biassed against Macaulay and against Whigs in general, even to the extent of exculpating Harley's conduct towards his colleagues in 1708, detracts but little from the value of a book which, had its author only lived to finish it, would undoubtedly have taken its place as the standard life of one of the greatest of soldiers of all time.

A History of Persia. By Brigadier-General Sir PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G. Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 2 vols. Second edition, 1921. £3 10s. net.

These two volumes contain a history of Persia from the earliest times until the beginning of this year. It is not until halfway through the second volume that the author arrives at the end of the eighteenth century, before which time, in the words of Sir Valentine Chirol, "Persia had never been seriously thought of in Europe as a political factor."* The earlier chapters of this work give a full and illuminating account of the Persian races, from the dawn of history to the foundation of the empire by Cyrus, and so through centuries of varied fortune to the rise of Nadir Shah, who conquered Delhi in 1738. But it is the foundation of the Kajar dynasty towards the end of that century that we propose to take as our starting-point in this notice. The subsequent history of Persia can be conveniently divided into three periods :

- (1) the period ending with the Treaty of Paris in 1857 ;
- (2) the growing importance of Russia during a period ending with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 ;
- (3) the years 1907 to the present time.

(1) Napoleon, who sent a plenipotentiary to Teheran in 1807, regarded Persia as a factor in his plans for world conquest. Through Persia, he considered, a blow could be dealt at British supremacy in

* See "The Middle Eastern Question ; or, Some Political Problems of Indian Defence," 1903, p. 8.

India. The danger had been foreseen by the British Government, which had made a defensive alliance with Persia, albeit on an unstable basis, a few years before. Sir Percy Sykes is firmly of the opinion that Napoleon's schemes in this direction must have ended in disaster ; and indeed the French envoy gave the impression to the Shah that he had promised more than he could perform (ii. pp. 300, 307). The result of these years from the European standpoint can be summed up in the terms of the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1914, by which " all alliances between Persia and European nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void, and all European armies were to be prevented from entering Persia, if hostile to Great Britain " (ii. p. 309). But our relations with Persia were strained during the remainder of this period over the question of Afghanistan, where Persia sought compensation for the loss of much of her northern territory to Russia. This question, which naturally was of grave importance to India, ultimately led to war, and was finally settled by the Treaty of Paris in 1857, by which Persia recognized the independence of Afghanistan and undertook to cease all interference in Afghan affairs.

(2) With the gradual advance of Russia, Persia became a part of the larger Asiatic question. Russia had encroached in the Caucasus and was supreme in the Caspian Sea ; and, during the period beginning about 1860, she not only became Persia's neighbour on the north-east, but she began the consolidation of her interests within the actual borders of Persia. Her influence was seen in road construction, in finance, and in the number of Russian officers holding responsible positions in the Persian Army. Her guiding policy, to quote Chirol again, was to bolster up " a weak and corrupt Oriental monarchy and secure its complete subserviency by a judicious combination of forceful pressure and pecuniary suasion." By the end of the century Persian trade was practically either in British or in Russian hands ; and, although in the main our interests centred in the Persian Gulf, where we maintained our supremacy, and Russian interests centred in the north, there were several questions which had produced serious rivalry. Russia had manœuvred to obtain very favourable customs treatment under a secret treaty ; and in the east, especially in Sistan, which lies across the boundary of Persia and Afghanistan, there was trade competition of a political kind. If the Shah, to quote one of his titles which are detailed at the head of a chapter in this work, was not precisely " The Pivot of the Universe," the question of his impoverished and turbulent country was one of the chief causes of dispute between two European Powers. It was

in these delicate circumstances that the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 was drawn up. This, so far as Persia was concerned, defined the special spheres of influence of the two countries, and in other ways was intended to substitute co-operation for rivalry. The Agreement, however, was made behind the back of Persia, whose fear that Russia intended to annex her sphere of influence had a solid basis ; and, " There is no doubt," says Sir Percy Sykes, " that the remarkable success of German propaganda in Persia during the Great War and the bitter hostility shown to Great Britain were mainly due to the openly avowed reason that the British were friends " of Russia (ii. p. 414).

(3) Between 1907 and 1914 the position of Persia grew from bad to worse. Constitutional Government, which had been set up in 1906, seemed destined to fail ; and a state of civil war, more or less constant, prevailed. On the outbreak of the European War, Persia proclaimed her neutrality ; but it was unlikely that, as a neighbour of Russia and Turkey, her country would be immune from military operations. Moreover, Germany was quite prepared to fan every flame which could create an anti-British atmosphere. Sir Percy Sykes, with his close personal knowledge of events, gives a detailed, and in part autobiographical, story of the war as affecting Persia. Of this story the outstanding features appear as follows : " At the end of 1915 German influence was paramount in Southern Persia, except at the ports " (ii. p. 450). The year 1916, which is described as " a year of ebb and flow," saw the fall of Kut-al-Amara, which, however, did not produce that wave of fanaticism across Persia to India which many feared (ii. p. 454). Then the tide turned ; the German mission at Kerman was captured ; and there followed that great march under Sir Percy Sykes from Bandar Abbas via Kerman and Yezd to Isfahan and back to Shiraz, of which the prime effect was the restoration of law and order in these districts, thus improving the situation in Afghanistan and on the north-west frontier of India (ii. p. 459). The organization of the South Persia Rifles in the following year increased these good results, so that " by the end of 1917 robbery on the main road had ceased and security in South Persia was greater than at any period during the previous decade " (ii. p. 484). But changes in the Persian scene during the war were kaleidoscopic. This is more particularly true of the north-west. In the spring of 1917 the collapse of Russia portended far-reaching results, not the least as affecting the security of India. The Dunster-ville Mission in the early months of 1918 had without doubt a steady-ing effect ; and a similar result ensued from the Malleeson Mission

dispatched to the north-east of Persia by the Government of India. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Persian Government was changing in the direction of active hostility ; and in the south, in the summer of 1918, the Kashgais started operations against us with, at any rate, no opposition from the Persian authorities at Teheran. By October, in the face of heavy odds, our troops were completely victorious, the Kashgais defeated and the attitude of the Persian Government once more changing in our favour. This period, which we have described as the third period of Persian affairs, cannot be said to have terminated with the Armistice. For the Bolshevik menace remained ; and the Bolshevik menace involved a large measure of Bolshevik intrigue. To this without doubt is materially due the refusal of the Persian Government to ratify the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 ; and the latest pronouncement on Persian affairs * gives no ground for the hope that Persia is striving to place her house in order.

Frank Maxwell, Brigadier-General, V.C., C.S.I., D.S.O. A Memoir and Some Letters. Edited by his Wife. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. London : John Murray. 12s. net.

The letters which are published in this book were written by a man of cheerful heart, with great honesty of purpose, fine courage, warm affections, and a cool and clear-thinking mind.

Frank Maxwell's life was full of incident and valuable work of which this book really gives only a bare outline, but his letters, written in a frank and intimate style, enable the reader to form an accurate estimate of his splendid character, and also give glimpses of other interesting personalities.

The value of the sidelights thus thrown on Lord Kitchener and other distinguished men is that it shows them as they really were, and not as they are popularly supposed to have been. The reader can thus appreciate the human side of men who are often spoken of as having lacked the ordinary feelings of other men. But to see men as they are portrayed in this book, is not to make us respect them less, but rather to love them more, for on this earth there is nothing so much to be loved and honoured as real humanity.

Frank Maxwell began his life as a soldier on service at the age of twenty-four, and, by the end of 1897, he had taken a prominent part in three Frontier Expeditions, in which, besides gaining experience in both regimental and staff work, he had already been recommended for the V.C., a distinction which fell to him later in his career.

* Marquess Curzon in the House of Lords, the 26th of July, 1921.

Probably the most interesting pages of the book, at any rate from the point of view of the general reader or the historian, are to be found in Chapter III., which deals principally with Frank Maxwell's association with Lord Kitchener in South Africa. Lord Kitchener was indeed fortunate in having with him such a cheerful and thoughtful friend and companion—a man also whose extreme candour and moral courage were such that he could always be relied upon to speak the truth, however displeasing it might be. There are few men like Frank Maxwell who have the strength of mind to express their opinions honestly to those in high places, and there are still fewer men in high places who have the greatness of soul and the simplicity of character as well as the wisdom to tolerate such honesty in their subordinates. It is not the least of Lord Kitchener's great attributes that he chose Frank Maxwell for a position of intimacy on his staff and never failed to appreciate his sterling qualities.

The stories which Frank Maxwell relates of his chief illustrate the human side of the latter's character, and show that, strong man though he was, he felt the heavy pressure of his responsibilities. Later on in life, when Frank Maxwell himself was in a position of responsibility, first as a battalion and subsequently as a brigade commander, even he confesses, in spite of his buoyant courage, to moments of "great anxiety." It is well for those who have never experienced the inevitable anxieties of high positions to realize how great these are, for many think, who even seek such positions themselves, that once attained, life is smooth and easy. It is one of the many merits of this book that it exposes in a way that one could not hope for, except from a series of intimate letters, the "pains and griefs" that are associated inevitably with responsibility, especially in war.

Kitchener's energy and the extent to which the task in hand absorbed him are evident from the following :—

"Next morning up at 4.30–5, and till 7 a.m. preparing the scheme for a new Drive. K. is an extraordinary person. He sleeps and dreams on schemes all night, and in the morning in pyjamas and dishevelled head, gets you to work with scale, pencil and maps, and in 2 hours, plans are more or less complete and orders more or less drafted. Being a quick-change artist, he is off and has shaved, dressed, and ready to ride out to columns, while you are but washing your teeth. . . ."

The trust and respect of the Boers for Kitchener is well illustrated in these letters. He won them over by his evident honesty and by his strong personality. There was no diplomatic or tactical

manœuvring with Kitchener in his dealings with the Boers, no threatening, no adopting an uncompromising attitude one day, and then giving ambiguous hints at concessions which might be withdrawn later. It was characteristic of Kitchener, as it has been of many other British soldiers, to work for the establishment of a lasting peace on that which he believed to be the only firm foundation—namely, the early burial of past bitterness and the immediate creation of mutual confidence, respect, and even affection. His efforts in this direction in his negotiations with the Boers were quite remarkable, and showed a largeness of soul and a breadth of view, which, if they had been shown to anything like an equal extent in the solution of the many peace problems facing Europe and this Empire after the Armistice in 1918, would have found us now in a happier, more prosperous and far more stable condition.

During the years which intervened between the South African War and the Great War, Frank Maxwell's life was a full one, but few of the letters in this volume deal with this period in his career. The letters written from France, however, during the great drama in which he played so gallant a part, give a wonderfully human and convincing picture of the life of a fighting soldier on active service. From the nature of his work Frank Maxwell had nothing to do with great policies or great people, but his letters teem with lessons for men, great and small alike.

Courageous to a reckless extent as he was, when only his own personal safety was in question, he showed a great capacity for prudence and thoughtfulness in his conduct of military operations when the lives of his men were involved. Indeed, even his personal recklessness was largely calculated, for he well knew the value of the impression made upon his soldiers by such conduct on his part. Without leaders like Frank Maxwell, should we have won the war? The debt we owe to such men in great crises cannot be over-estimated.

The cool way in which he organized the force detailed to capture Trones Wood was a fine example of Frank Maxwell's care for his men as well as of his courageous leadership. It would be difficult to surpass for realistic description his simple account of the desperate fighting which took place on this occasion, as also on that of the capture of Thiepval—probably the greatest military feat in the war, although now almost forgotten.

The grimness and terrible misery of modern war, when both sides are well armed and evenly matched, is well shown in these letters, and it is striking to note how even Frank Maxwell, to whose adven-

turous spirit war as he had previously known it was almost congenial, quickly realized all its horrors in France. He never flinched for a moment from his task, but it is clear that he was alive to the appalling scenes of horror in which he took part—scenes which no good man, however much he might be imbued with a love of adventure, could view without longing to end a state of things which made them possible.

Frank Maxwell's comments upon the officers and men of the New Armies prove that, in spite of his genuine love and admiration for them, he was alive to the weak points in their training. His criticisms, however, cannot be taken as in any way derogatory, when it is borne in mind that by September, 1917, the date of Maxwell's death, most British battalions were commanded by officers of not more than twenty-eight, and most companies by officers of not more than twenty, years of age ; while the majority of non-commissioned officers were not any older. The moral, of course, is that the privates of a new army can be young and can be quickly raised and trained, but that the officers and non-commissioned officers should be men of more mature age and require to be far more highly trained.

When we laid Frank Maxwell to rest in a soldier's grave in the shot-torn ruins of Ypres, our guns were sending a stream of shells over his grave, while the enemy's shells were bursting intermittently hard by among the ruins. It was a fitting frame to a tragic picture. Yet, like those who stood bare-headed round that grave, readers of these letters, while grieving for the loss of a man so noble, should thank God for such a great example, and be grateful that this country can produce such men.

The History of King Edward's Horse. Edited by Lieut.-Colonel LIONEL JAMES, D.S.O. With a Foreword by General the Hon. Sir HERBERT A. LAWRENCE, K.C.B. London : Sifton, Praed & Co. 25s. net.

In "The History of King Edward's Horse" Colonel James has produced an imposing volume, which is of interest and value to the general public as well as to those connected with the regiment. To the latter it is a complete and ably written record of a fine regiment from its earliest days ; but to the general reader it is something more than this, for the history of the regiment is a splendid illustration of the community of feeling which exists throughout the Empire. We can trace in the history of King Edward's Horse the growth and development of a great idea from its first inception, more than twenty years ago, to its realization.

The idea which influenced those who were responsible for the raising of this regiment was the formation in the Metropolis of the Empire of a force of Colonials resident in the British Isles—a force which should be a unit of the British Army, serving in the Mother Country, and at the same time in close touch with all the great Dominions of the Empire and representative of all the Britons beyond the seas. Such was the great ideal which led to the raising of King Edward's Horse. It resulted in the establishment of a magnificent body of men, self-reliant, intolerant of inefficiency, well disciplined and well officered, and also, as General Lawrence writes in his Foreword to this volume, "had its direct influence on the action of the Colonies in the hour of the Empire's peril."

Official sanction was given for the formation of a mounted regiment for home defence—"The King's Colonials"—in November, 1901. In its first years the regiment was confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties and underwent varying changes of fortune, and it was not without infinite perseverance and industry that it was established on a firm basis. Much was done to this end during the period when General (then Colonel) Lawrence was in command, 1904-09. In 1907 the regiment became part of the Territorial Force, but, on volunteering for general service, was allowed its own separate association, and, in 1911, its status was raised to that of a Special Reserve Cavalry Regiment, a change that greatly enhanced its reputation in the eyes of the Governments of the various Dominions which up to that date had been somewhat lukewarm in their support. On mobilization in 1914 there was a flood of applications from overseas men to join the regiment, and it appears that a supply of qualified recruits was satisfactorily maintained by the reserve squadron until the end of the war, although, after March, 1918, these were not always drafted to their own regiment in France. The regiment was sent to France in April, 1915, and was at first split up as Divisional Cavalry. The squadrons were, however, reunited in June, 1916, under the command of Colonel James, one of the original officers of the regiment, and the regiment took part in the advance after the German retreat in March, 1917, as well as in the battles of Passchendaele and Cambrai in the same year. A brief sojourn on the Italian front followed, but in March, 1918, the regiment was hurried back to France to meet the German attacks on the Lys, and on the 9th of April and the following days achieved undying fame in the magnificent resistance put up by it at Les Huit Maisons and Vieille Chapelle. After the heavy casualties sustained during these critical

days, the regiment, which was again split up as Divisional Cavalry, was refitted in time to have its share in the final advance to victory. The descriptions of the actions in which the regiment was engaged are excellent, and the book is plentifully supplied with maps.

The Diary of a Yeomanry M.O. By Captain O. TEICHMAN, D.S.O., M.C. London : T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

This book, besides being an interesting account of the author's personal experiences in Gallipoli, Palestine and Italy, goes a good deal further than could be anticipated from the title. It gives a clear and detailed account of the operations of the yeomanry in Palestine—the one theatre of war in which cavalry as such was given a chance of distinguishing itself.

As regards his own particular sphere of work, Captain Teichman explains the difficulties of attending the wounded in rapidly moving warfare, more especially in view of a constant shortage of water and lack of transport facilities. But at the same time he gives a clear and interesting account of the military operations, quoting the orders received, describing the dispositions made, following the course of events in detail, and relating the actions of the units which co-operated with his own.

The whole story as described by Captain Teichman is a fine testimonial to the moral and general behaviour of the yeomanry. In one of the early chapters there is an account of the famous advance of the Yeomanry Division, dismounted, across the plain at Suvla Bay on the 21st of August, 1915—an appalling ordeal for untried troops which was sustained with the utmost gallantry. On leaving the Dardanelles, the Division rejoined their horses, and the author devotes the remainder of his book to the cavalry operations in Palestine—operations which entailed periods of intense hardship and fatigue, and which were carried out with great efficiency.

The book is well worth reading and contains several photographs, some taken by the Turks and some included by permission of the Imperial War Museum. The main operations are illustrated by sketch maps.

Moltke. Makers of the Nineteenth Century Series. By Lieut.-Colonel F. E. WHITTON. London : Constable & Co., Ltd. 14s. net.

After reading this book we turned to the title page, and with no little astonishment found 1921 there, for it is a full-dress panegyric of the Prussian Chief of the Staff with long accounts of the wars of 1866 and 1870-1, which might have been written in 1891, the year of

his death. Except a reference on almost the last page to Moltke's plan for a war against France and Russia simultaneously, no attempt is made to show how far the influence of his teaching extended to 1914-18; even his nephew and successor, the man of September, 1914, who accompanied him in 1870-1 and was his A.D.C. for twenty years afterwards, absorbing his words, does not get a mention. It is all ancient history, and such criticism as is offered is mostly drawn from the pre-war works of Marshal Foch and General Bonnal, and almost equally out of date. There is no attempt to show what principles Moltke taught, how far he succeeded or failed in carrying them out in the field, or the fatal effect which his victories over foes, unready and inferior in numbers, had on the German nation.

The book begins, so to speak, "in the year one" with an account of Prussia at the time of the hero's birth in 1800, followed by a chapter on the regeneration of Prussia after Jena. Then comes the story of Moltke's youthful days and his struggles as a penniless young officer, and his four years in Turkey. His adventures there seem to have brought him to Court notice, for he became A.D.C. to Prince Henry of Prussia and later to Prince Frederic William (afterwards the Emperor Frederic). We notice that neither in the text nor in the chronological table, which, by the way, do not completely agree, is there any reference to Moltke having been Chief of a Section of the Great General Staff and Acting Chief of the General Staff for a year before he was formally appointed, somewhat important steps in his career. While some 80 pages are given to 1866 and 140 to 1870-1, only three deal with 1864, and these manage to omit mention of the Austrian and the two Prussian Commanders-in-Chief: Gablenz, Wrangel and Prince Frederic Charles.

In telling the story of the wars, the numerical superiority of the Prussians and, later, Germans, is not brought out. Yet this combined with marching to the sound of the guns was the principal cause of Moltke's victories. As since 1918 the Germans hold that to be vanquished by numbers is not defeat, therefore the converse must be the case, and they did not win victories in 1866 and 1870. On what, therefore, is Moltke's fame to be based? Except at Sedan, the envelopments permitted by superior numbers were tactical not strategic, and great opportunities were lost: *e.g.* at Königgrätz, Spicheren and Woerth, an attempt should have been made to send some of the enveloping troops behind the enemy, and not merely to make a brutal frontal attack on a bent back flank. Colonel Whitton, however, bestows nothing but praise, even defending Moltke from French criticism; he does not, however, try to compare him

with Napoleon. This is perhaps as well, for it cannot be said that Moltke advanced strategy, although he had the use of railways, one inch beyond where Napoleon left it ; he, indeed, went back and used bludgeon work instead of manœuvre. Moltke was certainly one of a Triumvirate which consolidated Germany ; but he waged war with all the trumps in his hand, and played them no better than in his family whist. We cannot concur, after 1914-18, in considering him a maker of the nineteenth century or one of the greatest of leaders.

Of the man himself, his affection for his wife and family, his sentimentality, his courtesy to his staff, his quarrels with von Roon, the War Minister, his icy manner with the King, his methods of work, and how he commanded, we are told little. Such trifles as that the handwriting of Bronsart von Schellendorf, Chief of the Operations Section (who is not mentioned in the book), was so like that of the Field Marshal, that no one knew by which of the two certain memoranda, etc., were written, are not noticed. Still less that Moltke has a ghost, Wilhelm von Blume, who provided such strategy as was required and, unlike Ludendorff, claimed no credit. For years Moltke was used by the Germans as a bogie to frighten their enemies ; we now know that he did not possess any receipt for victory except superior numbers.

The Desert Mounted Corps. By Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. M. P. PRESTON, D.S.O. With Introduction by Lieut.-General Sir H. G. CHAUVEL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. London : Constable & Co., Ltd. 21s.

In its own way, this is one of the best books on the Great War which has been brought to our notice. It is well written, in a style which is always clear and at times vividly picturesque, so that the interest of the reader is maintained from the first page to the last. At the same time, Lieut.-Colonel Preston has not allowed his excellent style to run away with him ; he tells us all we want to know about the plans of the British Commander-in-Chief, their execution by the troops under his command, and the enemy's dispositions, while keeping our main attention on the doings of the cavalry, to whom it was mainly due, as is clearly shown in the narrative, that the Turkish setback in the late autumn of 1917 was converted into a defeat, and the defeat of the late autumn of 1918 into a complete disaster.

The action of the Desert Mounted Corps during the period dealt with in this volume may be divided into three parts. First

comes the campaign which opened at the end of October, 1917, with the capture of Beersheba and Gaza and ended in December with the occupation of Jerusalem. During these two months of active fighting the Desert Mounted Corps advanced some 80 miles as the crow flies (though the actual distances covered by the divisions varied between 170 and 230 miles), fought nine general engagements, and captured about 9500 prisoners and 80 guns. Then came a pause of six weeks, followed by a period of further activity extending from the 19th of February to the 5th of May, which included the advance to the Jordan valley and the two raids against Amman, on the far side of that river. These raids, despite the tenacity and gallantry shown by all units which took part in them, failed to give all the results that had been hoped for ; but this was due in no small degree, as the author makes clear, to the fearful conditions of climate and terrain under which they had to be carried out. There followed another pause till the middle of September, during which the heat and dust of a Palestine summer forbade serious operations, and then came the crowning triumph of General Allenby's first victory and the exploitation of that victory in the advance of the cavalry to Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. For the story of these events, we must refer the reader to Lieut.-Colonel Preston's chapters, which it would be an injustice to attempt to summarize ; it will be enough to say that in the period from the 19th to the 30th of September the Desert Mounted Corps marched over 200 miles and took more than 60,000 prisoners, 140 guns and 500 machine guns in the advance to Damascus alone, while during the further advance to Aleppo the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions covered another 367 miles and took over 23,000 prisoners and 20 guns, bringing up the full total taken by the Desert Mounted Corps to 83,700 prisoners and 160 guns—from six to seven times its own strength.

A number of very useful comments on horse artillery, horses, transport and ammunition supply close the volume, which is fully illustrated from photographs and supplied with excellent maps.

It seems a pity where so much is good to cavil at minor matters, but it may be pointed out, without in any way disparaging the magnificent achievements of the mounted arm during the period under consideration, that the circumstances were somewhat peculiar and unlikely to be repeated. The Turkish Army, never first class according to modern standards, was ill-led, ill-clothed and ill-supplied, and by the autumn of 1918 was thinned by disease, restive against its German leaders, and in a deplorably bad state of moral. Moreover, we had the advantage of being nearer to our base

than were our foes to theirs, and of having command of the sea, so that an ample supply of munitions and material was always more easily obtained by us than by them, while throughout the whole period we possessed the superiority of numbers in men, guns and aircraft. In a word, the enemy was in every way our inferior, and this fact of itself afforded an opportunity to the cavalry such as rarely occurs in modern times, and did not in fact occur anywhere else during the Great War. This of itself should make one hesitate before accepting General Chauvel's statement in the Introduction that "this History must demonstrate to the world that the horse soldier is just as valuable in modern warfare as he has ever been in the past." The truth would seem to be that only if and when an army has obtained, or possesses from the first, an indubitable superiority over its enemy, can it nowadays use its cavalry for exploiting and reaping the full fruits of that superiority, whereas in the past cavalry could of itself achieve as well as exploit a victory. At the same time it is probably true that unless and until the next World War should come, the British horseman is likely to find employment in the future only against such inferior foes as will afford him manifold opportunities of winning further laurels.

The Marne Campaign. By Lieut.-Colonel F. E. WHITTON. (Campaigns and Their Lessons Series.) Edited by Major-General Sir C. E. CALLWELL, K.C.B. London: Constable & Co., Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

The first impression of the reader who turns over the pages of this volume will be one of pleased surprise at learning so many facts he has never dreamed of before (we suppose him to have already some slight acquaintance with the history of the Marne). For instance, he will notice (p. 12) that the French plan of campaign is very different from what he believed it to be, although he has probably read the text of Plan XVII., on which General Joffre is popularly supposed to have acted. He will learn (p. 22) that the Germans had 21 reserve corps in the field in the West, though he will be unable from their Order of Battle to account for more than 12. He will be surprised to see (p. 74) that the Third German Army took part in the battle of Charleroi. He will perhaps even find it difficult to accept the statement (p. 96) that the British were overwhelmed at Le Cateau. If he gets out the map of the positions and movements of the German Armies from day to day, as given, say, by Von Kuhl, and compares those given thereon for the 4th of September with those given on p. 120 by Lieut.-Colonel

Whitton, he will fail to discover the slightest resemblance between the two ; he will also observe that according to Von Kuhl (who was at the time Chief of Staff of the German First Army) that Army changed direction south-eastward on the 31st of August, whereas Lieut.-Colonel Whitton says (p. 121) that it did so on the 4th of September. And when he reads on p. 214 that "according to a trustworthy report" (the source of which is not given) "the German Emperor on the 9th of September signed an order for the retreat of the German armies," he will be more puzzled than ever and will probably remember Talleyrand's remark about a blunder being worse than a crime.

By this time also, he will probably have been struck by the fact that certain matters, hitherto considered of interest and even of importance, have been omitted from the story. Lieut.-Colonel Whitton does not, as a rule, tend to omit picturesque facts ; for instance, he indulges in a long description of German boots (with legs in them) and helmets (with heads in them) sent flying about the streets of Charleroi by the French artillery fire. But he does not apparently think it worth while to mention the part played at Liège by one Erich Ludendorff, a man of some importance in his time ; he gives no sort or kind of description of the operations of Sordet's cavalry in Belgium ; and he is silent as to the relations between Lord French and Lanrezac, as also those between Lanrezac and French G.Q.G. Our honest reader will also observe that the part played by General Galliéni before the battle of the Marne is rather curtly, not to say inadequately, dealt with ; and, when the whole story of the battle is completed without a single reference to Colonel Hentsch, he will probably feel as if he has been looking at "Hamlet" played without the Prince of Denmark.

At this point (if not before) he will probably turn to the list of authorities at the end of the book. Here he will find many odd books mentioned, but he will not find von Kluck, or von Bülow, or von Hausen, or either of von Kuhl's two books, or either of Baumgarten-Crusius' two books, or Palat, or the German Staff monographs or the official "Schlachten und Gefechte," or Becke or even Lord French's "1914." And then the student may turn back to the beginning of the book and discover that it was "first published" in 1917 and that this is merely a "Second Impression." So evidently some one (probably a bad fairy) has induced author or publisher to rehash these dry and out-of-date bones and reissue them under the guise of a new book ! And this is the way military history is dealt with in England !

In the "Introduction" signed "C.E.C.," and so presumably by General Callwell, some attempt is made to rectify the more glaring of Lieut.-Colonel Whitton's errors. But why is it stated in comparing Salamanca with the Marne, that in the latter case "the isolation" of the flank force "was the result of previous events," and that "the German Higher Command was making an effort to close its ranks when General Joffre assumed the offensive"? Considering that at the opening of the battle the German First and Second Armies were so close together that the left wing corps of the former had, as von Bülow complains, pushed itself right in front of the latter's right wing, and that at the end of the battle they were divided by a gap of some 25 miles, this comment would seem to be the exact opposite of the truth.

General Callwell, however, does not seriously endeavour to correct the many misstatements in the book—misstatements, we repeat, excusable and indeed inevitable in 1917, but unpardonable at this time of day. He is well advised to refrain from so doing. After all, any one who tries to get an accurate story of the Marne Campaign from a book five years old really deserves very little sympathy.

From Kastamuni to Kedos. Edited by Captain C. L. WOOLLEY.
Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 42s.

This volume is a record of the experiences of 175 British and Indian officers, with their 104 orderlies, who were collected together in Turkish prisoner-of-war camps, first at Kastamuni and then at Kedos. Written as it is in a light vein, there seems some danger lest the unfailing good-humour and good temper with which the record teems should obscure the very real hardships, the petty tyranny, the extortion and, above all, the utter and never-ending boredom, with which these unfortunate men had to put up during their two years of captivity. The efforts they made to kill time and keep their minds alive and their hearts high are retailed in great detail. Besides the usual resources of games, of a library and magazines, lectures were given, painting and sketching undertaken, classes held in all manner of subjects, such as carpentry, woodwork, watchmaking and metalwork, and a field club instituted for the study of natural history. Orchestral concerts were given from time to time; and a dramatic society was started, which, despite the most extraordinary difficulties in acquiring even the first necessities for make-up, costumes and scenery, succeeded in giving highly creditable performances of such plays as "Twelfth Night" and

"Theodore & Co" and of a topical revue "Kill that Bug," while a Pierrot Troupe was also instituted. As adapters of small means to great ends, the inhabitants of these Turkish prison camps can, by the time of their release, have had little to learn! The whole volume might well be adopted as a text-book in the unlikely event of the foundation in this country of that most necessary institution—an Academy for the Inculcation of Mark Tapleyism.

Army Veterinary Service in War. By Major-General Sir JOHN MOORE, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.R.C.V.S. London: H. and W. Brown. One guinea: Profits to be devoted to the formation of a Benevolent Fund, A.V.S., India.

Major-General Sir John Moore, who held the post of Director-General of Veterinary Services to the British Expeditionary Force, has put his knowledge to a useful purpose in compiling this book.

In all probability there are few people who have any idea of the number of horses required, even in these days of mechanical warfare, for an army in the field, but the figures given here—23,000 horses on the strength of the pre-war Army as compared with 475,000 possessed at one period in the war by the B.E.F.—will give some idea of the organization which successfully maintained this supply of horses, looked after their health and arranged for their distribution.

Sir John Moore first describes the organization and administration of the Veterinary Service, and then deals with the question of wastage, pointing out the lessons to be learned and thus suggesting improvements which should be effected. In the latter part of the book he deals in some detail with the different kinds of animals employed, discussing fully their suitability for various forms of work.

The book is certainly useful from a practical point of view, and at the same time is of great interest in showing the working of a Service which successfully coped with immense difficulties, and kept the Army supplied with the number of animals which was essential to its existence.

The Evolution of Naval Armament. By Commander F. L. ROBERTSON, R.N. London: Constable & Co. 1921. 18s.

Commander Robertson has set himself a task which was worth attempting, and he has achieved a very considerable measure of success. He has attempted to provide a book written in non-technical language in which is traced the history of the Navy on its

material side down to the evolution of our modern Navy. He has taken this as marked by the construction in the 'eighties of the "*Admiral*" class of battleship, which embodied so many new departures (such as the final rejection of sail-power and the definite adoption of the long-barrelled breech-loading rifled gun) that it is from that type of ship that the battleships which fought at Jutland were evolved. His purpose has entailed the study of three things, the actual construction of the ship, the development of its weapons and of its methods of propulsion. All these matters are clearly dealt with and their interaction has been well brought out. One sees, for example, how the geographical conditions which caused the Dutch to build their ships with less draught and flatter bottoms than the English, affected their fighting and manœuvring capacities ; the result being that the English could hold a better wind, could out-sail and out-manœuvre the Dutchmen, who had, however, the compensation that when out-fought they could find refuge in shallow waters in which their opponents could not follow them. The French ships, on the other hand, were more scientifically designed, had finer lines and could out-sail us, but English superiority in construction enabled our ships to stand more battering than the French. Commander Robertson shows that, while the superior strength and seaworthiness of our ships compensated somewhat for our neglect of science in shipbuilding, we handicapped ourselves by efforts at standardization which cramped the inventiveness of our designers, who were much hampered by the over-elaborate specifications submitted to them. Another fault from which the English ships suffered was a tendency, very marked in the seventeenth century, to over-gun our ships, which were usually too small for their rates as compared with those of France and Spain.

One or two individuals stand out clearly in these pages : Captain Broke of the *Shannon* is revealed as a gunnery expert, the Sir Percy Scott of his day ; his victory over the *Chesapeake* was no fluke but the fruit of careful thought and long labour. Another man, much less well known, who proves to have been of great importance is Benjamin Robins, a Quaker, whose "New Principles of Gunnery," written about 1743, was a really revolutionary work and contributed largely to the great reforms initiated by Anson.

The Fruits of Victory : A Sequel to "The Great Illusion." By NORMAN ANGELL. London : W. Collins & Co. 1921. 8s. 6d. net.

Mr. Norman Angell, who achieved a certain reputation before 1914 by his views on international relations and especially on

disarmament, is apparently a much misrepresented man : he did not, it would seem, teach that war was impossible though many of his disciples came to that conclusion as the result of reading his works. But his well-meant efforts to persuade Germany that war was futile and that she could not benefit by war are certainly reminiscent of Mrs. Partington's conflict with the Atlantic, and that any one after a serious study of public affairs should have believed that such a course was "practical politics" argues poorly for his perception and judgment and does not incline one to treat his remedies for the post-war situation with any great respect. Mr. Angell has no doubt plenty of facts of which he can make fairly effective use in dealing with the present economic situation in Europe, but, like many others who can be very convincing as destructive critics, he has nothing to offer which seems in the least feasible or effectively helpful. Nor does his new book seem to indicate that he has ever considered the question, "what would have been the results of a German victory?" a result which might easily have been reached had his teaching, or rather that of his disciples, been a little more effective before 1914.

Letters upon War and Neutrality. By Sir T. E. HOLLAND, K.C., D.C.L., F.B.A. Third edition. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1921. 10s. 6d. net.

The subject dealt with in these letters, contributed to the *Times* at intervals over a period of forty years, by the sometime Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford, is one on which there has been a good deal to say in the last few years, and there is hardly a section in the volume to which Sir Thomas Holland has not found occasion to make additions since the second edition of the work appeared in 1914. From the nature of the work it makes difficult because desultory reading, but as a work of reference for clearly expressed opinions on many different points it has great value. Sir Thomas Holland's letters are distinguished by their lucidity and definiteness, but one can hardly read one of them without reflecting on the futility of applying the term "law" to rules the violation of which can be visited by no legally enforceable penalty.

A Servant when he Reigneth. By JOHN TRAVERS (Mrs. G. H. BELL). London : Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd. 8s. 6d. net.

In an article which appeared in the April number of *The Army Quarterly*, the author of this novel made a powerful appeal for the better education of the children of the men of the Indian Army.

She emphasized the fact that the future of British rule in India must largely depend upon the maintenance of the splendid loyalty and discipline of the native troops. It is clear, therefore, that it is not only our duty but also our interest to do everything in our power to assist the children of the men who responded to the call of the King Emperor and who during the late war fought and died under the British flag in almost every theatre of operations.

In her novel Mrs. Bell develops her theme and shows how much useful work can be performed by English ladies among the women of India if they will only take the trouble to learn the native dialects and get in touch with the people. Mrs. Bell knows India well and her story, which is by no means all propaganda, is of exceptional interest and can be heartily recommended.

The Collected Verse of A. B. Paterson. Sydney, Australia : Angus & Robertson. 9s. net.

The author of these verses, it seems, is better known in Australia and America than in this country, for we are informed by the publishers that his poems have been "for years companions and sources for daily quotations for the entire Roosevelt family," and that in the Australian contingent in Palestine "every one knew him." Major A. B. Paterson served in the South African War under Lord French and in Palestine during the Great War ; but while several of the pieces in the present volume deal with the former campaign, the Great War has not as yet succeeded in inspiring his muse. This is to be regretted, for he excels in the writing of verse with "swing" and "go" in it, and his ballads seem to breathe of that strong and fresh manliness which is typical of Australia and Australian soldiers. To the more delicate of the poet's qualities the gallant Major would himself probably make no claim ; but any one who wishes to read stories of bush and racing life, told straightforwardly and well in easily readable and recitable verse, cannot do better than dip into this volume.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS.

The Quarterly Review, July, 1921. "The Germans in Belgium," by William Archer.

An English translation has been recently made of the German "White Book" of May, 1915, which forms the German defence against the charge of atrocities committed by the German Army in Belgium. The translation is prefaced by a "Foreword," in which

the English translator appears to have adopted in the main the German point of view ; and this article in *The Quarterly* illustrates the curious manner in which he has been deceived by German statements.

The Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1921, contains two articles of Military Interest.

(1) "Tanks in Future Warfare," by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O.

This article raises wider questions than its title would indicate. In regard to tanks the author, who requires no introduction as an exponent of his subject, gives interesting figures under the headings (i) Fighting man-power ; (ii) Manufacturing man-power ; (iii) Expenditure of money ; (iv) Economy of transportation ; and (v) Economy of time. But statistics are sometimes almost as dangerous a weapon as the tank itself. How, for instance, can we regard reasoning such as this ?

"Did the tank from the military point of view enable time to be economized ? To show that it did I will compare the operations of the summer and autumn of 1917 with those of 1918. At the third battle of Ypres, between the 31st of July and the 14th of November, 1917, an advance of about 12,000 yards was made ; the average daily penetration was, therefore, 110 yards. Between the 8th of August and the 11th of November, 1918, an advance of over 60 miles was effected, consequently the average daily penetration was 1100 yards. During the first of these periods the use of tanks was limited, during the second they were used in the van of nearly every attack, and the result was that the military hour was reduced to six minutes ; in other words ten times more work was done in the hour when tanks were used than when they were not.

"Whether these statistics be considered exaggerated or not. . . ."

No, it is not that the statistics are exaggerated (unless the measurements of the two advances are inaccurate), but it is that the deduction in this particular case fills us with amazement.

In order to appreciate the wider questions raised by Colonel Fuller, this article should be read *verbatim* by all who have sufficient imagination to share the author's power of looking into the future, and the necessary knowledge to scrutinize some of the practical steps which he advocates.

(2) "Marlborough," by Professor Spenser Wilkinson.

This article is a review of the most recent book on Marlborough's military career by Frank Taylor. He was "one of the Oxford men

who, in the period of the South African conflict, were attracted by military studies," and had almost finished his life of Marlborough when he died in 1913. His sister has now seen his manuscript through the press; and "The Wars of Marlborough" is the result. To this work Professor Spenser Wilkinson in his article gives warm praise. "Taylor's is the best interpretation of Marlborough's career, bringing out at once the strength of the man and the weakness of his position." The sketch of Marlborough's generalship contained in this article will attract many to the larger work.*

The English Review, July, 1921, contains an article on "Lord Milner's Memorandum on the Events of March, 1918," by Walter Shaw Sparrow, the author of "The Fifth Army in March, 1918."

The National Review, August, 1921, contains an article entitled "Civilian Criticism and the German High Command," by Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Beadon, C.B.E. The article draws attention to some of the ill-considered criticisms which have been levelled against the conduct of the war by the German Great General Staff.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

"The Inland Water Transport in Mesopotamia." By Lieut.-Colonel L. J. Hall, O.B.E., R.E., under the direction of Brigadier-General R. H. W. Hughes, C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.D. Published by Constable & Co.

"Sonnets and Semblances chiefly relating to the War." By Henry Cloriston. Published by the London Literary Alliance. 3s. net.

"Frank Maxwell, Brigadier-General, V.C., C.S.I., D.S.O." A memoir and some letters. Edited by his Wife. Published by John Murray. 12s. net.

"Moltke." By Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Whitton. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd. 18s. net.

"The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709." By Frank Taylor, edited by G. Winifred Taylor, M.A. Published by Basil Blackwell. Two vols. 50s.

"From Kastamuni to Kedos," being a record of experiences of prisoners of war in Turkey, 1916-1918. Written by many hands and edited by C. L. Wooley, Captain, R.F.A. Published by Basil Blackwell. 42s. net.

"The Collected Verse of A. B. (Banjo) Paterson." Published by Angus & Robertson, Ltd., Australia. 9s. net.

"The Desert Mounted Corps," an account of the cavalry operations in Palestine and Syria, 1917-1918. By Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. R. M. Preston, D.S.O. Published by Constable & Co. 21s. net.

"The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener." By Reginald Viscount Esher. Published by John Murray. 10s. 6d. net.

"Army Veterinary Service in War." By Major-General Sir John Moore, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.R.C.V.S. Published by H. & W. Brown. 21s.

"The History of King Edward's Horse (The King's Oversea Dominions Regiment)," edited by Lieut.-Colonel Lionel James, D.S.O. Published by Sifton, Praed & Co., Ltd. 25s.

"The Marne Campaign." By Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Whitton. (Second Impression.) Published by Constable & Co. 12s. 6d. net.

* A review of this book appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly*. See pp. 156-158.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

HOUSE OF LORDS

TERRITORIAL CADET FORCE REGULATIONS.—On the 14th of July *Viscount Peel*, replying to *Lord O'Hagan*, stated that the revised regulations governing the Territorial Cadet Force, would, it was hoped, be issued in August. The present regulations, which had been patched up periodically, were issued in 1914.

TERRITORIAL ARMY AND MILITIA BILL.—In moving the Second Reading of this Bill, on the 10th of August, *Viscount Peel*, stated in regard to the Militia that all questions of reorganization, reconstruction, recruiting and establishment of officers were now under consideration, but no decisions had been arrived at. *Viscount Haldane* deplored the change of name from Special Reserve to Militia, as such a change seemed to give countenance to the old notion that the Militia really was an effective fighting force in itself; the change of name to Special Reserve was made in 1907-8 in order to emphasize the fact that the primary function of the Militia was to supply drafts for the Regular battalions. *Lord Amthill* gave a spirited history of the Militia and welcomed the restoration of its time-honoured name, in which he was supported by *the Earl of Selborne*. [The Bill received the Royal Assent on the 17th of August.]

HOUSE OF COMMONS

THE MIDDLE EAST.—The following are some of the principal points in the statement made by the *Secretary of State for the Colonies* (*Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill*) on the 14th of June :—

(1) Pledges were given during our conquest of Palestine and Mesopotamia that (a) Turkish rule should not be re-introduced, (b) the Arab nation would be re-constituted, and (c) Great Britain would do her best to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Under the Treaties of Peace we have accepted the position of mandatory power in the two countries.

(2) A Middle East Department has now been created and placed under the Colonial Office. A conference has been held at

Cairo, and conclusions have been reached in regard to a reduction of expenditure.

(3) At the Armistice 700,000 men were on our ration strength in the two countries. For 1919-20 the expenditure was between 70 and 80 millions. At the beginning of 1920-21 the numbers were 250,000, and the expenditure 40 millions. At the beginning of 1921-22 the numbers were 200,000 and the expenditure estimated at 35 millions. At the Cairo conference it was agreed to reduce by the middle of July, 1921, the Mesopotamian garrison to a scale of 23 battalions, and after October, 1921, to one of 12 battalions; the horses would be reduced by August, 1921, from 47,000 to 17,000. In Palestine our forces have now been reduced from a ration strength of 16,000 to one of 7,000. For 1921-22 the revised estimate of cost for the two countries is 27½ millions; and for 1922-23 the total normal cost will be between 9 and 10 millions.

(4) In regard to policy, in Mesopotamia it is the intention to instal an Arab ruler acceptable to an elected assembly, and to build up an Arab state with Baghdad as its capital. This policy is a reversal of the Turkish policy of keeping the Arabs divided and of exerting influence through tribal jealousies. Emir Feisal, the son of King Hussein, has been informed that, if his candidature is acceptable to the assembly, he will receive the countenance and support of Great Britain.*

(5) On the question of security, an Arab Army is already partly formed; and, in addition to the British and Indian infantry in Mesopotamia (12 battalions), there will be 8 squadrons of aeroplanes. "The extent to which aerial control can be used in substitution of military force is still disputable, but with every month that has passed our confidence in its great utility has been increased." "Arrangements are being made which will make it possible for aeroplanes to fly regularly to and fro across the desert between Baghdad and Cairo."

(6) In Palestine "no Jew will be brought in beyond the number who can be provided for by the expanding wealth and development of the resources of the country."

[A debate ensued; and the question was the subject of further debate when the Colonial Office Vote was discussed on the 14th of July.]

ARMY ORGANIZATION.—On the 17th of August, on the debate on the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill, *Lieut.-General Sir A. Hunter-Weston* called attention to (a) the necessity for a

* Feisal has now been declared King of Irak.

review of our present resources for defence, and for the appointment of a small Commission to carry out that review, in the light of the experience gained during the war, and (b) the duty of the Government to review any proposals of the Government of India in order to ensure the safety of the lives of our fellow-subjects, both British and native. Reference was also made by subsequent speakers to other points relating to Army organization; *e.g.* (i) the distribution of overseas garrisons, (ii) the distribution of our Army reservists in the Dominions and their position when called up in time of war, and (iii) the policy of the Government in cutting down the Territorial Army, and in particular in causing the amalgamation of units in the 42nd Division.

STAFF OFFICERS.—On the 2nd of August *the Secretary of State for War*, replying to *Major Glyn*, stated that the number of officers holding staff appointments in the United Kingdom on the 30th of June, 1921, was 875, and the number on the 30th of June, 1914, was 635.

On the 9th of August *the Secretary of State for War*, replying to *Lieut.-Colonel Nall*, stated that there were three infantry brigade commanders with brigade majors and an officer commanding Royal Artillery with a brigade major with each division. Their abolition, involving an approximate saving of £150,000 per annum, was one of the possible economies now being considered.

TANK CORPS.—On the 2nd of August, in reply to a question by *Mr. Kenyon*, *the Secretary of State for War* made a short statement regarding the Tank Corps. He pointed out that, since 1918, experience had clearly demonstrated the value of armoured cars, and still more that of a suitable light tank. "Consequently, those armoured car units which existed in 1920, and which were manned by personnel drawn from various arms, have been reorganized as standard Tank Corps units. . . . Apart from administrative and instructional establishments, there are at present :

2 Service Tank Battalions serving at home.

2 Cadre Tank Battalions which it is proposed to expand in 1922-23.

12 Armoured Car Companies, 10 serving abroad and 2 at home."

TERRITORIAL ARMY.—On the 18th of August *the Under-Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Nall*, gave a statement showing the strength of Territorial Divisions, etc., on the 1st of August, 1921 (exclusive of permanent staff). The approximate totals for the 14 Divisions, Yeomanry, Army Troops and Coast Defences, were officers, 6700, and other ranks, 119,708.

TERRITORIAL ARMY AND MILITIA BILL.—On the 20th of July the Second Reading of this Bill was moved by *the Under-Secretary of State for War*. It was proposed to term the Territorial Force the Territorial Army and to term the Special Reserve the Militia. The Bill dealt with names, and with names only.

INNS OF COURT O.T.C.—On the 5th of July *the Secretary of State for War*, replying to *Mr. Maddocks*, stated that the Inns of Court had been offered the choice between two alternatives—(1) the opportunity of amalgamating with another battalion which was also an Officers' Training Corps during the war, with a view to forming a Territorial combatant battalion, each half of the amalgamated battalion retaining its old identity; and (2) continuing as an Officers' Training Corps unit under the General Staff.

7TH ROYAL SCOTS.—On the 11th of July, on an adjournment motion made by *Captain Benn*, *the Under-Secretary of State for War* stated that there were 21 battalions surplus to the 14 divisions laid down as necessary for an integral part of the Territorial Force. In regard to these 21 battalions the War Office recommended not disbandment, but amalgamation; the company or companies coming from old battalions preserving their identity as far as possible in the new amalgamated battalions. The Edinburgh Midlothian associations had been asked, by a process of amalgamation, to transform their four battalions into two.

AIR STATIONS.—On the 4th of August *Mr. Parker* (for *Captain Guest*), replying to *Sir Arthur Fell*, stated that the number of stations at present administered by the Air Ministry was 46; since the Armistice 391 stations had been notified as surplus for disposal.

AIRSHIPS.—On the 4th of August *the Secretary of State for the Colonies*, in reply to a question by *Mr. Raper*, stated that the decision taken in regard to airships was best explained by quoting the following Resolution of the Imperial Conference, adopted on the 2nd of August:—

"The Conference, having carefully considered the report of Mr. Churchill's Committee on Imperial Communications, are of opinion that the proposals contained therein should be submitted for the consideration of the Governments and Parliaments of the different parts of the Empire.

"On the understanding that the cost will be in the region of £1,800 per month, they recommend that, pending such consideration, the existing material, so far as useful for the development of Imperial air communications, should be retained."

WAR DECORATIONS.—On the 26th of July, in reply to various

Members, *the Secretary of State for War* stated : " After the fullest consideration, it has been decided that the 1914-15 Star cannot be awarded to the 1st Wessex Division, who went to India in 1914, as they do not come within the terms of Army Order 20 of 1919."

On the 27th of July, in reply to *Major Hamilton, the Secretary of State for War* stated : " After the fullest consideration, it has been decided that a War Medal should not be granted for home service, with the exception that the British War Medal should be awarded to the personnel of coast defence batteries actually engaged with hostile vessels during the war."

NOTES FROM A STUDENT'S SCRAPBOOK

England as an Ally

"England is one of those dexterous Powers with whom it is not only impossible to form any lasting Alliance, but who cannot be relied on with any certainty, because in England the basis of all political relations is more changeable than in any other State ; it is the product of elections and the resulting majorities."—"New Chapters of Bismarck's Autobiography," p. 288.

Propaganda

"Even during the great war Propaganda probably did more harm than good to every nation that made use of it. Laughed at by the soldiers, distrusted by the general public, regarded with unspeakable contempt by independent journalists, it was too often used merely for the purpose of screening Governments which had miscalculated."—"A Prisoner of the Reds," by Captain F. McCullagh, p. 20.

A First Essay in Frightfulness

(Massacre of the Inhabitants of Dantzic by the Teutonic Knights in 1308 A.D.)

The Order intended, as Dlugosz, the ancient chronicler, put it, "that the far-sounding echo of this cruelty should so affright the hearts of men in other towns and fortresses, that no one would dare to oppose it, so that the task of further occupations would be easier and safer."—Prof. S. Askenazy in "Dantzic and Poland," p. 8.

The Commune, 1871

"Maxime du Camp, who was in Paris throughout the reign of the Commune and who had access to all the documentary evidence, puts the number of rebels killed in the fighting or shot without trial at about 6,500. General de Gallifet told the writer of this article

that he thought 7,000 communard dead was a liberal estimate. The Versailles army lost 877 officers and men killed and 6,454 wounded."—Sir Evelyn Grant Duff in *The National Review*, May, 1921.

Kruger, Joubert, and the Germans

"I remember Mr. Kruger asking me what I thought of the Transvaal entering into a treaty with Germany. I answered that there was no room in South Africa for two European Powers, that the British rule was established, and, apart from that, the Boers would be less satisfied with German military rule and official methods than they had been with the milder and more liberal British administration. He said that I was always afraid of Hollander and German intrigue, and was prejudiced.

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"Shortly before the outbreak of the war (1899-1902), I was in Pretoria and walking up to Joubert's house with him. He said to me, pointing to some German officers in uniform: 'those are the fellows that are going to get us into trouble.'"—From "Recollections of Adventure," p. 188, by H. W. Struben.

Cavalry in 1900

"A gunner was talking to me just now (14th of June, 1900) and said: 'I'd rather have 500 mounted infantry than 2,000 cavalry,' and I am afraid this is the general sentiment. . . . We don't catch up our enemy—which boils down to the sad, sad fact that British cavalry cannot give the Boer oxen a twenty minutes' start in a 100 and catch them."—"Frank Maxwell, Brigadier-General, V.C.," pp. 68, 69.

The Peace of 1902

"And then Kitchener said to him:

"'Look here, Smuts, there is something on my mind that I want to tell you. I can only give it you as my opinion; but my opinion is that in two years' time a Liberal Government will be in power; and if a Liberal Government comes into power, it will grant you a Constitution for South Africa.'

"Said Smuts, 'That is a very important pronouncement. If one could be sure of the like of that, it would make a great difference.'

"'As I say,' said Kitchener, 'it is only my opinion, but honestly I *do* believe that will happen.'

"'That,' said General Smuts to me, 'accomplished the peace.'

We went back, and the arrangements at the (Vereeniging) Conference were definitely concluded, and the war came to a close.'"—Lord Shaw in "Letters to Isabel," pp. 202-3.

Le Cateau

"Where was the British Supreme Command on this day? One Army Corps marches off, the other remains behind against orders and accepts an unequal combat."—"Der Marnefeldzug, 1914," p. 81, by General von Kuhl (Kluck's Chief of the Staff).

Ludendorff on the Improvised German Corps

"It soon became apparent that the fighting value of the new formations was far below that of units composed of men who had had long service with the colours. . . . Their courage and devotion did not make up for lack of training. . . .

"An Army is not made in a few weeks—long training and tradition are required. This was also proved by the English divisions and American troops. They, too, had to pay a very heavy price for their intrepidity. The XXV. Reserve Corps was not able to effect any appreciable change in the situation on the frontier of East Prussia."—Ludendorff in "My War Memories" (translation), vol. ii. p. 96.

The Austrian Supreme Command in June, 1918

"There were four G.H.Qs.—Baden,* Waldstätten † in Belluno, Arz ‡ in the Court train in Tirol, his Majesty at the telephone in the Court train."—General Boroëvic in a letter dated the 29th of June, 1918, quoted from the *Pester Lloyd* in the *Times* of the 7th of June, 1921.

Germany to Austria in November, 1918

"What kind of illusions the German General Staff still entertained can be seen from the fact that when we informed them that we wished to ask for an armistice (November), we received as answer: Hold on till the snowfall begins in the Tirolese passes, in the spring they (the Germans) would help us on to our legs again. A nice message at such a time, when, far from allowing it to continue

* The fixed G.H.Q. near Vienna.

† The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who carried on routine duties, Major-General Alfred von Waldstätten.

‡ The Chief of the General Staff, successor to Conrad von Hötzendorf.

to the spring, we dared not witness the useless bloodshed for a day longer. Besides, it was no use even had we wished to do it, the inner and outer front would have collapsed before the spring, and we, who were the responsible authorities, would long before have deservedly ended our lives on a lamp-post."—Graf Julius Andrássy, "Diplomatie und Weltkriege," pp. 311-12.

Rosyth

"I got Rosyth delayed four years as not being the right thing or the right place."—Lord Fisher's "Memories," p. 194.

"I still (1912) hate Rosyth and fortifications and East Coast docks, and said so the other day."—*Ibid.* p. 216.

"By Admiralty orders, the battle cruisers changed their base (from Cromarty) on December 20th to Rosyth, where they remained throughout the war."—Filson Young's "With the Battle Cruisers," p. 108.

America's Part in the War

"America played the part of a strong man who, passing down the street, sees half a dozen men struggling to put a heavy piano into a van. The weight promises to be a little too much for them, but with the aid of the new-comer, the piano is lifted in. Perhaps the volunteer does not lift so hard as the others do, certainly he is not so badly exhausted, yet his aid was essential to the performance of the task."—From "The United States in our Own Times," p. 474, by Paul L. Haworth.

Moltke the Elder's Appointment as Chief of the General Staff

"The story that the War Minister, von Bonin, discovered in 1859 the military genius of Moltke, who until then had lived a retired life, will not bear investigation of any one who knows the circumstances and history. Moltke for the two years previous to his nomination as Chief of the General Staff had been personal Adjutant (A.D.C.) to the future King (Wilhelm I.), and if not living in the midst of Court life, had long been in close touch with the highest military and social circles of the capital, and was known, best of all, to the Regent who selected him for the post of Chief of the General Staff, as an educated soldier."—*Militärwochenblatt*, 12th of March, 1921.

APPENDIX

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I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

- Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt., M.P., *Secretary of State for War (President of the Army Council)*.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. A. Sanders, Bt., T.D., M.P., T.F. Res., *Under Secretary of State for War (Vice-President of the Army Council)*.
Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ulster Rifles, *p.s.c.*, *Chief of the Imperial General Staff*.
Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces*.
Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *Quarter-Master General to the Forces*.
Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master General of the Ordnance*.
Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff*.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. G. F. Stanley, C.M.G., M.P., *Parliamentary and Financial Secretary (Finance Member)*.
Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.; Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B., *Secretaries and Members of Council*.

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt., M.P.

Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War. Lieutenant-General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Judge Advocate-General. Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ulster Rifles, *p.s.c.*

Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Director of Military Operations. Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Military Intelligence. Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*

Director of Staff Duties. Major-General Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Adjutant General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
p.s.c.

<i>Director of Organisation.</i>	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) I. L. B. Vesey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Mobilisation and Recruiting.</i>	Major-General B. F. Burnett-Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Personal Services.</i>	Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director-General Army Medical Service.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir T. H. J. C. Goodwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Deputy Quarter-Master General

Major-General Sir G. F. Ellison, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*

<i>Director of Movements and Quarterming.</i>	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) R. S. May, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Remounts.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. E. G. Norton, C.S.I., A.D.C.
<i>Director of Supplies and Transport.</i>	Major-General Sir E. E. Carter, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.</i>	Major-General Sir H. D. E. Parsons, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Director-General Army Veterinary Service.</i>	Major-General Sir L. J. Blenkinsop, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Commdt. R.A.

<i>Director of Artillery.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) B. R. Kirwan, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Director of Fortifications and Works.</i>	Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Director General of Factories.</i>	H. Mensforth, Esq., C.B.E.

Under Secretary of State for War

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. A. Sanders, Bt., T.D., M.P., T.F. Res.

<i>Director-General of Terri- torial and Volunteer Forces.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. N. Birch, K.C.M.G., C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A.
<i>Director-General of Lands.</i>	Sir Howard Frank, Bt., K.C.B.

Finance Member

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. G. F. Stanley, C.M.G., M.P.

Joint Secretary of the War Office and Accounting Officer.

Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B.

Directors of Finance.

Sir W. P. Perry, K.B.E., C.B.; H. H. Fawcett, Esq., C.B.; J. B. Croxall, Esq.

Director of Army Contracts.

J. A. Corcoran, Esq., C.B.

Joint Secretary of the War Office

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.

*Assistant-Secretary.
Chaplain-General.*Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.
Rt. Rev. Bishop J. Taylor-Smith, C.B.,
C.V.O., D.D.**3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME****A.—ALDERSHOT COMMAND**

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Lieutenant-General F. R. Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., M.V.O., A.D.C.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) S. E. Hollond, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Lieut-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>1st Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>1st Division.</i>	Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge, K.C.B., <i>p.s.c. q.s.</i>
<i>1st Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant J. McC. Steele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>2nd Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant A. C. Daly, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>3rd Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant W. H. Kay, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>C.R.A. 1st Division.</i>	Major-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>2nd Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant H. C. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>5th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>6th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>C.R.A. 2nd Division.</i>	

B.—EASTERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	General Lord H. S. Horne, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt., R.A., A.D.C.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. W. Gwynn, C.B., C.M.G., D.O.S., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General Sir A. F. Sillem, K.C.M.G., C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i> , <i>q.s.</i>
<i>4th Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant N. W. Haig, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>4th Division.</i>	Major-General Sir C. D. Shute, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>11th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant C. H. T. Lucas, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>12th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant A. H. Marindin, C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 4th Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant S. F. Metcalfe, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>54th (East Anglian) Division T.F.</i>	Major-General Sir S. W. Hare, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Essex Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel E. C. Da Costa, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. J. M'Neill, D.S.O.
<i>East Midland Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel T. W. Visct. Hampden, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>C.R.A. 54th Division.</i>	Colonel H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>44th (Home Counties) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir J. R. Longley, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Surrey Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. H. Mangles, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Kent Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel P. M. Robinson, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Middlesex and Sussex Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. J. Ross, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 44th Division.</i>	Colonel Sir H. D. White-Thompson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

C.—IRISH COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Forces in Ireland.</i>	General Rt. Hon. Sir C. F. N. Macready, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. B. Wroughton, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>3rd Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. A. Weir, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>1st Division.</i>	For H.Q. Staff, <i>see</i> Aldershot Command.
<i>15th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. T. C. Carter-Campbell, C.B., D.S.O.

IRISH COMMAND—*continued*

<i>Londonderry Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant W. H. L. Allgood, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>5th Division.</i>	Major-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine, K.C.B.
<i>13th Infantry Brigade.</i>	
<i>14th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant P. C. B. Skinner, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Galway Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O.
<i>C.R.A. 5th Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant W. B. R. Sandys, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>6th Division.</i>	Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>16th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>17th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>18th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Major-General A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Kerry Infantry Brigade, also 24th, 25th, and 26th Provisional Brigades in Dublin District.</i>	
<i>C.R.A. 6th Division.</i>	

D.—LONDON DISTRICT

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.</i>	Captain L. M. Gibbs, D.S.O., M.C.
<i>Colonel in charge of Administration.</i>	Colonel J. B. Wells, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>4th Infantry Brigade (Guards).</i>	Colonel Commandant A. B. E. Cator, D.S.O.
<i>56th (The London) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir C. E. Pereira, K.C.B., C.M.G.
<i>1st London Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel E. S. de' E. Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>2nd London Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. Maxwell, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
<i>3rd London Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel B. L. G. Anley, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 56th (The London) Division.</i>	Colonel J. A. Tyler, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>47th (The London) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir N. M. Smith, V.C., K.C.B.
<i>4th London Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel F. G. Lewis, C.B., C.M.G., T.D.

LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

5th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. B. Hubback, G.M.G., D.S.O.
6th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. J. Kentish, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 47th (The London) Division.	Colonel H. E. T. Kelly, C.B., C.M.G.

E.—NORTHERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir F. I. Maxse, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., <i>q.s.</i>
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Colonel R. W. Hare, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , <i>q.s.</i>
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
10th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant W. J. Dugan, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Yorkshire and Notts Mounted Brigade.	Brevet-Colonel L. W. de V. Sadleir Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Midland Mounted Brigade.	Colonel D'A. Legard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
50th (Northumbrian) Division.	Major-General Sir P. S. Wilkinson, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Durham Infantry Brigade.	
Northumberland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. P. A. Riddell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
York and Durham Infantry Brigade.	Colonel B. G. Price, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.	Colonel J. W. F. Lamont, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
49th (West Riding) Division.	Major-General H. R. Davies, C.B.
1st West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. L. Mackenzie, C.I.E., D.S.O.
2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Sir G. A. Armytage, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O.
3rd West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. M. Withycombe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 49th West (Riding) Division.	Colonel Sir E. N. Whitley, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
46th (North Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir A. R. Hoskins, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Lincolnshire and Leicestershire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. Gordon, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Staffordshire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel V. W. de Falbe, C.M.G., D.S.O.
The Sherwood Foresters (Notts and Derby) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. D. Goodman, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
C.R.A. 46th (North Midland) Division.	Colonel Sir S. H. Child, Bt., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer 1st Grade.</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. St. John, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. A. Strick, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>51st (Highland) Division.</i>	Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Argyll and Sutherland Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Sir W. M. Thomson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C.
<i>Cameron and Seaforth Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. W. Sandilands, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Black Watch and Gordon Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel G. S. G. Crauford, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>C.R.A. 51st (Highland) Division.</i>	Colonel H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>52nd (Lowland Division).</i>	Major-General Sir P. R. Robertson, K.C.B., C.M.G.
<i>South Scottish Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. H. W. Pollard, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Royal Scots Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel C. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Scottish Rifles and Highland Light Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. M. Findlay, D.S.O., T.D.
<i>C.R.A. 52nd (Lowland) Division.</i>	Colonel G. N. Johnston, C.M.G., D.S.O.

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Harper, K.C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P. Deedes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General Hon. Sir A. R. Montagu-Stuart Wortley, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>2nd Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>3rd Division.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>7th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. V. Hordern, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>8th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Major-General F. A. Dudgeon, C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>9th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant E. S. Girdwood, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>C.R.A. 3rd Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant L. C. L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

SOUTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

48th (South Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Warwickshire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. Mudge, C.M.G.
Gloucestershire and Worcs. Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
South Midland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. J. F. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 48th (South Midland) Division.	Colonel A. T. Anderson, C.M.G.
43rd (Wessex) Division.	Major-General Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Devon and Cornwall Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. L. J. P. Butler, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
South Wessex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. G. Braithwaite, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Hampshire Infantry Bgde.	Colonel L. F. Philips, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
C.R.A. (Wessex) Division.	Colonel G. H. W. Nicholson, C.M.G.

H.—WESTERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel R. J. F. Hayter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) Sir C. C. M. Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
53rd (Welch) Division.	Major-General C. J. Deverell, C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
North Wales Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. R. N. Madocks, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Welch Border Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. J. Brock, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
South Wales Infantry Brigade.	Colonel N. A. Thomson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 53rd (Welch) Division.	Colonel L. A. Smith, D.S.O.
55th (West Lancashire) Division.	Major-General Sir C. L. Nicholson, K.C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
North Lancashire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. G. Parker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Liverpool Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
South Lancashire and Cheshire Infantry Bgde.	Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 55th (West Lancashire) Division.	Brevet-Colonel C. E. G. G. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O.

WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

42nd (East Lancashire) Division. Major-General T. H. Shoubridge, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
 Manchester Infantry Bgde. Colonel H. C. Darlington, C.M.G., T.D.
 East Lancashire and Border Infantry Brigade. Colonel R. J. Woulfe-Flanagan, D.S.O.
 Lancashire Fusiliers Bgde. Colonel M. L. Hornby, C.M.G., D.S.O.
 C.R.A. 42nd (East Lancashire) Division. Colonel E. M. Birch, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS

Guernsey and Alderney District :

Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops. Major-General Sir J. E. Capper, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

Jersey District :

Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops. Major-General Sir W. D. Smith, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Life Guards	Regent's Park	Lt.-Col. Hon. E. S. Wyndham, D.S.O.	
2nd Life Guards	Hyde Park Barracks, S.W.	Lt.-Col. H. C. S. Ashton.	
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Lord Tweedmouth, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. H. J. Williams, D.S.O.	
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards)	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. C. S. Rome, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd Dragoon Guards (Prince of Wales's)	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. C. L. Rome, D.S.O.	
4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. C. F. Hunter, D.S.O.	For India
5th Dragoon Guards (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Palestine	Lt.-Col. T. H. S. Marchant, D.S.O.	
The Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards)	Curragh	Lt.-Col. H. Sadler.	
7th Dragoon Guards (Princess Royal's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. B. G. Clay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Home

Cavalry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st The Royal Dragoons	Ballinasloe	Lt.-Col. H. A. Tomkinson, D.S.O.	For Palestine or Black Sea For India
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Palestine	Lt.-Col. W. M. Duguid-McCombie, D.S.O.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. Neilson, D.S.O.	
5th Royal Irish Lancers	Risalpur	Lt.-Col. H. A. Cape, D.S.O.	
The Inniskillings (6th Dragoons)	York	Bt.-Col. B. Vincent, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Home
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Mhow	Lt.-Col. H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	Mesopotamia	Lt.-Col. J. Van der Byl, D.S.O.	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Hare Park, Curragh	Lt.-Col. A. G. Seymour, D.S.O.	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. W. J. Lockett, D.S.O.	For India
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Curragh Camp	Lt.-Col. C. Fane, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
13th Hussars	Longford	Lt.-Col. E. F. Twist.	
14th King's Hussars	Rhine	Lt.-Col. J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
15th The King's Hussars	Dublin	Lt.-Col. F. C. Pilkington, D.S.O.	
16th The Queen's Lancers	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
17th Lancers (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Galway (temp.)	Lt.-Col. B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. E. C. Jury, C.M.G., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
19th Royal Hussars (Queen Alexandra's Own)	Muttra	Lt.-Col. A. W. Parsons, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
20th Hussars	Black Sea	Lt.-Col. A. C. Little, D.S.O.	
21st Lancers (Empress of India's)	Meerut	Lt.-Col. O. W. Brinton.	For Canterbury For Home

B.—Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery

Stations of Units.

Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	Battery.	—	Brig.	Battery.	—
1	H.-Q.	Egypt	3 (com.)	D	Delhi (for Egypt)
	A	Mesopotamia		J	Secunderabad (for Egypt)
	B	Egypt		F	Canterbury (for Egypt)
2	M	Egypt	4	H.-Q.	Newbridge (for India)
	H.-Q.	Risalpur		N	S. John's Wood
	K	Risalpur		I, L	Newbridge (for India)
3	C	Meerut	5	H.-Q., E, G, O	Aldershot
	H	Sialkot			
	H.-Q.	Lucknow (for Egypt)			

Royal Field Artillery.

1	H.-Q. 11, 146 (H)	Kilkenny	18	H.-Q. 59, 93, 95 (H)	Kirkee
	98	Waterford		94	Belgaum
	136	Fethard	19	39, 96, 97, 131 (H)	Mesopotamia
2	21, 42, 53, 87 (H)	Fermoy	20	H.-Q. 67, 145 (H)	Bangalore
3	18, 62, 75, 65 (H)	Rhine		99, 133	Secunderabad
4	7, 14, 66 4 (H)	Shorncliffe	21	H.-Q. 101, 148 (H)	Meerut
5	63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	Bordon		102	Ambala
6	69, 74, 77 79 (H)	Ewshott	22	H.-Q. 104 35 (H)	Agra
7	24, 34, 72, 60 (H)	Larkhill		105	Lahore
8	137, 138, 139, 82 (H)	Deepcut	23	H.-Q. 107, 100 (H)	Jullundur
9	19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	Deepcut		106	Ferozepore
10	46, 51, 54, 30 (H)	Black Sea	24	H.-Q. 110, 111, 43 (H)	Mhow
11	H.-Q. 78 (H) 85	Norwich		112	Neemuch
	83, 84	Ipswich	25	H.-Q. 40	Jubbulpore
12	6, 23, 49, 130 (H)	Aldershot		113	Kamptee
13	2, 8, 44, 132 (H)	Woolwich		115	Fyzabad
14	H.-Q. 38, 68, 88 61 (H)	Colchester	26	114 (H)	Lucknow
15	52, 80, 143, 144 (H)	Bulford		H.-Q. 116 141 (H)	Bareilly
16	89, 90, 91, 140 (H)	Woolwich		117	Allahabad
17	92, 10 (H)	Mesopotamia		118	Jhansi
	13, 26		27	119, 120, 37 (H)	Cawnpore
			28	121	Nasirabad
			29	H.-Q., 125, 126, 128 (H)	Nowshera
				127	Rawalpindi
					Campbellpore

Royal Field Artillery—continued

Brig.	Battery.	—	Brig.	Battery.	—
80	9, 17, 16	Kildare	84	22, 50, 70 56 (H)	Brighton
81	47 (H) H.-Q. 41, 45, 129 (H)	Cahir	85	12, 25, 58, 31 (H)	Bulford Porton
82	29 H.-Q. 134, 135,	Clonmel Hyderabad (Sind)	86	H.-Q. 71 142 (H) 15 48	Newbridge
83	27, 86 (H) 32, 36 55 (H) 33	Quetta Dundalk Dublin	87	1, 3, 5, 57 (H)	Kildare Aldershot

Allotment of Batteries to Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
1	37th	23	12th	45	31st	67	20th	89	16th	111	24th	136	1st
2	13th	24	7th	46	10th	68	14th	90	"	112	"	137	8th
3	37th	25	35th	47	30th	69	6th	91	"	113	25th	138	"
4	4th	26	17th	48	36th	70	34th	92	17th	114	"	139	"
5	37th	27	32nd	49	12th	71	36th	93	18th	115	"	140	16th
6	12th	28	9th	50	34th	72	7th	94	"	116	26th	141	26th
7	4th	29	31st	51	10th	73	5th	95	"	117	"	142	36th
8	13th	30	10th	52	15th	74	6th	96	19th	118	"	143	15th
9	30th	31	35th	53	2nd	75	3rd	97	"	119	27th	144	"
10	17th	32	33rd	54	10th	76	9th	98	1st	120	"	145	20th
11	1st	33	"	55	33rd	77	6th	99	20th	121	"	146	1st
12	35th	34	7th	56	34th	78	11th	100	23rd	122	29th	148	21st
13	17th	35	22nd	57	37th	79	6th	101	21st	123	"		
14	4th	36	33rd	58	35th	80	15th	102	"	127	"		
15	36th	37	27th	59	18th	81	5th	103	"	128	"		
16	30th	38	14th	60	3rd	82	8th	104	22nd	129	31st		
17	"	39	19th	61	14th	83	11th	105	"	130	12th		
18	3rd	40	25th	62	3rd	84	"	106	"	131	19th		
19	9th	41	31st	63	5th	85	"	107	23rd	132	13th		
20	"	42	2nd	64	"	86	32nd	108	"	133	20th		
21	2nd	43	24th	65	3rd	87	2nd	109	"	134	32nd		
22	34th	44	13th	66	4th	88	14th	110	24th	135	"		

C.—Royal Garrison Artillery Pack Brigades

Brigades.	Pack Batteries.				—
I.	1, 2, 3, 4	Bulford (for Egypt)
II.	5, 7, 9	Longmoor
III.	14	Mesopotamia (for India)
V.	13	Egypt
VI.	15	Palestine (for Home)
VII.	10	Jutogh
VIII.	12	Bara Gali
IX.	8	Landi Kotal
X.	17	Bara Gali
XI.	11	Quetta
	6	Waziristan
	16	Aden

Royal Garrison Artillery Medium Brigades.

Brig.	Batteries.	—	Brig.	Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q. 1 2 (H)	Malta	5	17, 18 (H) 19(H), 20 (H)	Tallaght
2	3 (H), 4 (H) H.-Q.	Gibraltar } (for Home) Agra	7	25, 26 (H), 27 (H), 28 (H)	Moore Park, Fermoy
	7 (H) 12 (H)	Delhi Ferozepore	8	H.-Q. 5 (H), 31 (H), 32 (H) 29	Exeter Rhine
3	21 (H) 23 (H) H.-Q. 10 (H), 11 (H) 8	Roorkee Peshawar Roorkee } (for Multan } Malta Agra } and Nowgong } Gib- raltar)	9	33, 34 (H), 35 (H), 36 (H)	Larkhill (temp.)
4	9, 24 13, 14 (H), 15 (H), 16(H)	Shoeburyness (for India)	10	H.-Q. 37 38 (H) 6 (H), 40 (H)	Larkhill

D.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham	13th Co. Survey, York
Electric Light School, Gosport	14th Co. (Survey), Edinburgh
Training Battalion R.E., Chatham	15th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
Depot Battalion R.E., Chatham	16th Co. (Fortress), North Shields
R.E. Mounted Depot, Aldershot	17th Co. (Field), Curragh
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot	19th Co. (Survey), Southampton
4th Field Troop, Egypt	20th Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
2nd Co. (Field), Egypt	22nd Co. (Fortress), Gosport
3rd Co. (Fortress), Dover	23rd Co. (Field), Aldershot
4th Co. (Fortress), Gosport	24th Co. (Fortress), Malta
5th Co. (Field), Aldershot	26th Co. (Field)
6th Co. (Fortress), Belfast	27th Co. (Fortress), Bermuda
7th Co. (Field), Rhine	28th Co. (Fortress), Malta
8th Co. (Railway), Longmoor	29th Co. (Army Troops), Black Sea
9th Co. (Field), Colchester	30th Co. (Fortress), Plymouth
10th Co. (Railway), Longmoor	31st Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
11th Co. (Field), Aldershot	33rd Co. (Fortress), Cork
12th Co. (Field), Limerick	34th Co. (Fortress), Guernsey

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units—*continued*

35th Co. (Fortress), Pembroke
 36th Co. (Fortress), Sierra Leone
 38th Co. (Field), Moore Park, Fermoy
 39th Co. (Fortress), Sheerness
 40th Co. (Fortress), Hong Kong
 41st Co. (Fortress), Singapore
 42nd Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
 43rd Co. (Fortress), Mauritius
 44th Co. (Fortress), Jamaica
 45th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
 49th Co. (Fortress), North Queens-
 ferry

54th Co. (Field), Bordon
 55th Co. (Field), Black Sea
 56th Co. (Field), Bulford
 57th Co. (Field), Bulford
 58th (Porton) Co., Porton
 59th Co. (Field), Curragh
 1st Pontoon Park, Chatham
 Experimental Bridging Co., Christ
 church
 Camouflage Experimental Section, Salis-
 bury
 1st A. A. Bn. R.E., Blackdown

E.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Wimbledon	Lt.-Col. B. N. Sergison Brooke, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. Hon. E. M. Colston, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
3rd ditto	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O.	
1st Coldstream Guards	Chelsea	Lt.-Col. J. E. Gibbs, M.C.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. C. P. Hey- wood, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
3rd ditto	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Scots Guards	Wimbledon	Lt.-Col. F. G. Alston, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Windsor	Lt.-Col. B. H. S. Romilly, D.S.O.	
1st Irish Guards	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. Hon. T. E. Vesey.	
1st Welsh Guards	Pirbright (for Tower of London)	Lt.-Col. T. R. C. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Scots	The Rangoon	Lt.-Col. G. H. F. Win- gate, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Regt. Ennis	Lt.-Col. H. E. P. Nash, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	Kilworth	Lt.-Col. H. C. Whin- field.	
2nd ditto	Ladha	Lt.-Col. E. B. Mathew- Lannowe, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bn. The Buffs (East Kent Regi- ment)	Fermoy	Lt.-Col. R. McDouall, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Mesopotamia	Lt.-Col. W. H. Trevor, D.S.O.	For Aden
1st Bn. The King's Own Royal Regi- ment (Lancaster)	Dublin	Bt.-Col. H. R. Head- lam, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Maymyo	Bt.-Col. O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	Carlow	Bt.-Col. C. Yatman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
and ditto	Dinapore	Lt.-Col. E. M. Moulton Barrett, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Newcastle West	Bt.-Col. H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Nowshera	Lt.-Col. D. A. L. Day.	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Killarney	Lt.-Col. L. F. Ashburner, D.S.O., M.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For the Rhine
and ditto	Aden	Lt.-Col. M. P. Hancock, D.S.O.	For Home
3rd ditto	Killaloe	Lt.-Col. A. C. Jeffcoat, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
4th ditto	Jullundur	Lt.-Col. H. A. Walker, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bn. The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Bantry	Lt.-Col. L. M. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
and ditto	Khartoum	Lt.-Col. F. Hyalop, C.B.E.	For India
1st Norfolk Regiment	Belfast	Lt.-Col. F. R. Day, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Bareilly	Lt.-Col. W. F. L. Gordon, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Mesopotamia
1st Lincolnshire and ditto [Regiment]	Tipperary Poona	Lt.-Col. R. H. G. Wilson. Lt.-Col. C. Toogood, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Waterford	Bt.-Col. E. D. Young, C.M.G.	
and ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. W. M. Goodwyn	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. F. T. D. Wilson.	
and ditto	Curragh	Lt.-Col. A. S. Peebles, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Somerset Light Infantry, (Prince Albert's)	Holywood, Belfast	Lt.-Col. A. H. Yatman, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. W. J. Bowker, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Ballincollig	Bt.-Col. G. D. Price, C.M.G.	
and ditto	Peahawar	Bt.-Col. T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O.	
1st East Yorkshire and ditto [Regiment]	Mullingar Mesopotamia	Lt.-Col. T. A. Headlam. Lt.-Col. F. H. Harvey, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment	Boyle	Lt.-Col. E. I. de S. Thorpe, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
and ditto	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. G. D. Jebb, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Athlone	Lt.-Col. E. L. Challenger, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Leicestershire Regiment	Delhi	Lt.-Col. C. H. Haig, D.S.O.	For Mesopotamia For Home
1st Royal Irish Regiment	Silesia	Bt.-Col. A. J. G. Moir, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Chakrata	Lt.-Col. G. A. Elliot, M.C.	
1st Bn. The Green Howards (Alexandra Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. C. V. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tipperary	Lt.-Col. G. B. de M. Maris, D.S.O.	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Dublin	Lt.-Col. C. de Putron.	
2nd ditto	Lahore	Lt.-Col. C. J. Griffin, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
[Fusiliers]			
1st Royal Scots	Tullamore	Lt.-Col. F. E. Buchanan.	
2nd ditto	Dum Dum	Lt.-Col. R. K. Walsh, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Rathdrum	Lt.-Col. B. H. Chetwynd-Staplyton, <i>p.s.c.</i>	For the Rhine
2nd ditto	Tralee	Lt.-Col. A. Crookenden, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. C. C. Norman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Limerick	Lt.-Col. F. J. Walwyn, D.S.O.	
1st South Wales Borderers	Dunslaughlin	Lt.-Col. A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Bt.-Col. C. C. Taylor, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Agra	Lt.-Col. A. J. Welch.	For the Rhine
2nd ditto	Berehaven	Lt.-Col. E. N. Broadbent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Curragh	Bt.-Col. J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Parachinar	Lt.-Col. R. Oakley, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. J. N. Crawford, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Lt.-Col. G. C. Grazebrook, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Kanturk	Lt.-Col. J. R. Wethered, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. R. P. Jordan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Nasirabad	Lt.-Col. H. A. Fulton, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. H. A. Carr, D.S.O.	
3rd ditto	Fyzabad	Bt.-Col. G. W. St. G. Grogan, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.	
4th ditto	Galway	Lt.-Col. M. R. Walsh, C.M.G., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Stirling (temp.)	Lt.-Col. J. E. Green, D.S.O.	For Jamaica
2nd ditto	Buttevant	Lt.-Col. G. E. M. Hill, D.S.O.	
1st East Surrey Regiment	Palestine	Lt.-Col. C. C. G. Ashton, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. R. H. Baldwin, D.S.O.	
1st Duke of Cornwall's Lgt. Infantry	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. A. M. Collard, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. R. M. Wetherell, C.M.G.	For the Rhine
1st Bn. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Tidworth (temp.)	Lt.-Col. R. K. Healing.	For the Rhine
2nd ditto	Collinstown	Lt.-Col. R. N. Bray, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Border Regiment	Karachi	Lt.-Col. H. Nelson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Castlebar	Lt.-Col. G. de la P. B. Pakenham, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Curragh	Lt.-Col. R. Bellamy, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jamaica	Bt.-Col. A. E. Glasgow, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Malta
1st Hampshire Regiment	Black Sea	Lt.-Col. A. E. Andrews, O.B.E.	For Egypt
2nd ditto	Cork	Bt.-Col. C. N. French, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Singapore	Bt.-Col. R. W. Morgan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For India
2nd ditto	Cork	Lt.-Col. M. B. Savage, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. A. L. Moulton-Barrett, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. F. W. Radcliffe, C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Egypt
1st Bn. The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Dublin	Lt.-Col. W. B. Ritchie, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Palestine	Lt.-Col. D' O. B. Dawson.	
1st Welch Regiment	Ferozepore	Lt.-Col. L. I. O. Robins.	
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. A. Derry, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Bn. The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Allahabad	Lt.-Col. S. H. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Bt.-Col. A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.	For Home
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Limerick	Lt.-Col. F. H. Stapleton, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Tipperary	Lt.-Col. E. R. Clayton, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For the Rhine

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Essex Regiment	Kinsale	Lt.-Col. F. W. Moffit, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For the Black Sea
2nd ditto	Malta	Lt.-Col. A. P. Churchill	
1st Bn. The Sher- wood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment)	Skibbereen	Lt.-Col. B. G. V. Way, C.B.E., M.V.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. R. J. F. Taylor, C.B.E.	For the Black Sea
1st Bn. The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Dublin	Lt.-Col. F. W. Wood- ward, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tralee	Lt.-Col. R. E. Berkeley, D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Templemore	Lt.-Col. C. R. J. Mowatt, D.S.O.	For India
2nd ditto	Landi Kotal	Lt.-Col. L. G. W. Dobbin, D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berk- shire Regiment (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Mesopotamia	Bt.-Col. S. G. Francis, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. W. B. Thorn- ton, D.S.O.	For the Rhine
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent	Calcutta	Lt.-Col. G. D. Lister.	
2nd ditto [Regiment]	Dublin	Lt.-Col. C. E. Kitson, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own York- shire Light Infantry	Tuam	Lt.-Col. H. E. Trevor, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Hong Kong
2nd ditto	Dundalk	Bt.-Col. J. B. G. Tul- loch, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st The King's Shrop- shire Light Infantry	Bombay	Lt.-Col. H. M. Smith, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Curragh	Lt.-Col. G. Meynell, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Singapore For Home
1st Middlesex Regi- ment (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Cootehill	Lt.-Col. R. M. Heath, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. E. Swainson	
3rd ditto	Silesia	Bt.-Col. W. D. Wright, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Hong Kong
4th ditto	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. O. H. Delano- Osborne, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. R. G. Jelf, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Clones	Bt.-Col. H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd ditto	Mhow	Lt.-Col. B. J. Majendie, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. Sir H. Wake, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Wiltshire Regi- ment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Dublin	Bt.-Col. R. D. F. Oldman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location,	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Hongkong	Lt.-Col. J. R. Wyndham.	For India
1st Manchester Regiment	Ballincollig	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dorling, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Kamptee	Lt.-Col. B. A. Wright, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's)	Curragh	Lt.-Col. T. A. Andrus, C.M.G.	For Gibraltar
2nd ditto	Tidworth (temp.)	Bt.-Col. L. J. Wyatt, D.S.O.	
1st York & Lancaster Regiment	Clonmel	Lt.-Col. G. H. Wedgwood, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Mesopotamia	Lt.-Col. G. E. Bayley, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For India
1st Durham Light Infantry	Silesia	Lt.-Col. H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O.	For Home
2nd ditto	Ahmednagar	Lt.-Col. E. Du. P. H. Moore	
1st Highland Light Infantry	Nenagh	Lt.-Col. R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. T. C. Singleton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Seaforth Highlanders, (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's)	Belfast	Lt.-Col. H. F. Baillie, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Meerut	Lt.-Col. L. Holland, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Black Sea	Lt.-Col. C. Ogston, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Malta
2nd ditto	Curragh	Lt.-Col. P. W. Brown, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. E. Craig-Brown, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Queenstown	Lt.-Col. G. C. M. Sorel-Cameron	
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles	Parkhurst, Isle of Wight	Lt.-Col. H. R. Charley, C.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. A. D. N. Merriman, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. C. W. H. Wortham, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. G. Shuter, D.S.O.	
1st Connaught Rangers	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. W. N. S. Alexander, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Lt.-Col. H. F. N. Jourdain, C.M.G.	
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Poona	Lt.-Col. H. H. G. Hyalop, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Claremorris	Lt.-Col. W. J. B. Tweedie, C.M.G.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Bn. The Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)	Wellington	Bt.-Col. E. T. Humphreys, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Lt.-Col. R.A.H. Orpen-Palmer, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Munster Fusiliers	Silesia	Lt.-Col. J.A.F. Cuffe, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. S. Jervis, M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers	Aldershot (temp.)	Lt.-Col. C.N. Perreau, C.M.G.	
2nd ditto	Multan	Bt.-Col. C. Bonham Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Cawnpore	Bt.-Col. A. T. Paley, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Strabane	Lt.-Col. W. E. Davis, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
3rd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. J. Harrington, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. W. W. Seymour, <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Mesopotamia

5. TANK CORPS

1st (Depot) Tank Battalion	Wool, Dorset.
Lieut.-Col. T. C. Mudie, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
2nd Tank Battalion	Aldershot (Pinchurst).
Bt.-Col. E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.		
3rd Tank Battalion (Cadre)	Dublin.
Lieut.-Col. W. J. Shannon, C.M.G., D.S.O.		
4th Tank Battalion (Cadre)	Wareham.
Lieut.-Col. H. G. R. Burges-Short, D.S.O.		
5th Tank Battalion	Wareham (for Salisbury Plain).
Lieut.-Col. K. M. Laird, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
Rhine Tank Company	Cologne.
Major A. G. Kenchington, M.C.		
Tank Workshops Training Battalion	Wool.
Lieut.-Col. N. Hudson, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
Central Schools Tank Corps	Wool.
Lieut.-Col. H. K. Woods, D.S.O.		
1st, 2nd, 6th Armoured Car Companies	Mesopotamia.
3rd and 4th	" " ..	Egypt.
5th	" " ..	Dublin.
7th, 8th, 9th, 10th	" " ..	India.
11th	" " ..	Wareham (for India).
12th	" " ..	Wareham.

II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

Army Headquarters

Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., *p.s.c.*

General Staff Branch

C.G.S. General Sir C. W. Jacob, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., I.A.
D.C.G.S. Major-General Sir A. A. Montgomery, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*, B.S.
D.M.O. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, British Service.
D.M.T. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) F. J. Marshall, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.
D.S.D. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) J. R. E. Charles, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

MILITARY OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

D.D. (Intell.) Colonel W. H. Beach, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.

ATTACHED TO GENERAL STAFF

Major-General, Cavalry. Major-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.
Major-General, Artillery.
Major-General, Engineers. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) H. R. Stockley, C.I.E., R.E. (Officiating.)

Adjutant-General's Branch

A.G. Lieut.-General Sir W. S. Delamain, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., I.A.
D.A.G. Major-General H. F. Cooke, C.B., D.S.O., I.A.
D.P.S. Major-General L. N. Younghusband, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.
D.M. and R. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) A. H. P. Harrison, C.S.I., I.A.
J.A.G. Colonel J. Beatson Bell.

Quartermaster-General's Branch

<i>Q.M.G.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir G. F. MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
<i>D.Q.M.G.</i>	Major-General Sir H. C. Holman, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
<i>D.M. and Q.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) P. O. Hambro, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S. Offg. D.Q.M.G.
<i>Military Secretary.</i>	Major-General W. C. Black, C.I.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>

Headquarters, Northern Command

(MURREE)

<i>G.O.C.-in-Chief.</i>	General Sir W. R. Birdwood, Bart., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) C. M. Wagstaff, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , R.E.
<i>D.A. and Q.M.G.</i>	Major-General H. C. Tytler, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

Headquarters, Peshawar District

(PESHAWAR)

<i>Commander.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Risalpur)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Major-General P. Holland-Pryor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Landikotal)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. A. Holdich, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 2ND INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ali Masjid)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Bt.-Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. F. Orton, <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 3RD INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Peshawar)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. C. Luard, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.
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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

Peshawar District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Nowshera)

*Brigade Commander*Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) J. W. O'Dowda, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.*Headquarters, Kohat District*

(KOHAT)

*Commander.*Major-General Sir A. Skeen, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Darsamand)

Brigade Commander
(Temp.)Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) S. G. Loch, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, R.E.

HEADQUARTERS, 6TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Kohat)

Brigade Commander.

Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. A. Fagan, C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Dardom)

*Brigade Commander.*Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. J. P. Browne, C.B., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 8TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Bannu)

Brigade Commander.

Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) T. R. MacLachlan, C.M.G., I.A.

Headquarters, Rawalpindi District

(MURREE)

Commander.

Major-General Sir H. C. C. Uniacke, K.C.M.G., C.B., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 2ND INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Sialkot)

Brigade Commander.

Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. H. Rankin, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Rawalpindi District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 11TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Abbottabad)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. R. P. Boileau, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 13TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Jhelum)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. D. DePree, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 16TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Rawalpindi, temporary)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) L. W. Y. Campbell, C.M.G., I.A.

*Headquarters, Lahore District**(Dalhousie)*

Commander. Major-General Sir S. T. B. Lawford, K.C.B., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ferozepore)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. J. Poole, C.M.G., B.S.

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE AREA

(Jullundur)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. F. Bainbridge, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, LAHORE BRIGADE AREA

(Lahore)

Area Commander. Major-General A. LeG. Jacob, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A.

AMBALA BRIGADE AREA

(Ambala)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. C. Wooldridge, I.A.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

Headquarters, Western Command

(KARACHI)

<i>G.O.C.-in-Chief.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
<i>Colonel on the Staff,</i> <i>General Staff.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) W. S. Leslie, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
<i>D.A. and Q.M.G.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) J. C. Harding-Newman, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.

Headquarters, Baluchistan District

(QUETTA)

<i>Commander.</i>	Major-General Sir D. G. M. Campbell, K.C.B., B.S.
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HEADQUARTERS, 14TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Quetta)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. L. Tarver, C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 15TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

(Quetta)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. J. Bridford, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.
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BALUCHISTAN-ZHOB AREA

(Quetta)

<i>Area Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. B. D. Baird, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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Headquarters, Sind-Rajputana District

(KARACHI)

<i>Commander.</i>	Major-General C. W. G. Richardson, C.B., C.S.I., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, NASIRABAD BRIGADE AREA

(Mount Abu)

<i>Area Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. H. Hare, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
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Headquarters, Waziristan Force

(DERA ISMAIL KHAN)

<i>Commander.</i>	Major-General T. G. Matheson, C.B. C.M.G., B.S.
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Waziristan Force—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ladha)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. Gwyn-Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 10TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Manzai)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. M. Orr, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 21ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Sargodha)

Commander (Temp.). Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. J. Mitchell, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, WANA COLUMN

(Sarwekai)

Column Commander. Brevet-Col. (Temp. Col. Commandant) O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., B.S.

Headquarters, Eastern Command

(Naini Tal)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir H. Hudson, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., I.A.

Colonel on the Staff,
General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) G. H. N. Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) J. Charteris, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, R.E.

Headquarters, United Provinces District

(Mussoorie)

Commander. Major-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 3RD INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Meerut)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. L. Gregory, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Lucknow)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) L. C. Jones, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

United Provinces District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Dehra Dun)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Isacke, C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

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3.—Air Commands**A.—UNITED KINGDOM****(a) Inland Area**

The Inland Area comprises all units in Great Britain, with the exception of those units comprising the Coastal Area, and the Cranwell and Halton Commands.

Headquarters : Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.

Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Uxbridge.

Telephone No. : Uxbridge 231/2/3/4/5/6.

<i>Air Vice-Marshal..</i>	..	Sir John Maitland Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Group Captain</i>	Philip L. W. Herbert, C.M.G., C.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Group</i>	Kenley.
No. 24 Squadron
" 25 "	Hawkinge.
" 1 Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
" 4 " "	Ruislip.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(a) *Inland Area—continued*

The Packing Depot	Ascot.
Medical Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
Armament and Gunnery School (cadre)	Eastchurch.
Instrument Design Establishment ..	Biggin Hill.
Signal Co-operation Flight	" "
School of Technical Training (Men) ..	Manston.
No. 6 Flying Training School ..	"
Central Pay Office	Woking.
General Services Pay Officer ..	Trafalgar House, W.C.2.
Record Office	Ruislip.
No. 39 Squadron	Spittlegate, Grantham.
" 207 Squadron	Bircham Newton.
" 2 Flying Training School ..	Duxford.
" 3 " " " (cadre) ..	Digby.
Aeroplane Experimental Establishment	Martlesham Heath.

<i>Headquarters, No. 7 Group</i>	Andover.
No. 4 Squadron (less "A" Flight). ..	South Farnborough.
School of Photography	" "
Experimental Section, R.A.E.	" "
School of Army Co-operation ..	Old Sarum.
Air Pilotage School (cadre)	Andover.
Central Flying School	Upavon.
No. 1 Flying Training School ..	Netheravon.
Electrical and Wireless School ..	Flower Down and Worthy Down.
No. 5 Flying Training School ..	Shotwick.
School of Balloon Training	Larkhill.
No. 3 Stores Depot	Milton, Berks.

Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—

R.A.F. Depot	Uxbridge.
R.A.F. Central Band	"
School of Physical Training and Drill	"
Inland Area Medical Headquarters ..	Uxbridge.
R.A.F. Central Hospital	Finchley.
Research Laboratory and Medical Officers' School of Instruction ..	Holly Hill, N.W.3.
Aviation Candidates and Central Medical Board	"
M.T. Repair Depot	Shrewsbury.
Inland Area Aircraft Depot	Henlow, Beds.

(b) *Coastal Area*

The Coastal Area comprises Stations, etc., as follows: Calshot, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport, Isle of Grain, Cattewater, Donibristle, Leuchars, Smoo groo, Felixstowe. Also all Aircraft-Carriers and

(b) *Coastal Area—continued*

Units afloat in Fighting Ships in Home Waters, and all Airship Stations.

Headquarters : 33-34 Tavistock Place, W.C.1.

Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Kincross, London.

Telephone No. : Museum 7840.

Air Vice-Marshal. Arthur V. Vyvyan, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain. Frederick W. Bowhill, C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

Headquarters, No. 10 Group Lee-on-Solent.

No. 210 Squadron Gosport.

" 238 " (cadre) Cattewater.

School of Naval Co-operation and

Aerial Navigation Calshot.

Marine Training Section "

Seaplane Training School Lee-on-Solent.

Headquarters, No. 29 Group Donibristle.

R.A.F. Base Leuchars.

(a) No. 203 Squadron "

(b) " 205 " "

Coastal Area Aircraft Depot Donibristle.

H.M.S.'s *Argus*, *Furious* and *Ark Royal* (Aircraft-carriers).

Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.

R.A.F. Airship Base Howden.

Marine and Armament Experimental

Establishment Isle of Grain.

No. 230 Squadron Felixstowe.

Inspector of Recruiting, R.A.F. Henrietta Street, W.C.2.

Air Ministry Wireless Section.. .. Kingsway, W.C.2.

London M.T. Section War Office Garage, Ebury Bridge Rd., S.W.1.

(c) *No. 11 (Irish) Wing*

This Command comprises all units in Ireland. For operations these units are controlled by the General Officer Commanding, Irish Command.

Headquarters : Baldonnell, Clondalkin, Co. Dublin.

Telegraphic Address : Wing Aeronautics, Clondalkin.

Telephone No. : Clondalkin 22.

Group Captain. Ian M. Bonham-Carter, O.B.E., Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader. C. S. Wynne-Eaton, D.S.O., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follows :—

No. 100 Squadron Baldonnell and Oranmore.

" A " Flight of No. 4 Squadron Aldergrove.

No. 2 Squadron Fermoy.

Irish Stores and Repair Unit Baldonnell.

(d) Cranwell

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Cranwell, is Commandant of the R.A.F. (Cadet) College and commands all units at Cranwell.

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.

Telegraphic Address : Aircoll, Sleaford.

Telephone No. : Sleaford 64/5/6/7.

Air Commodore. Charles A. H. Longcroft, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.

Wing-Commander. Arthur L. Godman, C.M.G., D.S.O., Administrative Duties.

Units as follows :—

R.A.F. (Cadet) College.

(a) Ground Wing.

(b) Flying Wing.

Boys' Wing.

Band.

R.A.F. Hospital.

(e) Halton

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Halton, is Commandant of No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) and commands all units at Halton.

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.

Telegraphic Address : Aeronautics, Halton.

Telephone No. : Aylesbury 161/2 ; Wendover 72/4.

Air Commodore. Francis R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Units as follows :—

No. 1 School of Technical Training

(Boys) Halton.

R.A.F. Hospital "

B.—OVERSEAS**(a) Middle East Area**

Headquarters : Cairo.

Air Vice-Marshal. Sir William G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain. Bertie C. H. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*,
Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

Administered direct by Area Headquarters.

Egypt Stores Depot Aboukir.

„ Engine Repair Depot Abbassia, Cairo.

„ Aircraft Depot Aboukir.

„ Base Pay Office Cairo.

(a) Middle East Area—*continued*

<i>Headquarters, Egyptian Group</i>				Heliopolis.
No.	45	Squadron	Almaza, Cairo.
"	70	"	Heliopolis.
"	216	"	"
"	47	"	Helwan.
"	56	"	Aboukir.
<i>Headquarters, Palestine Group</i>				Ismailia.
No.	14	Squadron	Ramleh, Palestine.
"	208	"	Moascar, Ismailia.
"	4	Flying Training School	Abu Sueir.
<i>Headquarters, Mesopotamian Group</i>				Baghdad.
No.	1	Squadron	"
"	6	Squadron	"
"	8	"	"
"	55	"	Mosul.
"	30	"	Baghdad.
"	84	"	Shaibah.
Aircraft Park				Baghdad and Basrah.
Central Air Communication Section				Shaibah.

(b) R.A.F. India

Headquarters : Ambala.

<i>Air Commodore.</i>	Tom I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G., Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Wing-Commander.</i>	Reginald P. Mills, M.C., A.F.C., Air Staff Duties.

This Command comprises all R.A.F. Units in India grouped as follows:—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing</i>				Peshawar.
No.	5	Squadron	Quetta.
"	20	"	Parachinar.
"	27	"	Risalpur.
"	60	"	"
<i>Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing</i>				Ambala.
R.A.F. School				"
No. 1 Squadron				"
No. 28 Squadron				"
"	31	"	Cawnpore.

The following Units are administered direct by Headquarters, R.A.F. India :—

Aircraft Depot	Karachi.
" Park	Lahore.
" Factory	Karachi.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(c) Mediterranean Group**Headquarters : Valetta, Malta.**

This Command comprises all units in the Mediterranean Sea Area co-operating with the Navy.

Group Captain. Charles R. Samson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.,
Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader. Harry F. A. Gordon, O.B.E., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follows :—

No. 267 Squadron Calafra, Malta.

Seaplane Repair Base Feneraki, nr. Constantinople.

Aircraft-Carrier :—H.M.S. Pegasus.

(d) R.A.F. with the Army of the Rhine

No. 12 Squadron Bickendorf.

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	225
II. The Strategy of the Campaigns of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (with Sketch Maps). By Lieut.-Colonel A. P. Wavell, C.M.G., M.C., The Black Watch	235
III. The German II. Cavalry Corps (H.K.K.II.) at Le Cateau (with Map). By Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G. (Retired R.E.)	250
IV. General Liman von Sanders on his Experiences in Palestine (with Map). By C. T. Atkinson	257
V. The Geography of the Treaty of Trianon (with Map). By W. E. D. Allen, F.R.G.S.	276
VI. Problems of Mechanical Warfare. By Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O.	284
VII. The Administrative Services of the B.E.F. during the Great War	303
VIII. A Day with the Byzantine Army on Active Service (with Map). By J. M. Seammell, Captain Infantry Reserve Corps, U.S.A.	312
IX. Demobilization. By E. Stopford Holland, late Captain Royal West Kent Regiment	335
X. Prisoners of War. By Dr. J. Fitzgerald Lee	348
XI. Policy and Strategy. By Major-General Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B.	357
XII. A Novel about the Ex-Kaiser	369
XIII. Notes on Foreign War Books	373
XIV. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	391
XV. Parliamentary Notes	410
XVI. Notes from a Student's Scrapbook	412
XVII. Appendix. I. The Army.—1. Army Council.—2. Departments of the War Office.—3. Commands of the Army at Home.—4. Distribution of Regular Units of the Army.—5. Tank Corps	421
II. The Army in India	427
III. The Royal Air Force.—1. Air Council.—2. Air Ministry.—3. Air Commands	445

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
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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

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JANUARY, 1922

EDITORIAL

THERE seems to be a growing tendency among statesmen and journalists—many of the latter of whom, we notice, especially the peripatetic variety, prefer nowadays to describe themselves by the more high sounding title of “publicist”—to profess a belief that almost every question in dispute, whether national or international, can be settled if only a suitable formula can be discovered to express in words some kind of agreement, not wholly unacceptable to the disputants. The idea appears to be that there is no problem, however long-standing it may be, however vital the matters of principle at stake, which cannot be solved in this way if only a small body of sufficiently superior persons can “get round a table” and discuss matters calmly, whether in the strictest privacy or *coram populo*.

* * * * *

We do not doubt that this touching confidence in the efficacy of discussion is a natural consequence of the war. It is largely attributable to the tragic failure of the arbitrament of arms as a means of effecting a satisfactory settlement of human affairs. It is only natural that men, who have themselves witnessed the havoc and misery produced by war, should shrink from having recourse to such a weapon again and should strive by every means in their power to adjust their differences by peaceful methods. Such an attitude of mind is perfectly explicable and wholly to be commended by all sensible people. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that this mania for the devising of formulæ may be carried too far and may succeed in defeating its own object. Statesmen may become too confident in their powers of reconciling bitter adversaries

round a table—their dexterity in phrase-making may carry them a long way towards their goal and yet not far enough to avoid the danger they are anxious to escape. A spirit of compromise and toleration is no doubt essential to the adjustment of differences, whether public or private, but the discovery of a certain form of words to prevent a definite rupture of negotiations in any particular dispute does not necessarily imply that this spirit has taken hold of the contending parties. In cases where peoples are divided by racial animosities, by religious differences, by definite social or economic rivalries, where great matters of principle or of national *amour propre* are involved, it is difficult to see how their hatred for each other can be changed except by the removal of the actual cause which has produced it. It seems to us that the most which can be expected from a round table conference in any such case is that some *modus vivendi* may result from it calculated to prevent, for a time at any rate, any more violent method of settling the dispute. The object of the negotiators, in other words, is to tide over a period of crisis in a manner more or less satisfactory to all parties; they cannot hope to cure the evil without eradicating the cause of the disease.



Statesmen whose business it is to conduct such conferences must realize well enough the limitations within which they are working—the futility of expecting to assuage the passions and prejudices of centuries by some hastily contrived patchwork of more or less neatly balanced compromises. They, at any rate, should have no illusions as to the purely ephemeral character of their work. They should know that however easily individuals may shed their principles, nations but rarely rid themselves of their prejudices. But unfortunately the public at large is incapable of appreciating such things. It is always apt, therefore, to take far too rosy a view of the situation when it is assured in glowing time by those who should know better that some historic feud has been successfully brought to an end by some ingenious juggling with words. It not unnaturally fails to grasp the fact that little has really been done to bring about a permanent improvement in the situation—that morally the disputants are as far apart as ever. When the inevitable disillusionment comes,

therefore, the public is thrown into despair and the general confusion becomes worse confounded.

* * * * *

Much has been written about the Washington Conference. Its promoters have had "a wonderful Press." President Harding and Mr. Hughes, the American Secretary of State, and in a somewhat lesser degree Mr. Balfour, have been hailed as the true friends of humanity, whilst unfortunate individuals like M. Briand and the Japanese representatives at the Conference, when they ventured to disagree in any respect with the American formula with regard to the limitation of armaments, have been roundly taken to task both on the platform and in the Press.

And yet the theory that disarmament—still less the limitation of armaments—can put a stop to war is clearly absurd. "The story of Cain and Abel," as Mr. Bernard Shaw points out, "has been questioned by many Bible smashers, but never on the ground that Cain had no armament." * The limitation of armaments is of course eminently desirable—if not actually necessary—in the interests of economy, but it does not in itself constitute any real guarantee for the preservation of peace—any more, that is to say, than the limitation of public houses constitutes any real guarantee against drunkenness. Mr. H. G. Wells, one of the many enthusiastic and disinterested publicists who was rushed over to Washington with so much advertisement to assist in promoting the Millennium, has discovered this truth, and in his disillusionment when faced with the realities of the Conference has expressed his opinion that when the representatives of the various Powers have stated their minimum security requirements "it becomes plain that the conferring States are to be not so much disarmed as stripped for action with a highly efficient, instead of an unwieldy and overwhelmingly expensive equipment. They do not so much propose to give up war as to bring it back by gentlemanly agreement within the restricted possibility of their austere bankruptcy." †

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It is often argued that one of the principal lessons of the late war was that great armaments will no longer be necessary. This argu-

* See Mr. Bernard Shaw's articles in *The Nation* and *The Athenæum* on "The Limitation Conference," 19th and 26th of November, 1921.

† See *The Daily Mail*, 18th of November, 1921.

ment is, of course, founded on the assumption that the application of science to the mechanism of war has brought about such a revolution in the means of fighting that there is no longer any need for the maintenance of large trained navies and armies. It is urged that in the late war it was proved (at any rate to the satisfaction of the civilian) that there was no difficulty in converting men into soldiers during the actual progress of hostilities, and that therefore in the next war the nation which is the most progressive in its scientific development and industrial machinery will be the best equipped to mobilize its manhood when the decisive hour arrives. If so, even if the Powers were to take Mr. Bernard Shaw's advice—to disband their armies, to countermand their orders for battle-ships, to sing peace on earth and good will towards men at the top of their voices—it still would not mean the Millennium. Mr. Bernard Shaw seems to us to be correct in his deduction when he declares that wars would probably continue in spite of the scrapping of armaments. The reason for this should be plain to all readers of this Review. In the past we have witnessed the exciting struggle between arms and armour; in the future we shall witness the continuation of the same struggle and also a struggle between gas and anti-gas appliances. No sooner will some new destructive agency be discovered than the necessary antidote will be found. The competition between mechanical experts and scientists is too likely to be carried on just as keenly whether we continue to maintain costly fleets and armies, or decide that armaments are no longer required and should be suppressed in the interests of national economy. So long as malice and envy and all uncharitableness exist in the world there must be danger of war.



What, then, is the real way of ending war? That there is a solution to every earthly problem goes without saying—that to some of these problems it passes the wit of man to profit by the solution when it has been found is also fairly apparent. Mr. Bernard Shaw, who apparently holds the view that wars are manufactured by diplomatists, tells us that they will not cease until diplomatists—we ourselves should like to add, "and publicists"—have the conviction that the making of war is sin. But even if Mr. Bernard Shaw's

theory with regard to the origin of wars is right, his solution of the problem is not a very convincing one—for, after all, the great ones of the earth are human and just as liable to sin wittingly as more humble folk. Although, therefore, the opinion expressed by Mr. Russell (A. E.), that the only person who has come out of the late war with any intellectual credit is Jesus Christ, is certainly one to which few soldiers would take exception—whatever might be the view of certain of our statesmen and publicists who never seem to tire of hearing themselves described as the winners of the war—is it yet possible to expect that human beings in the mass will be generally inclined to act scrupulously upon the literal teaching of the Gospel? In the long run it may be the truest wisdom to offer the other cheek to one's opponent, but can any dependence be based on the likelihood of great aggregates of average men and women submitting to this process. We ourselves must reluctantly confess that we have little faith at least in Mr. Bernard Shaw's solution of the problem—more especially perhaps because we are of opinion that causes and forces make for war which are usually not within the power of individuals, however influential they may be, to guide and control.



If mankind, if even Christendom as a whole, were converted to Christianity, wars might cease. If mankind, if even civilized mankind as a whole, were sufficiently educated to understand the simple economic truth that war from a merely material point of view was generally as disastrous to victors as to vanquished, wars might cease. History teaches us this latter truth. It is certainly plain enough to most of us to-day. We, who have seen with our own eyes the chaos produced by one war, are not enamoured of the idea of ever embarking upon another. And yet the experiences of each generation tend to become dimmed or to be forgotten while the motive forces which lead to war are always recurring. It is not by "finding formulæ," it is not by railing at diplomatists for their follies or exhorting them to be Christians that wars will be averted, at any rate in these days of triumphant democracy, but it is a step in the right direction to make it plain to the people at large that, though the burdens which they bear may seem to be intolerable,

they are as nothing in comparison with those which even a victorious war may bring in its train.

But war's a game which, were their subjects wise,
Kings would not play at.

* * * * *

As we go to press the news is announced that a settlement has been arrived at with regard to the Irish question. A great victory has been won in the cause of peace. We trust that this will lead to the necessary change of heart which alone can give essential verity to the verbal expression of the settlement.

We venture to give expression to this hope because it emphasizes the point which we have endeavoured to make in these notes ; not because we wish in any way to suggest that the heartfelt satisfaction with which the result of the negotiations has been received by the great majority of people both in Great Britain and Ireland is not a good omen for the future happiness and prosperity of these Islands and of the British Empire as a whole.

* * * * *

Since we published in this Review accounts of the plans of some of the belligerents in August, 1914,* we have received numerous requests to complete the series by giving accounts of the British, Russian and Belgian plans at the beginning of the war.

Until the publication of the first volume of the official History of the War—the appearance of which may be expected early in the course of this year—it would be unwise in our opinion to attempt to set out in an authoritative form the British plan of operations in August, 1914, although the main idea upon which it was based may be fairly well known and understood.

* * * * *

So far as we are aware, no genuine official account has hitherto been published with regard to the Russian scheme of operations on the outbreak of hostilities, nor presumably would any such account be of much value if produced under the auspices of the existing

* For the French plan with the British in their " logical position " on the left, see *Army Quarterly*, January, 1921 ; for the German plan, see *Army Quarterly*, April, 1921 ; for the Austrian plan, see *Army Quarterly*, July, 1921.

Government in Russia. But the Russian plan in 1914 was a fairly obvious one and its main purpose was clearly defined. The Russians took up arms in defence of the interests of the Slav races. It was only natural, therefore, that they should decide to begin the war by striking a vigorous blow against Austria among whose population they could count upon obtaining considerable support. They could afford to stand on the defensive against Germany.

* * * *

In his recently published book "With the Russian Army, 1914-1917," which is a work of exceptional military and political interest, Major-General Sir Alfred Knox sets out in a few words exactly what the Russian General Staff proposed to do in the event of a war against Germany and Austria, and explains how its original scheme of operations had to be altered as a result of events on the Western Front. We feel, therefore, that we cannot do better than give to our readers the following quotation from Sir Alfred Knox's book to which we advise them to go for a full and interesting account of the work of the Russian Army in the war.

* * * *

"The original Russian plan of campaign was to act on the defensive towards Germany and to assume the offensive against Austria. To hold back Germany, the First Army under Rennenkampf was to be formed in the Vilna Military District, while the Fourth, Fifth, Third and Eighth Armies were to operate against Austria. The Second Army was to assemble opposite Warsaw as a reserve to the Southern armies and the Ninth Army was to be held in readiness at Petrograd for the defence of the capital against possible landings.

"This plan was changed after mobilization with the sole object of helping the Allies in the West. The Second Army was sent north, and was replaced on the middle Vistula by the Ninth Army from Petrograd." *

* * * *

A good account of the Belgian plan in August, 1914, is to be found in the opening pages of the "Report of the Belgian General

* See "With the Russian Army, 1914-1917." By Major-General Sir Alfred Knox. pp. 46-47. London: Hutchinson and Co.

Staff for the period, 31st of July to 31st of December, 1914. The War of 1914, Military Operations of Belgium," * a valuable and authoritative summary.

Belgium, it need hardly be said, had no offensive plan, nor had she any plan of operations in combination with an ally. She was merely prepared to do her best to ensure the strict observance of the obligations imposed upon her by her neutrality as defined by the Treaties of 1839, and at worst to withdraw her forces into Antwerp. Furthermore, she was bound by the articles of the International Convention "Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land," drawn up at the Hague Conference in 1907, of which the pertinent articles are, Nos. 1, 2 and 10, which run :—

- (1) The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.
- (2) Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power.
- (10) The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

In addition to these articles the Convention contains various provisions dealing with the internment of belligerent troops.

The Belgians in 1870, the Dutch in 1914, and the Swiss, both in 1870 and 1914, it will be recalled, mobilized their Armies in order to protect their neutrality, and interned and disarmed all belligerent forces which crossed their frontiers.

* * * * *

The Belgian Field Army in 1914 consisted of six divisions and a cavalry division. The peace stations and concentration areas of these formations were so arranged that on each front where danger to Belgian neutrality might threaten, there would be one division—an outpost or advanced guard division—whose business it was by delaying the enemy to gain time for the rest of the Army to concentrate and move as a fighting force to oppose the invader or to deal with any forces driven across the frontier.

* English Translation, London : Collingridge, 1s. net.

Thus :

The 1st Division was stationed in Flanders, ready to oppose a British landing ;

The 3rd (Liège) Division faced Germany ;

The 5th (Mons) Division faced France ;

The 4th (Namur) Division was in a position to oppose an advance across the Meuse by either France or Germany.

The 2nd (Antwerp) and the 6th (Brussels), with the Cavalry Division (which had its headquarters at Brussels), formed the Central Force.

In addition to the field divisions, there were garrisons of the fortresses Namur, Liège and Antwerp.

• • • • •

The German violation of the Treaty of 1839, of which Prussia was a signatory, and also of the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers, which was practically drafted and strongly supported by the German delegates, left Belgium no doubt as to her action. The Liège and Namur Divisions met the first onslaught of the German invasion, while the rest of the Field Army moved up to the Gette to their support.

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We have received the following letter from Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Whitton with regard to a review of his book, "The Marne Campaign," which appeared in our last number.

"Until my attention was called to a review of 'The Marne Campaign,' in the current issue of the *Army Quarterly*, I was in complete ignorance of the fact that a reprint of that book had been issued or was contemplated. 'The Marne Campaign' was written by me in 1916, and published early in 1917. The so-called '2nd Impression, 1921,' has been printed and issued without my knowledge, sanction or authority."

Messrs. Constable & Co., the publishers of the book in question, have written to us in confirmation of Colonel Whitton's statement. They also inform us that "a new impression is not a revised edition," and that the new impression of Colonel Whitton's book was reprinted

to meet the large public demand which apparently exists for it. This hardly seems to affect the point made by our reviewer, namely that, to a reading public so much interested in the history of the Marne Campaign, the book only supplies a record just as it was written in 1916 when obviously many of the sources of information now available were inaccessible to the author.

THE STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE *

(*With Sketch Maps*)

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. P. WAVELL, C.M.G., M.C., The Black
Watch

THE campaigns of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Sinai, Palestine and Syria, have by many been called a "side show." If the term is intended to indicate that these campaigns were planned and executed independently of the main theatre of the war on the Western Front or the other theatres, it is a complete misnomer, as the present writer hopes to show.

He proposes to regard the war, for the purposes of this article, as one continuous battle on a single front, a front which extended across Belgium, France, Italy, the Mediterranean, the Eastern frontier of Egypt, Mesopotamia, right across to the frontiers of India; and to consider this battle as fought on the general principles of our pre-war Field Service Regulations, only lasting for years instead of days and extending over hundreds of miles instead of thousands of yards.

Field Service Regulations deals with a battle in three main phases. The first phase is the collision of the advanced troops, under cover of which the opposing forces gradually deploy their full strength. We may regard our Regular Army as the advanced guard under cover of which the British nation deployed its full fighting strength, taking nearly two years to do it. The second phase, when the main forces have been deployed, is the struggle to obtain fire superiority so as to exhaust the enemy's reserves in preparation for the final attack. In the late war this phase may be said to have covered the latter part of 1916 and all 1917. The third phase is the final great attack or counter-attack and the exploitation of success when the enemy's line has been broken. This phase occurred in the year 1918.

The writer's reason for this form of introduction is that he considers that the strategy of the campaigns with which he is dealing † will become clearer if the Egyptian Expeditionary Force is regarded in that which he maintains is its true perspective, namely, as one

* The basis of this article is a lecture given at the Senior Officers' School, Woking, in August, 1921.

† A brief chronology of the campaigns will be found in Appendix I. p. 248.

part of a long battle line ; and also because the actual campaigns fall conveniently into three periods, Sinai, Palestine and Syria—periods which correspond generally with the three phases of a battle as outlined above.

From the eastern frontier of Egypt, close to the coast where it crosses the Sinai Desert, thence up the maritime plain of Palestine, across the low pass of Megiddo to the Plain of Esdraelon, across the Jordan, up the heights east of the Jordan, and along the tableland to Damascus and Aleppo, runs the oldest land route in the history of the world, by which trade, thought and war have passed between Africa and Asia since time immemorial. The E.E.F. in its campaigns followed exactly this route.

The first question which naturally strikes one is—why did the greatest Sea Power in history take this long land route, instead of using its sea power ? It looks absurd ; from Egypt to Aleppo by land over 700 miles, from Alexandretta to Aleppo 75 miles.

The principal reason, of course, is that the original objective was never Aleppo for, as the writer proposes to show, this town did not become an objective until a very late stage in the war. Secondly, although our command of the sea, so far as regards our ability to prevent the surface ships of the enemy using it, had never been so absolute in any previous war, it has seldom, since we became a Great Power, been less absolute than in the later stages of the late war as regards securing the unrestricted passage of our own ships, owing to the submarine. Further, it should be borne in mind that the growth of modern armies and their requirements in heavy guns, lorries, etc., seem to set a definite limit to the possibility of landing operations, at any rate until the amphibious tank restores the balance.

We endeavoured to make use of our naval power at the beginning of the war with Turkey. Both the Turks and ourselves in fact went for a knock-out blow in the first round ; we tried to force a passage to Constantinople, the Turks to cut the Suez Canal and to raise Egypt against us. Both attempts failed ; but while we have always maintained, and justly, that we detained and destroyed on Gallipoli the flower of the Turkish Army, the Turks might make almost a similar claim. For their very small force, which advanced on the Canal, kept at one time some twelve British divisions inactive. This fact was the reason for the first advance of the E.E.F. ; attack was in this case the best and most economical form of defence, as Sir Archibald Murray proved in a brilliant campaign, for the greater part of which he employed only three divisions.

If the writer passes briefly over the Sinai campaign, it is because he knows less of it, and not because it was less interesting or less skilfully conducted than the campaigns of Palestine or Syria. After the defeat at Romani of the second Turkish attempt to reach the Canal, our advance continued, keeping pace with the progress of the railway. The Turk contented himself with observing the advance by detachments kept at what he considered a safe distance from our railhead. Twice, at Maghdaba and Rafa, his miscalculation was shown him; and the lesson which he was to learn so thoroughly later on—the power of boldly handled mounted troops—was brought home to him by the capture of his detachments.

These successes enabled Sir A. Murray, in the spring of 1917, to reach Gaza, the natural frontier fortress of Palestine on the south. The Turks had detachments here and at Beersheba, the remainder of their forces were farther north. Sir A. Murray attempted to deal with the enemy's detachment at Gaza on the same principles, only on a larger scale, as he had dealt with the detachments at Maghdaba and Rafa. The stroke was boldly and skilfully planned, and came within an ace of success. Our mounted troops passed between Gaza and Beersheba and attacked Gaza from the north, while the infantry attacked from the south. The reasons for the ultimate failure of the enterprise need not be considered here. It only just failed, and it showed the Turk his error. He promptly closed the gap between Gaza and Beersheba; and the second attack on Gaza was purely frontal, and met with the almost inevitable fate of such attacks on strongly entrenched positions when insufficient artillery support is available.

With the second battle of Gaza, the first phase ended. The E.E.F. had attained its original objective, the security of one of the British Empire's main lines of deployment through the Canal and Egypt. A short distance behind our lines opposite Gaza a strong natural position at Rafa, with one flank on the sea and the other on the desert, had been entrenched, to fall back on if the Turks brought greatly superior force to the Palestine Front.

There seemed no object in a farther advance. In order to find out, therefore, the reasons why the E.E.F. went on, we must turn to the remainder of the battle line. There would appear to have been three reasons for the attack which constituted the second phase.

In the first place, 1917 was, or was certainly intended to be, the period of the Allies' maximum pressure on all fronts with the object of exhausting the enemy's reserves. If such were the plan, no part of

the battle line should be left idle ; the pressure should be exerted on all parts of it.

The second reason was perhaps more cogent. The Russian collapse had freed the greater part of the Turkish forces operating in the Caucasus ; and it was known that a large Army, called the "Yilderim Force," under the command of the German General Von Falkenhayn, had been collected in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, with the intention, almost openly avowed, of retaking Baghdad, which General Maude had captured in the previous year. Our Intelligence at the War Office had worked out the problem very carefully and had come to the conclusion that it was possible for the enemy to transport a sufficiently large force to the Mesopotamian Front to threaten General Maude's Army very seriously.

Now if one is attacked, or threatened with attack, on an important part of one's battle line, one has two alternatives—either to reinforce the threatened portion, or by an attack elsewhere to force the enemy to divert his reserves to meet one's own attack. In this particular case it was obviously better and more economical (in point of distance) to make the E.E.F. strong enough to attack and draw in the reserves at Aleppo before they could be moved to the Mesopotamian Front.

The third reason was that Mr. Lloyd George had lately become Prime Minister of Great Britain. He had come in on a "win-the-war" policy and had hoped that this might be achieved by the combined Allied offensive planned for the spring of 1917. But things had not gone well. General Nivelle's offensive had failed badly ; it was obvious that little or nothing more could be expected of Russia ; and all hope of ending the war in 1917 was gone. Mr. Lloyd George's imagination, which neither his friends nor his enemies have ever questioned, sought for some success which might compensate the public for the disappointed hopes of an early end to the war ; he found it in the idea of the recapture of Jerusalem for Christianity ; and told General Allenby on his departure for Egypt that "he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation"—possibly the most curious objective ever given to a British Army.

For the first two of the above reasons, however, the real objective was of course the defeat of the Turkish Army. General Allenby accordingly took over command of the E.E.F. in July, 1917, with instructions to report on the conditions in which offensive operations could be undertaken against the Turkish forces on the Palestine Front.

The third reason, to which allusion has been made above, then became of importance, for it implied that any requests made by the

new Commander-in-Chief for additional troops were likely to be viewed with favour by the War Cabinet.

The situation in July, 1917, when General Allenby arrived is shown in Sketch Map 1. The lines of the opposing forces were close together only opposite Gaza, elsewhere at distances varying from a mile to 10 or 12 miles apart, these positions being dictated mainly by the consideration of water supply.

General Allenby based his plan on an appreciation made some time previously by Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, who commanded the forces on the Gaza Front. The obvious line of advance was by Gaza, keeping close to the sea, which would allow of naval co-operation, directly covered the lines of communication, and presented comparatively small difficulties of water supply. But the defences of Gaza were very strong and could only be overcome by a slow and costly process of siege ; there would be no opportunity for the use of mounted troops, the arm in which lay our chief superiority over the Turks.

The Turkish centre was also strong, our lines were a considerable distance away and the approach to the enemy's works were up an open glacié slope ; difficulties of water supply were considerable and there was little scope for the action of mounted troops.

There remained the Turkish left which rested about Hareira. The defences here were weaker and less complete ; there was an open flank and an opportunity for the employment of mounted troops. But a preliminary operation was necessary to capture Beersheba, which the Turks held by a detached force ; for there was not room to manoeuvre between Beersheba and the Turkish left ; and the water at Beersheba was, as will be shown, essential to the force operating against the Turkish left.

An attack on the Turkish left was the plan adopted

General Allenby estimated the force required at seven infantry divisions and three mounted divisions, with some additional artillery and aeroplanes. The force was made up to strength by the dispatch of the 10th and 60th Divisions from Salonika and the completion of the 75th Division, already in process of formation. The disposition of the force for the intended operation was generally as follows : *

Striking wing to attack the Turkish left, 4 divisions and 2 mounted divisions.

For subsidiary attack on Gaza, 3 divisions.

To hold centre, 1 mounted division.

* See Appendix II. p. 248.

The main difficulties in carrying out the plan adopted were three—transport, water and secrecy.

As regards transport, it must be borne in mind that there were no roads available, and, although the ground permitted the use of wheeled transport, it was not practicable to use mechanical transport for the supply of the force until the Gaza—Beersheba line had been passed and the cultivated plain of Palestine reached. The force was dependent, therefore, for its supply on horse-transport and camels, and this of course greatly increased the difficulties as regards the supply of water, which was the second main problem.

The places where water was available are indicated on the sketch map and it will be seen that not only had a great deal to be done as regards the development of the water supply before the enterprise began, but that during the actual operations water for the whole force had to be carried in addition to the ordinary supplies. The striking force required some 400,000 gallons of water daily, and 30,000 camels were employed mainly in carrying water.

Without going into detail, the ruling factors as regards transport and water were these : by the employment of all the transport available, including that of the three divisions opposite Gaza, the striking force could be supplied from railhead up to Beersheba and one march beyond ; it could be supplied with water only up to Beersheba ; and its farther advance was dependent on the water supply at Beersheba.

The third difficulty was to move the striking force some 10 to 12 miles over open country, capture Beersheba and attack the Turkish left without the enemy becoming aware of our intention. There could be no question of concealing entirely the preparations for a movement against Beersheba ; but it was hoped to persuade the enemy that this movement was only a feint and that the real main attack was against Gaza. To this end, the three divisions opposite Gaza were to make an attack on a portion of the defences, and a heavy bombardment of Gaza continued throughout the operations ; the greater portion of the heavy artillery was left opposite Gaza, the absence of roads and difficulties of supply limiting the amount which could be employed with the striking force. The intended deception was aided by the natural nervousness of the Turk of operations by sea against his right flank and by his knowledge of our difficulties with regard to supply and water in the event of our undertaking any operation against his left flank. Measures, therefore, were skilfully taken in order to play on his fears for his right flank ; to confirm his belief that the natural difficulties sufficiently safe-

guarded his left ; and to convince him that our activities on this side were only a bluff.*

On the night of the 30th-31st of October the force detailed for the capture of Beersheba (two infantry and two mounted divisions) moved into position for the assault next morning. The staff work for this night march was very thorough, and a complicated operation was carried through without any hitch. By about midday on the 31st of October the main defences of Beersheba on the south-west were carried by the infantry ; the advance of the mounted troops to the town from the north-east completed the Turkish defeat ; and by the evening the whole town, together with the greater part of the garrison (the 27th Turkish Division), was in our hands. The preliminary operation had thus been a complete success. But the real crisis of the battle was in the next few days. Having placed a large force within striking distance of the exposed Turkish left wing, it was obviously essential to deliver the main blow as speedily as possible. It had always been foreseen that time would be required to reconnoitre the Turkish position, which had never been seen except from the air, to plan the attack, and to move guns and men into position ; but it was hoped that the attack could be made by the morning of the 3rd of November, provided that the water supply at Beersheba had been sufficiently developed ; for, as the writer has already explained, our troops had to depend on the Beersheba water during any advance beyond Beersheba. The time required to develop a sufficient supply of water at that place was the factor which it had been impossible to calculate beforehand.

In this matter of the water, the striking force had one great piece of good fortune and two pieces of bad fortune. The good fortune was that though the Turks had prepared for destruction all the wells (seventeen in number) at Beersheba, they had been so completely taken by surprise on the 31st of October that they destroyed only two. On the other hand, during the days following the capture of Beersheba a particularly hot " Khamsin " blew, which meant that the normal ration of water had to be increased instead of reduced ; and some water north of Beersheba, reported by aeroplanes, at which it had been hoped to water the greater part of the mounted troops, turned out to be surface water only, already practically dried up.

* It should be noted that at this period our reinforced Air Service gained a complete mastery over the enemy's Air Service—a most important success for us.

The result was that the water situation was at one time critical ; and the attack instead of being made on the 3rd of November did not take place until the morning of the 6th.

The enemy's Commander (Kress von Kressenstein, a German and no bad general) had thus a considerable respite after the capture of Beersheba in which to decide his plan of action. It would be interesting to know his appreciation of the situation, but it has, so far as the present writer is aware, not yet come to light. From our point of view, the action which would have ruined the plan would have been the withdrawal of the Turkish left wing, before it could be attacked, to a position outside the range of our striking force, limited as it was by the difficulties of transport to one day's march from Beersheba. But the continued bombardment of Gaza and an attack which had captured a portion of its defences on the night of the 1st-2nd of November may have caused the enemy's leader still to believe that Gaza was the main point of our attack ; with his crippled air force he must have received little information from the air and may have been unaware of the weight of the blow that threatened his left. It is even possible that the operations of the mounted troops north of Beersheba, and of a small irregular detachment sent in the direction of Hebron, made him think that we contemplated a cavalry raid up the Hebron road on Jerusalem.

At any rate, the enemy's action during the pause after the capture of Beersheba was to strengthen the garrison of Gaza with a portion of his reserve, and with the remainder (some two divisions) to make a spirited attack on the 53rd Division which had been sent into the hills north of Beersheba for the protection of our right flank (*see Sketch Map 2*). There was some hard fighting, but the 53rd Division held its own ; and when our main attack fell on the left of the Turkish entrenched line at Hareira on the morning of the 6th of November, and captured it, the enemy had no reserves left to restore the situation and his whole defensive line collapsed. By nightfall he had evacuated Gaza and was in full retreat.

Owing to the difficulties of the water situation, the mounted troops had become widely distributed when the time for pursuit came. The Turkish retreat was, however, energetically pressed by the mounted troops, by the 60th Division of the right Corps as far as Huj, and by the 52nd Division of the left Corps, which was launched in pursuit as soon as Gaza was found evacuated.

The supply question limited the number of divisions which could follow up the enemy ; all the transport available had to be

transferred from our right wing to the left Corps, which now took up the task of pursuit.

On the 11th of November the Turks took up a position to cover Junction Station, and a pause had to be made in order to organize the pursuing force for attack. The enemy was dislodged from his position after a short fight on the 13th of November (Sketch Map 3). Junction Station was captured the following day and Jaffa occupied on the 16th.

The capture of Junction Station split the Turkish force in two ; part retreated into the hills on Jerusalem, part along the plain by Ludd and Jaffa. As will be seen from the map, no good communication between the separated forces of the enemy existed south of the line Tul Keram—Nablus.

After the occupation of Jaffa, General Allenby took a very bold decision. His original intention had been to wait until the development of his communications allowed of his whole force being brought up before turning into the difficult hills towards Jerusalem. He now decided to advance on Jerusalem at once.

It was a big decision. He had only three infantry and two mounted divisions available and the supply of these strained the resources of the transport to the utmost : the dispatch of two infantry divisions and one mounted division into the hills left his line of communications in the plain covered only by one infantry and one mounted division, and the Turks had received a reinforcement of two fresh divisions since the commencement of operations : the troops available had had a hard time (the 52nd Division had marched 69 miles in 9 days fighting all the way) : little was known of the hill country save that it was very difficult and that there was one road only fit for wheels.

The 75th Division was ordered to advance up this main road, with the 52nd on its left and the Yeomanry Mounted Division on the left of the 52nd (Sketch Map 4). The two latter Divisions had to rely entirely on pack transport. The plan was to isolate Jerusalem by getting astride the Jerusalem—Nablus road north of the city, thus avoiding fighting in the vicinity of Jerusalem itself.

The advance of this force, after some stiff fighting, was checked by the enemy on the 21st of November just short of the main road ; but it had secured the difficult passes through the hills and justified the boldness of the attempt.

A pause now took place while communications were improved and the XX Corps enabled to come up and take over the line in the hills in preparation for a second attack on the positions round

Jerusalem. This attack was successfully made on the 8th of December, and on the following day the city was surrendered, having been evacuated by the Turks on the previous evening.

The fall of Jerusalem really marks the end of the second phase of the campaign, although the E.E.F. continued its advance during the winter of 1917-18, by means of a series of small operations—operations which gradually pushed back the enemy until a strong defensive line was secured which gave plenty of room for manœuvre in front of Jaffa and Jerusalem.

The campaign had removed all danger to Baghdad, and had practically exhausted the last Turkish reserves of man-power ; on which the fresh impetus given to the Arab revolt caused a still further drain. The British nation had got its Christmas present, and the capture of Jerusalem had had a great moral effect.

Once again there seemed, from that which may be called the local point of view, no objective to justify any farther advance on a big scale by the E.E.F. The line which had been reached in front of Jerusalem and Jaffa by the spring of 1918 was a strong one, and could be held, in view of the exhausted state of the Turks, with a smaller number of troops. In order to understand the arguments for a farther advance, it is necessary, therefore, to turn again to the general situation on the rest of the battle line at the beginning of 1918. The main factor was, of course, the expected great German attack on the Western Front.

What our course of action was to be in Palestine during 1918 now became the subject of considerable discussion and argument in high places. There were two conflicting views which may be summarized briefly as follows : Against any farther advance in Palestine the arguments were that : (a) The danger on the Western Front was absolutely vital ; defeat there meant the loss of the war ; all available men should be withdrawn, therefore, from less vital portions of the battle line to ensure security in the West ; (b) the Palestine campaign was wasteful of tonnage, as supplies and reinforcements had to be conveyed across the worst submarine zone ; all available tonnage was required to transport the Americans to France ; (c) any farther advance in Palestine would be only a blow in the air ; Turkey was already exhausted, and even an advance to Damascus and Aleppo would leave us still many hundred miles from the real heart of Turkey and so would not force the Turks out of the war, if the Germans were successful in the West.

In view of the above considerations, it was urged that our right

policy was to stand on the defensive in Palestine, to transfer to the Western Front two divisions, and to replace them, if necessary, by Indian troops from Mesopotamia and India.

The arguments of the opposing school of thought were that : (a) we had been trying with very considerable numerical superiority for nearly two years to break the line on the Western Front and had failed ; why then should there be any danger of the Germans, who at their strongest would have but a slight superiority (and that only for a short time in view of the incoming flow of American troops), breaking our line ? to adopt a purely passive attitude everywhere while we still greatly outnumbered the enemy in total combined forces would be a confession of bankrupt strategy ; (b) the Palestine Front might be wasteful of tonnage, but the Western Front was wasteful of lives ; we must economize our man-power until the arrival of the Americans ; (c) Turkey was tottering ; one more blow would force her to terms. If she suffered a heavy defeat in the approaching spring and saw the final German effort checked in the West, she would make peace. Her defection would cause that of Bulgaria, already sick of the war, and we could thus defeat Germany by knocking out her props.

These considerations led to the conclusion that our policy for 1918 should be a defensive one in the West, and one of vigorous aggression against Turkey.

It will be realized that the great point of difference between the two plans was the question of our ability to withstand the impending German offensive in the West. If this were done, the Turks would no doubt take the opportunity to make terms as soon as they suffered a further defeat ; if the Germans had been at or near the gates of Paris, it is unlikely that the loss of Damascus or Aleppo would have forced the Turks from the war.

The curious thing is that these two conflicting plans were both carried out, although the defeat of the Turks took place in the autumn instead of the spring.

The Supreme War Council met at Versailles in February and passed a plan for 1918—to stand on the defensive in the West and to take the offensive in Palestine against Turkey ; the French making a proviso that no white troops were to be moved from the Western Front to Palestine.

The 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions had been moved from Mesopotamia to Palestine, and the details of the proposed offensive were being prepared, when the storm broke in the West. The days which followed the 21st of March showed that it would require all

our resources to resist the German offensive, and the alternative plan as regards Palestine was at once adopted.

During April and May, two complete divisions, twenty-four British battalions, nine regiments of Yeomanry and five and a half heavy batteries were withdrawn from the E.E.F. and dispatched to France. These were gradually replaced by Indian cavalry from France and Indian units from India, and the E.E.F. was reorganized as practically an Indian force. This was economical from the point of view of the whole battle line, for the climate suited the Indian troops and supplies from India avoided the submarine zone.

By the end of the summer the reorganization was complete and the E.E.F. was once again ready to play its part in the final offensive along the whole battle line which ended the war.

Before describing the great battle of the 19th of September, 1918, reference must be made to the two raids east of the Jordan in March and May, 1918, as they formed an important part of General Allenby's strategical plan. He had long before decided that his next big advance, if and when made, would be from his left flank along the coastal plain, where our great superiority in the mounted arm could be used.

Therefore, the more of the Turkish Army he could draw over to the opposite flank, east of the Jordan, the easier would it be to break through on the coast when the time came.

A look at the map and the position of the Turkish railways will show that the junction at Deraa station was a vital point in the Turkish communications. If the enemy could be induced to believe that a move in force up the Hedjaz railway on Deraa was a possibility, or if, by the encouragement of the Arab revolt, Deraa and the railway down the Yarmuk valley could be actually attacked or threatened, the enemy would be forced to move more troops from the coastal plain to east of the Jordan.

It was with these objects in view that the raids east of the Jordan were undertaken. Neither of them was a complete tactical success. The first raid, intended to capture Amman station and, by cutting the railway there, to isolate the Turkish garrisons along the line to Medina (already severely harassed by Feisal's Arabs), failed to capture Amman, although it reached the railway and cut it in several places, before supply difficulties caused by vile weather necessitated its withdrawal. In the second raid, the mounted troops reached Es Salt, but the Turks could not be driven from their strong positions in the Shunet Nimrin pass ; and the defeat of the left flank guard of

the mounted troops, with the loss of 9 guns, rendered their position at Es Salt dangerous and compelled a withdrawal.

But the two raids had the desired effect of seriously alarming the Turks for their left flank. After the second, one-third of their total force was distributed east of the Jordan, and their force west of the Jordan correspondingly weakened.

General Allenby kept alive their fears for this flank by maintaining throughout the summer, in spite of the heat, a considerable force in the valley of the Jordan. His plan was in fact that of the Gaza—Beersheba battle reversed: then he turned the enemy's left flank while persuading him that he intended to break through along the coast; now his intention was to break through on the coast while keeping the enemy apprehensive of his left flank being again turned.

Sketch Maps 5 and 6 show General Allenby's plan and its results more clearly than any number of words. The concentration on the coast opposite the weak Turkish right of a mass of five infantry and three mounted divisions (approximately four-fifths of our total force on one-fifth of our total front) without the knowledge of the enemy was rendered possible mainly by obtaining complete air superiority before the operations began.

The attack was launched at 4.45 a.m. on the 19th of September, and by 7.30 a.m. the leading cavalry division was through the enemy's lines. The orders to the mounted troops were to ride straight north disregarding any hostile troops who did not directly bar their path, to cross by the passes near Megiddo into the plain of Esdraelon and to secure El Afule and Beisan. Thus 24 hours after the attack had started the lines of retreat of all the Turkish forces west of the Jordan (VII and VIII Armies) were blocked, and it remained only for the advancing infantry to drive the doomed armies into the hands of the cavalry.

The pursuit and capture of the greater part of the Fourth Turkish Army east of the Jordan and the capture of Damascus followed.

As this is purely a strategical article, the writer does not propose to give any details of these or the subsequent operations. He would like, however, to call attention to the boldness of the pursuit by one cavalry division to Aleppo, where a greatly superior force of the enemy had collected.

Aleppo was captured on the 26th of October, and on the 31st of the same month the Armistice with Turkey was concluded.

APPENDIX I

SHORT CHRONOLOGY OF CAMPAIGNS OF E.E.F.

Declaration of war by Turkey	November, 1914
First attempt on the Suez Canal by the Turks	5th of February, 1915
Landing at Gallipoli	28th of April, 1915
Evacuation of Gallipoli	{ Suvla	19th of December, 1915
	{ Cape Helles	9th of January, 1916
Action at Romani—end of the second Turkish attempt on the Canal.		4th of August, 1916
Capture of Maghdaba by E.E.F.	December, 1916
Capture of Rafa by E.E.F.	9th of January, 1917
First battle of Gaza	26th of March, 1917
Second battle of Gaza	17th of April, 1917
General Allenby assumes command of E.E.F.	28th of June, 1917
Capture of Beersheba	31st of October, 1917
Fall of Gaza	7th of November, 1917
Occupation of Jaffa	16th of November, 1917
Capture of Jerusalem	9th of December, 1917
Crossing of River Auja north of Jaffa and advance in coastal plain.		21st—22nd of December, 1917
Turkish counter-attack on Jerusalem		26th—27th of December, 1917
Capture of Jericho	21st of February, 1918
Advance on Judæan Hills to line of Wadi Jib	8th—11th of March, 1918
First raid east of Jordan	21st of March—2nd of April, 1918
Second raid east of Jordan	30th of April—4th of May, 1918
Assault of Turkish position in coastal plain		19th of September, 1918
Capture of Nablus	21st of September, 1918
Capture of Damascus	1st of October, 1918
Capture of Beirut	8th of October, 1918
Capture of Aleppo	25th of October, 1918
Armistice with Turkey	31st of October, 1918

APPENDIX II

ORDER OF BATTLE E.E.F.





Operations from Beersheba to Jerusalem, October—December, 1917.

DESERT MOUNTED CORPS (Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel).

Yeomanry Mounted Division.

Australian Mounted Division.

Anzac Mounted Division (1 Brigade Australian Light Horse, 1 Brigade New Zealanders, 1 Brigade Yeomanry).



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IMPERIAL CAMEL CORPS BRIGADE.**XX CORPS (Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt.).**

- 10th (Irish) Division.
- 53rd (Welsh) Division.
- 60th (London) Division.
- 74th (Yeomanry) Division.

XXI CORPS (Lieut.-General Sir E. Bulfin).

- 52nd (Lowland) Division.
- 54th (East Anglian) Division.
- 75th Division.

TURKISH FORCES.—8 Infantry Divisions (72 Bns.), 1 Cavalry Division,
plus 2 fresh Infantry Divisions which arrived during operations.

Operations beginning 19th of September, 1918.

DESERT MOUNTED CORPS (Lieut.-General Sir H. Chauvel).

- 4th Cavalry Division } Indian Regiments and Yeomanry.
- 5th Cavalry Division }
- Australian Mounted Division.

XX CORPS (Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt.).

- 10th Division.
- 53rd Division.

XXI CORPS.

- 3rd (Lahore) Division.
- 7th (Meerut) Division.
- 54th Division.
- 75th Division.
- 60th Division (attached from XX Corps).

(All Brigades in Infantry Divisions now consisted of 3 Indian battalions and 1 British battalion).

CHAYTOR'S FORCE. (In Jordan Valley.)

- Anzac Division.
- 20th Indian Infantry Brigade.
- 2 Battalions West Indian Regiment.
- 2 Battalions Jews.

Approximate fighting strength :—

				<i>British.</i>	<i>Turks.</i>
Rifles	57,000	32,000
Sabres	12,000	3000-4000
Guns	540	350-400

THE GERMAN II. CAVALRY CORPS (H.K.K.II.) AT LE CATEAU (with Map *)

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. E. EDMONDS, C.B., C.M.G.
(Retired R.E.)

VERY little has been written in Germany about the battle of Le Cateau. Von Kluck's and von Kuhl's short accounts of it in their books leave the action of the III. Corps, the IV. Reserve Corps and the II. Cavalry Corps very vague. The recent publication of General von Poseck's "Die Deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und Frankreich, 1914,"† has, however, now thrown considerable, though not complete, light on the operations of the Cavalry Corps, which advanced in the early morning against the British left. The account he gives will be summarized in this article; important passages will be, however, translated in full and shown between inverted commas. Footnotes have been added where they seem required. It will be noticed that the general narrative and the regimental accounts do not always tally; the latter seem the more trustworthy.

The general impression on the day of battle, as regards the German cavalry attack, was that, after an initial surprise on the extreme left of the British line and a short initial success—the troops on the British left had been marching all night and had not in some cases reached the end of their march, far less settled down, when the enemy opened fire—this attack died down by about 11 a.m. No further effort was made by the German cavalry until the IV. Reserve Corps began to arrive about 2 p.m., and part of the IV. Corps was moved west to assist the 4th Cavalry Division, which had no Jäger with it.

Neither von Kluck nor von der Marwitz had any idea of where the British were on the morning of the 26th of August. The German II. Cavalry Corps advanced straight into the left division of the B.E.F. Had it reconnoitred first and then manœuvred to gain the flank of the Allied line, the result might have been serious. No attempt was made by von der Marwitz to push back Sordet's Cavalry Corps,

* Only the divisional routes are given on von Poseck's map; the deployment is compiled from his text. The British position is taken, with permission, from Major F. A. Becke's "Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau."

† Reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1914.

which was in echelon behind the British left until the day after the battle, when it was already retiring.

"After another short night spent in a muddy bivouac in the rain," the German II. Cavalry Corps, under General von der Marwitz, "started at 3.30 a.m.* to continue the pursuit. Spurred on by the news that the enemy had been beaten between Maubeuge and Givet,† Namur captured, and that the German Fifth Army was advancing victoriously,‡ all pressed forward, although the terribly soft state of the roads delayed the advance considerably. . . ."

The II. Cavalry Corps consisted of three Divisions,§ of which the 2nd had passed the night near St. Hilaire and Rieux, the 9th near Avesnes les Aubert, and the 4th near St. Aubert and Villers en Cauchies (about 1 mile north of St. Aubert). General von der Marwitz gave them "the direction of the great Roman Road Bavai—Maretz—Nauroy," due south :—

2nd Cavalry Division, with 4th and 7th Jäger Battalions, *viâ* Carnières and Esnes against Beaufort.

9th Cavalry Division, with 3rd, 9th and 10th Jäger Battalions *viâ* Beauvois against Prémont.

4th Cavalry Division, *viâ* Caudry against Maretz.

Their line of advance brought them against the left half of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's force :—the 7th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division, and what was available of the 4th Division.||

THE FIGHT AT CATTENIÈRES.

The 5th Cavalry Brigade, the advanced guard of the 2nd Cavalry Division, reached the railway station south of Cattenières about 7 a.m.¶ From here the British were observed entrenching on the

* The hours given in the German original are corrected to English time throughout this article.

† The French Fifth Army had been very skilfully withdrawn by General Lanrezac.

‡ It had to retire after the "battle of Longwy" on the 25th of August, only escaping defeat because General Maunoury's Reserve Divisions were required on the western flank. (See the German General Staff monograph "Longwy," which explodes the idea that the Crown Prince had won a victory there.)

§ Each Division contained three brigades each of two regiments, a brigade of three horse artillery batteries (12 guns), a mounted machine-gun detachment of 7 guns, an engineer and signal detachment. The Corps had five Jäger battalions—the 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th and 10th, which were allotted to Divisions as required. Each of these battalions had a machine-gun company of 7 guns, and a cyclist company.

|| Only the divisional staff, the three infantry brigades and the divisional artillery (less heavy battery) were present on the 26th of August.

¶ British accounts make it a little before 6 a.m. and this agrees with the German 9th Cavalry Division account.

ridge Caudry—Crêvecoeur, and columns of men and vehicles seen on the move.* The Divisional Machine-Gun Detachment immediately came into action and "with its seven guns opened a devastating fire on the enemy, who had no protection, and was completely surprised."† There was a scene of confusion, only a few survivors escaped into some trenches,‡ and slowly opened fire. Up to this point, the machine guns had been fired from their travelling carriages in the open; they were now taken off and worked lying down. The enemy's fire, however, increased in strength, and soon after there were dead and wounded at every gun; fortunately Jäger and dismounted cavalry came up right and left of the detachment, and the enemy's trenches were captured.§

Meantime, the Horse Artillery Brigade had come up and unlimbered on either side of Cattenières, and the Jäger and the cavalry of the main body were sent forward as soon as possible. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, with the 7th Jäger, attacked in the direction of Longsart, whilst the 8th Cavalry Brigade and one regiment of the Life-Hussar Brigade, with the 4th Jäger, deployed in the railway cutting near the station, facing south-eastwards.

There was a fire fight lasting many hours in which the British, in spite of numerical superiority, were driven from the heights near Longsart,|| and lost heavily in dead and prisoners.

Then follow in the text detailed narratives of the 7th Jäger and the two regiments of the 5th Cavalry Brigade (the 3rd Uhlans and 2nd Dragoons). The Jäger attacked from Wambaix and the two cavalry regiments from Cattenières station. Rifle fire was opened at 1,500 metres, so it is no wonder that it is stated:—

"from every section and group came reports of lack of ammunition . . . gradually the situation became critical. As a result of ever-increasing want of ammunition, the power of resistance, in spite of all good will, became weakened."

* These were, no doubt, the rearguards of the 10th and 11th Infantry Brigades.

† A battalion of the left of the line was thus surprised, French cavalry having reported soon after daybreak that the front was clear. There was no British cavalry on this flank, and the mounted troops of the 4th Division were still on the march to join the Division.

‡ Even at the end of the day more than half the battalion was still available, in spite of subsequent losses from artillery.

§ The outpost trenches abandoned at the first surprise.

|| There was no further success after the initial surprise. The numerical superiority was four British battalions (one already much reduced in numbers), with 8 machine guns, against two Jäger battalions and five Cavalry regiments with 21 machine guns. A German witness, Captain Wirth of the 7th Reserve Divisional Staff, in his book "Von der Saale zur Aisne," p. 31, states that on reaching Cattenières, he found the German "cavalry had been thrown on the defensive, and several regiments were cowering behind the houses."

About 2 p.m. the IV. Reserve Corps came up and relieved the 5th Cavalry Brigade. The 2nd Cavalry Division narrative then continues :—

“ in spite of heavy enemy artillery fire, the riflemen of the division reached their horses, which were three miles in rear, in perfect order, and the division then moved into bivouacs at Naves north-east of Cambrai. The losses on this day were again heavy in some units, but they were not in vain. The cavalry had done its duty, in that it relentlessly attacked the enemy and held him fast till the infantry came up.* . . . A complete casualty list cannot be given here.”

The 2nd Life-Hussar Regiment filled the gap between the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions. Nothing is related of its action, except that

“ it stoutly held the railway embankment south-east of Cattenières and lost two officers and three men killed, one officer and eighteen other ranks wounded.”

THE FIGHTS AT FONTAINE AU PIRE AND CAUDRY.

On the advance of the 9th Cavalry Division from Avesnes, Beauvois was evacuated by the British about 6 a.m. after a short fight.† The division then attacked the enemy who was entrenched at Fontaine au Pire and the heights west of it,‡ with the 19th Cavalry Brigade and the 3rd, 9th and 10th Jäger, whilst the 13th and 14th Cavalry Brigades with the 4th Cavalry Division attacked in the direction Caudry-Bethencourt.§

At 9 a.m. the British retired to Caudry, where, reinforced, they offered renewed resistance from trenches already prepared for them.||

Nothing further is said by General von Poseck about the action of the 9th Jäger and 19th Cavalry Brigade,** but there are short narratives from the 3rd and 10th Jäger. The 3rd Jäger state they advanced with dismounted cavalry on the right and the 10th Jäger on their left, the 10th having cavalry on its left again. It found the

* There was a complete pause in the action of the German 2nd Cavalry Division after 11 a.m. until the head of the IV. Reserve Corps arrived about 2 p.m. What the division was doing in these hours has already been pointed out in the previous footnote. During these hours the left of the British line could have retired undisturbed.

† By the rearguard of the 11th Infantry Brigade.

‡ 11th Infantry Brigade.

§ 7th Infantry Brigade was in and around Caudry.

|| There was no retirement here until after noon; the Germans were held without difficulty.

** They only fired a little in a desultory manner.

Rifle Brigade, which it thought consisted of six battalions, opposite it.*

"The position became damnably critical (*verdammt kritisch*), as the enemy, though he had evacuated his advanced position at Beauvois,† enfiladed the 3rd Jäger with good effect from the west with artillery and machine guns. By advancing a little, the companies got some shelter from hostile fire. Replenishment of ammunition could only be carried out with difficulty. Finally, about 2 p.m., reinforcements came up, and our artillery belaboured the enemy's position.‡

The attack in which the 10th Jäger joined with the cavalry was carried forward to beyond the Le Cateau—Cambrai railway line. "Further pursuit was prevented by hostile artillery fire."§ It is claimed that 240 prisoners were taken. About 6 p.m. the battalion was relieved by the IV. Corps (not IV. Reserve Corps).

The story of the 10th Jäger agrees with the above. It adds that on the following day 150 British and 50 Jäger (cavalry numbers are not given) were buried in the cemetery of Fontaine au Pire.

There is also a short account of the action of the Horse Artillery Brigade of the 9th Cavalry Division. At first one battery was west and two batteries east of Beauvois, facing south. About 11 a.m. the Jäger at Fontaine au Pire sent an urgent message for help, and two batteries were sent to the south-west exit of the village. It is claimed that they drove back several British counter-attacks.

Of the eastern detachment of the 9th Cavalry Division, the 14th and 13th Cavalry Brigades, which attacked Caudry, very little is said. The 14th advanced between Beauvois and Jeune Bois Farm, and had "considerable losses." The 13th could see little of its opponents, who were well hidden. Little progress was made until late in the afternoon, "When the heavy artillery of a German division took Caudry, and particularly the factory—under fire." The village was then entered, but the cavalry was relieved by the IV. Corps. The 9th Cavalry Division then joined the 2nd at Naves.

THE FIGHT AT BÉTHENCOURT.

East of the 9th Cavalry Division, the 4th advanced level with it *via* Quiévy, and attacked on both sides of the Quiévy-Béthencourt

* The 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade of the 11th Infantry Brigade was just south of Fontaine au Pire.

† There was no advanced position then. The 11th Infantry Brigade fought there as it came in.

‡ The reinforcements were doubtless the 4th Reserve Corps, which came up at this time, the artillery hurrying on ahead.

§ The Germans made three desperate attempts to reach the 11th Infantry Brigade after it retired from Fontaine au Pire to Ligny, but were driven back with heavy losses.

road.* The Horse Artillery Brigade from the heights south of Quiévy shelled British columns moving from Beaumont to Béthencourt and occasioned them heavy losses.† “The 18th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades succeeded in taking the heights at Herpigny Farm,” ‡ and gaining ground to the south.

“Towards 11 a.m. the infantry of the IV. Corps (8th Division) entered into the fight § and the attack was then carried forward to Béthencourt.|| Towards evening the 4th Cavalry Division was pulled out and reached Caurioir east of Cambrai, where it spent the night. Its losses were comparatively small.”

Next day,

“Marwitz’s Cavalry Corps, followed by the II. Corps, was ordered to Combles (25 miles south-west of Cambrai) to prevent the British from drawing off to the west, and then south of the Somme to drive the enemy left wing eastward on to the First and Second Armies, which were pursuing the British and French Army south-westward.”

Thus Marwitz was misdirected, and there was no pursuit after Le Cateau by him or the eight regiments of divisional cavalry on the field. It was not until the 1st of September that the II. Cavalry Corps came into contact again with the British at Néry—with disastrous results to itself.

It may be added, in order to complete the story of the German Cavalry, that on the night of the 25th—26th, the German I. Cavalry Corps (von Richthofen) was twenty-five miles north-east of Le Cateau (*see* map): Guard Cavalry Division at Sivry and 5th at Lissies. On the 26th, the Guard Cavalry Division was ordered to reach Landrecies, but running into French and British rear-guards at Avesnes and Marbaix (Connaught Rangers of General Haig’s Corps), got no further than Taisnières, seven miles short of its destination. The 5th Cavalry Division similarly was delayed by French cavalry, and instead of reaching Catillon as ordered, spent the night at Zurées, twelve miles short of it. The advance made by the two divisions was under ten miles. On the 27th, the two Divisions advanced under eleven miles, taking part with the X. Reserve Corps in the fight with the rear-guards of General Haig’s Corps at Oisy and Fesmy.

* This brought them against the 7th Infantry Brigade in Caudry, which was thus attacked by two forces.

† There were no British columns there on the 26th.


‡ These heights were not occupied by the British; the farm is nearly two miles in front of the British advanced position.

§ The IV. Corps commenced its attacks about 6 a.m. Possibly reference here is made to some infantry sent to assist the cavalry.

|| Still nearly a mile from the British position. There was a good field of fire here, and the Germans did not press their attacks.

On the 28th, Richthofen was ordered south-west to St. Quentin to assist von der Marwitz in rounding up any enemy still remaining near there, and his Division came into contact with French Territorials and the rear-guards of the British Cavalry Division.

Thus the action of the German I. Cavalry Corps was entirely directed against the French and the right wing of the British troops which had not fought at Le Cateau.



[To face p. 256.]

GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS ON HIS EXPERIENCES IN PALESTINE (with Map) *

BY C. T. ATKINSON

THE British operations in Palestine and Syria in September and October, 1918, constitute one of the most striking and remarkable episodes in the whole four years of war. The associations and traditions of the theatre of war, the large share played by the mounted arm which on the other British fronts had been denied such opportunities as Lord Allenby's operations gave it, the very great difficulties presented by the administrative problems with which the British Staff was confronted, the success with which these problems were tackled, the comprehensive and decisive results which were achieved so rapidly and at so slight a cost, all these impart to the final offensive in Palestine a distinctive and dramatic character. Moreover, unlike most of the operations of the late war where the definite beginnings and ends of individual episodes are extremely hard to fix, the campaign stands rather by itself and lends itself to separate treatment. It can be differentiated from the earlier operations in the Palestine theatre owing to the very definite change which came over the situation on that front in March and April, 1918.

Then, as the result of the German offensive in France, it became necessary to draw upon the Egyptian Expeditionary Force for well over half its British infantry, for a substantial proportion of its cavalry, and for some of its artillery. The British infantry had to be replaced by Indian units, most of them new formations, some of which had to be improvised in the theatre of war. The consequent reorganization and re-distribution of the Force constitutes a remarkable achievement in itself and naturally, quite apart from other considerations, imposed upon the Commander-in-Chief a change of plan. Offensive operations on a great scale had to be suspended for nearly six months, although throughout the greater part of this period minor operations were constantly carried on. Public attention was diverted from Palestine until suddenly directed to it by the great attack of the 19th of September. The campaign, therefore, is one which it is comparatively easy to isolate for purposes of study—although it must not be forgotten that no small share

* The footnotes to this article are translated from General Liman von Sanders's "Fünf Jahre Türkei."

of its success was due to the efforts of our troops who had been engaged with the Turk in the earlier days of the war. Various descriptions of the campaign have already been published. Lord Allenby's despatches are authoritative, but do not go into much detail. The semi-official account, issued by the *Palestine News*, is especially valuable for its situation maps. Colonel Preston's account of "The Desert Mounted Corps" tells the story of that important force clearly and fully. Mr. W. T. Massey's "Allenby's Final Triumph" is a well-written narrative of a popular rather than a professional character, excellent of its kind though inadequately equipped with maps, and there are several personal and regimental accounts which add details and fill in the gaps. But with fairly ample evidence from the British standpoint one needs a picture from "the other side of the hill," and, as it is hard to imagine the production of an official Staff History at any period in the history of the Ottoman Empire and least of all in its present circumstances, it is especially valuable to have his own version of events from General Liman von Sanders, the German General who commanded the Turkish Army Group in Palestine, the so-called "Yilderim (Lightning) Group," from the beginning of March, 1918, onward.

Well over a third of von Sanders's "Fünf Jahre Türkei" ("Five Years in Turkey") is devoted to his experiences in Palestine, and if his claims and conclusions do not always seem quite warranted even by his own evidence, if he seems to have developed very highly the art of omission and under-statement of the inconvenient, and if his statistics in particular make heavy demands on credulity, it is something to know what the other side would like us to believe. The narrative starts with General von Sanders's arrival on the Palestine front, where he took over command at Nazareth from General von Falkenhayn on the 1st of March. At that moment the Turks were expecting a big attack astride the road from Jerusalem to Nablus (Schechem) and the Chief of the General Staff of the Seventh Turkish Army, Major von Falkenhausen, greeted the new Commander-in-Chief with the hardly cheering announcement that the British were "so superior in numbers along the entire front that they could break through at any moment in any place they might choose." Actually, the British were preparing to continue the offensive which had already resulted in the capture of Jerusalem and Jericho and the establishment of a line from the coast north of Jaffa and the Nahr el Auja to the Jordan. This offensive, urged upon General Allenby by the Supreme War Council, meant asking a good deal from troops

who had been fighting hard with very little intermission ever since the end of October and had had nothing like the drafts needed to fill up the gaps in their ranks, and the upshot of the fighting which was about to begin went to show that Major von Falkenhausen's pessimism was a little exaggerated.

The situation of the Yilderim Group on the 1st of March was that the front from the sea to the Jordan, forty-five miles as the crow flies, was held by the Seventh and Eighth Turkish Armies—the Eighth Army, under Djevad Pasha, on the right having in its frontage the sandy plain, eight miles in breadth, from the coast to the foot of the mountains together with about ten miles of hilly country. The Seventh Army, under Ferzi Pasha, continued the line east-south-east across the Jerusalem—Nablus road to the Jordan, across which one of its Corps (XX) had been driven as the result of the recent fighting in which the British had captured Jericho. It held a bridgehead west of Jordan at El Ghoraniye where the Jericho—Tell Nimrin road crosses the river; below that place to the Red Sea the river was guarded by a few men of the Camel Corps. But the country east of Jordan was as a whole entrusted to the Fourth Army, which was endeavouring to protect the Hedjaz railway from the attacks of the Arabs, who were co-operating with, and being assisted by, the British. The Fourth Army was much scattered; its only large formation, the VIII Corps, being at the moment mainly occupied in operating against Tafle in the rich corn-growing district south-east of the Red Sea. But the character of the Jordan valley, a deep trough 1300 feet below sea-level at the Dead Sea, through which the Jordan runs rapidly with many twists and turnings and very few fords, kept the operations on the two sides very clearly distinct except for the occasions when the British endeavoured to penetrate to Amman.

The Fourth Army was not under the direct command of von Sanders, nor was the Second Army, to which was entrusted the protection of the lines of communication.* The fact that this last-mentioned Army was not immediately under his command undoubtedly added to his difficulties, more especially as his relations with Turkish Headquarters and with the Turkish Ministry of War

* "The Seventh and Eighth Armies only were unconditionally under my orders, with the Fourth Army (H.Q. in Damascus) in charge of the L. of C. The Fourth Army had also to supply the Sixth Army on the Mosul Front, which was directly under Turkish H.Q. The Second Army (H.Q. at Aleppo) was also directly under Turkish H.Q. This Army was responsible for the defence of the coast, from a line half-way between Haifa and Beirut to the north across the Gulf of Alexandretta and past Messina. The separation of the Second Army from the Yilderim Army Group, being immediately in rear of it, was inappropriate."

were often strained. He is continually complaining of the failure of the authorities at Constantinople to attend to his requests or to provide the drafts and supplies needed on the Palestine Front. Such failure was in some measure inevitable in view of the confusion which existed in the administrative services and interior economy of the Turkish Army, due, of course, in a great measure to the chronic inefficiency of the Turkish Government; still it is clear from von Sanders's narrative that Enver Pasha was inclined to interfere in matters of detail which he should have left to the Commander of the Yilderim Group, and even attempted to supervise the administration of the German troops serving on the Turkish Fronts, an interference which led to a more than usually acrimonious controversy between him and von Sanders.

Liman von Sanders, then, quite apart from the military problems before him, had a thorny position, and these administrative difficulties did much to aggravate the anxieties with which the military situation filled him. At the moment of his arrival he found the position highly unsatisfactory, the numbers available being altogether inadequate for the frontage to be held, especially west of the Jordan, where both flanks of his line were weak.* On the left there was a gap of some miles between the left flank of the III Corps astride the Nablus road and the Jordan: this he promptly filled by bringing the XX Corps back from east of the Jordan, leaving only a small detachment to cover the bridge opposite Jericho. On the right, near the coast, there was no good natural defensive position south of Mount Carmel, but a withdrawal to this region would have uncovered the centre of his line and opened the whole plain of Esdraelon to the enemy, necessitating a retirement to the line Mount Carmel—Djenin—Beisan, which was not to be contemplated; the position just north of Arsuf was therefore retained and as far as possible strengthened, but it may be noted that the events of September show that von Sanders was correct in his appreciation of the tactical

* "The situation was undoubtedly serious. The two divisions of the III Corps in the front line (the 1st and 24th), both under German commanders—Lieut.-Colonel Guhr and Colonel Boehme—were reliable and in good positions, but, like all the Turkish formations, weak in numbers. No reserves were available. The left wing of the Corps was exposed, as the area between the main position and the river Jordan, about twelve miles in breadth, was only protected by one or two small isolated detachments. I telephoned, therefore, an order from Chan Lubban to the effect that on the following two nights the XX Corps was to re-cross to the west bank of the Jordan by passing farther to the north and take up a position between the III Corps and the Jordan. In order to mislead the enemy, a small, widely extended detachment was to remain in the Jordan bridgehead and to withdraw to the east bank of the river, if necessary, after blowing up the bridge. The movement of the XX Corps at night, and the transfer of the detachment, left behind, from one bank of the river to the other, were both skilfully carried out."

and strategical weakness of the positions on the coast. However, it was not on this portion of the line that the next British blow was to be delivered but in the centre, astride the Nablus road. This attack, as von Sanders admits, pushed back the Turks for some distance and wrested from them the important position of Tell Asur, but did not effect a break through to Nablus, thanks largely to the recently completed shift of the XX Corps to the west of the Jordan—a movement which had doubled the Turks' strength at the point attacked and had enabled their III Corps to shorten its line. But the Turks could ill afford the losses involved in maintaining their front unbroken, for their 24th Division was so much reduced that it had to be promptly relieved by the 11th Division, with the result that von Sanders found himself without any effective general reserve.

It was only by running risks east of Jordan that von Sanders had been able to secure his left flank on the western bank, and the next operation was to show how narrow was the margin by which the Turkish position on the eastern side was retained. The defence of the 750 miles of the Hedjaz railway, exposed as it was to Arab attacks which increased in frequency and effectiveness, was a heartbreaking task and to the German military mind the attempt to maintain this connection with the forces of Fachreddin Pasha at Medina was not worth the candle. Again and again von Sanders urged its abandonment and the withdrawal of the Turkish forces to the Kalaat el Hesa district (just south of the Dead Sea), which would have covered the valuable corn-growing area and rendered large forces available. But his representations "met with an insuperable resistance," based not on military but on religious and political grounds.* The troops

* "The situation east of the Jordan was moreover far from satisfactory, as the organization of the rebel Arabs was being continually extended and improved. They were provided with British officers, machine guns, guns, aeroplanes and armoured cars and since the capture of Akaba the way was open from the sea for any British assistance they required. The Hedjaz railway was frequently destroyed in places by the Arab troops of the Sherif Feisal, assisted by British engineers with explosives, and the weak Turkish force on the long stretch of line that ran for the most part through the desert was unable to hinder their operations. . . . The Hedjaz railway was the only means of communication left with Medina, where Fachreddin Pasha's Corps was holding out successfully, after Mecca had fallen into the hands of the rebels—as the opposing Caliph and the hostile Arabs were called by the Turks. From the military point of view it was hard to understand how the whole Hedjaz railway could be held under conditions then prevailing. . . . If the decision had depended on the military point of view alone, the Turkish line of defence east of Jordan should have been withdrawn long before, at any rate as far as the Kalaat el Hesa sector on the southern edge of the Dead Sea. It was quite impracticable for the large area as far as Medina to be retained, long after the whole country west and south-west of the Dead Sea had fallen into the hands of the enemy and proved in the long run to be hopeless. The Turks should have been contented with holding the Kalaat el Hesa sector if it could be done, and they

along the Hedjaz railway and at Medina "alone seemed to connect the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Places of Islam." With this object in view, therefore, Enver was determined to hold on, even though, with the British at Jericho, and the XX Corps withdrawn west of Jordan, the defence of the country east of the river had become a task of great difficulty. But the maintenance of the defence in this region was essential, as its loss would have imperilled the communications of the Yilderim Group, for a glance at the map will show that the railway to Damascus turns east just south of Lake Tiberias and runs east of Jordan by way of Deraa and the Yarmak valley. Nervousness for this important line of communications is constantly in evidence in von Sanders's pages and the two British raids into Amman, if not completely successful and even something of a disappointment at the moment, played an important part in paving the way to the British success of September. General Allenby had put his finger on the weakest point in his enemy's position, and it was by playing upon von Sanders's fears for his left that he was able to effect his great concentration against the other flank with such amazing secrecy and success.

It is only by reading between the lines that the reader will discover that von Sanders appreciates that these and lesser attacks formed an essential part of General Allenby's general scheme of operations. They were designed to wear down the moral and power of resistance of the Turkish troops, whilst, at the same time, they enabled the British Commander-in-Chief to train and to test the quality of his reorganized divisions, in which Indian battalions, many of them newly raised, had replaced three-quarters of the British infantry recalled to France.*

The actual operations of the 20th to 31st of March did not result in the capture of Amman or even in as much damage to the railway as had been hoped. The stubborn resistance of the Turkish garrison of Amman held up the attack long enough to allow substantial

might then have retained the use of the rich grain land east of the Dead Sea. In that case it would have been possible to assemble the Turkish troops who were dispersed, far in advance, along the Hedjaz railway into one compact formation."

* Von Sanders evidently wishes the reader to believe that the reorganization of the British forces rendered necessary by events in France materially strengthened General Allenby's Army. "In the spring . . . General Allenby's Army had received considerable reinforcements in the shape of Indian troops who were naturally especially fitted to be employed in the country near Jordan during the hot season. A division of Indian cavalry had also been brought from France to the Palestine Front, while the British Army in Palestine had been obliged in return to send large units to reinforce the British troops in France. The strength of the enemy had been increased by this change owing to the greater number of fighting troops in the Indian formations."

reinforcements to be hurried to the threatened point, including a complete German battalion, and the heavy rain which made the roads so bad that even the camels could hardly keep their footing was a severe handicap to the British. Even so, on the evening of the 30th of March, the Turkish commanders at Amman were on the point of retiring and were only restrained by urgent and explicit orders from von Sanders that the position was to be retained to the last. But to represent the operations—the “first battle of Jordan,” as he calls them—as a great victory for the Turks seems a little out of proportion.

Liman von Sanders talks vaguely about the heavy casualties of the British and implies that they greatly exceeded those of the Turks, but as the British losses were officially returned as just 1350 and the Turkish prisoners alone came nearly to 1000 this view of the situation seems improbable. Moreover, the railway was actually reached by the demolition parties and a good deal damaged, while the operations of the Arabs were greatly facilitated by the necessity of withdrawing some of the defenders of the railway to reinforce the trans-Jordan garrisons. Certainly von Sanders's anxieties for this quarter were by no means diminished by the experiences of March, and for the next few weeks he was busily engaged in trying to scrape together troops and to strengthen the defences. The combing out campaign produced some remarkable revelations. At Afule station no less than 700 men were found who had gradually collected there and apparently taken root. The most striking incident was the discovery of a company at Damascus which had risen to 1200 of all ranks by gathering in reinforcements of every kind. “According to our ideas,” writes the German, deeply distressed at such irregularities, “a unit would have to appear on the lists if only because of its claim to pay—but in this case this reason did not hold good as the men received no pay. The company had merely demanded and had always received the necessary food, etc., from the distributing office of the dépôt. Presumably it was assumed that some higher authority had this formation under its august protection—it goes without saying that the company had seen no service for months.”

It is statements such as that mentioned above which lead the reader to feel some doubts as to the accuracy of the few figures which von Sanders gives. Usually he is vague and altogether lacking in precision, but he states explicitly that his battalions at the front averaged only 120–150 rifles, and he would have one believe that the rifle strength of all his ten divisions was under

15,000. Statistics are notoriously easy to manipulate and the different varieties of "strengths" lend themselves admirably to the process. Still, while there is reason to suppose that the ration strength of 100,000 given in a captured Turkish return as the strength of the Yilderim Group is exaggerated in view of the fact that supply officers would naturally over-state their needs, especially in the Turkish Army where it was unlikely they would get what they asked for, von Sanders's figures can hardly be credited. If the Turkish divisions only averaged 1500 rifles, it is hard to see from where the 50,000 prisoners taken between the 19th of September and the 22nd of October came, or to account for the good fight which the Turks were able to put up in more than one of the sharply contested minor engagements which took place in the course of the summer. Von Sanders is careful to calculate the Indian battalions which opposed him as from 800 to 1000, but perhaps if they also were reckoned at a "rifle strength" which excluded bombers and Lewis gunners as well as officers, N.C.O.'s and headquarter details, the disproportion would not seem quite so large.

It was not only for the trans-Jordan district that von Sanders was nervous. He was full of anxiety about the sea-coast, conjuring up visions of landings on and behind his flank, especially at Haifa, and he was the more concerned because he found it impossible to secure the services of the German naval detachment serving in the East, some 550 officers and men. This unit, on which he had counted, was mainly employed on the lines of communication with Mesopotamia and von Sanders was compelled to go without its help in watching the Syrian coast. It is interesting to notice how the mere possibility of an "amphibious" attack disturbed and distracted the Commander of the Yilderim Group. To add to his troubles, it was just at this time (April) that his differences with Enver were becoming acute. The Turkish War Minister went so far as to threaten to withdraw the German troops, if their movement to the Palestine front was delayed to make room for the Turkish drafts of which he was as sparing as von Sanders was desirous. Matters reached such a pitch that von Sanders writes angrily, "No one can continue to fight against the enemy in front of him and at the same time ward off attacks from the rear," and he went so far as to request Enver to lay before the Sultan his request to be recalled from the command of the Yilderim Group, a step Enver refused to take with "half apologetic, half evasive" answers and explanations.

It was at this moment that the second British raid into Amman occurred. It narrowly anticipated a Turkish effort to thrust the

British back from their most advanced positions just west of the Jordan at Msallabe (Musallabeh), a post which was "very troublesome" to the Turks and not very strongly held.* As in March, the British attack came as a surprise to the enemy, so "secretly and ably had their preparations been carried out that even the most important were hidden from our aviators and from ground observation." Once again the attack only just failed to achieve a big success. The scheme was a complicated one, involving an advance by mounted troops up the Jordan almost to the Turkish post at the Jisred Damie ford, while part of the force turned east against Es Salt, threatening the rear of the Turkish advanced position at Tell Nimrin, which was simultaneously attacked by infantry, though not as von Sanders states by a whole division, but only by one brigade. Delays in putting in motion the 3rd Turkish Cavalry Division and the 24th Division, the only available reserves, were occasioned by the reluctance of the Seventh Turkish Army to believe that the main British attack would not be delivered on its left, west of Jordan, against which a vigorous demonstration was actually in progress. Von Sanders, however, was convinced that the operations east of the Jordan were the real danger and insisted on transferring the reserves to that bank, where their counter-attack on the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, which was protecting the attack on Es Salt from interruption from the north, was the decisive factor in robbing the British of success. The position at Tell Nimrin, despite the stubborn resistance of the VIII Corps, was only maintained with considerable difficulty, but thanks to the promptitude with which reinforcements,† including a German howitzer battery, were hurried up only unimportant losses of ground were suffered. In the end, the pressure brought to bear by the Turkish reinforcements on the British troops at Es Salt compelled the latter to withdraw south-westward; von Sanders having deliberately pressed the attack from the north had left that road open for their retreat, as he saw that the attempt to cut off the British at Es Salt would have led to a desperate battle which would have been too much for his exhausted troops.‡

* "The Yilderim Army Group was considering a surprise attack for one of the nights early in May on the Msallabe, which was only occupied by a weak British force. This small, fairly sharply defined mountain formed the farthest advanced post of the British. Across the Auja to the north and on the west bank of the Jordan, it was very troublesome for us. The night operation was to be undertaken by the 24th Division, which had been brought up to Dome for the purpose, and the 3rd Cavalry Division. On the early morning of the 30th of April, however, the great British advance into the country east of the Jordan began and resulted in the second battle of the Jordan, lasting five days."

† Von Sanders is extremely vague about the precise strength and composition of these forces.

‡ "I was absolutely convinced that, if the fighting was to lead to a satisfactory

The British retreat across the Jordan von Sanders found himself unable to hamper, still less was it possible for him to follow it up by the counter-attack west of the Jordan which, as he explains, "would have been of decisive importance for the general position on the Palestine front" by allowing "the widely-extended front of the Seventh and Eighth Armies" to be shortened and their strength increased by bringing the VIII Corps across the Jordan. Actually, the raid had shaken the Turkish position considerably; by drawing off troops from the railway it allowed the Arabs to renew their operations with much success. In some places these attacks, von Sanders states, were beaten off, but he adds that "it was impossible to prevent their succeeding at others. The repeated demolition of bridges and railways became all the more troublesome as there was already a lack of material with which to replace them." Von Sanders found it necessary to strengthen still further his lines and reinforce his troops at Nimrin, to post a new detachment on his left at El Rame, just north-east of the Dead Sea, and to send down to Es Salt, the really important reinforcement he had just received in the shape of the 146th (German) Infantry Regiment—detached, it may be noted, not from the Western Front but from Macedonia.*

During the period of comparative inactivity which followed "the second battle of Jordan," the German General was mainly

issue, a decisive result must be obtained at Es Salt within the next twenty-four hours. The troops were nearing the end of their powers of endurance, having been engaged in heavy fighting for four days. Neither the Yilderim Group nor the Seventh Army had any reserve—Es Salt *must be taken no matter what the cost*, by the troops advancing from Suda and the 3rd Cavalry Division. By the evening, the Suda Group had worked its way forward as far as the height lying close to the town on the eastern side. The German howitzer battery and the Turkish artillery began to bombard the town from the east whilst on the west the 3rd Cavalry Division also gained ground. In the evening I issued an order to H.Q. Fourth Army and to the 3rd Cavalry Division to penetrate into the town *from the north* by means of a night attack, bringing *all* available forces into action. The northerly direction was chosen because the ground there facilitated an advance, and also in order to enable the British to retreat from Es Salt to the south-west . . . in my opinion there was no doubt that our weak and thoroughly exhausted troops were not in a fit state to fight a desperate battle, such as must inevitably ensue if the British saw their line of retreat was directly threatened. It would have led to a defeat for us."

* It was about this period that von Sanders received information that the Turkish Government proposed to delegate to him authority over the internal political administration of Syria. It was a prospect which did not please him. He foresaw that he would be saddled with additional responsibilities without any improvement in his position. There was no "well-regulated or reliable civilian administration in existence," Government credit was at the lowest ebb, the population were abominably oppressed; the "mal-administration of centuries, the corruption of officials high and low," the persistent refusal of the authorities at Constantinople to consider the interests, still less "the just demands of this country," had produced a state of affairs which von Sanders would have found himself incapable of remedying. He firmly declined, therefore, an offer which he saw was merely prompted by the desire of the Turkish Government to shift their responsibilities on to his shoulders.

occupied in quarrelling with the authorities at Constantinople. In the little which he has to say with regard to military events he invariably represents the various minor operations undertaken from time to time by the British as much more serious than they really were. He magnifies raids into attempts to hold the positions raided; operations like the Meerut Division's ejection of the Turks from the "Twin Sisters" near Arsuf (8th—9th of June) he describes so as to leave the impression upon the reader that the attacks failed completely, though he avoids actually asserting that no ground was lost.

On the 10th of June von Sanders received an order, forwarded by Enver Pasha from Constantinople, instructing him to send back the last German reinforcement which had just arrived. This was the 11th Reserve Jäger Battalion, a crack unit, over 800 strong and provided with many machine guns, whose arrival von Sanders had hailed with special enthusiasm and whose withdrawal depressed him correspondingly. He took occasion to complain formally to the German Ambassador at Constantinople of the way in which the Turkish Headquarters were making arrangements about his troops without consulting him in the least. In particular, he protested vigorously against the withdrawal to other Turkish fronts of the German troops who were "the backbone of future operations" and by whose help alone he had so far been able to maintain his ground. If the troops were needed for the West, where the fate of the war lay in the balance, he explained that he would raise no objection, however unfavourable might be the consequences in his own theatre of war, but, if they were to be employed in any other Turkish theatre of operations, he maintained that it was contrary to the conditions under which he had agreed to accept the command of the Yilderim Army Group, and he begged to be allowed to resign. Turkish troops, he declared, could not hold the front alone; their condition was deplorable, desertion was so rife that the deserters outnumbered the men under arms, equipment was deficient, clothing ragged, even officers were without boots. The moral effect of the withdrawal of the German troops would, in his opinion, be so disastrous that there would be no prospect of withstanding the next British attack. He also emphasized very strongly the folly of proposing to undertake a new Turkish offensive in Trans-Caucasia. In the existing condition of affairs, and especially in the state of destitution and weakness of the Turkish Armies, such a proposal was lunacy. Already disasters had followed from the Turkish tendency to undertake far more than could be safely ventured. "Owing to

the advance into the interior of Persia, which I strongly opposed at the time, the Turks lost Baghdad; owing to the efforts of the Yilderim Army Group to operate against Baghdad, they lost Jerusalem, and now they will lose the whole of Arabia together with Palestine and Syria, as the result of extravagant enterprises in Trans-Caucasia." *

Von Sanders's protests were so far successful that, although the 11th Jäger Battalion was withdrawn, he was allowed to retain the remainder of his German troops. He was less fortunate, however, with his arguments against the Trans-Caucasian scheme, a political project "with a very substantial hope of pecuniary gain," but quite unwarranted by the military situation or by sound strategy. Though Turkey had "too many fronts already," men, munitions and money, urgently needed in Palestine, were diverted elsewhere. Von Sanders's lines of communication were starved of the coal required to keep up a proper train-service; some reinforcements arrived but in dribblets only, barely sufficient to balance the wastage which was swollen by the steadily increasing desertion. The conduct of the Turkish troops reflected their condition. When in July it was decided to make the attempt on the British positions at Msallabe which had been projected for May,† the two Turkish divisions employed on the flanks altogether failed to back up the efforts of the Germans, two battalions and a Jäger company, in the centre. These last penetrated deeply into the British lines, but,

* On the 21st of June von Sanders sent a very strongly worded letter to Enver Pasha in which he complained bitterly that he had never been consulted by the Turkish authorities with regard to the withdrawal of German troops. "Since I took over command on the Palestine Front your Excellency's H.Q. has continually made difficulties for me, the final responsibility for which lay with the German authorities. The events which have just occurred, however, are beyond all bounds. Without my views being heard, my most valuable troops—without whom the front cannot be held—are ordered to be withdrawn and the withdrawal of the other German formations—without which the war cannot be carried on at all—is under consideration." On the evening of the 22nd, a reply was received from Enver, "the tone and contents of which were most unsuitable" and are consequently not inserted by von Sanders in his book. On the morning of the same day, the incensed General had asked the Emperor's permission to resign his command. This permission was refused on the 23rd, and so von Sanders remained at his post.

† "The over-extension of the front of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, which was very pronounced in view of the dwindling numbers of the troops, became more and more felt during the hot season, as the divisions could not be relieved. In certain parts of the thinly-held line the men hardly got any rest owing to hostile artillery fire and aircraft. . . . The only possible means of shortening the front of the Seventh and Eighth Armies was for the Fourth Army to take over the positions of the Seventh Army on the west bank of the Jordan close to the river. As the Fourth Army had no reserves available for the purpose, it could only be done if the troops now in the salient about Aere and south-west of it were used. In order to do this, however, the advanced point occupied by the enemy at Msallabe and his weak front on both sides of this height would have to be pressed back towards the lower Auja. If we succeeded in doing that, a third hostile break-through to the country east of the Jordan was improbable, as the British would not have room to manoeuvre."

being unsupported and left in the lurch, their success was its own undoing : they lost heavily in cutting their way out, and the Jäger company was practically wiped out of existence.*

Thus when on the 19th of August, a request was received from von Ludendorff for a candid appreciation of the situation von Sanders's reply was gloomy in the extreme. He expected to be attacked, and, although he held out some hopes of holding his ground in the coastal district, he declared that a defeat east of Jordan would be fatal.† His position was but thinly held by weary and dispirited troops, forage and water were so deficient that the artillery horses were hardly capable of moving the batteries ; in the air the Germans were completely outmatched ; in reserve he had only one weak division of little over 1100 rifles. The troops could not be distributed in depth—there were not enough of them—consequently, in case of a break through, there was little hope of rallying his army in rear. He had considered the chances of a retreat to the shorter line Haifa—Lake of Tiberias—Yarmak valley, but had rejected it, partly because it would mean the complete abandonment of the Hedjaz railway and of all possibility of holding the Arabs in check, but more because in the condition of the troops he did not think it feasible. Poorly as he thought of the chances of successfully resisting an attack, he believed there was "more chance of success in holding the positions to the last than in attempting a lengthy retreat with Turkish troops whose moral was already shaken." Writing after the event, von Sanders declares "I made only one mistake

* "Nothing showed me more clearly the decline in the fighting capacity of the Turkish troops than the events of the 14th of July. The incidents which occurred would have been impossible with any of the troops under my command in the early years of the war. The most that could be expected of the regiments for some time to come, in their present state of decay, was that they would stand fast in case of an attack by the enemy." Apparently at this time Turkish officers who were serving in the Yilderim Army Group were being offered preferential treatment with regard to promotion and pay if they volunteered for service in the Eastern Caucasus. Not unnaturally many officers availed themselves of this tempting offer. "An offer to officers serving on an active fighting front to take employment on a much easier front where there was no prospect of fighting for some time to come, combined with preferential treatment as regards promotion and an increase of pay must surely be unique in the history of warfare." It was not surprising in the circumstances that von Sanders found a growing scarcity of officers.

† In a private letter to Ludendorff in August, von Sanders wrote that "it was obvious that an important attack was to be expected in the coastal sector. After previous experiences, however, I hoped to be able to withstand this attack, even if the front were pressed back at certain places. On the other hand, the situation of the Yilderim Army Group would become positively critical if we were defeated at, and east of, the Jordan. A retreat on the base of the Group of Armies, which stretched out in echelon to the east, would then be impossible, as also the use of the lines of communication running *via* Deraa and Damascus. The Arab forces east of the Jordan, which were continually increasing, were situated on the shortest line to these communications."

in my calculations. I hoped that individual units would only be pressed back step by step: I did not expect the complete failure of whole divisions."

It is clear, however, that von Sanders and his staff failed in another respect. They were altogether surprised by the distribution of the British forces in the attack of the 19th of September and had absolutely failed to discover the systematic transfer of troops to the left. It was this undetected great concentration in the coastal plain which was the foundation of General Allenby's triumph.* Scarcely less important as a factor in the Turkish rout was the work of the Royal Air Force. From the start the various telephone exchanges and cables on which von Sanders depended for intelligence were systematically and effectively attacked and from first to last the Yilderim Group's headquarters were deprived both of news of what was happening and of all power to control their forces. The efforts of von Sanders to rally his men and to form something of a defensive line farther in rear were rendered futile by the "fog of war" in which he was wrapped. At a time when the resistance of the Eighth Army had completely collapsed, when the roads and tracks leading from the coastal area were crowded with fugitives in hopeless disorder, von Sanders was framing plans based on altogether inaccurate assumptions; and not even from the Seventh Army, or from the German detachment under Colonel von Oppen on the left of the Eighth Army, did he receive any effective information. It was not only by the actual losses which they inflicted on the throngs of fugitives struggling along the mountain roads that our airmen contributed to the destruction of the Turkish Armies, their work in paralysing the hostile command was scarcely less important. If the account which von Sanders gives of the disaster which overcame his force is somewhat meagre and lacking in precision and in definite details, this is to be largely put down to the fact that precise details never reached him.

The stress of the bombardment was mainly felt on the right of the Eighth Army, where the 7th and 20th Turkish Divisions

* Von Sanders draws especial attention to the weakness of his Air Force at this period. "During the summer the German aviators on the Palestine front had to contend with many difficulties in fighting their opponents. The German aeroplanes were much inferior in climbing capacity and speed to the British modern type of machine. Two consignments of spare aeroplanes had almost all proved to be useless when tested. In this case, too, the supply of spare aeroplanes was hindered owing to the urgent needs of the German Western Front. Our Air Force detachments had to report, between the Spring and Autumn, the loss of fifty-nine pilots and observers. Air reconnaissance of the enemy had practically to be abandoned in September. As soon as German planes appeared, they were attacked by British aviators in such numbers that reconnaissance was impossible."

seem to have collapsed completely almost before the British infantry advanced. The 19th Turkish Division at Kez Kasim, a little farther inland, hardly held out longer, and though the weak 46th Turkish Division, the only reserve on this flank, managed to hold up the British advance at Et Tireh for a time,* it was soon overcome, and the British cavalry, passing through the gap which the infantry had made, pressed rapidly forward north and north-east. Indeed, the first definite information which von Sanders received was that the Eighth Army was completely broken and that, although the Seventh Army was faring better and had as yet lost but little ground, its position had been rendered untenable. But it was not till noon that this information came through from Nablus to Nazareth, nearly five hours after all direct communication with Eighth Army headquarters at Tul Keram had been broken off. It was then too late to entertain any hopes of restoring the situation, such as had led von Sanders, on an earlier report that the line had been penetrated near the coast, to order a counter-attack by Colonel von Oppen's Germans from Kalkilieh. It was now clear that von Oppen and the Seventh Army must retreat and retreat promptly. In order to cover this move, von Sanders endeavoured to organize resistance at Anebta, "an important point as the bare steep heights are close up to the road on both sides and the narrow defile thus formed could be easily defended": so long as Anebta was held, von Oppen's line of retirement through Messudieh Station (near Samaria) would be kept open. Farther east, the Seventh Army's line of retreat ran by Beit Hassan to Beisan, by a road which had been considerably improved since the March fighting near Tell Asur. To cover the right rear of the Anebta position, von Sanders pushed forward some six companies of a dépôt regiment stationed at Nazareth to occupy Lejjim (Megiddo), but in all these arrangements he was calculating on the Eighth Army having contrived to make a stand somewhere in rear of its original positions, and the picture he had formed fell very far short of the realities of the situation.

Actually, by the afternoon of the 19th of September, the Messudieh—Djenin road "was already congested with transport and fugitives," who also swarmed along the Tul Keram and Anebta road and all the tracks over the hills, being so mercilessly plied with bombs by British aviators that the roads "were soon piled up with dead men and horses and shattered vehicles." As a fighting force the Eighth Army had already ceased to exist, though not till some days later did the Commander-in-Chief realize this.

* It was at this spot that the British 75th Division met with such stubborn resistance.

Indeed von Sanders had only very meagre information. He knew that von Oppen had been forced back by increasing pressure on his right flank and that the divisions farther east were also retiring, while from across Jordan the Fourth Army reported that on its front as yet there was scarcely any fighting. But of the Eighth Army no information was available and it was uneasiness as to its situation which led von Sanders to give orders on the evening of the 19th of September for the formation of local covering parties for the protection of Nazareth. To this wise precaution he owed his narrow escape from capture next day by the leading brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, which, after covering fifty miles in less than twenty-four hours, came into Nazareth at dawn on the 20th, and all but effected the capture of the enemy's Commander-in-Chief. There was sharp street fighting and von Sanders declares that, if the British had pushed forward a little on the left to the Tiberias road, a few troopers and machine guns could have commanded completely its steep and narrow descent into the valley. As it was, the bulk of the Yilderim headquarters got away by this route, though many valuable documents were sacrificed, and in the end the British cavalry, too weak to capture the whole town, retired on El Afule. Von Sanders's account supplies the accurate story as to his own movements. He had not left Nazareth overnight, as one version suggested, nor did he escape during the fighting. It was not till after mid-day, when the rear-guard of the garrison had already evacuated Nazareth, that he himself proceeded to Tiberias, which he reached about 3.30 p.m.*

* "At 5.30 a.m. on the 20th of September loud shouts and cries, followed by rifle and machine-gun fire, broke out in the streets in the south part of Nazareth where the headquarters offices of the Group of Armies were situated. The British were in the town hoping to capture the headquarters. . . . The British at once took possession of the Hotel Germania, some 200 yards distant from the headquarters at Casanova, taking prisoner various officers and officials. . . . Violent street fighting developed, in which even the officers had to use carbines. . . . It was soon reported that, strangely enough, the exit from the town towards Tiberias was still free. The road there not far from the French orphanage winds down a steep descent into the valley. The enemy could have easily held it with a few troopers and machine guns and thus have closed the only remaining exit from Nazareth. . . . As the situation at Casanova remained unchanged at 8.30 a.m., I went up to the French Orphanage, where I found the remainder of the *Dépôt* Regiment Würth von Würthenau. I ordered the commander to make an immediate attack, with all his men, on the British detachments advancing on foot with machine guns about three-quarters of a mile west of the Orphanage. After the attack had been made twice without success, I ordered a third attack, no matter what the cost. This attack was successful and soon after 10.15 a.m. the British evacuated the heights. The enemy must have considerably over-estimated the forces under Major Würth von Würthenau, for shortly afterwards I saw the led horses of a squadron, then at short intervals those of five other squadrons, galloping to rejoin the dismounted skirmishers, who were assembling. . . . The enemy disappeared behind the western range of hills in the direction of Haifa. . . . The bold attempt by the British brigade to capture the staff of the Group of Armies, after a hard ride during

For the next few days von Sanders was occupied in futile attempts to organize a fresh line of resistance on either side of the Lake of Tiberias. He hoped by occupying a defile leading to the Jisr Benat Yakub where the Haifa—Damascus road crosses the Jordan to protect himself on that flank and meanwhile to form a line along the Yarmak valley eastward to Deraa on which the Seventh Army might be rallied and on to which the Fourth Army might retire. But to do this the occupation of Beisan was essential and von Sanders is very severe in his condemnation of the temporary Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division, who had been ordered to secure that important spot, but abandoned the attempt on finding himself forestalled there. He is equally emphatic on the importance of a decision taken in ignorance of the exact situation by the G.O.C. Eighth Army that Colonel von Oppen should withdraw to the east of the Jordan, instead of doing what that officer himself advocated—namely, that he should proceed to Samach, just south of the Lake of Tiberias, the connecting point between the Tiberias and Yarmak valley sections of the new front. Von Sanders professes to believe that the arrival of von Oppen's group at Samach would have provided "decisive support" at that point, but this seems a highly optimistic appreciation. His own description of the state of disorder and demoralization into which the Turks had fallen, of the effects produced on them by the unremitting attentions of the British aircraft, of the way in which the soldiers not only of the Eighth Army but also of the Seventh Army were deserting and surrendering wholesale, is conclusive evidence against the possibility of an effective stand. Had von Oppen pushed through to Samach, he and his men would only have been captured there. By moving across Jordan they, at any rate, evaded capture.

On the 22nd of September von Sanders left Deraa by rail for Damascus, only to find the line already cut by the Arabs. He made his way through, however, and once again started the thankless task of trying to organize resistance. By a belated decision the Turkish Second Army was now placed under his orders, but it could only provide a few battalions of unreliable Arabs, and, while the Commander-in-Chief was trying to scrape together such fighting men as he could find, the Tiberias—Yarmak valley line had already collapsed. The retreat of the Fourth Army from the Amman front had been much impeded by Arab attacks on the railway, the Seventh

the night had failed. . . . About 1.15 p.m. after Major Würth von Würthenau had been ordered to withdraw to Tiberias with the rear-guard, I left Nazareth . . . passing an endless stream of fugitives . . . until I reached Tiberias at 3.30 p.m."

Army had made no attempt to stand, and on the 26th of September a little fighting gave the British possession of Samach and led to the evacuation of Tiberias. Von Sanders had little better fortune with his endeavours to organize the defence of Damascus. Von Oppen's Germans, who reached Damascus by rail from Deraa on the 27th of September, were posted on the right flank of the new line at Rayak, north-west of Damascus, as von Sanders's apprehensions of a descent on the Syrian coast had been revived and he was in momentary expectation of seeing British troops landing at Beirut. So nervous indeed was he on this account that he himself moved back from Damascus to Baalbec and the bulk of the headquarters staff retired forthwith to Aleppo. But the only hope for a successful defence of Damascus depended on the ability of the rear-guard on the Tiberias front to offer a steady resistance; this it failed to do against the steady pressure exerted by the British cavalry. By this time the population of Damascus were openly displaying their hostility, and "parties of armed Arabs entered the town daily, at first contenting themselves by displaying their skill in horsemanship and firing in the air." With the British coming steadily on and the Emir Feisal's troops on the outskirts of the city, there was nothing for it but to abandon Damascus, and on the 30th of September the evacuation was in full swing all day, the last troop train which got out leaving about 9 p.m. and reaching Rayak safely.

Damascus having been abandoned, the Rayak position was not worth holding—it was decided to retire at once to Homs, to which place von Oppen withdrew unmolested on the 2nd of October, his troops being almost the only ones to retain real cohesion and organization. But Homs was no more tenable than the Tiberias—Yarmak line or Damascus, and directly the British resumed their advance it became evident that the Fourth Army, which had been detailed to act as rear-guard, while the Seventh was reorganized at Aleppo, would have to go. Homs was evacuated on the 12th of October, the British entering it two days later. By the 19th of October the pursuit had reached Hama, and, though by this time two divisions of the Seventh Army had been got together to a strength of about 11,000 all told, Aleppo soon went the way of Damascus and Homs. By the 26th of October it was in British hands and British advanced troops were pressing upon the Turkish rear-guard north of Aleppo so vigorously that von Sanders represents our 15th Cavalry Brigade, by that time certainly not 1000 strong, as a strong force of infantry and four squadrons. He hardly conceals his relief at receiving orders on the 30th of October to proceed to Constantinople to superintend the evacuation of the German troops serving in Turkey.



[To face p. 274.]

It is clear from the detailed narrative of the efforts to rally the Yilderim Group after the break through of the 19th of September, that, though the Turkish troops were already half beaten before the attack, the speed of the pursuit was of the greatest value in completing the success. The infantry did wonders in marching, the airmen's part in the destruction and demoralization of the Turkish Armies produced a tremendous impression on their victims, but it was the cavalry who achieved the main success. Our horsemen were across the Seventh Army's line of retreat almost before its retreat began, and they were up against the Tiberias—Yarmak valley line before it could be organized or properly occupied; they were thus able to maintain upon the retreating enemy a relentless pressure which a less rapidly moving arm could not have exerted. Von Sanders in his account of the operations seems to be trying to convince himself that a successful rally might have been made; his account will not leave that impression on any one else.

The actual attack of the 19th of September reaped the fruits of months of devoted and systematic work, in organization, in training, in administration; it yielded the deferred payment of earlier and less immediately successful efforts; it is worth study as an example of careful planning and skilful execution, but it was so well planned and delivered in such overwhelming strength that the completeness of its success almost conceals its merit. It is as the prelude to a great pursuit that it is most likely to be studied in military history. As an example of the prompt exploitation of victory, of an unrelenting pressure exercised on a defeated enemy leading to his complete demoralization, to the destruction of all cohesion, of all possibility of further resistance, of all desire on the part of the majority of the pursued for any stand or succour, Lord Allenby's pursuit will rank among the great pursuits of history. It is the conspicuous achievement of the cavalry arm in the war and it is unfortunate that Von Sanders, himself a cavalry man, was not himself an eye-witness of the achievements of the British cavalry, except for some anxious moments at Nazareth on the 20th of September. But his account, although apt to degenerate into special pleading and somewhat lacking in the definite details which students of the campaign would welcome, is no small testimony to the success of his opponent's strategy and to the impression produced upon the victims of one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of the mounted arm.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON (with Map)

BY W. E. D. ALLEN, F.R.G.S.

1. *The former Kingdom of Hungary.*—To understand the significance of the changes—political, economic and strategic—which have been brought about by the Treaty of Trianon, it will be necessary to examine briefly the geographical formation of the Kingdom of Hungary as it existed until November, 1918, and to outline the main tendencies, economic and historical, which have contributed to the formation of the Hungarian State.

Hungary is surrounded in a semicircle from north-west to south-east by the great natural wall of the Carpathians. The Carpathians may be divided for practical purposes into three sectors : the Western Carpathians, which stretch for a distance of over three hundred miles from Pozsony on the Danube, to the sources of the rivers Ondova and Topoly ; the North-Eastern Carpathians, 250 miles in length, which run from the Ondova—Topoly to the Rodna Massif, and form the watershed of the rivers Dniester, Pruth and Sereth to the north, the Szamos and Tisza to the south ; and the Eastern Carpathians or Transylvanian Alps, which run two hundred miles south from Rodna to the Wallachian Plain, and then turn west for 250 miles to the Iron Gates at Orshova. The whole range encloses the vast Hungarian plain, which can be divided into three parts : the Great Alföld, the central plain stretching between Budapest and the Danube at Belgrad ; the Little Alföld on the north-west, between Pozsony and Budapest, separated from the Great Alföld by some low ranges of hills ; and the Transylvanian Plateau, divided from the Great Alföld by the Gyalu block. The whole is watered by the Danube and the Tisza, flowing from north to south, and by a multitude of tributaries, many with a considerable displacement of water, flowing west to east, and east to west. Hungary is thus a perfect economic unit, sheltered by the Carpathians—themselves rich in the timber and minerals which the plains do not possess—from the influence of northern and eastern climatic conditions ; watered by rivers, which serve both as a means of fertilization and

communication. But there are two gaps, unprotected by nature, which have been economically a strength, and militarily a weakness to the Hungarians. On the north-west the valley of the Danube leads into Austria and the South German lands ; on the south-east the valleys of the rivers falling into the Danube—the Morava, the Sava, the Drina, the Bosna and the Vbras—are passage-ways which give access from the Adriatic and Balkan lands into Hungary. Economically they are trade routes ; militarily they are roads of invasion. And the political history of Hungary is the story of attempts to capture and hold these routes, of their loss and of their recapture.

Between the Tenth and Fifteenth Centuries, when the Hungarian Kingdom was being founded and consolidated, the military strength of the Hungarian kings, based on a feudal system, which itself was founded on a tribal organization adapted particularly to war, had enabled the Hungarians to dominate the whole of Central Europe. Bohemia and Poland, Moldavia and Wallachia, Serbia and Bosnia, in turn recognized the supremacy of the Kings of Buda, and then was consolidated the first compact Monarchical State in Europe, which Hungarians now proudly call the Millenium Kingdom, at a date when England and France were yet little more than an agglomeration of large feudal principalities. (England, Wales, Scotland ; France, Burgundy, Brittany, Normandy, Anjou, Provence.) Circumstances combined to ruin the Hungarian Monarchy ; an ambitious foreign policy sapped the military strength of the country, internal trouble weakened its political position, at the period when the Turkish Armies were conquering the Balkans. After a long series of wars the Osmanli occupied the heads of all the southern Danube tributaries ; at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century they at last took the Hungarian bastions in the south, Belgrad, Temesvar and Szeged, and finally overran all the Great Alföld up to Buda. At the same time the Austrians came in on the west, and a Habsburg was proclaimed King of the strip of Western Hungary (Söpron-Poszony district and Slovakia) which remained free of the Turks.

For nearly two centuries the Hungarian Kingdom ceased to exist, but Hungarians never relinquished their national ideal, and allied themselves with, or fought against, Austrians and Turks with unscrupulous impartiality, holding as their one great principle the re-establishment of the Kingdom.

Finally, during the Eighteenth Century, the Turks were driven completely out of the Alföld, and a struggle for supremacy in Hungary began between the native aristocracy and the foreign Habsburg dynasty, which was only compromised by the Ausgleich of 1867.

This long subjection to Austria and Turkey has had a profound effect on the social and economic development of Hungary. First, there was no social progress during the 16th and 17th centuries—a most important period in the social history of Western Europe—and when the Hungarian Kingdom was re-established under the Habsburgs the country was re-organized as a feudal state. Constant war kept the peasants in subjection to their military leaders, the nobles, while the necessity for repopulating and developing the whole of the Alföld—which had degenerated into a steppe under the Turks—and the rich alluvial regions of Bacska and the Banat, prevented that over-population which is the most direct cause of modifications in a social system. Further, the economic policy of the Habsburgs, designed to develop the industrial resources of Austria in preference to those of Hungary, checked the conversion of Hungary from an agricultural into an industrial state, and prevented the growth of a middle class of sufficient strength to assert its political aspirations in opposition to those of the nobles. Lastly, the psychology of the Hungarian peasant must be considered. He is slow and heavy-witted, with the proverbial stolidity, patience and indifference of the Mongoloid nomad race from which his nation is sprung. He is also intensely conservative in instinct, imitative and obedient. Thus, from various causes, historical, economic and psychological, Hungary has preserved into the Twentieth Century a social system which recalls those of the Middle Ages.

In the last half-century, the question of the subject nationalities in Hungary, which first came into prominence and was exploited by Vienna during the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848, had assumed alarming proportions. But antagonism between the subject nationalities and the dominant race was by no means so acute as in Austria. The Slovaks and Ruthenians, in the north, did not subscribe to the extreme claims of the Czechs, whilst in the south, the Croats only demanded fuller autonomy, and their middle classes at least were not enthusiastic advocates of union with the Balkan Serbs, whose culture, in which survived the elements of Turkish inefficiency and corruption, they despised. The Wallachs of Eastern Hungary and Transylvania were possibly the most extreme in their claims, but they, even, hoped for an equal union of all Rumanians with Hungary, rather than for complete independence. In general, the differences between the Magyars and the subject races, were fundamentally social and agrarian, rather than national, and, had not the war supervened, it is probable that a solution of the

national question would have been found within the fabric of the Hungarian State.

2. *The Treaty of Trianon : Economic Results.*—By the Treaty of Trianon Hungary lost two-thirds of her former territories. The settlement was based, in theory, on the principles enunciated by President Wilson, and it is impossible in a short article to deal in detail with the several great questions, moral as well as political, involved. Sufficient to remark, that basing their propaganda in the disputed districts on the principle of an agrarian revolution at the expense of the Magyar landowners, and abroad on the great ideal of Self-Determination, the shrewd politicians of Prague succeeded in obtaining from the Peace Conference the whole of the Western and Northern Carpathian districts of Hungary, while the politicians of Bucharest, themselves landowners, with an historical record considerably less reputable than that of the Magyars whom they denounced, secured the whole of the rich mineral and forest districts of Transylvania, with a broad strip of flat country between the Transylvanian Alps and the Tisza, the whole containing nearly two million Hungarians. In the south, Croatia-Slavonia was—with justice—incorporated in Jugo-Slavia, while the rich alluvial lands of Bacska and the Banat, developed by a huge expenditure of Hungarian capital and effort, were divided between Rumania and Jugo-Slavia. Over half a million Hungarians were incorporated in Slovakia, and Pozsony, a purely German-Hungarian town and the ancient capital of the Kingdom, was sacrificed to satisfy the ambitious Czech project for a port on the Danube.

The Great and Little Alfölds alone remained to Hungary, which now constitutes a purely agricultural country, with a small industrial area round Budapest. Hungary has lost her main mineral regions, with the exception of the Baranya country, in the south, and must now rely on imported coal, iron and copper.* Salt, of which 200,000 metric quintals per annum were produced before the war, is now completely lacking. The country's losses in forests are even more severe. The present frontiers include only 13·4 per cent. of the former forest area of Hungary, and the timber remaining is of secondary quality. The present production of Hungarian saw-mills is 10·6 per cent. of the production in 1913, and that of Hungarian paper-mills 1·0 per cent.

Further, Hungarian agriculture is adversely affected by a delineation of frontiers, which has left in hostile hands the sources of some

* The Hungarian coal supply was always deficient; much coal was imported from abroad before the war.

of the chief rivers watering the Great Alföld. Thus the Tisza finds its sources in the districts of Saros, Zemplén, Ung, Bereg and Maramaros, ceded to Czecho-Slovakia, and in Szilagy and Besztersze, ceded to Rumania. Similarly, the sources of the Körös and the upper course of the Maros—which joins the Tisza at the important agricultural centre of Szeged—lie in Rumanian territory.

During the last half-century, by careful afforestation at the sources, and by works lower down, the Hungarians had sought to regulate the courses of these rivers, and had succeeded in reclaiming great areas of marshland, and in irrigating moorland, on both sides of the Tisza. But since the Armistice the new authorities in Slovakia and Transylvania have, either maliciously or carelessly, neglected the works along the courses of the rivers, and engaged in widespread felling of trees—with consequent deforestation at the sources—with the result that, during the last two years, wide stretches of the Alföld have been affected, and are threatened with desiccation or inundation.

A serious defect of the Treaty, which affects the Slovaks, Ruthenians and Transylvanians even more than the Hungarians, has been the neglect to consider the question of labour distribution. Before the war, it was the custom of the inhabitants of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Highlands to pass the winter in timber felling, and when the spring came, to float down the rivers with their timber for sale in the Alföld. Here the mountaineers would remain for the summer, and seek employment or extra labour in harvesting, returning in the autumn to the mountains with a comfortable sum of money. Since the Armistice the policy of the Czecho-Slovak Government has been to sever as far as possible the economic connections of Slovakia with Hungary, with the result that thousands of Slovak workmen have been thrown out of work. A similar policy has been pursued by the Rumanian Government, which, in June, 1920, suppressed with unnecessary severity a movement of some thousands of Rumanian workmen in the district of Bihar, who tried to pass the military line and enter the Hungarian Alföld for harvesting.

In general, it must be recognized that the effects of the Treaty are disastrous for the whole of the territories forming the old Kingdom of Hungary, with the exception possibly of Croatia-Slavonia. The food-producing regions have been separated from the timber and mineral producing regions; the distribution of labour has been dislocated; and agriculture has been affected, in a degree by political vindictiveness in the control of water-power, and in a great extent by agrarian reforms and administrative changes, the details of which

it is impossible to discuss in a short article. Again, the detachment of Slovakia from agricultural Hungary, and its attachment to industrial Bohemia, has tended to accentuate, and not to solve, the supply difficulties of the Czechs, and has completed the creation out of the old Habsburg Empire, of a second Republic dependent on foreign countries for vital food supplies. The inclusion in Slovakia of agricultural districts such as Czallakos, with large Hungarian racial majorities, represents an immoral and futile attempt to secure to the Carpathian mountain districts some of the fertile lowland country.


3. *The Treaty of Trianon : New Strategic Frontiers.*—By the Treaty Hungary has been rendered virtually defenceless. On the north, the Czecho-Slovaks command all the Carpathian approaches to the Little Alföld, and are within two days' march of Budapest. On the south, the Jugo-Slavs have come into possession of the different heads of valleys (Sava, Drina, etc.) leading into the Great Alföld. On the east, the Tisza, as a river line, forms a very unsatisfactory defence against Rumania. Political arguments might conceivably be brought forward to justify this complete subjection of the Hungarian plains to the peoples of the surrounding mountain districts. The Treaty of Trianon is, however, open to more serious criticism from a strategic aspect. By the partition of the Carpathians between Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, this formidable line of defence for Central Europe, the strength of which has been proved many times in history, and particularly in the late war, has been rendered useless. The whole of the Northern Carpathians, with the vital sector between the Topoly and Czorna Hora, have passed to the Czechs ; the Eastern Carpathians, with the passes leading into the valleys of the Pruth, the Sereth and the Moldava to Rumania. Czecho-Slovakia thus controls a narrow strip of mountainous country, roughly 250 miles by 50, from Kosice (Kassa) to Maramaros, which the history of the Russo-German campaigns of 1914-17 teaches is the gateway from the East into Central Europe. It would be necessary to defend this strip—"our sausage" as the Czechs call it—against an attack from north-east to south-west, operating on a line of supply running west to east. The Czechs have no railway communication west to east, east of Kassa, and thus a Russian attacking army would be able with ease to occupy the lateral valleys Latorcza—Borszova—Taracz, Féher Tisza, etc. From Maramaros they could then proceed to turn the Rumanian river defences (Sereth, Pruth, etc.) or march into Transylvania. Thus the Eastern Carpathians, with their north to south passes and river valleys, and their

lack of all west to east railway communication—which even if it existed would be difficult to defend—are useless as a future line of defence against a possible Russian attack.

The historical and natural defenders of the Carpathian line are the Hungarians, who are in a geographical position to offer an opposition to an advance through the Carpathians, on a front running west to east. Control of the lateral line Miskolcz—Nagykarolyi, with branches running north-west to Kassa, north-east to Ungvar and Munkacz and north-east-by-east to Szatmar-Németi and Maramaros, would afford an excellent line of communication.

An attack by Russia through the Carpathian passes may be an unlikely eventuality during the next generation. At the same time, a Russo-German coalition to revoke the Treaties which have placed the best parts of Central Europe in new hands, is a possibility which must be considered. In the event of a combined Russo-German attack on Poland and the Little Entente States, the Carpathians, as at present held, are virtually indefensible.

4. *Suggested Modifications.*—In the present circumstances any alteration of the Trianon Treaty in favour of Hungary, or any concessions on the part of the victorious States for the general good of Central Europe, appear impossible. At the same time, Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian politicians will do well to remember that the stability of their States only rests on the goodwill and continued support of the Entente. Any change in British and French policy, or any determination to refrain from all active intervention, would at once expose both States to attack from their despoiled neighbours, and to dissolution. Only a policy of reconciliation and reasonable concession can give to Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania any lasting guarantee of territorial security. Politically, a policy of toleration and moderation towards national minorities, and economically a policy of concession and co-operation, alone can bring peace and, eventually, contentment and a decline of irredentism to the defeated. Economically, the first necessity for Central Europe is a Customs Union, or some kind of commercial understanding between Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Rumania. Jugo-Slavia, which is an economic unit, with interests rather in the Balkans and the Adriatic, need not be included. To the other States, some understanding which will combine the industries of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, the mineral resources and forests of Slovakia and Rumania, and the agriculture of Hungary and Rumania, is an urgent necessity. To such a union the commercial ambition of Czecho-Slovakia is the main obstacle, and in this respect it is to be regretted that the



[To face p. 282.]

acquisition of a Danubian frontier from Poszony to Komorn has made her independent of co-operation with the other river States.

Further, a frontier revision is an urgent necessity—a revision which will give to Hungary control of the Carpathians between the Topoly and Rodna. Such a concession would be to the strategical advantage of all the Carpathian States, for Hungary would then be interested as a defender against, and not as an ally of, a hostile Power attacking from the east. A concession which would give to Hungary the districts of Zemplen, Ung, Bereg, Ugocza and Maramaros, would be both to the strategical and economic advantage of all concerned, and would at the same time be a guarantee of a new spirit of reason and conciliation in Central European relations.

PROBLEMS OF MECHANICAL WARFARE

BY COLONEL J. F. C. FULLER, D.S.O.

" Big Mars seems bankrupt in their beggar'd host,
And faintly through a rusty beaver peeps :
The horsemen sit like fixed candlesticks,
With torch-staves in their hand . . ."
King Henry the Fifth, iv. II. 43.

" O ! now doth Death line his dead chaps with steel ;
'The swords of soldiers are his teeth, his fangs ;
And now he feasts, mousing the flesh of men."
King John, ii. I. 351.

Introduction.—The final victory of the Allies in November, 1918, was so stupendous an event that it is apt to obscure from us the main issue of over four years of war, which was not the defeat of the Central Powers, but the destruction of the world outlook—social, political and military, as it was accepted by all civilized nations before the outbreak of the war. So all embracing was this cataclysm that, during the years immediately following the cessation of hostilities, no other condition could have been possible save that of a world-wide revolution, the intensity of which can better be gauged from the changes which have taken place in ideas than from the quantity of blood spilt. These changes are still gaining impetus, and, in the vortex which is sucking down old institutions and belching up new ones, the military forces must take their place.

In August, 1914, the tactical mobility of our Army was based on muscle, the infantry marched, the cavalry rode, the guns were dragged by horses, and, except for a few lorries and a few aeroplanes, our soldiers were scarcely more mobile than their ancestors at Waterloo. In this respect our Army did not differ from the foreign armies it fought with or against. Nevertheless, the war which followed was different from all preceding wars, in that the railway, the great civil means of movement, was at once turned to strategical account. This enabled such an inundation of soldiery to be effected that warfare has never seen its like before. So pronounced was the influence of the railway that, failing a navigable river or proximity to the sea, no great army could subsist without locomotives to supply

it. Where railways were many, fronts became continuous, as in France and Flanders ; where few, broken, as in Russia ; and where only one railway existed, unless one or both flanks rested on the sea, open warfare on the exposed flank or flanks became possible, as in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Sinai and Syria. In railless countries, operations were of the small war type.

On the Western Front, the first great lesson of the war was : that, when masses of men are engaged, a serious tactical failure is likely to result in a strategical deadlock ; the second, that a strategical deadlock is likely to result in a war of attrition ; the third, that a war of attrition is a war based on supply. Consequently, we find that, before the war was six months old, because of, and not in spite of, the enormous facilities of movement rendered possible by the railway, all tactical movement ceased, until we see two immense phalanxes of men facing each other, as they did 2500 years ago, but hurling projectiles at one another in place of pushing pikes. As in the days of Alexander the longest pikes wielded by the staunchest side normally won, so was it hoped by multiplying weapons to defeat the enemy. Seemingly, however, it was not realized that just as every foot added to the *sarissa* reduced the mobility of the *hoplite*, so every shell exploded on the ground reduced the mobility of the foot soldier, the horse soldier and the wheeled vehicle whenever the breaking down of the enemy's resistance rendered an advance possible. Alexander, realizing his own particular difficulty, did not seek to overcome it by increasing the length of weapons, but by making extensive use of cavalry directly the enemy's ranks were broken ; consequently, most of his victories were completed by the cavalry charge. Since the days of Alexander, except for a break of some 800 years during the Middle Ages when infantry disappeared before the armoured knight, this distribution of tactical power between infantry and cavalry remained the normal process of gaining battles down to the close of the Seven Years War, after which a rapid decline in the opportunity of the cavalry charge took place until, after the Franco-Prussian War, massed cavalry charges became impracticable. Turning now to the difficulty which confronted us in the Great War, we find that ultimately we solved our own particular problem by the old Alexandrian tactics, but in a reverse order. The tanks charged the enemy, disorganized and demoralized him, and then only did the infantry advance and drive him from the field. In this reversal of the historic method of attack is to be discovered the germ of a great number of our future problems.

Why was this reversal necessary? It was necessary because modern fire-power, coupled with trenches protected by entanglements, rendered it impossible to advance, and until the infantry could advance, the cavalry and gunners behind them had to remain stationary. The tanks carried out, therefore, the primary duty of the infantry, namely, the disorganization of the enemy. The cavalry attempted to pursue, but, on the Western Front, consistently failed, as they could not face the machine gun; the infantry attempted to pursue, but failed equally because of their lack of mobility; finally, the tanks attempted to pursue, but also failed because they did not possess the necessary radius of action or the requisite mobility to protect themselves against the enemy's gun-fire. Had they possessed these attributes, pursuit, that is, the act of annihilating the enemy, would have been possible, especially if the artillery and supply vehicles could have kept up with the pursuing tanks in order to protect and supply them. Had such an operation been feasible, then the ancient method of waging war would not have been reversed, heavily armoured tanks would have broken the enemy's ranks just as the *hoplites* did, and lighter armoured and faster tanks would have destroyed the fractions thus created, just as the *cataphracts* did. Towards this ancient method of warfare we were returning when the Armistice terminated hostilities, for we were then building a large number of machines of two types—a five mile the hour machine and an eight mile the hour machine, with a possible twenty mile the hour machine should the war last late into 1919.

If, then, the ancient method of battle is sound, namely, that we should disorganize our enemy before we attempt to annihilate him, and, if these two acts can most efficiently be carried out by armoured cross-country machines, what part are infantry, cavalry, artillery and road supply vehicles going to play in future warfare? Here then, are four military problems of the first magnitude, on the correct solution of which will depend the entire foundations of our future Army.

The writer proposes to consider these problems in three categories—great wars, small wars and internal security, the three purposes for which armies are raised.

(i) *The Great War Tank Problem*.—Assuming that the reader is well acquainted with the lessons learned from the use of tanks during the late war, we will suppose that, at some future date, two armies meet in battle, and that each side possesses infantry, cavalry and artillery as equipped to-day and two types of tanks—a light

cavalry tank with a speed of 25 miles the hour, and a heavily armoured infantry tank with a speed of 15 miles the hour. What will then happen ?

It may be assumed forthwith, if the lessons of the last war are of any value and if human nature remains what it is, that, by the time the two armies are within striking distance, the infantry will be in rear of the infantry tanks and the artillery in rear of the infantry. Tank will consequently engage tank, and a battle for tank supremacy will result. As cavalry cannot take part in this battle, unless it be employed in galloping towards the hostile machines and scattering land mines in their path, an operation which might more efficiently be carried out by a mine-laying tank or by an aeroplane, the cavalry tanks will be detached from the arm they are protecting and will manœuvre behind the infantry tanks ready to move forward should the enemy's tank front be pierced, or preparatory to attacking this front in flank.

The question now arises, what can the infantry do ? These troops can do nothing outside playing the part of interested spectators. What can the gunners do ? They can do next to nothing for, being distant from the actual field of action, upon which in a minute a tank may have changed its position by a quarter of a mile, they dare not promiscuously bombard any area ; besides, in order to fire at all, they will generally have to employ direct laying which, in most cases, will require them either to be with, or in advance of, the infantry. In such positions, as the gunners, in order to protect themselves, cannot lie flat like the infantry, their pieces will soon be silenced by hostile machine-gun fire.

Let us now carry the battle to its next stage. One side will gain tank supremacy and the shattered remnants of the other side will retire. As the pursuit will be rapid—at from ten to twenty miles the hour—the defeated tanks can either retire with their infantry, which delaying them will jeopardize their retreat, or else abandon their infantry and let them be destroyed. Falling back on their artillery what can the gunners do ? They cannot move their guns without their horses, which are very vulnerable to fire, and they cannot fire them whilst in movement. They must, therefore, remain stationary and, if the ground in front of the guns be an obstacle to tank movement, they may possibly hold up the enemy's infantry machines which, nevertheless, if they advance behind a smoke cloud will be very difficult targets to hit. Meanwhile, the enemy's cavalry tanks will be racing round the artillery flanks in order to attack in rear the guns, wagon parks, teams and command

headquarters. We see, therefore, that, even if the artillery can halt the hostile infantry machines, in nine cases out of ten the guns are likely to be destroyed in a few hours. The only arm which will be able to save itself from destruction is the cavalry, not by charging the enemy, but by galloping off the field.

In the main this picture is not overdrawn, because to-day tanks exist which can move at twenty-five miles an hour. True they are not reliable—neither was the motor car in 1900, nor the aeroplane in 1908—yet the tank to-day is as old as these two means of movement were twenty-two and fourteen years ago, consequently there is no reason why reliability should not be accomplished within a few years of to-day.

The question now arises, what is the utility of cavalry, artillery and infantry as equipped at the present time? Let us inquire into this question in some detail.

The cavalry charge, save against ill-equipped barbarians who frequently inhabit difficult cavalry country, is to all intents and purposes dead. Yet does not cavalry still possess utility for reconnaissance? Aeroplanes can see much more in general, but far less than the trooper can in particular. They cannot move through woods or examine houses, they are not suited for obtaining information from the inhabitants, for tapping telegraph wires, neither can they lie concealed in country which offers facilities for hiding as, normally, this type of country is the very worst for landing. Why, however, cannot cavalry for purposes of reconnaissance be replaced by fast scout tanks, unarmoured or very lightly so over their vitals, each carrying two men armed with automatic rifles? There is no tactical reason which should render this impossible. The machine will be able to traverse all ground which can be crossed by a horse, except perhaps very thick woods and very narrow hill tracks, both of which can, however, be better negotiated on foot. Being small it can be hidden; it will require no horse holder; it will not require feeding and watering when standing still; it will be able to carry a week's rations for its crew and explosives for demolition work; further, it will be able to traverse distances of 100 miles and more in twelve hours. Frankly, there is nothing of intrinsic importance which cavalry can do now which a scout tank will not be able to do infinitely better in the near future, except break in half, so as to permit its crew of two men galloping away in different directions.

Let us now turn to the artillery. The gun to-day is dragged by six horses; it cannot fire whilst in movement; for prolonged

marches it requires a road, and, being fashioned for long-range action, it is not suited to carry out its own local defence ; consequently, it must operate in rear of the infantry or, if away from the infantry, it must be provided with a special escort.

There are three ways in which guns can be motorized. They can be hauled by a cross-country tractor ; they can be mounted with their wheels on a cross-country transporter, or fitted on to a tank. The first method is obviously a makeshift, with these advantages, however, over the existing equipment—namely, that more ammunition can be carried into action, and that the tractor, when free of the gun, can be used as an ammunition carrier. The second method is a great advance on the horse-drawn gun, for the gun can be fired from the transporter. The third, which possesses this advantage in a more accentuated form, also possesses the important characteristics of not needing an infantry shield in front of it or a local escort to protect it ; consequently, it can operate in advance of the infantry and take part in the tank *versus* tank battle. This advantage is so considerable that any difficulty in concealing the machine is fully compensated for ; further, it is a very moot point whether static concealment from aircraft observation is anything like as effective a means of protection as ability to move rapidly from place to place.

We will now turn to the last of the battle arms—the infantry. First of all, it must be realized that, even though infantry may still be “ the Queen of Battles,” for 800 years during the Christian era dismounted troops were mere pawns in the game. When the armoured knight ruled the battlefield, infantry was employed merely to garrison castles, or to hold tactical points such as swamps, forests and hilltops, that is, in localities in which the knights could not move. We believe that the armoured tank is going to create a tactical condition similar to that created in the past by these armoured horsemen, and that, in the near future, infantry will continue to exist, but only as the defenders of positions—rail-heads, bridge-heads, workshops and supply magazines. As this is a point which is likely to be hotly debated, let us trace the evolution of this assumption.

To provide the infantry with an escort of tanks is no guarantee that in battle, if the tank *versus* tank engagement is likely to fail, any but a totally incapable commander will not at once withdraw all these protective machines in order to support his tanks, for on their success will depend victory or defeat. Assuming that we shall have a capable commander, his initiative can of course be restricted

by supplying him with protective tanks the speed of which does not exceed the pace of the infantry ; but to suggest such a restriction is absurd, for these slow machines would be no match against faster hostile ones should they break through.

We must try another solution. The infantry may be equipped with a heavy machine gun, which will weigh seven times the weight of a rifle and, therefore, an infantryman will not be able to carry it. It will have to be mounted on a transporter and, as off this machine it will be immobile and on it unprotected, the first thing its crew will ask for is protection by armour. We are once again back to the tank and an indifferent one at that, for the effective range of the tank gun against a lightly armoured tank is far greater than that of a heavy machine gun against a heavily armoured machine ; in addition to this objection, there will be nothing to prevent the heavier tank adopting a heavy machine gun as its in-fighting weapon.

As it would appear that the heavy machine gun will not meet the purpose for which it was intended, it would be preferable to give to the infantry a high velocity gun such as the tank 6-pounder. If this were done, the evolution would be the same as in the case of the heavy machine gun. Starting on its wheels, it would end in a small 6-pounder tank, in this case a male in place of a female weapon, and, if it were found to be an efficient tank destroyer, then its proper place would be in the tank battle and not behind it.

The writer considers that the main deduction to be made from the above conclusions is that whatever offensive weapon we may give to the infantry, it will have first to be motorized ; secondly, armoured ; and thirdly, taken away from the troops at all critical periods—periods when it is most required. We must, therefore, in his opinion, seek for a solution in a purely defensive weapon, that is to say, a weapon which cannot be used when in movement. Such a weapon is the land-mine, which, to hark back to mediæval warfare, will take the place of the old-fashioned moat. It may, therefore, be predicted that tank mine layers will accompany the future infantry, siege artillery and administrative services. In order to keep in the vicinity of the battle, though always at a safe distance from the actual front, the infantry and administrative troops will be carried forward in cross-country transporters, the descendants of the motor 'bus. These transporters will be lightly armoured and constructed so that they may be made gas proof, and endowed with a sufficient speed to enable them to escape from their strongholds should the tank mine sweepers, which tank mine layers will render necessary, succeed in clearing a way through the minefields. Lastly, as warfare

is likely to become more and more mobile in nature, the slow digging hand spade will be replaced by the fast digging cross-country trench digger, so that, when halted, the infantry and their transporters will be able to seek cover by ground in order to protect themselves from aircraft attack.

From the above we may gather that the tank has not only come to stay, but also that it will revolutionize existing modes of warfare. Cavalry is likely to disappear, except perhaps as mounted police ; infantry may become the "Queen of future Fortresses," but the rule of this monarch on the battlefield is rapidly drawing to an end, for without offensive power this Queen is bereft of her crown. Artillery will become doubly important and, as speed is added to this arm, the old naval struggle between gun and armour will find its counterpart on land. Then will the infantry tank, as we know it to-day, disappear and be replaced by the heavy-gunned and strongly armoured land battleship—the artillery of the future ; then will the cavalry tank, relying on less armour but greater speed, become the battle cruiser. Numerous auxiliary machines may be built, but on these two types the writer believes that the battles of the next great war will be founded, battles which will be fought after the fashion of Alexander—the *hoplites* disorganizing, and the *cataphracts* annihilating the enemy.

As to the supply services, even if the reader may dismiss the whole of the above as "such stuff as dreams are made on," he surely must agree, if he has learned anything at all from the recent war, that the following is one of its greatest lessons : namely that *the chances of victory or defeat are multiplied directly by any increase or decrease of road-power in an area of operations, and that, unless this road-power is equal to the supply requirements of the attack, either the attackers must eventually die of starvation or the attack must be abandoned.*

Even with an army at the present time—a road-bound army—the cross-country supply transporter can reduce the length of the marching columns, can reduce the weight carried by the soldier, and can enable him when deployed to remain deployed and be provided with shelter, hot meals, cool drinks and the hundred and one requisites which differentiate civilized warfare from the combat of barbarians. How much more so will not this be the case in the tank wars of the future ?

(ii) *The Small War Tank Problem.*—However fascinating may be the study of the next great war, the subject is a highly speculative one, particularly so as the next great war is in all probability a remote event, for great wars normally originate in a breaking down of the

balance of power between nations, and, as to-day this balance no longer exists, it will have to be reconstructed before it can be re-broken. Before this balance can once again be established, much friction will take place between the broken and damaged nations which the last breaking up of the balance of power has produced, and, during this period of reconstruction, we may expect to witness a series of small wars arising out of the ferment of discontent which such friction inevitably produces. Our immediate problem is, consequently, not a great war but a small war problem, the nature of which is far less speculative, as small wars change slowly and their nature is generally known.

We, as the inheritors of a world-wide empire, have an all but unlimited knowledge of the nature of small wars ; we have engaged in them for over two hundred years, and throughout this long period our difficulties in winning them have been very similar.

It is not proposed in this article to examine these difficulties in detail, for they should be familiar to every military student, but rather to venture the assertion that, in practically all the small wars in which the British Empire has been engaged, the outstanding difficulty has not been the tactical power of the enemy, but the physical characteristics of the country in which he lived. In order to grasp the validity of this assertion, the writer proposes to divide small wars into their types and to examine each type in the light of its history. These types are :

- (a) Desert warfare.
- (b) Plain warfare.
- (c) Mountain warfare.
- (d) Bush warfare.
- (e) River warfare.

To begin with, it must be realized that, in the small wars of the past, two fundamental difficulties have usually existed. The first of these difficulties is that, in nature, small wars are like attacks of intermittent fever, they give little notice of their advent, prostrate a district rapidly and are frequently highly contagious. The second is that of distance, the distance which separates the delirious district from the military forces which can quell the outbreak. To-day the British Army may be likened to a poor and overworked country doctor who, possessing no carriage or car, is compelled to walk from patient to patient in order to tend them as best he can, generally indifferently. On his feet he can manage to visit about twenty scattered patients in the course of a day, but in a motor car, he could visit forty, and therefore, if a time arrived when he could buy a

motor car, he would be a complete and senseless fool if he did not buy one, for with one he would be able to double his utility and his income ?

Our present small war problem is almost identical with the problem of the above doctor. Law and order constitute the health of a nation, unrest is its disease ; those who judge and govern us are the specialists and we soldiers the general practitioners upon whose skill the social health ultimately depends. Sometimes we are called upon to perform a surgical operation, sometimes to administer an anæsthetic, sometimes a pill, even a bread pill, for frequently social disturbances can be as easily quelled by suggestion as bodily ones, for the origins of both, as often as not, are imaginary. Our difficulty is not one of skill but of distance, of time taken in our numerous and periodical visits, for, as the greater number of our patients are of barbarous predilections, they live in most inaccessible places. In order to visit a demented Arab, many hundreds of miles of desert may have to be crossed on foot or by camel, and to operate on some kleptomaniacal Pathan may necessitate months of most fatiguing hill climbing and coolie work as elementary in nature as in the days of Alexander and Tamerlane.

To-day, our lack of mobility in small wars * stands out a truly remarkable contrast against the present-day enormous powers of the civil means of movement—the locomotive, the lorry and the motor car. Why is this the case ? Because small wars take place in undeveloped countries where railway construction is expensive as the countries are not sufficiently wealthy or civilized to render such construction commercially remunerative ; where roads do not exist and where their maintenance is most difficult. Some day railroads will be built, but only after the countries concerned are worthy of their building. What then are we to do ? We must maintain law and order so that stability of government may foster prosperity and contentment. We can do this either by maintaining an army of a million men, costing several hundred million pounds a year, which to-day means conscription and bankruptcy, or we can drastically reduce the Army which we have now and motorize the remainder. We may not be able to design tanks which will scale hilltops, but why should we attempt to scale hilltops if in an armoured box on tracks we can advance securely along the valleys, and when this progress is impossible, walking can always be resorted

* A recent example of this is the Moplah rising. On the 19th of September, 1921, the following statement appeared in *The Times* : "The troops were hampered by the mobility of the rebels and by the difficulties of transport and communication."

to, but it should not be contemplated as long as the machine can move. The doctor may on occasion have to leave his car at the garden gate and walk from there to the front door of his patient's house ; because of this his car is not rendered permanently useless. In mountain warfare our problem is identical.

In desert warfare it is scarcely necessary to accentuate the tactical advantage accruing from the possession of a fast-moving tank or of a water transporter carrying five tons of sterilized water, and, if necessary, an ice plant as well. One machine of this nature can carry sufficient water for 224 men or 112 horses. For such numbers 28 camels are theoretically required, but, on account of evaporation and jolting, in practice 40 are necessary. Forty camels require further camels in order to carry water for them ; thus it happens that with a large force of men all the camels in the world would not get it cross Arabia.

In warfare on the plains, and in thickly populated lands, what are the main difficulties ? The guarding of communications, the escorting of convoys and the likelihood of being shot at from every bush, paddy-field, go-down and house. The difficulties vanish, or at least grow very small, before the armoured box on tracks, for it does not require to have its communications protected, it does not require an escort, it can run over a bush, or through a paddy-field, or over a go-down and it can enter any village and demand capitulation.

In bush warfare the difficulties are greater, but they are not insurmountable, though the construction of a machine suitable for this type of fighting would probably be uneconomical seeing how seldom we are confronted with this problem. For river warfare, the possibilities of an amphibious tank require no accentuation.

Whatever may be the demands of future great wars, for present and future small wars motorization is essential. Recently, a rising of the Senussi was quelled by three armoured cars ; during the South African war de Wet was never caught, but when, at the beginning of the last war, he again took to horse, he was run to ground by an armed motor car in a few weeks. If a wheeled vehicle can do this, a tracked vehicle can do several times as much, for it can indirectly reduce the size of our Empire by endowing the soldier with an increased power of movement. Aldershot is 30 miles from Hyde Park Corner ; a trained athlete will walk this distance in 10 hours and be dead beat at the end of it ; a soldier will take 30 hours and be equally exhausted ; a Rolls-Royce car will take one hour and its driver will, at the end of the journey, be to all intents and purposes

as fresh as when he started. What has the Rolls-Royce car done in terms of time, the supreme factor in war? It has reduced distance by nine-tenths in the first case and by twenty-nine-thirtieths in the second—this is our immediate small-war problem.

(iii) *The Internal Security Tank Problem.*—Internal security is closely related to the problem of small wars, but with this difference, that, whilst a small war is normally waged against an alien nation, internal security refers to the maintenance of law and order among subject races and peoples; consequently, as every British citizen has a right to live, even when temporarily demented, law and order should be enforced by as bloodless a process as is possible. To kill a man may destroy the ravages of disease, but it is no cure.

Here, again, we may illustrate our intention once again by returning to the doctor. We will suppose that he is called in to tend a patient suffering from delirium tremens. What does he do? He does not creep towards the bed and, when the maniac is not looking, hit him over the head with an axe; on the contrary, he tries to pacify him, and, if necessary, straps the sick man down so that he may not injure himself or others; in fact, he tackles the case on the spot and uses common-sense.

To-day, we hear much of the possibilities of maintaining law and order by means of aeroplanes. Is this feasible? Before answering this question let us set ourselves another: do human beings live in the air or on the earth? As they live on the earth it is plain that they must be controlled on the earth. But cannot man be controlled from the air? Certainly they can be so controlled, if we follow the example of the doctor and the axe. There is a truculent knave in Mosul; very well then, send fifty bombing machines there and blot that ancient city out, obliterate it like Carthage, man, woman and child! This method is so easy as to be impractical; we no longer live in the days of Nebuchadnezzar or Ghengis Khan, George V. is our King, and, further, the British Empire has not been built upon obliteration, but on pacification.

Not for a moment does the writer deny or doubt the enormous and ever-increasing powers of aircraft. The Air Force may ultimately replace Navy and Army in great and small wars, but, in his opinion, it will never replace the policeman, and a policeman is what the soldier is when he stands behind the law of the land and says to all would-be delinquents—"Move on."

To-day the policeman-soldier is armed with weapons of war; the writer considers that, so far as it is possible, he should be equipped with weapons which neither kill nor permanently injure. Is any

imperial benefit gained by shooting down several thousand Hindoos in Amritza or Moplahs in Madras? For the greater part of their lives these unfortunate victims were useful law-abiding citizens; for a few days or weeks they were demented maniacs. Is dementia, and particularly social dementia, cured with the axe? If not, how can it be cured? The answer is by a non-lethal gas, and this answer is hazarded in spite of the archaic diatribe delivered by Professor Sir Edward Thorpe, President of the British Association of 1921, against gas warfare. What could be more effective than the progress of a tank through a riotous crowd, a tank which emitted a laughing gas, or a lachrymatory gas, or a sneezing gas, or a colic-producing gas, or a simple and harmless anæsthetic. A man cannot simultaneously orate and sneeze and a colic-stricken rioter is a most indifferent looter, for he will have other things to do. People like Professor Thorpe are blood-thirsty monsters compared with the gentle behaviour of the operators of such a machine. Why do not we at once adopt so simple a solution to a real and existing difficulty? It is hard to say, unless it is that, like Professor Thorpe, we allow preconceived ideas to obliterate our imagination, which, when all is said and done, is an exceedingly useful faculty.

In addition to the tank problems connected with great wars, small wars and internal security, to which the writer has now alluded, there are two other tank problems which deserve consideration. They are concerned with the parts which tanks may play in the naval and aerial battles of the future, and can only be examined very briefly in this article.

The Naval Tank Problem.—During a war, the main object of a fleet is to maintain command of the sea, so as to allow the free movement of merchandise and troops upon its surface. The outstanding difficulty in the accomplishment of this purpose is the enemy's fleet, which may be attacked either when at sea or when in harbour. In the past the second method of attack has met with far too little consideration, because it has mainly been looked upon as a naval problem, in spite of the fact that history relates that naval attacks on defended harbours are seldom profitable. In fact, it is a military problem, as the Japanese eventually discovered at Port Arthur.

To land foot and horse soldiers in the close vicinity of a defended harbour is generally a most dangerous and costly operation which, under modern conditions of sea and land warfare, is likely to prove too uncertain to be attempted. To land these forces at a distance from the harbour is almost as hazardous; surprise is lost and the forces concerned have generally to make a flank march along the

coast and so may be attacked and, at any moment, driven into the sea. In the first case the main difficulty is that of landing; in the second, that of moving towards the objective. Both these difficulties could be modified if, in place of foot and horse soldiers, we were to substitute floatable tanks which could be launched under cover of darkness from the ships, which could crawl up the beach—possibly 100 miles from the harbour to be captured—and could move forward early the following morning and, strongly supported by aircraft, open their attack the same evening.

The Aerial Tank Problem.—The co-operation of tanks with an air force is in nature very similar to the above operation. In war the main object of an air force is to maintain command of the air so that civil, military and naval movement on earth and sea may be protected. In this case the main hindrance is the enemy's air force, and again there are two ways of attacking it—in the air and on the land. It is true that a superior air force can do both, but the hostile flying centres may not be situated along the coast or frontier, but may be far inland, with the consequent result that the enemy will be able to support his own air force by action from the ground. In order to support our aircraft, we must advance over this ground and threaten its defences; for such a purpose, foot and horse soldiers may not be altogether useless, but their movement is exceedingly slow and, if even only slightly opposed, their daily progress is not likely to exceed an average of five miles. Granted that a tank will be able to advance 100 miles in twelve hours, should a force of those machines be able to circumvent or burst through the enemy, substantial ground support to the air fleet becomes possible, in spite of the fact that the aeroplanes may be advancing at seven or eight times the speed of the tanks. The aeroplane will protect and guide the tanks and the tanks will assist the aeroplanes in the destruction of the hostile air centres—landing grounds, repair shops and aircraft factories. The importance of being able to destroy these as soon as possible after the outbreak of a European war is manifest, seeing that London, the heart of the Empire, is the most extensive human air target in the world and by no means a difficult one to attack.

At the present time as regards any intimate co-operation between our three great defence forces, the weak link lies in the nature of our Army, which is a force dependent on muscular energy for its power of movement. Once endow the Army with mechanical force and this weakness vanishes. To-day, each of these forces is climbing up one side of a three-sided pyramid. The Army says—the Navy

is on my right and the Air Force on my left—and the Navy and the Air Force repeat identical words ; nevertheless, at the apex all three will meet. What this will mean it is impossible to foresee, but one thing is clear, that the more we consider the apex and the more we strive to get there, the closer will mutual co-operation be during war.

However much the reader may disagree with the above speculations, he cannot deny that to-day all military nations are faced by one great problem, namely, " What will the requirements of the next war be ? " One thing we all know for certain, namely, that our Army in 1918 differed from our Army in 1914. To what were due the main differences ? To mechanical and scientific improvements ; there can be no shadow of doubt as to this. If, in the course of four years, our Army changed so greatly, it is only logical to suppose that, if another great war does not break out for, say, forty years, the changes will be immense, for science never stands still. Then, if the Army is going to change, in what direction will it change ? This question can be answered offhand. The changes will be effected in the direction of increased moving power, increased hitting power, increased protection, increased facilities of supply and increased moral.

If, for a moment, we consider these problems, it will be realized that their key is to be sought for in increased power of movement, because if we increase this power we can increase the power of our weapons, the protection to be carried and the transportation of ammunition and supplies, and, though perfection in these will not create moral, it will safeguard moral once it is created.

We know that we cannot increase the carrying power, or radius of action, or speed of man and horse ; therefore, we must supply man with some means of carriage and, as the horse is only a carrier of men or a hauler of supplies and weapons, we must replace the horse altogether. To-day there is only one means of doing this on land, namely, the cross-country tractor.

Are there signs that this is being realized ? Yes, many, of which the following are a few :—

- (a) We are abolishing four British cavalry regiments and eighteen Indian ones.
- (b) The French have cut down their cavalry divisions from ten to six and are maintaining nearly forty battalions of tanks.
- (c) The Italians suggest replacing half their field artillery horses by tractors.

- (d) The following countries are interested in tanks and similar vehicles : Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Spain, Russia, Belgium, Rumania, Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Japan, Chili, Argentina and Honduras.
- (e) The following countries are spending considerable sums of money on tank designs : Great Britain, France and the United States of America ; especially the last named whose Government has taken up the question full-heartedly.

The American Ordnance Department has already produced a large number of artillery transporters, and one of these, mounting a 105 mm. gun with a range of 12,000 yards, recently ran a distance of 125 miles, maintaining an average road speed of 18 miles an hour, and under favourable conditions 25 miles, with a maximum speed of 31 miles. Accepting these figures as correct, if within three years of the termination of the war the Americans have been able to attain such progress, it is quite impossible to foresee what they will not accomplish within ten years from to-day.

Many American officers are also alive to the vital necessity of motorizing their army. Major William T. Carpenter, in a lengthy article on self-propelled track-laying artillery, which appeared recently in the *Field Artillery Journal*, writes :

"The tank, which may be considered as a mobile machine-gun nest or a form of accompanying artillery, depending upon its armament, will lead the infantry attack of the next war. The infantry wave will struggle to keep pace with it—surely the infantry will utilize the mobility of the motor vehicle in some form whenever possible, and whether it does or not, the artillery must keep pace with and support both the infantry and tank if this wonderful life-saving weapon is to be utilized in the future as suggested by its results in the late war."

And again—

"The principle of aggressive mobility should influence the design of all types of heavy artillery, particularly of those for sea-coast defence. . . . There is no limit in my mind at which we should stop in our attempts at self-propelled track-laying artillery design. . . . I see no reason why we should not have super-types for the primary armament, such as 16-inch guns and howitzers, with all-round fire and stability enough for firing when in motion."

In order to trace the military evolution of the future, let us turn back for a moment to the recent war, which proved beyond question that large conscript armies, organized on muscular movement, possess two fundamental defects : extreme vulnerability to projectiles and extreme immobility due to size. Further, the recent war also

proved that the petrol engine could transport armour and so reduce vulnerability and that it could dispense with roads and so increase mobility. Consequently, if we are to remodel our Army, there can be little doubt that we should remodel it round the petrol engine, our object being to produce, within the limits of the Army Estimates, a force of men who can effect a higher hourly output of victory than is possible with our Army of to-day.

If our whole Army has to be recast, where are we to start remodeling it? This question is not a difficult one to answer, if the requirements of the soldier are written down in order of importance.

- (a) The first requirement of the soldier is to live—he requires food and lodging.
- (b) The second requirement is protection whilst he approaches the enemy.
- (c) The third requirement is fighting power in order to defeat the enemy.

We should, therefore, begin by mechanicalizing our transport—first line and train. This, after all, is the simplest problem, being purely administrative and not tactical; meanwhile our existing artillery and infantry can remain much as they are.

Secondly, we should mechanicalize our artillery—our main protective weapon, and a simpler arm to motorize than the infantry, who can continue to remain somewhat as it is.

Thirdly, we should mechanicalize our infantry troops by placing some in tanks—the attackers of positions, and some in cross-country transporters—the holders of positions.

Surely this evolution is an economical one, for we cannot expect our present Army to adapt itself to a new means of movement in two or three years; in the writer's opinion, accepting the soldier as he is, namely a very conservative individual, the whole process is likely to take about fifteen years.

While the above evolution is in progress, we should not, however, stand still; we should attempt to discover the best mould wherein eventually to recast our Army. It is for this reason that, at Aldershot, an Experimental Brigade has been formed, a small body of all arms with a dual object:

- (a) To test out existing organizations.
 - (b) To test out our theories as regards cross-country traction.
- The work of this Brigade is going to enable us:
- (a) To discover the tactical and administrative influences of the new arms on the old.
 - (b) To work out the proportion of new arms to the old.

- (c) To set together these proportions in a definite organization.
- (d) To discover the time necessary wherein to train the new organization.
- (e) To enable us to estimate the cost of the new organization, not only in terms of money, but also in terms of increased efficiency.

The importance of the work to be carried out by this Brigade cannot be exaggerated, for the whole future organization of the Army depends upon it—upon the individual work of every single man in the Brigade. To be a member of such an organization as this is an honour which in peace time cannot be equalled.

The last Experimental Brigade formed in this country was established at Shorncliffe in 1803, under Major-General Sir John Moore. This Brigade grew into the ever-famous Light Division, the influence of which on the British Army generally is too well known to require accentuation.

In the fact that the Light Division surpassed in efficiency all troops it either fought with or against, is to be found a happy omen for the future, for, in 1803, Sir John Moore was faced with a problem even more difficult than the one which confronts us to-day. His problem was to humanize the Army—to change men's hearts ; ours is to mechanicalize the Army, that is to change men's legs. Guided by his example, if we fail to appreciate our task, then, in the next war, shall we deserve defeat. It is the next war and not the last which is our problem ; all past wars are as nothing to this one vital question—what will the next war require ? This question cannot be answered either by reactionary or by revolutionary assertions, but solely by careful analysis and logical inference. It is upon this basis that the writer has attempted to build in this study of the problems of mechanical warfare.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OF THE B.E.F. DURING THE GREAT WAR

WE must recover from a certain dullness of mind due to over-astonishment before any truly adequate history of the Great War will be written. There is a merciful provision of Nature that sets a limit to the bodily endurance of pain : when that limit is reached comes unconsciousness. Similarly, there is a limit to the mental endurance of astonishment : when that limit is reached comes lethargy. It will not be until the generation growing up is able to look at the Great War free from the mental insensibility which the bewildering continued hammering of its events inflicted on those who were close to them that there can be any good attempt to place it as a whole in its proper relation to human thought ; to " make it understood." In attempting, then, to give an impression of what the writer believes was the greatest wonder of the campaign—the successful organization of the Administrative Services of the British Army—he knows that it can only be an impression, and a slight one.

The life-and-death struggle was between groups of nations bending to the task of war the whole of the resources of a highly complex, scientific civilization. All the Powers of the world took the field and used in the prosecution of the war every material and moral factor at their command, and brought to an early maturity for its purposes such new inventions as flying machines and the use of æther for carrying electrical impulses. It was thus a very difficult war from the point of view of administration, not only because of the enormous number of combatants but also because of the abnormal development of equipment, and because of the economic scarcity which had to be met during its later stages owing to world exhaustion.

For this kind of war none of the combatants had had any previous experience of much value, least of all the British Empire. Germany thought she knew the kind of war for which she was preparing, but very quickly discovered that the war upon which she had entered was quite different ; France in 1870, Russia in 1906, had had hints, the slightest of hints, of what such a war might be like ; Great Britain no hint at all. No previous war had " called up " our nation. In the Civil War of Cromwell's day the opening of a " great battle " was postponed to allow a fox hunt to sweep across the battlefield. During the Napoleonic wars a most painstaking and intelligent observer, Jane Austen, could write a series of novels without indicating once that her country was involved in a great campaign.

Great Britain up to 1914 had organized her national life on the line of depending on the Navy for national safety and counting a great Army unnecessary. Thankfulness, indeed, was expressed openly in some quarters that we were "not a military nation." Yet it fell to Great Britain's lot to be the core of the resistance to the Germans in the Great War. Her whole national organization had to be turned from the uses of peace to the uses of war. It was turned, and turned in time. The peaceful British nation made the most powerful war machine that the world had ever known. This machine was working in every corner of the globe, but its two points of most intense energy were at Scapa Flow, the Headquarters of the Fleet, and at Montreuil-sur-Mer, the General Headquarters of the British Army in France. Let us put aside for a while thought of all the other war tasks of the nation and try to get into the mind some impression of the working of the machine as regards administration at the second of these points.

To seek to convey even an impression is a difficult task. A mere enumeration of the various activities which were there co-ordinated and directed to the task of driving the Germans back to the Rhine would be impossible in the space of an article. For this British Army in France was really a nation in concentrated extract, exercising within its lines every phase of national energy. Indeed, its range of energy was wider in some respects than that of the British people at home, for, in order to forge better its spear head, it had drawn largely upon the industries, as well as the soldiers, of the Empire overseas. This Army was in very great measure its own lumberman; in the last year of the war, through its Forestry Department it produced from the French forests over two millions of tons of timber, four-fifths of its total needs. It was in some measure its own farmer, growing vegetables and other food and fodder stuffs, and helping as tiller and harvester the French peasant (in 1918 it saved the crops on 18,000 French acres, harvesting them at night, the soldiers having to work sometimes in gas masks). It was its own repair tailor and bootmaker, and in workshops at the Base employed prisoner and civilian labour with such close and clever economy as evoked the admiration of the thrifty French bourgeoisie. It did not despise the rôle of rag-picker, or the thrift of turning to use the remnants of derelict boots. As laundryman it was a wonder of efficiency and economy. The soldier going out of the line had always clean underwear waiting for him at his Divisional Baths, and his soiled garments were disinfected, cleaned, and repaired, rents patched, everything reconditioned, while such garments as were beyond repair were shipped away as rags for the shoddy mills of Dewsbury.

This Army, of course, was caterer for its men and horses ; that has been always a proper function of an army in the field. But what generosity, yet what scrupulous economy, and what careful consideration for a wide variety of national tastes it showed ! Our men, three million, and our animals, half a million, were fed with a bountifulness, a variety, and a certainty that practically banished from an exacting campaign sicknesses due to bad nourishment. The world towards the end (Europe in particular) was suffering from a severe pinch in food supplies : but to the very last the British soldier and his animal enjoyed good rations. This could only be made possible by an economical organization which eliminated waste, which saved from the camp kitchens the fat and the bones and the swills. Not only was food supplied in plenty, and economically utilized to the last scrap : it was also supplied with a nice consideration of individual tastes that could remember the spices of the Indians' curry and the nut-oil for the Chinese labourers ; and, when its hospitality was extended to the soldiers from the United States to whom coffee was a necessity, it was ready with coffee beans and with hand mills to grind the beans.

As banker this Army dealt with every currency and note issue of the civilized world. It had Savings Banks and an investment organization for British troops and special Savings Banks for the Chinese. It insured its civilian labourers against death and accident, and it negotiated the payment of *octroi* to towns where its troops were stationed, and the compensation to French property owners for the leases of their lands and buildings and the war damage to their property. It had a great printing organization. As manufacturer, it repaired everything and made many things it used, and the designing of the most effective " lay-outs " for its numerous factories and works was not the least of its economical activities.

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But it is not possible to be fully categorical. It will be better worth while to study in some detail a few of the services of administration of the British Army. Transport naturally will claim first attention, and at Montreuil there was a special hint to think first of transport. There in the early days of the nineteenth century rested the right wing of Napoleon's Army for the invasion of England, and there, or near by, was planned the brilliant feat of transport which diverted that Army suddenly to Austria, utilizing the *diligences* of the country for the carriage of troops (the hint perhaps to General Galliéni when he rushed an army out of Paris in taxi-cabs !).

When the British Army marched into France in 1914 the transport was relatively simple ; its main reliance was on its 40,000 horses and its little fleet of motor lorries. The railway transport for our forces

was managed by the French ; we had no lines or trains of our own. We had no special road-making or road-repairing organization other than the sappers and the pioneers. The demands which our transport had to meet were comparatively small. The era of big ammunition expenditure had not come.

In 1918 the transport animals in France numbered 500,000. The problem of keeping them fit for duty had been complicated enormously by the "mustard gas" of the enemy (which poisoned the ground and attacked their feet) and by air raids which made it necessary to split up horse-lines into small groups protected by bomb-proof traverses. To keep the animals in condition in a time of world-scarcity of forage and of shipping transport (because of the intensive submarine warfare) it was necessary to utilize every local opportunity for growing forage and to guard against the waste of a pound of grain or of hay. Economical organization had to go further and provide two categories for the animals, category "A" fit for full work and category "B" fit for lighter work. Thus the sickness rate was got down to 7.5 per cent., and at the time of the Armistice, after the long chase of the enemy, it was only 9 per cent.

No two officials at G.H.Q. had a better right to be proud of their departments than the Director of Veterinary Services and the Director of Remounts. These two were responsible for the welfare of the half-million animals of the B.E.F., and there was never a collection of war animals that had a better time. It was a commonplace of German criticism of Great Britain's military position before 1914 that the possibilities of a big quickly-trained British Army were negligible, because whilst rank and file might be raised quickly enough, three things could not be improvised in a hurry : knowledge of staff work, of gunnery and of horse-mastery. The German now knows that he was wrong, and in no particular was he more wrong than in regard to horse-mastery. It is admitted that horse-mastery in the British Army reached a very high standard. The military advantage to transport through keeping the Army's animals fit and well is so obvious that it need not be dwelt upon. The advantage to the moral of the men is not so generally appreciated, but was none the less real. It helped to keep our men in good spirits that the animals which worked with them, and for them, were in good heart and condition.

The mobilization of the horse strength of Great Britain in 1914 was assisted by the willing and instructed patriotism of farmers, landowners and hunting men. It yielded far better results than were anticipated. One calculation makes it that 17 per cent. of the total civilian horse strength of the country was mobilized. But there

was a tremendous gap between this result and the needs of the New Armies. A wise prescience at the very outset decided to reinforce horse strength with mule strength. Before the end of 1914 mules imported from abroad were being tried as substitutes for horses in the Army. Some of the experiments did not give promising results. The mule, for example, did not prove possible in gun teams. But it established itself in a very wide range of general utility and materially helped to win the war.

In the winter of 1915-16 the great concentration of horses and mules in Flanders was mainly in charge of men new to horse-management. The animals had to be nursed through a winter in what was the wickedest country conceivable for horses. It is doubtful whether any civil organization would have carried the same number of horses through the same conditions with the same small percentage of losses. The British Army, which was by nature an army of horse-lovers, by industry became also an army of skilled horse-masters. It was through the unsparing work of the men, with brain and hand, that the horses were kept so fit. The British public can never express sufficient gratitude for that work, which had little glamour, but which was as necessary to victory as that of rifleman and gunner.

The final triumph of our Army horse administration was in the summer of 1918, when it was able to take up a big part of the burden of horsing the American units arriving in France. That, again, was a factor of victory. Without transport, or gun-horses, the American troops could not have given their magnificent help in the last stages of the campaign.

The roads for these horses and other transport were the care of the British Army in 1918, which was then maintaining 4,412 miles of French roads. In 1917 it made 1,215 miles of new roads and used 2,340,000 tons of road metal as well as great quantities of timber (in some marshy places timber roads were necessary).

In 1914 the B.E.F. had 950 lorries and 250 motor cars. In 1918 it had 33,500 lorries, 1,400 tractors, and 15,800 motor cars. This vast force of Mechanical Transport had its own schools of instruction, repair shops, etc. In the winter of 1917-18, after the battle of Passchendaele had exposed a weakness in light railways—that they had to work along defined tracks which could be intensively shelled by the enemy—the British Army decided to trust more to the mechanical transport. There was effected then a complete reorganization of it, with the central idea of doing away as far as possible with the “earmarking” of motor vehicles for particular units or particular tasks and making the total strength completely mobile and liquid. Vehicles saved by this “pooling” were formed into a

G.H.Q. Motor Reserve—a most happy idea which proved of enormous strategical benefit in the spring of 1918, when the last rush of the Germans captured much of our light railway system and gravely reduced the efficiency of our main railway system. The G.H.Q. Motor Reserve was able then to take up a great part of the load, and was largely responsible for saving the situation.

Light railways at one stage of the war were perhaps a little over-estimated. There was an inclination in some quarters to regard them as all-sufficing. The British Administrative Services ultimately gave to them what, in the event, proved their proper rôle, recognizing that they were most valuable when the line of battle was stabilized for some length of time, and tended to be less valuable as the war became one of movement. In the spring of 1918 we had 920 miles of light railways in operation; in the summer 100 miles less. Probably, in the future judicial estimate of the campaign, it will be accounted to the special credit of the British Command that it showed conspicuous common sense in its co-ordination of different means of transport. Our great advance was planned on the principle of concentrating labour in pushing forward the broad-gauge railways and the roads forward from them, trusting to motor transport and to horse transport to carry on the load from the broad-gauge railhead. Light railways were given a secondary place. This proved to be sound.

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The broad-gauge railway system of the B.E.F. had a somewhat chequered history. Originally, the French did the railway carrying for our Army in France. When we first took on the responsibility of it, there was not in England a full recognition of our railway necessities. The military railways were in a great measure starved. When the impolicy of this was perceived and there was more generous provision of material, the mistake was made of taking railways from out of the control of the Quartermaster-General. Thus transport became a matter of divided authority, and in the broad-gauge railway section of it the military idea was not fully expressed. During the period of almost stationary "trench warfare," the weakness of this division of authority and the mistake of allowing any but the military idea to influence an essential part of the Army's organization were not fully apparent. But when the Germans attacked in the Spring of 1918 these errors showed very clearly, and the railways had to be brought again under the control of the Quartermaster-General after a short transition period when, as an emergency measure, they were administered by a committee of the General Staff. The situation at the moment was very critical. The German advance had brought our front lateral line—St. Just, Amiens, St. Pol, Hazebrouck,—under shell-fire at several points. The Germans (whose strategy under

General Ludendorff was largely dominated by transport considerations) sought to paralyze completely our whole system by continuous air attack on the rear lateral—Eu, Abbeville, Etaples—especially at the points where it crossed the rivers Canche and Somme. Whole-hearted work in building “avoiding” lines and bridges and the splendid efforts of the motor transport just kept the situation in hand until our advance in front of Amiens relieved the front lateral. At the time of the Armistice the broad-gauge railway system was working perfectly. Its extent can be judged from these figures : in 1918 it ran 83,680 loaded trains and covered 62,000,000 loaded wagon kilometres. In that year 15,000,000 British personnel were carried by it, and on a day of intense fighting it could carry up 1,934 tons of supplies of all kinds per mile of front.

The tale of the Transport Services is not even yet complete. There are yet to be noted the Inland Water Transport organization, which had 980 vessels in use, the train ferry and the barge service across the English Channel, the dock services which in efficiency far surpassed anything that is possible in England to-day.

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This great transport organization utilizing every means of getting things to move was necessary because not only had we the most intensive concentration of troops ever known to history, but also because these troops had to be provided with so much armament and equipment. Above our Army in the air flew hosts of aeroplanes and hovered swarms of balloons, and for these birds of war there had to be moved forward their cages, rivers of petrol, and stores of gas. In its ranks were also tanks of various types, all of which required petrol. Transport had to provide stores of poison gas, and means to guard against poison gas ; houses for carrier pigeons ; mobile wireless stations ; mobile laundry and disinfecting plant. There were big guns which required a whole railway truck to carry twelve rounds of their ammunition, and so many guns of all types that one day nearly a million shell (mostly 18-pounder) were fired ; and 650,000 tons of ammunition were issued during April—June, 1918.

The problem of munitions supply was a vast one. The British Force at the outset of the war suffered from a shell and gun shortage as compared with the enemy, because it had been trained and equipped for a different type of warfare from that which actually came. It had very little high explosive shell, and what it had was rarely “high explosive” in the real sense of the term. Indeed, considered in the lights of the needs of this war, it may be said there were practically no shells, no guns, and—what was most serious—

no machinery for making them. Essential material was lacking in many cases, and the only source of quick supply was Germany ! These vast difficulties were overcome. The production of high explosive in 1914 was almost negligible. The year's supply would not keep the guns of 1918 going for a day. In 1915 we began to produce high explosive on a large scale, and in amounts which made the 1914 output seem contemptible, but still in quite inadequate quantities. In 1916 we had increased the 1915 amount sevenfold. In 1917 we had increased that 1916 amount fourfold. From March, 1915, to March, 1917, the increase was twenty-eight fold. Of machine guns we made samples in 1914, and we began to manufacture quantities in 1915. In 1917 we made twenty times as many as in 1915. Of aeroplanes the figures mounted in steep flights. In 1916 we seemed to be producing vastly. In 1917 the rate of production for the first six months had increased fourfold as compared with the previous year. In the end we were enormously superior to any other Army in the field in the matter of munitions. To the very day of the Armistice improvements in the quality and rates of production were still going on in preparation for the Spring, 1919, campaign, which, it was anticipated, would end the war. The German threw up the sponge before then. If he had waited, he would have been literally blown out of his trenches and his chief cities.

Here are some records. On the 8th of August, 1918, when our big final thrust began, there were used 15,598 tons in a single day. On the 29th of September, 1918, there were used 23,706 tons. Other big figures were :—

Date.	Battle.	Amount.	Date.	Battle.	Amount.
1.7.16 ..	Somme ..	12,776 tons.	31.7.17 ..	Ypres ..	22,193 tons.
9.4.17 ..	Vimy ..	24,706 "	20.9.17 }	Polygon Wood	42,156 "
3.6.17 ..	Arras ..	17,162 "	21.9.17 }		
7.6.17 ..	Messines ..	20,638 "			

In the dépôts in France we kept a reserve of 258,000 tons of ammunition, and the issues in a normal month ran to about that figure, though it varied a good deal month by month. Thus the average expenditure during the last months of 1918 was : May, 5,478 tons daily ; June, 4,748 tons daily ; July, 5,683 tons daily ; August, 9,046 tons daily ; September, 8,576 tons daily ; October, 4,748 tons daily ; November, 3,158 tons daily.

A heavy item in munitions supplies was for defence against poison gas and for our own poison gas service. We entered with extreme reluctance into gas warfare, but once we started we soon made the German sorry that he had brought that element into the war. Our gases were more potent and more plentiful than his.

For lack of material, he could not give his men perfect gas protectors ; to our men we could and did.

* * * *

Medical supplies were on an enormous scale. There were so many new diseases to be met and the conditions of the battlefield were so terrible. To illustrate with one example—"Trench Feet" which gave more trouble than any other single disease. The struggle with it was long and strenuous. The soldier in the trenches must stand for long periods. That in itself makes for foot trouble. Tight boots and tight bandages round the legs are bad for the blood circulation, and the soldier was often careless as to whether his boots were of a proper fit, and was apt to bind his puttees too tightly. Here were the beginnings of "Trench Feet." To have the feet wet and cold for long spells, to have circulation restricted, will cause "chilblains." Then came the final aggravating cause—the filth of the Flanders mud getting into the sores of the broken chilblains. In the early days cases were of dreadful severity, often leading to amputation of both feet. Preventive measures covered a wide field: precautions against tight boots and tight puttees; increased provisions of socks; increased bathing facilities; provision of waterproof rubber boots of the high wader type for men while in the trenches; paving of the trenches with "duck-boards," which gave a dry standing; more frequent reliefs in wet trenches. These were material provisions. To second them there was an active propaganda in personal hygiene. "Trench Feet" in the later stages of the campaign was no longer a serious menace.

To tell in detail how all the various great undertakings of administration were co-ordinated and kept under the control of one mind without that mind being smothered in a mass of detail would be outside the scope of this article. But I think that emphasis should be laid on this one point, that when the vast increase of the responsibilities of the Quartermaster-General in the field suggested the experiment of attempting a division of those responsibilities, the experiment proved unsound and dangerous. Experience has proved that the Commander-in-Chief must have one man to whom he can confide the responsibility of the administrative side of his Army's operations. Experience, too, has shown that to divide this responsibility among two or more principal staff officers is not to simplify but to complicate the task. For example, to assign to one man the responsibility for holding and issuing supplies, ammunition and stores of all kinds, as well as the allocation of maintenance depôts, and to hold another individual responsible for providing and controlling the means by which supplies, etc., are distributed, is obviously to place a premium on misunderstanding, friction, delay,

and unnecessary correspondence. The dangers inherent in a system which puts two men to do one man's job were fully exemplified during the Great War ; first, when the Q.M.G. and the Inspector-General of Communications in various theatres shared administrative responsibility, and secondly, when, later, an attempt was made to differentiate between maintenance and transportation and, subject only to the Commander-in-Chief's authority, to place each of these functions under co-equal heads. In every single theatre of war the hard logic of facts drove home in due course the lesson that supply (in its widest sense) and transportation are functions which can, and must, be assigned to one man, and one man only, namely, the Quartermaster-General in the field.

When a task is the task of one man it is only the question of having the right man with the courage of command, the mind to grasp big affairs, and the good sense to devolve routine work. In the summer of 1918 we had a splendid administrative machine in France which worked with an economy of force and an efficiency of result that struck American critics as almost miraculous. Over all the details of its operations, from the feeding of the Chinese labourers to the deadly rhythm of the train service which kept the troops and their supplies moving forward towards the Rhine, there was close check and supervision. So sound was the general system of control that nothing could depart seriously from the normal without the man at the head knowing both the fact, the explanation and the remedy : in the remotest of the sub-departments his influence was felt. Yet his attention was never absorbed in details. He was free to think out methods of stronger co-ordination, of closer economy, and to consider the change of methods that would be necessary three months hence if the war went this way or that way. Nobody could remain long in any of the administrative departments who had not the capacity for individual judgment, and the energy and courage to use it freely within his task. A good flexible routine with a habit of hard and clear-cut work was established. Only new points or points of real doubt " went up " past the officer to whom they first came, and as they went up they passed through more than one senior rank to be settled mostly on the way. There were, indeed, only few matters and those only matters which related to vital questions of policy, which were referred to the head. Leaders in the world of business who had opportunities of becoming familiar with the administrative organization of the Army in France were convinced that here was " Big Business " conducted with wonderful economy and rare efficiency ; and it was all the work of the British officer, who, we hear from a certain section of the Press, is invariably a wasteful and stupid fellow.

A DAY WITH THE BYZANTINE ARMY ON ACTIVE SERVICE (with Map)

BY J. M. SCAMMELL, Captain Infantry Reserve Corps, U.S.A.

"Men who propose to enter upon a war or are preparing themselves for any kind of struggle may derive benefit from a narrative of a similar situation in history."—PROCOPIUS OF CÆSAREA.

THE period which has been characterized by Colonel Dodge in his book, "Great Captains," as "A gap of seventeen centuries of unmethodical warfare," witnessed nevertheless an army superior in organization, administration and tactics to any modern army up to the time of the French Revolution. In some respects, as for example in the services of security and information, it was superior to the French Army in 1870 and to the American Army in the Spanish-American War; in sanitation it was far ahead of any modern army up to the time of the Russo-Japanese War; and in its general organization, it is quite probable that we could learn from it to-day.

Since these statements contradict the general impressions which have been formed of the Byzantine Army, it may be well first to discover whence these opinions arose.

It is somewhat unfortunate that so great a historian as Edward Gibbon, exerting as he still does so weighty and widespread an authority, should have commented so acidly upon the soldiers of Byzantium; in one passage he remarks:

"Their victories were accidental, and their costly maintenance exhausted the substance of a State they were unable to defend."

Gibbon exhausted the sources available in his time, and spoke therefore with assurance. So monumental was his labour, such is his prestige as a historian and so overwhelming is his ponderous prose that—despite the early date of his work,* and despite the equally honest and equally industrious research of later historians—the effects of his displeasure still persist.

* "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" appeared in 1776.

George Finlay, who devoted his life to Greek studies, writing a century later, remarks : *

"Historians generally speak of the Byzantine Empire . . . as if it had been destitute of military power. Events as far removed from one another in point of time as our own misfortunes in India at the Black Hole of Calcutta and the massacre at Cabul are cited to prove the Byzantine Army feeble and unwarlike."

Professor Oman gives as his opinion : †

"The men of the lower Empire have received scant justice at the hands of modern historians . . . but it is never easier to produce a strong defence than when their military skill and prowess are called in question."

A modern French scholar of the civilization of the Eastern Roman Empire states : ‡

"Nous pouvions y admirer le degré de perfection étonnant auquel était arrivée à cette époque qu'on s'est longtemps plu à nous représenter comme si barbare, la tactique militaires des armées orientales, tactique dans laquelle rien absolument, ni le plus imperceptible détail d'armement, ni la moindre question des subsistances, ne demeurerait livré au hasard ; où tout . . . était réglé avec un soin minutieux comme sur les livrets militaires des plus grandes nations modernes."

Such regulations exist to-day in the "Taktika" of Nikephoras Phokas and the "Strategikon" of the Emperor Maurice. §

Gibbon undoubtedly bases his judgments upon Procopius, who describes the wars of Justinian. Maurice, the author of the "Strategikon," was, according to Oman in his "History of the Art of War—The Middle Ages," a general in the service of Justinian. Of the reforms and reorganization under Maurice, Gibbon was doubtless unaware. The limits of this article forbid a detailed description of the resulting organization under Maurice ; but an outline will be given in order that the tactics described later may be better understood.

In principle universal military service was the rule in the Byzantine Army. This rule was modified, however, in practice by scutage and also by the employment of foreign and domestic mercenaries and other special forms of military service. || These latter included

* See "History of the Byzantine Empire," Everyman Ed., p. 188.

† See "A History of the Art of War." London : Methuen & Co., 1898, p. 169.

‡ See "Un Empereur Byzantin au Xe Siècle," by Gustave Shlumberger. Paris : Firman-Didot et Cie., 1890, p. 170.

§ The latter supplies the basis of the present article. Copies being rare, recourse was had to an analysis of the "Strategikon" by a French scholar. (See "L'Armée Byzantine à la Fin du VIe Siècle," by F. Aussaresses. Bordeaux : Feret et Fils, 1909.) Occasional references will be made to this work.

|| See Aussaresses, p. 10.

hereditary military service on the part of colonists on the frontiers, the employment of allies under Roman officers and a local militia which only took up arms in case of invasion. The result was an army similar to that of Frederick the Great whose forces were composed of 110,000 natives and 80,000 foreign mercenaries.*

All citizens up to the age of forty were liable for military service and non-citizen residents were liable for service in a non-combatant capacity.† The period of active service was probably two years for infantry and three for cavalry. The best men physically were selected for the combatant arms and the remainder detailed to the non-combatant Services.‡ The oath of allegiance to the State and to the commanding general was administered to all recruits, and drafts were called up at the end of the autumn, in order that their training might be carried out during the winter.

During the period of preliminary recruit instruction, the last year's class was sent home on a three months' furlough and the time-expired men were discharged. At the end of their leave the men on furlough returned in order to be amalgamated with the recruits in time for company training. This amalgamation was made, in the infantry, on the basis of half and half; in the cavalry, the more important arm, in the proportion of one-third recruits to two-thirds veterans. Non-commissioned officers were appointed and each soldier was armed and assigned to his place in the company according to his aptitude and proficiency.

This system gave the recruits five or six months' training before the summer campaigning season, while the veterans had about a year's service. That this length of training was not considered sufficient is indicated by the fact that it was only the infantry—and possibly the cavalry of the line—who received it, and tactically these arms were employed in a manner which indicated the lack of confidence placed in them. The infantry, if employed at all in battle, was used only to thicken and solidify the central mass of resistance, the core of which was a body of *élite* cavalry; while the line cavalry, although it would appear to have had a longer term of service than the infantry and although it had but one-third recruits, was not entrusted with a decisive part in battle, but was supported and sustained by the professional *élite* corps. The really important

* See "Die Militärische Thätigkeit Friedrichs des Grossen." Berlin, 1886, p. 14.

† See Aussaresses, p. 10.

‡ There was nothing original about this policy of recruiting; it was the normal system of antiquity. For the use of resident aliens see Thucydides II, 31; III, 16, 42-53. For the development of mercenaries see *ibid.* V, 6; VII, 27; also Xenophon, Hellenika II, 4; 30; IV, 2, 5, 16; IV, 8, 32.

rôle in the fighting was reserved, therefore, for the flexible and mobile wings and the reserve mass of manœuvre—the crack *Bucellaries*.

As to-day the American Army is composed of the Regular Establishment, the National Guard, the Reserves, the Philippine Scouts, Philippine Constabulary and the Porto Rico Regiment, as the British Army has its Regular Army, Territorial Army and Contingents from the Dominions and Colonies, and as the French Army has its Foreign Legion and various colonial troops, so the Byzantine Army had its different systems of recruiting and its different corps. In addition to the frontier and local militia and the "Household Troops," there were in the field armies wide distinctions, and in the cavalry three classes of *élite*. These were the *Bucellaries*, the *Federals* and the *Optimates*.* The *Bucellaries* supplied head-quarter troops and personal escorts for general officers. In this respect they resembled Napoleon's Polish Lancers of the Guard. In battle they formed, like his Old Guard, the final reserve. Belisarius, in an army of 7000 men, had two squadrons of *Bucellaries*, 300 to the squadron. There were three classes of *Bucellaries*; the *spatharies*—probably gentlemen cadets—cavaliers-of-honour—possibly analogous to "Companions," and the rank and file.

Next to the *Bucellaries* came the *Federals*, who originally were probably especially favoured allies. They formed the defensive *élite* of the first line. Last came the *Optimates*, who were the most numerous, forming brigades of 2000 sabres. They were second-line troops and constituted the general reserve.

Different arms and classes had different rates of pay. In addition to their equipment, arms, subsistence and pay, the Byzantine soldiers were provided with servants, the proportion per soldier being dependent upon his rank and class. Bounties were given for meritorious conduct and distinguished service, and prize-money from the sale of booty. As in the Peninsular War, though on a larger scale, wives were permitted to accompany their husbands, and did the cooking, washing and repairing.

A Byzantine Army was composed of infantry of the line, light infantry, cavalry of the line, *élite* cavalry, artillery, engineers and train.

An army ranged from 5000 to 25,000 pikes and sabres in varying proportions. Generally speaking, however, cavalry predominated. The various armies were used to garrison frontier districts and to form the local reserves. One authority estimates the total armed force of the Eastern Empire at 200,000 men. From this policy

* See Aussaresses, p. 13.

of employing small mobile local forces to combat frontier raids grew the later *Theme* system, or army corps districts described by Bury.*

The basic units in the Byzantine military organization were the squadron (*tagma*, or *bandon*) and the company (*tagma*). The former varied in strength from 200 to 400 men, and the latter from 150 to 250 men. The larger *tagmata* might be likened to the Russian cavalry regiments, and the smaller to their half-regiments, for the former bore two standards, and the latter but one.†

The schematic relation of Byzantine units may be seen from the following table of a "normal" organization in a moderately sized army of 9000 ‡:—

10 <i>dekarchies</i>	1 <i>hekatonarchy</i>	100.
3 <i>hekatonarchies</i>	1 <i>tagma</i>	300.
3 <i>tagmata</i>	1 <i>moiros</i>	1000.
3 <i>moira</i>	1 <i>meros</i>	3000.
3 <i>mera</i>	1 <i>stratos</i>	9000.

This would be the purely cavalry part of the army. The infantry, theoretically, would be similarly organized; in practice, however, all organization depended upon the terrain, the enemy, the proportion of different arms present, the quality of the troops and the plan of action. Generally, the centre *moira* would be composed of fewer but larger units, while the wings would be made flexible by being composed of more but smaller *tagmata*.

The officers' cadre of the above hypothetical unit would be : ‡

	1 <i>strategos</i>	general, commander-in-chief.
(senior <i>merarch</i>)	(1) <i>hypostrategos</i>	lieutenant-general, chief-of-staff.
	3 <i>merarchs</i>	generals-of-brigade.
(senior <i>tagmatarchs</i>)	(6) <i>moirarchs</i>	colonels.
	30 <i>tagmatarchs</i>	captains or majors.
(senior <i>hekatonarchs</i>)	(30) <i>ilarchs</i>	first lieutenants.
	90 <i>hekatonarchs</i>	lieutenants.

The composition of the staffs is uncertain; but the *merarch* had a relay of two adjutants, two orderly officers or aides-de-camp, one cornet of horse, one bugler, two sergeants-major, one stable sergeant, one orderly and an escort of *Bucellaries*.§ It would seem, therefore, that the staffs of the *strategos* and of the *hypostrategos* (for he had a separate staff)|| would have been much larger. The

* See "The Imperial Administrative System in the Ninth Century." Oxford University Press, 1911.

† See Aussaresses, p. 20.

‡ Adapted from Aussaresses, p. 45.

§ See Aussaresses, p. 35.

|| See Aussaresses, p. 33.

adjutant function is clearly represented in the officers called *diarchraphoi*; the administrative branch is seen in the paymasters and chaplains, while in the uses of the *spatharies*, *merarchs* and the *hypostrategos* we may recognize the General Staff function.

Except in the inclusion of the bow and arrow as a major weapon—the bow being drawn to the ear—and in the use of the mace, the weapons of the Byzantine Army differed little from those in common usage throughout antiquity. The winter uniform was composed of a woollen tunic, a belted felt raincoat, knee-length, with loose sleeves, a felt cap and heavy-soled, hob-nailed, square-toed marching boots. The summer uniform was of linen. There was no colour common to the whole Army, but the colour within units was uniform and the same as that of the standards.

But although the organization, the discipline, the equipment, the administration and the methods of sanitation of the Byzantine Army cannot fail to be of absorbing interest to the military student, it is not possible to deal with them in any more detail here if the writer is to carry out his intention of giving a description of the tactics of this Army in the field. He proposes to do this, first, from the point of view of a hostile scout, and secondly, from that of a friendly correspondent attached to some Byzantine expeditionary force.* First, therefore, the reader must imagine himself to be attached to a Persian cavalry patrol which has been sent out in order to gain information as to the whereabouts, intentions and approximate strength of an approaching Byzantine force.

* * * * *

One of our prowling light horsemen dashed up and reported that hostile patrols were scouring the country from the north-west. From the description of their formation and method of approach our wily leader was able to deduce their line of march. Since the enemy's scouts would beat out every bit of cover, he cast about for a suitable spot for concealment and observation, and then directed our march toward a high and rocky hill. The horses were led up a deep ravine and concealed amongst the scrub, while we proceeded upward on foot. Among the burning rocks under the hot sun a double sentinel post was established commanding the country below.

* The engagements which the writer describes are fictitious, but they are founded on facts. The conversations are, of course, purely imaginary, but here an expedient has been borrowed from Thucydides:

" . . . my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense. . . ."

The conversations are based upon passages from the "Strategikon" or from the work of Procopius.

As we ourselves were new to war, we too crept up beside the motionless observers. Afar off on the dry plain we could distinguish little groups crawling across the face of nature. One group, which swerved neither to the right nor to the left, halted from time to time whilst a trooper dismounted in order to make a mound of stones, to hollow a shallow pit or to slash the sides of a bush. A veteran explained to us the reason for this curious performance: these marks were to serve as a guide to the Byzantine Army along its line of march.

One of the enemy's patrols was now coming our way. It halted and observed our hill, then divided, one half going on either side. One trooper pointed his green pennanted lance in our direction; our hearts battered madly in our throats. But none of the troopers dismounted to climb the rugged slopes and the patrol cantered slowly on. Gradually, as the long afternoon wore away, the patrols passed out of our sight and were forgotten. And then our attention was even drawn away from the discomfort of our hot post among the fiery rocks as a thin high cloud of dust heralded the coming of a body of horse. These followed the blazed trail and drew near—a long column of blue-clad riders with rippling blue pennants. The squadron halted and a small group detached itself and rode towards a low knoll beside a considerable stream. The leader signalled the others, who took up the trot towards the hill. There they dismounted and soon the mound became as busy as an ant heap; we could make out little dots running about apparently working energetically.

After a little time our sentinels relaxed the fixity of their watch. In reply to our questions they stated that unless the Romans had had wind of the presence of our Army in the neighbourhood, we should see no more of them until the morrow, because, as a rule, except when in the presence of the enemy, their *antecessors* preceded their Army by a day's march in order to lay out the camp. "They have chosen a strong site," one of our men remarked; "their front is protected by the stream, all approaches and fords being commanded by the knoll. It will be a place difficult to surprise." He added that the Romans were no fools; and that he would be better pleased if they were not so devilish busy over their accursed camp.

Whilst instructing the other sentinel to carry a report to the patrol-leader, this man's eye, which was keenly sweeping the horizon, became fixed upon one point. We ourselves could see nothing at first, and then only a slight haze. This soon grew, however, into a thin dust cloud and later on a dark streak appeared below it. Soon a squadron blazing in scarlet and gold appeared, and gradually a column

of horsemen took shape before our eyes ; squadron upon squadron of them, their cloaks and pennants forming blocks of colour ; blue, purple, yellow, red and orange. They swung past and halted along the stream below the camp. Some of the squadrons then began the orderly process of picketing, watering and feeding their horses, the other squadrons standing by in formation ready to protect their comrades. The first squadron had meanwhile ridden to the top of the knoll, and in their midst arose a large tent, the tent of the general.

Then our gaze swept back along the winding column to where the dust drifted low and thick. This marked the approach of the infantry battalions. We glanced at our observers, but stilled the questions which we should have liked to ask as they were deep in calculations.

As soon as the Byzantine infantry arrived, the men were drawn up under arms while groups fell out to entrench the camp. One of our men, who apparently had satisfied himself as to the enemy's numbers, now informed us that the habit of the Romans was to make their ditch six feet wide by eight feet deep, and that palisade and stakes were also not unusual in places where wood was to be found. Within the rampart they formed a roadway 200 feet wide where the wagons were parked and the train *personnel* and perhaps the light infantry camped. The camp itself was square and a gate pierced the centre of each face. From each gate a broad road led to the general's tent in the centre of the camp. The open space around it, this man told us, was reserved for the cavalry when it was picketed inside the camp, although generally it remained without. The two roads at right angles marked the camp off into four squares which were occupied by the infantry. Large tents were erected in the centre of each section of the camp for the *merarchs* * or brigade commanders.

We again turned our attention to the enemy's movements and we saw winding up the grade into the camp and coiling like a huge serpent within the wall and the ditch, a long train of carts and pack animals. Soon after their arrival, tents began to spring up and in an instant the appearance of the knoll was changed and it took on the form of a symmetrical garden. Swarms of servants flocked about, bringing in wood and water and preparing the evening meal, while the blue smoke, like incense in a temple, ascended straight up in the still air. Small groups, outposts, began to depart, and the

* See Aussaresses, p. 96. This is the classical Roman camp with no essential changes.

regiments no longer stood to arms, but began to break ranks and to melt into the growing twilight. As dusk came on apace, our once burning hot post became chill. Through the calm evening the pleasant hum of warm camp life came up to us. As by magic this sound suddenly stilled ; a trumpet blared out, and then we heard the solemn tones of a Christian chant. A deep silence followed, broken only by the shrill whinnying of a distant horse or the braying of a restless pack-mule.

We had seen all we could, and by this time it was dark enough to depart and to try, whether by a ruse or a quick dash, or, if need be, by force, to break through the network of outposts and patrols, and to bear our news to our leaders.

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Such might have been a common enough sight for a Persian scout in the tenth century. Now let us look upon the scene from the Byzantine point of view.

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Conscious of the greatness of our Imperial ruler, and eager to perpetuate his fame to succeeding generations, we obtained his sanction to accompany the Army in the field. So Procopius of Cæsarea accompanied Belisarius as his friend, adviser and historian. So too did Xenophon accompany Cyrus and rose to the supreme command.

Darkness was coming on when we overtook the rear guard, and the tidings of traces of the enemy caused us to spur on our jaded mounts. We were conducted to a large tent in the centre of the camp. There we found a group of *Spatharies** lounging about in their gorgeous equipment, talking together ; one of the adjutants signified to us that the general was in conference with the *hypostrategos*† and the other brigade commanders.

We were permitted to be present at this conference and learned that the matter under discussion was the action to be taken in view of the presence of the enemy less than a day's march away as reported by patrols. The first step was to modify outpost duty ; only carefully picked units were to be used, and the number of units was to be determined by the terrain and nearness of the enemy. The

* These *élite* cavalry were used as liaison agents and apparently even as staff officers. They may be likened to the troops of Gentlemen-Volunteers of Charles I. They may have been cadet officers as well as orderlies. Napoleon employed scores of aides-de-camp and orderly officers for purposes of communication and liaison.

† The *hypostrategos* was the senior brigade commander, and in addition commanded the first line of battle ; as senior *merarch* he was also practically a chief-of-staff.

interior guard was to be performed by the train to husband the strength of the combat troops. All sanitary regulations were to be rigidly enforced by the sentries.

After these immediate matters had been disposed of, the conference considered the details of march orders for the following day. One of the *merarchs* urged a night march in order to surprise the enemy. The general, however, refused to consider this suggestion, saying that in a hostile and little-known country, except in a case of the most urgent necessity, an advance in the darkness would be a difficult, dangerous and doubtful enterprise, unless indeed the road had been reconnoitred carefully and all commanding points seized. As a matter of fact, he pointed out that patrols had reported rough country ahead and a nasty defile which would have to be passed.

Organization for the march was then taken up, and here it must be observed that formations suitable for the plains are not suitable for mountain warfare. It was decided that light infantry should be attached to all but the leading cavalry squadrons, and that the main body should march in an approach formation on a wide front. The wagon train was to close up in a double column. The following order of march was drawn up :—

1. Patrols and point.
2. *Antecessors* (to prepare the next camp).
3. *Bucellaries*, 2 squadrons.
Light infantry, 1 battalion.
4. Main body of cavalry, led by :
Spatharies, 1 squadron.
Light infantry, 2 battalions.
5. Main body of infantry.
6. Train, with escort of :
2 squadrons line cavalry.
2 companies light infantry.
7. Rear Guard :
Opisthophylakes.
1 company light infantry.

As soon as the orders had been settled, they were distributed to the *merarchs*, who called their *moirarchs* into consultation, and so on throughout the Army.

Afterwards, during mess, the general was kind enough to explain to us the problem before him. When he was assigned to this frontier sector, he stated that his first duty had been to study the numbers, organization, armament and tactics of all possible enemies in order

to prescribe an organization to meet each. He also had to take into consideration the probable theatre in which hostilities might arise. This implied noting its products, its water supply, and the terrain generally, in order that his plans might be so framed as to comply with the resources and natural features of the country in which he would have to operate. The nature of his organization for battle on the following day, he explained, would thus depend upon where he met the enemy, on the hills or on the plains.

An officer who was going to inspect the outposts then invited us to go along with him. The troops detailed for this duty were composed of men selected for their high sense of duty, their strict discipline and careful training. They had been trained in all manner of *ruses-de-guerre* and how to set ambushes to catch prisoners. They had been told how to treat deserters; how to calculate the number of the enemy and how to estimate distances. The last-named task appears to be most difficult, and we were told that great errors are made when looking up or down hill or across valleys or water. Officers, too, are especially selected to command these *élite* troops.* We found a triple line of double sentry posts, and discovered that our visit was indeed a privilege, as these posts (which are fixed) are known to the guard alone, and visited only by reliefs, visiting patrols and the officer of the guard. Beyond these posts we were told that mounted patrols were moving about, scouring the country far and wide to locate the enemy, in order to keep away his patrols and scouts, to learn his strength and purposes and to capture prisoners.

We returned in time to hear the bugles blow thrice in honour of the Trinity and to hear the Doxology chanted. Then straightway darkness and silence fell on the camp.

The following morning we were awakened by the bugles. We arose and stepped forth from our tent into the chill morning air. The camp was astir and busy. The servants were moving about the fires and the odour of smoke and of cooking was pleasing. The mess was simple but hearty and agreeable to our sharp appetites. Nevertheless, we confess that we missed our wine, which apparently is forbidden to the soldier in the field; however, we made the best of it and found the vinegar in the water—to avert sickness—refreshing. We remarked upon this to the general, who said that the foremost duty of a general was to preserve his men for the battles of the State. It was for this reason, he explained, that high, well-drained, sunny and wind-swept hills were chosen for camps and the low, damp places

* See Aussaresses, p. 92.

avoided. For the same reason, cleanliness was enforced and the men's hair kept close-cut, while latrines were kept without the camp. In the field water was made safe to drink by the use of vinegar, while in sieges it was kept fresh by constant dripping from one tank to another.

After mess the battalions were formed and drawn up for morning service, after which, in the train of the advance cavalry and the billeting party, squadrons of *Bucellaries*, followed by the general and his staff, rode down the street of the camp. The remainder of the troops followed, while the train were occupied in packing and breaking camp.

We ourselves rode ahead in order to watch the advanced guard at work. It was engaged in beating every copse and other bit of cover. It examined fords and bridges and sent back reports. It interested us to see that the trees along the road were carefully examined: and we learned that the reason for this precaution was that the enemy sometimes saws them nearly through, thus making traps across the road.*

Before us lay a stretch of rough, broken country leading up to a defile. To traverse this the column behind us split into lines of small columns at intervals of a stone's throw. There was no sign of the enemy. The approaches narrowed as the advanced guard neared the pass. As the first troops entered the throat of the defile arrows whizzed past and splintered on the rocks. The outer columns then faced to flank and stood fast, while the light infantry moved up swiftly, breaking up into groups of five men who dashed off among the brush and rocks. While some of these groups kept up a sharp fire, others advanced in rushes. Soon these rushes ceased; the enemy stood his ground and a lively exchange of stones and arrows took place. The general rode up and we scanned his face anxiously to find out the effect which the situation had upon him. To our surprise he gave no orders; he appeared only mildly interested and not at all concerned.

Then suddenly from a new direction came the sound of a sharp twanging of bow-strings; and a fresh flight of arrows assailed the enemy. Immediately a stir and confusion marked his position. Men darted from rock to rock and now our skirmishers leaped and pressed forward. They did not fire, but sought to close with pike. The general gave a nod, the officers shouted out their orders, the flank columns faced again to the front and our march was resumed. What was strange to us was normal to the soldiers, so we asked

* See *Aussaresses*, p. 91.

bronzed *dekarch* the interpretation of what has passed. He gave us a sharp, curious look—unconsciously tinged with that shade of contempt for civilians which comes to the soldier with years of experience—and answered very courteously that the rear groups of light infantry had succeeded in occupying commanding positions on the hostile flank and rear and had then opened a hot fire. Under cover of this diversion, the attack had been pressed. Surprise, he told us, is more effective than hard fighting as it demoralizes and disorganizes the enemy. He foretold that we should meet with no further opposition that day and apparently he is right, for the column is proceeding peacefully and with no apparent concern.

We climbed the hill to inspect the scene of battle. On the crest there was a strong guard of light infantry. The captain of this force told us that this guard would remain there until the train was through the defile and would then fall in with the train escort. Whenever a pass is of importance, and is to be used on the return march, it seems that a permanent guard is maintained, so apparently the general does not intend to use this pass again, or considers it more economical to have all his troops with him and to force it again if need be.

From the crest of the hill we obtained a good view of the infantry coming up to the pass. In order to traverse the rough ground more easily it was advancing in a line of small columns. After the infantry came the train and we watched it manœuvre from double to single column to pass through the defile. On either flank rode detachments of horse; closer in, marched light infantry groups and the armed train *personnel*. In rear followed a rear guard including the *Opisthophylakes* or Military Police.

Leaving the hill we pressed forward to rejoin headquarters. As the defile opened out into a fertile valley, we passed the *chiliarchs* and *moirarchs* who were superintending the march of their units across the cultivated fields. We noticed, too, that the *tagmatarchs* were keeping a sharp eye on the conduct of their men, for the annoying of peasants, or the pillaging or the unnecessary destruction of crops, constitute serious offences.

We soon overtook headquarters as the head of the column had lted for the mid-day meal. Outposts had already been set, but found the general ill at ease, for the defile had not yet been cleared and the enemy was reported near at hand. Prisoners who had been taken by the scouts were brought in one by one. They were heavily armed. The general addressed them harshly, threatening them with death if they attempted to mislead him, but offering rich rewards

to them if they spoke the truth. Their depositions were carefully compared with one another and with other sources of information.*

A thorough reconnaissance was then made in order to determine the enemy's strength, disposition and intentions. Meanwhile *Spatharies* as liaison agents were sent out to conduct the incoming units to their places in line, for the general had resolved to halt for the noonday meal in order of battle. He apparently noted that this particular disposition caused comment, and was evidently determined to discourage any idle rumours which might affect the moral of his men, for he immediately issued an announcement to the effect that the fighting at the pass had resulted in an easy victory; the most miserable specimens of the prisoners were then paraded before the troops in order to increase their contempt for the enemy.

We now went to mess and the general asked us how we were enjoying our experiences with the Army. He seemed vastly pleased when we expressed our interest in all we had seen—all the more so because, as he explained, he was not accustomed to hearing any appreciation of military discipline from civilians. He quoted to us from the "Strategikon" of the Emperor :

"As a ship cannot sail without a pilot, so an army cannot conquer without order and command. Valour and numbers, regardless of vulgar opinion to the contrary, do not decide battles : on the contrary, it is discipline and intelligent leadership with the aid of God, that triumphs ever." †

The question then arose as to what really constituted intelligent leadership? The general gave as his opinion the doctrine of the "Strategikon" : namely, that he who compels the retreat of the enemy with the least loss of life is the greatest captain. The direct frontal attack was, he maintained, brutal, costly and dangerous; even if one could be certain of victory thereby, except in cases of absolute necessity, he argued that it was pure folly so to purchase an empty glory at the price of a costly victory. He maintained that stratagems, ruses and ambushes should be regarded as preferable to force as productive of the same result at a lesser cost of life. A retreat was always preferable to risking battle when the advantage lay with the enemy.

Some of the junior officers opposed this doctrine by saying that it applied equally to both sides, was indecisive and kept us continually at war. But the more sober of those present pointed out the practical considerations which we have to bear in mind,

* See Aussaresses, p. 93. See also Cæsar, "Bell. Gall."

† See Aussaresses, p. 98.

namely, the length of the frontier to be defended, the swift raiding character of the enemy's tactics and the impossibility of waiting for superior forces with reduced mobility which the enemy with superior mobility can refuse to engage while he carries out raids in other places until our Government may become too much impoverished to support any army at all. With so long a frontier and so many turbulent and nimble neighbours, we cannot be superior in all places at once. In minor wars, therefore, it would seem that we must meet the enemy with inferior numbers and that this disadvantage can be countered by superior discipline, mobility, flexibility and leadership. It was generally agreed that the greatest factor in successful generalship was the skilful use of surprise.

This pleasing and instructive military discussion was broken into by the arrival of the officers who had been engaged on reconnaissance duties. They reported that the hostile Army was entirely composed of cavalry and was advancing rapidly, thinking perhaps to surprise us in a trap with our backs to the defile.

The general laid all this information before the *merarchs* and called for opinions. One of them was in favour of retiring into the pass and there setting an ambush. The *hypostrategos* remarked dryly that by the time the wagon train had the pass effectively blocked on its return trip, the battle would be over, and so that, unless we decided to leave our train to the enemy, the suggestion was quite useless. The general agreed, saying that it was self-evident that we had no option but to give battle where we were. He admitted that we had no room for manœuvre owing to the swiftness of the enemy's approach, but that we must try and turn our disadvantages to advantage and stake all upon an audacious surprise.

"The wind is against us," he added, "but the sun will be in their eyes."

His air of meditation swiftly gave way to the flash of decision. "Fellow-soldiers," he cried in a clear, firm voice, "here is my plan of battle : *

"The enemy's troops are all horsemen, and Persians. If we are strong, they will not close, but will attempt to harass us by repeated charges, flights of arrows and sudden dashes out of range. If they think us weak, or trying to escape, they will close and attack with vigour. If we can induce them to close, we can use our infantry and cause them to fight on ground unfavourable to cavalry. The

* The action is purely imaginary and is merely a device to avoid a dull description and to crowd many lessons into a brief compass. It is based upon passages from Aussaresses and Procopius; see "Persian Wars," I, iii, 8-12; I, xiii, 13-39; I, xv, 9-18, etc.

dust, too, we shall turn to our benefit, for it will serve to screen our ambush and the manœuvres of our cavalry which will operate against their flanks.

“ Our cavalry patrols and the details, both cavalry and light infantry, from the wagon train will move out at once to screen and protect our movements.* When no longer of use as a screen, they will drop back toward the high ground and take a post on the flanks of, and in advance of, our line.† The *Optimates* will move forward down the valley and take their post drawn up in four ranks. The second line will be formed from train *personnel* mounted on baggage animals to give the appearance of strength. These, when the screen is driven in, will fall back with it in disorder. The *Spatharies* will give the train *personnel* time to get clear, and, keeping only far enough from the enemy to induce him to forget caution, will follow after and lead him on. The dry brook on our front is not an obstacle to cavalry, but is deep and so placed as to throw the enemy's ranks into disorder. Behind the bed of the brook the infantry will be drawn up at mid bow-shot, supported by the engines from high ground. If pressed, the infantry will retire up the slope to more difficult terrain. The ground on either flank is suitable to the light infantry. Leaving a gap wide enough to be covered by its fire and that of the line infantry through which the cavalry may pass, the light infantry will take up a position on the high ground on either flank, with its outer wings thrown forward and its interior flanks refused. This will give a flanking fire. The line cavalry will take post behind the nose opposite the left flank of the line infantry keeping out of sight, but prepared to operate through the gap between the heavy and the light infantry. In the ditch behind the similar interval on the right the *Bucellaries* will be posted. The *Federals* will move into the head of the ravine in rear of the right flank and remain concealed in readiness to move round our right and operate against the hostile rear. The *Optimates* will rally after their withdrawal and reform behind the *Bucellaries*, where they will constitute the general reserve. The train *personnel* must be reorganized and held in readiness in case of disaster to take to the high ground and operate as irregular light infantry, or to guard the pass and to move the train. In case of defeat, the infantry will defend the high ground and cover the retirement of the horse into the pass. The train will follow and be sacrificed if necessary. The commanding officer of the train will retain sufficient men to keep up the

* See Aussaresses, p. 101.

† This use of flank patrols was customary.

ammunition supply and to maintain the usual liaison with combat units.*

"The infantry," the general continued, "will be organized in *tagmata* of four ranks, to give a maximum of fire. Units will be small for ease of control and flexibility. The cavalry brigade commanders will organize their units to meet the requirements of their situation.

"I am deliberately sacrificing depth to deployment," he explained, "in order to cover a wide front, and to develop the maximum of aimed fire for surprise effect. Tell your men of our plan so that they may not become demoralized, and say that I am thinning the line in order to show my confidence in their discipline and bravery. To your posts to make your preparations; we have no time to lose."

From our position on the top of the knoll we then watched the officers sizing and reorganizing their units, and marching them to their new positions. As the line was beginning to settle down, the *Optimates* rode proudly forth, their coloured pennants fluttering gaily. Behind comes the variegated and slovenly column of camp-followers, laughing and joking at their new rôle and with much beating of mules, asses and scrubby ponies.

We next noticed the captains addressing their companies and explaining the plan of battle. The heralds followed with exhortation, and then the sacred colours were blessed and the line of battle was marshalled and ready.

By this time the dust caused by the enemy's approach was visible and the flash of his arms and armour. The *Optimates* were not yet in position. This proved, however, to be in our favour, as the screen was prematurely driven in and the enemy was led to believe that he had surprised our Army in the process of being marshalled, for his main body pressed on closely behind his irregulars who were pursuing our disorganized patrols. These patrols dashed by and the baggage beasts in the false second line were stampeded. The enemy's troops came hotly on in order to avail themselves of the confusion. The *Optimates* stood their ground, allowing the cumbersome mob to get clear and making an irresolute show of a covering

* See Aussaresses, p. 64. The form in which orders were given is not known; the plan of battle, however, was made known to all (Aussaresses, p. 98). Orders during the course of action were written, and, if delivered verbally, were confirmed in writing. Owing to the small size of the army, the formal position of the general and the ease with which his station could be identified by his fanion and escort, it was unnecessary for him to describe where he might be found. The dressing station was always with the train and the train was charged with liaison to the front.

action. The valley was now hidden in a drifting cloud of dust created by the stampede and the approaching enemy. Above and through it flickered the wavering pennants of the *Optimates*. They were moving towards us, hotly pursued by the enemy. They made their way through the intervals in our line and then our infantry came into action. We could hear the twanging of bow-strings, at first loud and shrill, then a desultory hum as the sharp clash of steel against steel and the hoarse shouts of combatants reached our ears. The pennants of the horsemen rose over the crest none too soon, for in places our infantry was being severely mauled; in some places indeed its ranks were broken. The stream of mounted hospital orderlies with their double stirrured saddles full was rapidly becoming thicker and the walking wounded began to trickle rearward. The fact that the *Optimates* had reformed, however, told us that the *Bucellaries* were through the gap and the panic which was now discernible among the hostile troops could only mean that the *Federals* had fallen upon them in rear.

Disorganized, dismayed and confused by the dust, and disheartened by the successive charges from all sides from a supposedly broken enemy, the Persians now sought to escape. The fight was won.

The *Optimates* immediately took up the pursuit, but with exceeding prudence and circumspection, for fear of an ambush, and the Strategos, relaxing for the first time his close attention to the action, asked us :

“Did I not tell you we were safe in thinning the line? The infantry held famously.”

“The men stood like a line of *dekarchs*,” we replied in the words of the camp.

While some details were bringing in the wounded, stripping and burying the enemy's dead and collecting our own, others were bringing up food, wood and forage.

While we were watching these proceedings an embassy under a flag of truce from the enemy was announced. As none of this party was in possession of the proper credentials showing his power to treat, our general entertained them courteously, but ordered the pursuit to be pressed, for he assured us that the embassy might only be a ruse to gain time and merely showed that the enemy was no longer in a position to fight. Our patrols had brought in word that the Persian forces were trying to put a river between themselves and us, and doubtless needed time to complete this delicate operation undisturbed.

This plan the general decided to prevent if possible, and, if not, to force a passage before the enemy could reorganize. He, therefore, ordered the cavalry to press on and interrupt the operation and detailed light infantry, with artillery and engineers, to follow closely.

When we ourselves arrived at the river, the enemy was across it and his rear guard was engaged with our light infantry in a duel of bows and slings. Our river flotilla had been summoned by signal and came up to cover the unlimbering of our *manga* and *ballista*. Under cover of this fire, the engineers busied themselves on the bank with ropes, planks and pontoons. A bridge was soon made across the stream and before even it was made fast some of our infantry had swum across the river. Stiffened by a couple of *banda of élite*, these infantrymen advanced and covered the passage of the other troops, who pressed the pursuit while the advanced guard remained behind to protect the engineers. These were employed in building more bridges, and in gathering up stones, wood, and earth for the erection of walls and block-houses to defend the bridge-head.*

The next day a report was received to the effect that the enemy had found our frontier guards occupying a pass on his line of retreat and having no time, owing to our vigorous pursuit, to force the pass, and finding himself caught between two fires, had abandoned his booty and scattered. So ended the campaign.

* * * * *

In the foregoing account the writer has tried to construct a conscientious picture of the tactics of a much maligned Army which held the outposts of civilization for nearly a thousand years. It would seem that this accomplishment alone would afford proof of a general high average of efficiency, however low at times it may have fallen.

It may be asked, however, what profit is there in all this ?

Well, many a sound principle, many a laudable military institution expired with the passing of the legions, and there are very real lessons to be learned from the despised soldier of the Eastern Empire.

In the matter of discipline the American public was charmed at the "new discipline" evolved to meet the requirements of "a race of freemen springing to arms," and so on, whereas it was but an incomplete return to the system expounded by Xenophon in his "Cyropædea." As a matter of fact, nowhere to-day is there any discipline which can compare in its effectiveness with that of the

* For the passage of the river and the fortifying of the bridge-head, see Aussaresses, p. 56.

Roman legion as described by Josephus, nor is there any as intelligent as that of Xenophon, or any method of implanting it in the recruit which can compare with the method of Byzantium. There the maxim was "Discipline first, organization and tactics later;" to-day the maxim in America is :

" Three days to learn equitation
And six months of bloomin' well trot."

Marshal Foch recognized the influence of democracy when he said : " On va désormais se battre avec les cœurs des soldats," which is what Xenophon depicted Cyrus the Great as practising. This does not mean that there is no need for strict discipline, but only that to-day a high average of intelligence makes the soldier supply a willing co-operation.

" Discipline first " enabled the Armies of Byzantium to reform after a defeat and to return again and again to the attack, just as the " Old Contemptibles " were able in 1914. Such also was the discipline of the regular red-coats at Bunker Hill. We may condemn their tactics, we may glorify the gallant " embattled farmers," but it is just as well to remember which side won.

Another lesson we may learn from these misunderstood strategists is their recognition of the value of surprise. " Surprise . . . the supreme weapon of generalship," as General Maurice calls it in his " Forty Days in 1914." This factor in war was given tremendous weight in Antiquity. Ardant du Picq concludes that it was the normal decisive factor. It is this moral force, and not any material effect of enfilade or of converging fire, which contributes even to-day to the chief value of flank attacks. A sufficient proof of this is furnished by the Boer War, where the British repeatedly failed to obtain a decision through flank attacks because the movements were foreseen and superior mobility enabled the Boers to meet them.

It was not in strategical or tactical surprise alone, however, that the Byzantines excelled, but in guarding against " that more serious kind of tactical surprise " referred to by Spenser Wilkinson in his " War and Policy," " which results from the want of forethought, not on the part of officers leading the troops in the field, but on the part of those whose duty it was to superintend the training of officers and troops. It consists in the officers and men having been properly taught the use of the weapons with which they and their enemies are armed."

The regulations of the Byzantine Army were *founded*, not merely

upon the arms, but also upon the tactics and terrain of their potential enemies. Nor was this all ; the Byzantine military authorities also took into consideration the character and temperament of their enemies and their effect upon the conduct of war. Thus there was one organization, tactics, even equipment, for employment against the Persians and another against the Franks ; one for the Bulgars, another for the Vandals.*

Since the enemies of Byzantium were many and diverse, and their tactics, characteristics and terrain widely different, there was no rigid organization, and therein did they excel those of all modern armies. To-day all the Great Powers, except Great Britain, adopt the basis of two smaller units to the larger. The statement of Clausewitz that this is the weakest possible arrangement has never been disputed, although there are factors which oppose any change. One is historical tradition, another is the expense of reorganization and the danger of being attacked while the process is under way ; and the third, the suitability of this form for penetration under European conditions. During the World War, however, the United States changed its organization—not from, but to, the two system, and has decided to retain it.

The objection to this organization is that it is suitable only to conditions such as were met with in Europe in the late war. There the high industrial development permitted the nations to raise and equip masses of combatants, to provide munitions and supplies upon a huge scale, and, because of the network of modern communications and the existence of quantities of mechanical transport, to bring these masses to bear and keep them supplied. Moreover, the comparatively restricted theatre of war intensified these conditions and made organization in depth imperative.

But where in the world, except in Europe, would such conditions be met with ? The United States meets all these requirements but one : there is ample room for manœuvre. A map of Eurasia will show that Europe is but a tiny wart on the edge of a vast continent, and General Gourko's " War and Revolution in Russia " indicates how different were conditions on the Eastern Front. The Bolshevik campaigns against Poland, Denikin and Wrangel were largely campaigns of manœuvre. There are few nations to-day able to support such a form of war as existed on the Western Front, and only in the European theatre are there the conditions which could make such a war possible. Therefore, since the normal conditions call for manœuvre, and manœuvre calls for flexibility, we would do well

* See Aussaresses, p. 5.

to-day to take note of the most flexible organization which the world has ever seen.

The Byzantine system had perhaps a normal organization, but it was neither fixed nor was the size of units constant. It seemed incredible to the Byzantines that the same organization and equipment were suitable for mountain warfare and war on the plains ; for desert warfare and warfare amid lakes and swamps. To-day gradually our organizations become modified by the conditions of war, but, except in the case of Alpine troops and mountain batteries, there is no provision to meet these conditions. It is perhaps no coincidence that the British, who have had the widest experience in different theatres of war, have an organization based upon a system of fours and have almost invariably clung to the small company.

The Byzantines merely laid down general rules for the proper organization, equipment and tactics suitable to every possible enemy, every possible climate and every possible terrain. These rules were but a general guide ; it was the duty of the commander-in-chief to supplement this information and to be prepared with a plan of organization to fit the peculiar conditions of the approaching campaign.* The armament and tactics were also then prescribed.†

Conditions to-day roughly reproduce the situation with which Byzantium was faced, and once more the frontier of civilization is in danger. So self-centred and self-sufficient is Western Civilization that we do not commonly realize that we are in a minority or recognize our limitations. The material aspect of our culture has created within our society some unwholesome by-products, and the conservative forces of religion and morality have not everywhere the strength to hold lawless ideas in check, and the world-old fallacies of shortcuts to ease and happiness gain an easy credence wherever discontents exist. The very instruments whereby liberals had hoped to raise humanity, the mechanical facilities for the greater comforts of living and the wider distribution of knowledge, are employed to the undoing of these things.

The ignorant and unorganized masses of Asia are becoming, if not less ignorant, better organized, and discontents are fanned or created. Our potential theatre of war is enlarged to embrace the whole world. Our war organization, therefore, ought to be designed so that it can be readily modified to meet any set of conditions, and to meet them in such a way that superior mobility and superior equipment will enable us to hold in check greater numbers with less.


* See Aussaresses, p. 5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 6.

The principles of organization, armament and tactics for every possible contingency ought to be laid down and their application practised. This calls for thoroughly trained officers and soundly trained men.

Such are some of the lessons which come down to us out of the past. They will serve not only to benefit us in the sense that Procopius had in mind, but will serve also to aid our perspective and to check too hasty conclusions deduced from the special conditions which existed during the World War.

AN IMAGINARY ENGAGEMENT TO ILLUSTRATE THE TACTICS OF THE BYZANTINE ARMY



LEGEND:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------|
| Cavalry Brigade. | Headquarters. |
| Infantry Regiment. | Train. |
| Co. Lt. Inf. (First Position) | First Position |
| Co. Lt. Inf. (Second Position) | Camp Followers |
| Squadron. | Balista + Manga. |
| Patrol. | |

[To face p. 334.]

DEMOBILIZATION

BY E. STOPFORD HOLLAND, late Captain Royal West Kent Regt.

THE subject of demobilization is not one which has ever seized hold on the popular imagination. True, just after the Armistice, it became a favourite topic with the politicians and the Press, and, of course, the latter is supposed to be the mouthpiece of public opinion. Columns of type were devoted, therefore, daily to the subject of demobilization, and criticism of a conspicuously violent character even for these unreticent days was directed against the official arrangements. But this interest in the subject, as will be shown later on in this article, was not entirely spontaneous in origin nor did it continue for long—in fact, during the greater part of the demobilization period the attitude of the Press and public alike was one of serene indifference. The mightiest Army the Empire has ever known crumbled silently in obedience to the calculated process of attrition to which it was subjected. And yet the ordinary lay mind, if it appreciated anything of the dramatic significance of the passing of this great host, if it conceived of that passing as in any way due to intricate and untiring organization, did so but vaguely and indifferently. Well, a decent obscurity is, in these advertising days, a thing to foster ; and the writing of long-winded explanations and defences has become a tiresome fashion. But it may be in the public interest, as certainly in the interest of abstract justice, that now, when the controversial fret and fury have faded, when the politicians have forgotten all about it and the Press is practising new “stunts,” some attempt should be made to determine the respective values of the original demobilization scheme and of that which was introduced under cover of Army Order 55 of 1919.

Very little is known among laymen of the real nature of the task. On the one hand, the flood of invective and misrepresentation which came down relentlessly as the waters of Lodore during the early period of Press agitation created an atmosphere of suspicion and misunderstanding which has never been dissipated ; and, on the other hand, there has been inevitably much individual dissatisfaction with, and condemnation of, the working of a scheme which was designed to deal with millions. Each man was, naturally, convinced of the overwhelming righteousness of his own claim to priority of release ;

each illogically attributed a refusal to release him both to the rottenness of Army methods and also to a certain malignancy on the part of his superiors. The truth is, of course, that it is impossible, in formulating any modern scheme of demobilization to reconcile entirely the antipathetic claims of the individual and of the State ; and it happened that in this country the natural antagonism of the two claims was aggravated by the system of tribunal exemption from military service. This is a point, however, to which the writer will return later. For the moment he feels it necessary to give some brief statement in explanation of the genesis of the demobilization scheme as it was originally framed.

Long before Armistice Day, of course, the subject of demobilization had been under discussion. So far back as January, 1915, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Secretary of the Board of Trade, and Sir Reginald Brade, Secretary of the War Office, had prepared a paper on the subject for the consideration of the Cabinet. The proposals then put forward were provisionally approved, but, owing to the need for secrecy, they had to be shelved ; and it was not until February, 1917, that a draft scheme was drawn up. This scheme was the result of a decision of the War Office Army Demobilization Committee at its first meeting on the 30th of September, 1916. Two alternative methods of dispersal were open to adoption ; the one, release in an order of priority determined by individual industrial qualifications, the other, release in an order of priority determined independently of industrial and economic considerations. The Committee decided in favour of adopting the first principle and the draft scheme was framed accordingly. Later, as the joint result of Press agitation and political opportunism, the principle was "scrapped" ; but, as will be explained, this "scrapping" must be by no means accepted as proof of its unsuccess. The Committee's choice was, indeed, the old one between Scylla and Charybdis, between the devil and the deep sea. Had it originally decided in favour of release on purely ethical grounds the same initial dissatisfaction would have arisen. For the real reason for the Press attack during the first few weeks succeeding the Armistice was the slow rate of dispersal and it was merely an illogical deduction which caused that slowness to be attributed to the principle on which releases were being carried out. It is difficult, indeed, to imagine the fulness of wrath and indignation which would have been aroused had the military authorities deliberately decided in the first place to ignore civil and economic considerations in formulating plans to meet the demobilization emergency.

The draft scheme (originally issued as Part II of the Report of

the War Office Army Demobilization Committee) was re-issued separately in September, 1917. But it did not receive War Cabinet approval until November, 1917. This delay did not tend to decrease the difficulties of the experts engaged in preparing for the demobilization period ; and the refusal of the Government—a refusal which was, of course, in the circumstances inevitable—to give any decision regarding the strength of the Army to be maintained in post-war days was also a disturbing factor.

Since, however, it was necessary to “get a move on,” the War Cabinet’s acceptance of the scheme was assumed, and certain preliminary action was taken. Thus, as it was clear that, in order to carry out the demobilization of men in an order of priority based on their respective “trades,” precise information must be available of each man’s civil occupation, so it was equally clear that the information must be obtained at once. To inquire of a man on the eve of peace—that is, when he is conversant with the rules governing his release—what was the nature of his pre-war occupation would be to put a strain upon his natural tendency—shall one say—to speak the truth. Army Order 93 of 1917 was, therefore, issued in March, 1917, providing that the “Industrial Group” of each soldier, his particular trade or calling, and whether he was married or single, should be recorded either in Army Book 64 (in the case of men serving in theatres of war) or Army Form B. 103 (in the case of men serving at Home or in Overseas Garrisons).

The importance of this step is apparent. Of the decision at the first meeting of the War Office Army Demobilization Committee, already recorded, it may be said that it was the foundation stone of the demobilization structure ; and pursuing the metaphor, one may say that the effect of this Army Order was to provide the cement which held the structure together.

Something more, however, than the registration of each soldier’s civil profession or occupation was necessary. The priority of release which, in the national interest, ought to be granted to men of particular industries had also to be determined. This was, of course, a matter for the Ministry of Labour, and a departmental “Demobilization Priority Committee” was accordingly set up. Moreover, another Committee—the “Demobilization of the Forces Co-ordination Committee”—was also constituted for the purpose, not only of securing executive co-ordination, but also of settling, during the demobilization period, such revised instructions with regard to priority as might be deemed necessary on public grounds or by the state of employment in particular industries.

Almost simultaneously with the issue of Army Order 93 of 1917, work was begun on the Demobilization Regulations. Early action on these Regulations was essential. It was clear that they would have to be set forth in some detail and at some length. Yet it was necessary that they should be at the same time simple, lucid and carefully arranged. Many units were commanded by officers of junior service, who had little or no experience of regimental interior economy ; and it would have been unfair to burden them with unnecessary technical difficulties. The preparation of the Regulations, therefore, could not be left to "the last minute." It was felt that they should be in the hands of commanding officers some time before the actual process of dispersal was to begin. On the other hand, by beginning them early, the difficulties attending their compilation were greatly increased. Definite rulings—often indeed definite information—on many points could not then be obtained, while the not unnatural attitude of opposition to any mention of demobilization when the war was still in full swing which was shown by practically every branch of the War Office that was not directly concerned with the problem, of course, added to the difficulties of the task. The psychological effect upon men engaged in so complicated an undertaking of such an attitude on the part of others was considerable ; and not the least tribute that can be paid to the Staff which perfected and carried through the Demobilization Scheme is to say that it got through its work, in these early days, in spite of the studied indifference, and sometimes even the discouraging attitude displayed by those who should have had a clearer vision.

In drafting the Regulations certain practical difficulties had to be met. In the first place, it was clear that the same regulations would not apply universally throughout the Army—there was, that is to say, no "master-key." Of the officers serving there were no less than twelve different categories ; of other ranks, thirteen different categories ; and in practically every case special provisions were necessary. Again, during the war, *personnel* had been transferred indiscriminately from unit to unit, and often, of course, the transfer had been incompletely effected ; that is to say, the necessary documents had not always followed the soldier from his original unit. It was possible, therefore, that data essential to the carrying out of a soldier's demobilization would not be with his commanding officer.

To add to the complexity of the task, the Regulations had to be framed not only with a bias in favour of industrial reconstruction, but also in such a manner as to provide for a very early reconstruction of the Army after the war. As early as April, 1918, indeed, the

primary importance of having recruiting machinery ready for use on the cessation of hostilities had been strongly urged upon the Army Council. The possibility of remobilization being ordered during the period of demobilization had also to be borne in mind and provided against in the Regulations. Even ethical and personal considerations had to be taken into account. Thus, for example, provision had to be made to ensure that preference was given, in the matter of early release, to the men who had served longest in a theatre of war and to time-expired men who, serving on pre-war attestations, had, of course, no prospect of civil employment in front of them. The mere compilation of the Regulations—Part I alone extended to over 300 closely printed pages—was in itself, therefore, no mean task and had to be carried out on methodical lines.

It is no part of the purpose of the present writer to discuss the technical details of demobilization procedure and machinery. His intention is simply to consider in a desultory fashion such of the more important aspects of the demobilization scheme as appear to be of general interest. A certain disconnectedness of narrative and chronological hiatus, therefore, may perhaps be excused ; and, after a few remarks on the working of the demobilization machinery, it may be permissible to enter into consideration of the criticism which, in the early days after the Armistice, centred round the principle of industrial priority generally and the " pivotal " system in particular, and which resulted in the issue of the guillotine Army Order 55 of 1919.

Of the demobilization machinery, then, it should be said that it worked throughout with unflinching smoothness and precision. It was entirely an improvisation—it was based on no precedent ; it was almost wholly untested before being put into use. Yet it served to meet the very diverse and exacting requirements of the financial, medical and other departmental authorities, and stood the strain not only of the most arbitrary and unlooked for fluctuations in the rate of dispersal, but also of arbitrary and ill-considered changes—due rather to political than to any other causes—of principle and procedure.

There can be little doubt that, in any future scheme for national demobilization, some special arrangements for the release of " pivotal " men will be necessary. The ideal to be striven for, in formulating a system of demobilization for modern application, is that of ensuring a rate of dispersal which, whilst as fast as is required, will not exceed the rate at which the various industries can absorb the man-power released. The truth of this axiom will hardly be denied. It was

recognized from the first. Even the Press criticism of the early days succeeding the Armistice was concerned at the outset rather with the rate at which the dispersal machinery was working than with the principle on which releases were being carried out. The principle of industrial priority was in fact almost unanimously accepted ; and its acceptance involved acceptance also of the logical corollary—the release, in advance of general demobilization, of “ pivotal ” men required to assist in the rehabilitation of industries.

The Press agitation, however, from being violent became more violent ; and practically the one note in the raucous chorus was that which kept calling for more speedy release. The initial slowness in the working of the machinery was to a great extent inevitable—although it must be remembered that the War Cabinet’s decision to accelerate the rate of dispersal was not given until the 8th of December, 1918—and its causes were apparent to any one who knew anything of the difficulties attending finely-strung lines of communication and transport shortage. And that our lines of communication were indeed very finely strung needs little arguing. During October and November, 1918, the disposition of our Armies in the different theatres of war had undergone great changes. In France, for example, our five Armies up to that date had been disposed in a rough line between Ostend and St. Quentin ; but by the end of November two of them had left for the Rhine. In Italy, too, our troops were no longer all disposed along the right bank of the Piave, part of them having crossed the Carnic Alps. The Salonica Army, again, instead of being within sixty miles of its base, had been split up, part having advanced to the Danube and occupied Constantinople and part being on the way to the Caucasus. Advances had also taken place in Palestine and Mesopotamia. These changes in disposition did not, of course, make it necessary to modify the actual demobilization scheme, but they did complicate very materially the application of the scheme by the General Headquarters concerned. Accordingly, writers like Colonel Repington and Major-General Sir F. Maurice, who knew the real difficulties, did their best to stem the flood of misrepresentation and to enlighten the public. But such journals as did not, by a wrong deduction, attribute the early slowness of demobilization to the principle—industrial priority—on which releases were being carried out, attributed it to a certain malignant unwillingness of the Army authorities to let men go. Considerable unrest was thus aroused not only among the general public, but also among the troops themselves ; and many letters were received in the War Office from individual soldiers alleging that their commanding

officers were deliberately refraining from taking steps to effect their demobilization.

A general election was pending. This, of course, gave the agitation a political significance. Anyway, the hands of the military authorities were forced; and, much against their better judgment, they were compelled to accept the introduction, about the middle of December, 1918, of the system of releasing men, particularly those on leave, who could produce a "contract" of employment from the employer with whom they were serving before the 4th of August, 1914. The only possible justification for the adoption of this system—which was no part of the original Demobilization Scheme—was that it temporarily accelerated the rate at which demobilization was proceeding. Its effect was bad. Owing to the numbers of men involved and the paramount necessity for speed, a close scrutiny of each claim submitted was impossible. Many men were released who had no shadow of a right to priority. *The Times* (6th of January, 1919), commenting on the introduction of the system, said, "The argument for it is reasonable on the score of transport difficulties alone, but . . . it introduces a form of priority not based on national grounds, and therefore likely to be misunderstood and to cause confusion and discontent"; and *The Daily News* (7th of January, 1919), similarly commenting, remarked that the system had probably been superimposed on the original scheme "in deference to popular clamour," and added that, although no doubt it would accelerate the immediate pace of demobilization, if persevered with, it would assuredly check the release of the "pivotal" men with disastrous consequences—a prophecy which was to prove a true one.

Finally, in this connection must be quoted the words of the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief British Armies in France. Writing on the 14th of December, 1918, from General Headquarters, 1st Echelon, Earl Haig referred to the general question of priority of release, and pointed out that, though in Army Demobilization Regulations it was "laid down that, apart from 'demobilizers' and 'pivotal' men, 10 per cent. of every draft for dispersal should be made up of soldiers who have been longest in the Expeditionary Force and of time-expired soldiers who enlisted on pre-war attestation," yet, through constant change of instructions, particular groups such as coal-miners, men who had been 28 days in hospital, "contract" men on leave, were getting priority while nothing was being done to release the promised 10 per cent. of long-service men. The Field-Marshal concluded his letter by saying, "I desire to represent most emphatically the danger of the present policy of

selecting for demobilization certain categories of *personnel* on what appear to be grounds of temporary expediency only. All ranks of the Army in France are deeply interested in the problem of their return to civil life, and their moral and discipline will be seriously affected if the system which has been explained to them is departed from and preference given to individuals who have no just claim to early release."

The chief, if not the only, objection to the "pivotal" system—and to the general principle of industrial priority—was a moral one. The men classed as "pivotal" were those who, by reason of their civil qualifications, were especially vital to the work of national reconstruction. But, on the other hand, they were, for the most part, men who, having been the subject of appeal after appeal to tribunals, had little military service to their credit, and on purely moral grounds had no sort of right to priority of release.

Allusion has already been made in the course of this article to the impossibility of reconciling, in a modern demobilization scheme, the conflicting interests of the individual and of the State; and the only point for determination is, whether it is better to study most the interest of the State or that of the individual? On the face of it, there appears to be but one answer to such a query; and the original demobilization scheme was formulated with a bias in favour of the national interest.

Our military system is based on voluntary service and makes, therefore, no arbitrary calls on the man-power of the nation to the exclusion of industrial interests. In countries where conscription is in force, on the other hand, all males of appropriate age are liable for service with the Colours and there is consequently a certain dependent relationship between the industrial and the military organization. So sudden a drain, therefore, upon the whole of the available man-power as was involved during the late war would come upon industry in such countries with much less of a shock and with much less devastating results, than on industry in this country. Yet, even in France, where conscription holds, our system of industrial priority met with considerable attention and cordial approval not only from the Press, but also in the Chamber of Deputies. It seemed, indeed, to be recognized that the French system, based on "annual class," was not conducive to a rapid restoration of industry, and that even the introduction of *sursis*, or special furlough, to meet exceptional cases, was not sufficient. One may perhaps, therefore, be pardoned a certain irony in noting that the method of release adopted later and introduced under cover of Army Order 55 of 1919 was, as *The Manchester Guardian* (30th of January, 1919)

pointed out, to a great extent based on the French system—publicly condemned by Sir Eric Geddes—of demobilizing by classes in inverse order of age.

But to return again to the original scheme—the chief objection to the “pivotal” system, as the writer has pointed out, was a moral one. It was stigmatized as a new name for “favouritism.” The charge is a plausible, but not a true, one. In the first place, the maximum number of “pivotal” men to be released was fixed at not more than 150,000 (and this number included “demobilizers”)—a mere fraction of the total of men to be dispersed. Further, their release was granted solely for the purpose of assisting in the reorganization of the various industries and thus increasing the capacity to provide employment for the less highly qualified men. The system of Special Releases (by means of Army Form Z. 56)—another innovation and no part of the original scheme—was, in fact, much more justly open to the charge of favouritism; and its introduction, there can be little doubt, was responsible for the creation of a suspicion that certain men were “wangling” their release—a suspicion that spread only too rapidly. The opposition to “pivotalism,” it may be added, became greatly strengthened when it was discovered that men of 19 and 20 years of age, with little or no technical experience, were being claimed as “pivotal” men, and that the Ministry of Labour, without verifying such claims, was endorsing them. But steps were taken, as far as possible, to prevent this abuse of the system.

Army Order 55 of 1919 (which abolished the principle of release on industrial grounds and substituted that of release on grounds of age and service) was issued on the 29th of January, 1919. Unrest among the troops, as has been said, had been created by the violent nature of the Press agitation. That this was the case was admitted by some of the more sober journals. The situation, indeed, had become somewhat critical. The Folkestone incident, and others of a similar character, had occurred. The effect of this Army Order, however, was miraculous. It acted as an anodyne, as “oil on troubled waters.” The Press campaign died out—the inharmonious chorus diminuendoed gracefully into silence. Unrest among the troops in a short while disappeared.

How can this be explained? What magic was there in the Army Order? What was the secret of the felicity which it produced? Why, since the principles which it laid down proved so palatable to all concerned, were they not previously adopted?

A glance at the Army Order will show that the changes it wrought

were not fundamental ones. The principle of release by age and length of service had after all always been recognized and had been embodied to a great extent in the original scheme. The machinery of dispersal was in no way altered ; the transport problem was not solved ; in a word, *the maximum rate at which dispersal could be carried out remained as before*. Just so many men as were released under the new Army Order could have been released under the old rules. And that the *demand* for release was as acute as ever is proved by the statistics of letters received at the War Office. After the issue of the Army Order the weekly numbers of letters received asking for the release of particular soldiers increased rapidly. In one branch, dealing with demobilization correspondence, the figures of letters received on representative dates were as follows :—

Week ending 25th of January, 1919	4,821
" " 15th of February, 1919	9,827
" " 15th of March, 1919	10,715
" " 12th of April, 1919	10,705
" " 3rd of May, 1919	14,648
" " 10th of May, 1919	17,506

‘In view of these facts, it would appear difficult to explain the sudden soothing effect of the Army Order. But indeed the reason is not far to seek. The Order was accompanied by a Royal Warrant (Army Order 54 of 1919) increasing the rates of pay of men in the Army. The increases were on a generous scale ; and there can be no doubt that both the Press and the men themselves realized that the issue of the Warrant was a statesmanlike effort to compensate to some extent those whose services were being unavoidably retained. Its issue was, in fact, nothing but a stroke of genius. The mere changing of the principle underlying the releases would have been ineffectual—was, indeed, unnecessary. What was needed, however, was some unmistakable proof that the military authorities were not acting in any arbitrary or obstructive manner. The idea, as has been said, had got abroad that men were being deliberately retained ; and the issue of the Warrant coupled with the frank Statement (accompanying Army Order 55) by the Secretary of State for War threw a very different light upon the whole matter.

It is well to remember these facts ; and to remember also that the “scrapping” of the original principle was in no way a proof of its failure. It had never been put to the test. Had the Royal Warrant and Statement referred to been issued and, at the same time, the old principle been adhered to, the result would have been exactly the same. The Press, previously hostile, would have “purred”

just as gently and contentedly, and the troops would have been equally satisfied.

And if it be contended that no great industrial unrest resulted from the "scrapping" of the old principle governing release, certain mitigating factors may be pointed to. In the first place, it should be noted that even under Army Order 55 the release of such "pivotal" men as had been registered before the 1st of February, 1919, was proceeded with and, further, that many releases on purely industrial grounds were carried out through the medium of Army Form Z. 56. Reference has already been made to the disadvantage of the latter method; but, nevertheless, it did much to meet the emergency created by the change of principle. Case after case was brought to notice in which the retention of a particular man, ineligible under the new Order, would have involved not only serious financial loss to the firm concerned, but would actually have prevented the employment of other men. Had it not been for the discretionary powers afforded by this method, there is no doubt that irreparable damage would have been done to British industrial and commercial prospects. Secondly, it must be noted that many thousands of men were allowed to re-engage for short periods of Army Service, and that the issue of unemployment benefit—after all, an expensive palliative—also tended to minimize the danger of distress.

Some remarks on the causes of the early Press agitation seem necessary.

It was, of course, natural and desirable that, whatever might be the scheme of demobilization, it should, when the time came for its practical application, be subjected to the most searching criticism. Millions of men were in question—the man-power of the nation, in fact; and the problem of their dispersal to civil activities was as much an economic as a military one. Criticism of the scheme, therefore, was particularly necessary. But it was also necessary that the criticism should be constructive and unheated; and it happened that, for two reasons, the bulk of the criticism in these early days was of a markedly prejudiced nature. The first reason was a general one. Official references to the demobilization plans had, as a matter of policy, been impossible while the war was in progress. The result was that, on the signing of the Armistice, the Press as a whole found itself utterly in the dark concerning the nature of the preparations which had been made for demobilization. Much uneasiness was thus aroused and, perhaps, a certain amount of resentment; and official assurances that a carefully prepared scheme was ready to be put into instant practice were accepted with

studied reserve even by the more responsible newspapers. The second reason is not a general one, but there seems little doubt that the somewhat bitter attacks of one or two organs can be traced to a refusal on the part of the authorities to release certain journalists for whose speedy return to civil life application had been made.

The disturbances at Folkestone and elsewhere, however, had a steadying effect. The more sober newspapers realized at once the extreme seriousness of the situation which had arisen and did their best to counteract the evil wrought by the "sensational journals." *The Times*, for example, on the 8th of January, 1919, announced, curtly, its refusal to publish any further letters tending to fan an agitation "which is already mischievous and may become dangerous."

There is only one thing more to be said. The successful accomplishment of the demobilization task has been directly, though untheatrically, due to the personality of one man, the head of the responsible War Office branch. The C.I.G.S., presiding at a recent lecture, said of Major-General B. Burnett-Hitchcock, the officer to whom the writer is now referring, "He has demobilized over four millions of men and has dealt with millions of letters and he has never once got muddled." And the statement should—"we speak that we do know and testify that we have seen"—be taken literally.

The fifteenth century—the Vespasiano—type, the combination of soldier and lover of letters, the man of action and of imagination—is happily not an obsolete, though perhaps an obsolescent, one. That the old *curiosa felicitas* is still possible is, anyway, exemplified in the personality of the man who was responsible for the demobilization arrangements. No doubt much of his success can be attributed to the fact that he is a Staff College graduate. The course at Camberley is, properly, a training in, a continuous insisting upon, principles; its value is becoming more and more evident. It is the fashion nowadays, of course—it may be said, parenthetically—to decry the work of the Staff. But this fashion has been due in no small measure, perhaps, to the distinctive dress; and now that staff officers will carry out the same work on the same lines as hitherto, but in soberer garb, something like justice may be accorded to them. Be that as it may, any one who has had any experience of staff work during the war will be agreed upon the superiority of *p.s.c.* men in securing efficiency without sacrificing harmony, co-ordination without stifling individual effort. The power of being able to direct and curb, and yet at the same time cunningly to foster, individual effort and enthusiasm seems, indeed, to be one of the unique results of the Camberley training. Certainly, to the possession

of this power by the General Officer responsible for the demobilization arrangements was due the extraordinarily dogged and harmonious working of his staff in circumstances of strain and difficulty. There was, one knew, a certain icy inflexibility in his character which would visit ruthlessly any looseness or carelessness of effort ; but a natural aloofness of temperament never prevented him from extending a ready encouragement to junior officers. They, indeed, perhaps more than any, gave him untiring service and they, more than any, are jealous lest he should not receive the full measure of the credit which is most justly due to him.

PRISONERS OF WAR

BY DR. J. FITZGERALD LEE

WAR is the only game in which the man who loses is subject to the additional mortification of imprisonment. In all ages of the world's history the treatment of prisoners of war has been a disgrace to humanity. Well-meaning, but utterly ineffectual, "Conventions" have, over and over again, specially enjoined the alleviation of the hard conditions of their captivity: humane societies have raised fervent protests against their ill-treatment. Yet, judging by the evidence given in some recent legal proceedings, it would seem that even in this twentieth century of the Christian Era the prisoner taken in battle is but little better off than he was forty centuries ago, when Homer described him as one whom the gods had deprived of his immortal soul.

In the gray dawn of antiquity men were evidently without bowels of compassion. The Egyptian and Assyrian bas-reliefs, showing us the inhuman manner in which prisoners of war were treated, were not only intended to magnify the glory of the victorious sovereign, but also to publish the gospel of terror. They show us the horrors exactly as they were enacted: the gouging of the eyes, the tearing-out of the tongue and the lopping-off of the limbs. Long files of captives are led to the feet of the conqueror, to be butchered by his executioners or to be slain by his own hand.

The much-vaunted civilization of the Greeks and Romans stopped short when it was a question of dealing with prisoners of war. In the sacred wood of Argos, Cleomenes massacred all his Argive captives; having first told them that he had received their ransom. Sylla murdered eight thousand Samnites and Lucanians, prisoners of war: Cæsar permitted the massacre of the Nervians; and, after his victory at Pidna, P. Æmilius killed ten thousand of his opponents who had surrendered on the promise that their lives should be spared. Sylla occasionally allowed some of his captives to live, but only after their eyes had been gouged out; and the similar clemency of Cæsar was exercised only after every prisoner

had had his right hand chopped off at the wrist. The humane and merciful Pyrrhus was spoken of with contempt, because he sent his prisoners of war back to their homes without even demanding the ransom for them, saying that he "made war as a soldier, not as a petty tradesman."

The Christian religion certainly did something, but very little, to modify these savage customs. History tells us that Lothair III. granted life to only those of his prisoners whose height did not exceed that of his own sword. Charlemagne killed fifteen hundred Saxons in a fit of angry disappointment at having failed to capture their chief.

The Mussulmans—for whose conversion the Christians used to offer up fervent prayers—set a worthy example in the treatment of prisoners of war, which, however, the Christians were very slow in following. In the year of the Hegira 189 (805 A.D.) the great Khalif, Aaron the Just (Haroun al Raschid), entered into an agreement with the Emperor of the East, at Constantinople, by which prisoners of war could be exchanged or ransomed; and the saving of thousands of lives was one of the results of the humanity of the noble Khalif. We have this on the authority of the Arab historian, Masoudi; who also tells us that many Christian prisoners in the Khalif's hands became Mussulmans and refused to allow themselves to be ransomed.

When the early Kings of France engaged in a successful war, they did not, as a rule, put their prisoners to death. This was not altogether due to feelings of humanity; but rather because they looked upon war as the late Herr Krupp did: a good money-making business if only properly managed. In the year 1213, Philip Augustus captured Lille. He was not content with merely selling the soldiers who had defended the city against him: he also sold all the inhabitants, man, woman and child, to the highest bidder. The French historian, Froissard, relating the events of this time, says:

"One of the prisoners of war was an Englishman named William Neill. The Frenchman who bought him permitted him to go back to his own country; for this was the fashion in which the gentlemen of France and England dealt with each other at the time. But the Germans never do this. When a German once gets a prisoner of war into his claws, he keeps him in stocks and fetters, in chains and severe imprisonment, without mercy; and all to extort more money out of him (*il le met en ceps et en fers, en chaînes et en dures prisons, ne il n'en a nulle pitié, et tout pour estordre plus grand argent*)."

From which it will be seen that the national characteristics of European

nations have changed but very little even in the course of six centuries.

The man who seized a prisoner in battle had the right to dispose of him, and to fix what price he pleased as the prisoner's ransom. We remember that Shakespeare—always particularly correct in historical details—makes Ancient Pistol get two hundred crowns from his captive French soldier, Le Fer. But there were certain rough and ready rules to be followed in such cases : a Seigneur, when captured, had to pay a year's revenue ; a Marshal of France, 50,000 livres ; and a Lieutenant-General, 15,000 livres. In certain cases, however, the price was very high. The Abbé of St. Denis had to pay to the Normans a sum equal to a million and a half sterling ; the Sultan of Egypt demanded two hundred and fifty thousand marks of silver as the ransom of King Louis ; and Duguesclin had to pay one hundred thousand francs as his ransom.

But the cases in which human lives were saved by ransom were only as a drop in the ocean ; and when we look back over the past, we see that there is no civilized nation of our time whose records in this respect do not reveal ugly stains. The slaughter in cold blood of the French prisoners at Agincourt ; the massacre of thousands of captured Arabs at Jaffa, by the orders of Bonaparte himself ; and similar cases in which prejudiced historians and false patriotism have vainly endeavoured to whitewash black brutality with a varnish of wretched sophistry alleging " military necessity " ; all proving that even the most humane of nations and the most brilliant military commanders are occasionally subject to those sudden and violent attacks of hardening of the heart, which cause them to stain their names with everlasting disgrace.

In spite of everything, however, it must be acknowledged that the records of French and English history are unblemished and white as snow when compared with those of the greatest military Power of the sixteenth century, Spain. The hard and cold ferocity, the unmentionable atrocities and deeds of cruelty which blacken the pages of the military history of Spain, as recorded by Prescott and Motley, are enough to make a man ashamed of his species. For cold-blooded and diabolical brutality they have never been surpassed in any age or at any time. As Buckle puts it, the Spaniard of that period inherited only the worst qualities of the Moor and the Latin ; the result being a lump of living clay kneaded up with blood. And it would seem that the successors of the cut-throats and torturers who followed Cortez, Pizarro and Alva still retained the worst qualities of their predecessors when we read of the way in which the Spaniards

dealt with their French prisoners in the time of Napoleon ; hanging them, head downwards, over slow fires, smoking them like haddocks, or sandwiching them alive between deal boards before sawing them into pieces.

Much as we are inclined to look down with contempt upon Oriental conquerors and leaders in war, still these compare very favourably with Europeans in general and with the Spaniards in particular. Tamourlane instructed and warned his subordinates that a policy of needless cruelty never pays in the long run ; that, the battle once over, the slaying of an opponent is rarely justifiable. In referring to the treatment of prisoners of war he laid it down that they should not be killed ; giving as his reason for this merciful rule the opinion of another great and very wise Oriental monarch—a living dog is of more use than a dead lion. Still, they had in the East their own peculiar method of dealing with any prisoners who were at all likely to become troublesome. Old Froissard, who has already been quoted, knew of this. He gives us the story of a too amorous and venturesome knight, who was captured by the Saracens ; and puts it in his delightfully pithy way : *on lui coupa le et les*. In our own time, Italian prisoners of war, taken by the Abyssinians in the Adowa Campaign, were also treated in the same manner.

For reasons which need not be specified, it would be improper to discuss in detail any of those notorious cases of cruelty to prisoners of war which have lately filled the columns of our newspapers ; it will probably be found more interesting to give what a mathematician would call a graphical representation of the rise and fall, the progress and relapse, of the higher instincts of humanity applied to their better treatment.

In the time of the Plantagenets, and even later, the prisoner of war was looked upon as the absolute property of his captor ; his condition, so far as personal freedom was concerned, was far worse than that of a negro in a Virginian tobacco plantation in the eighteenth century. It is beyond dispute that the French have the honour of being the first to look upon a captured opponent as simply a man who has been unfortunate. The victor considered it his bounden duty to relieve the sufferings of his prisoner ; it was enjoined by the code of chivalry that not only should the prisoner's sword be returned to him, but also that he should be treated as a guest and brother-in-arms ; and it frequently happened that conqueror and conquered shared the same tent and dined at the same table. But the enactments of this gentlemanly code never reached Germany, where the prisoner was looked upon as a person

to whom no humiliations or vexations should be spared. And although he might claim the benefits conferred by the customs of chivalry and their protection, whenever it suited him, the German always held these in contempt, as he does to this day. Indeed, the military apostle, Clausewitz, who is the personification of that egoism, hardness and materialism, called Germanism or *Deutschthum*, in his best-known work, seems to take a glory in this characteristic of his countrymen.

In the sixteenth century the condition of prisoners of war in France was not at all cruel ; as we can learn from the experiences of a certain English soldier who was taken prisoner on the surrender of Calais in 1558. Here are his own words : " I, Edward Grimston, former Commandant of the defences on the coast side of the town, was made prisoner when the garrison surrendered, and was taken to the French camp at Sangatte, where I spent two nights. I was then handed over to M. Soyper, who passed me on to an Italian farrier and a few French musketeers. At the end of three days these took me with them from Calais to Boulogne. I had only with me my night clothes, and no shoes. Next day we started for Haedlowe, in order to wait for the return of the King to this place ; from there we went to Abbeville, where I got a pair of strong boots. Then to St. Denis, where we dined. They took me out with them to see the hunting, and they also showed me the precious treasures in the cathedral. Next evening we went to Paris, where I dwelt in the house of a mason until Ash Wednesday. I was then taken to the Bastille, where they kept me for nineteen months."

In the Bastille he was often visited by Sir Nicolas Throckmorton, the English Ambassador, who had remained in Paris notwithstanding the state of war. On one of his last visits to the prisoner, the Ambassador kindly gave him a file with which Grimston sawed through three thick iron bars outside his window, and so got away. He procured a horse for himself, rode to the coast and crossed the Channel to England. When he came to London, he was at once arrested on a charge of high treason for having surrendered Calais. But he was acquitted ; and he died in 1599, in his ninety-second year.

Henry IV. of France was very desirous that fixed regulations should be drawn up, and adhered to, by the European States with special relation to the treatment of prisoners. He suggested that the idea of ransom should be altogether abolished ; and by the Treaty of Lyons (1601), between himself and the Duke of Savoy, the prisoners of both parties were sent to their respective homes.

It was about this time that lawyers first began to pay attention to questions connected with war. In the year 1625, Grotius published his work on International Law. It is a curious fact, that lawyers and judges always appear to be opposed to any change in the law, even if it is designed to ameliorate the condition of their fellow-men. If lawyers and judges had had their way, we might still be hanging men for stealing a sheep or five shillings' worth of firewood. So Grotius, being a professional lawyer, not only supported warmly the savage custom which made the prisoner of war an abject and helpless slave, but also suggested that all of the prisoner's personal property should become the property of his captor. But, fortunately for humanity, the soldiers proved more generous and just than the lawyers.

In the war between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II., a great improvement took place. Officials were appointed by both belligerents, to arrange for the repatriation and necessary payments at the end of the campaign.

In June, 1743, a treaty was made between England and France, which fixed the ransom of officers. It was settled that each commander should have the right to buy back his own men; and if he did not wish to do so, another commander could have them by paying for them.

During the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), a French chemist who had a smattering of surgery was given a commission. His name was Parmentier; he incurred the enmity of the Church, and was abused for an infidel, because he had induced the French peasants to cultivate the potato, "an article of food of which no mention is to be found in Holy Writ." In the campaign of 1757 he was taken prisoner five times by the Prussians; and each time stripped naked and then sent back to his own army. He must have taken it in a very philosophical spirit; for, in his memoirs, he says: "These hussars are the most skilful valets; every time they undressed me far quicker than I could have done it myself; and they are not at all bad fellows, for they only robbed me of my clothes and my money!"

In 1758, the Swiss lawyer, Vattel, wrote a book on International Law and the Usages of War. He did not at all agree with Grotius as to the proper treatment of prisoners of war. But he said it was quite right that they should be interned, even fettered, if necessary; but still those who held them in custody should be considerate and merciful to them as men who had fallen into misfortune. "*Un grand cœur ne se sent plus que de la compassion pour un ennemi vaincu et désarmé.*"

The duties of a State towards its prisoners of war were laid down by the French Republic in the law of the 29th of June, 1792. They were declared to be in the safe-keeping, or custody, of the nation (*sous la sauve-garde de la nation*). With regard to the necessities of life, such as food, clothing and shelter, they were placed on exactly the same footing as the soldiers of the nation who had made them prisoners. They could be compelled to work for their living ; but the fact that they were taken armed made them persons worthy of consideration (*des personnes respectables*), and they were not to be employed in raising fortifications or digging trenches.

Some years later, during the Napoleonic Wars, the French had an opportunity of proving to the world that their practice was as good as their professions. In 1808, a thousand English officers were interned at Verdun. A large number of these became Freemasons ; they joined the local Lodges of this fraternity, and were even permitted to form Lodges of their own, but under the French Constitution. It is unpleasant to have to relate that they took a mean advantage of the privileges which were so kindly accorded to them, for many of them succeeded in getting back to England. In consequence of this, General Virion, the Commandant of Verdun, took measures to curtail the liberty of those who remained. But the English officers had gained much popularity, and complaints against the General were forwarded to Paris by some of the leading citizens in the Verdun district. The General was summoned to Paris to answer these complaints ; and on the second day of the official inquiry he drove to the Bois de Boulogne and blew out his brains. The Commandant of Besançon, where a good many Spanish and English officers were interned, took warning by the fate of Virion. He got himself appointed one of the principal officers in the Lodge formed by the Fifth Regiment of Horse Artillery in Besançon, which many English officers had joined. When one of these escaped, he was simply reported as dead, and there was an end of the matter. Some of the prisoners, far from showing any desire to regain their freedom, married French women and became French citizens.

During the Crimean War there were no complaints to speak of, as to the ill-treatment of prisoners. A certain Russian Captain, named Dechtinski, who was captured at Sebastopol, wrote an account of his experiences as a prisoner of war. " When we got to the French camp," he says, " some French officers came to visit us. They invited us to dine with them that evening, and they gave up their beds to some of my brother officers who were wounded. They gave each of us two hundred francs and a month's pay in

advance. We could have easily escaped and got back to our own Army, but such an act would have been too shameful, considering how we were trusted. When we were to be sent to France they gave us a farewell banquet ; and, among other toasts, they drank the health of the gallant defenders of Sebastopol. When we arrived at Toulon we were told that we were at liberty to live wherever we pleased in France, but we were not allowed to go to Paris. Our private soldiers who were prisoners were also very well treated ; the only complaint they had to make was that they were given too much *white bread* to eat."

In 1870, the French officers taken at Sedan and Metz were allowed to go back to France on the condition that they took no active part in hostilities during the rest of the war. Many of them took advantage of this ; but it was unpopular ; it was not called "*donner sa parole*," but "*signer le revers*," because the conditions were signed by the officer on the back of the permission. The officers who refused to take advantage of this were interned in towns in Germany ; but there were no "*Ruhlebens*." They had to report themselves twice a week to the police ; their letters were censored ; they lived in fairly good condition ; and frequently they enjoyed the serenading of German children, who sang the "*Wacht am Rhein*" and "*Des Deutschen Vaterland*" under their windows. When a batch of French prisoners arrived in Posen, they were greatly surprised to find themselves received with enthusiastic cheering, and loud cries of "*Vive la France*," from the Polish inhabitants, which the Prussian gendarmes were unable to suppress. They were presented with cigars, fruit, cakes and money ; and their military guards—the majority of whom were Poles—fraternized, drank and played cards with them. Among the French prisoners at Ulm were a good many Turcos. One of them died ; and a French officer asked the Protestant pastor of Ulm whether he would be kind enough to pray at the man's funeral. "I shall do so with the greatest pleasure, my good friend," said the pastor ; "your Turco, who was a Mahommedan, believed in God. How can I refuse to bury him, when I have held service over many of my own parishioners who never believed either in God or the devil ?"

Notwithstanding all this, good treatment of prisoners of war has never been the rule in Germany. As proof of this, the following sentence taken from the first page of the *Cologne Times* of the 10th of January, 1871, may be quoted : "The German fortresses are already crowded with prisoners of war ; and the transport of more of such unfortunate men, in open coal-wagons, at a temperature of twelve

degrees below zero, is a cruelty which cannot be justified in the eyes of humanity."

It is worth recalling an incident in connection with prisoners of war in Russia, which took place in Kieff, in September, 1916. A number of Czech and Slav soldiers of the Austrian Army were already prisoners at Kieff. But they enjoyed full liberty and were very well treated by the Kieff citizens. Hundreds of them were employed by the Municipality to keep the streets and public squares clean and to act as general scavengers. They had heard that some thousands of the hated Hungarians were being brought to Kieff as prisoners of war. They were not going to let slip such a good opportunity of getting some of their own back. So, in spite of the public notices forbidding any demonstrations on such an occasion, the Slavs formed up in great force, lining each side of the broad road leading from the railway station. As each batch of the Hungarians appeared, they were received with tremendous cheers; and whenever an officer was recognized, brooms, shovels and rakes were shouldered and presented with military precision. This went on until a battalion of regular Russian infantry came from the barracks and dispersed the demonstrators at the point of the bayonet. Later on, the Hungarians found existence so hard among their former comrades, that they begged to be sent elsewhere. Their petition was granted and they were transferred to Siberia.

No prisoners of war have ever been better treated than the British soldiers who were captured by the Boers in the South African War. And the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) was also a model of chivalrous and humane conduct in this respect.

The Article in the Hague Convention (1909) which deals with the question of how prisoners of war should be treated is, both in letter and spirit, a disgrace to International Law. "*Les prisonniers de guerre seront traités . . . sur le même pied que les troupes du Gouvernement qui les aura capturés.*" It is a matter for regret that those who were responsible for this Article should have forgotten what had taken place only four short years before. The Russian prisoners of war were "treated on the same footing as the troops of the Government which captured them"; the result was that they died off like flies, from sheer want of nourishment; and it would be the worst sort of nightmare to imagine what would happen to our British soldiers who might have the misfortune to be captured by Bolsheviks or Afghans, if these were to keep strictly and conscientiously to the letter of Article Seven, Chap. II., of the Annex to the Hague Convention.

POLICY AND STRATEGY *

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR F. MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B.

SOLDIERS, young and old, should read and study Sir William Robertson's autobiography: the young because they will find in it how it is possible by hard work, devotion to duty, and by serious professional study, to rise without any advantages of birth, education, wealth or influence, from the bottom of the military ladder to the very top; and the old because they will find in it much about the conduct of war, coming from a man who has but recently conducted war, which is worthy of all the attention they can give. I doubt if in any other Army than the British such a career is possible. In other armies soldiers have risen from private to Field-Marshal, but in every case of which I know they have passed through the ranks quickly and have won most of their grades by displaying valour, coolness, and leadership in battle. Sir William Robertson enlisted in the 16th Lancers as a private when just under eighteen years of age, a friendly recruiting sergeant assuring him that the few months he was short of the statutory limit would not count, and he served for close on eleven years in the ranks. He escaped none of the trials and difficulties of the young soldier, for he was three times "crimed," and once spent three weeks in the guardroom. It is certainly unique to find a Field-Marshal describing the guardroom from inside.

The account which Sir William gives of life in the ranks in the 'seventies is full of interest, and makes one realize how much progress the Army has made in most matters, not in all, for it shows how much he owed to his troop and company officers, and makes one understand what a strength the fine tradition of close and kindly relations between officers and men, which existed then, as it does now, is to the British Army. His colonel, Wigham, tersely described Robertson's three crimes when he was brought before him for the third time: "First you allow a man to escape; then you allow a horse to escape; and now you allow both a man and a horse to break loose. You are severely reprimanded, and if you ever come before me again I will reduce you to the ranks." Sir William makes it abundantly clear that if he had not served under sensible officers,

* "From Private to Field Marshal." By Field Marshal Sir W. Robertson, Bart. London: Constable and Co.

who knew how to treat a willing young soldier in difficulties, his services would have been lost to the Empire. He says of the Brigadier who had to deal with his first crime : " Had he brought us to trial the chances are that I should have followed in the steps of many another soldier in those days, and have become a hardened offender against military law, a disgrace to myself, and a burden to my country."

Sir William sets out at the end of the book a table showing the dates of his promotions from private to Field-Marshal, and it is interesting to note that when with eleven years' service he became second lieutenant at the age of twenty-nine, he had already climbed half the rungs of the ladder to general officer. Naturally, in such a career, the changes and chances of promotion brought about some curious and interesting incidents, but perhaps the most interesting of all was that in 1880 Lance-Corporal Robertson was sent on what he describes as his first independent command, to Chatham in charge of three mounted orderlies for Major-General Evelyn Wood, and in March, 1920, he succeeded to the baton vacant in consequence of the death of Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood.

In 1888 Robertson joined the 3rd Dragoon Guards in India as a second lieutenant. It was no light task for a man without any private means to live in a British cavalry regiment. Robertson found a way of paying his bills by working hard at native languages during the hot weather, whilst most others were asleep, and in a wonderfully short time he had earned the rewards for qualifying in no less than five languages. He kept himself fit by practice with sword, foil and lance, and became famous for his skill as a man-at-arms throughout India. There can be no doubt but that these years of hard work as a subaltern formed his character and endowed him with that remarkable power of concentration which distinguished him in after life. In 1892 his fame as a linguist obtained for him an appointment in the Intelligence branch in Simla, and thenceforth he won his way forward by displaying in his service on the Staff his grasp of the higher problems of the military profession ; it is this which distinguishes him from all others who have carried a Marshal's baton in their knapsacks.

Sir William Robertson's career from subaltern to Major-General has been matched by the careers of many others of the British Army, and calls for no special comment here. The remarkable feature in that career is that a man coming from the ranks should have equipped himself to compete upon more than equal terms with the keenest professional soldiers of his day. Robertson first became widely known in the Army as Senior General Staff Officer of the Aldershot

Command, and as Commandant of the Staff College, where he trained and earned the admiration and affection of many of those who were destined to play important parts in the Great War. When war came he was Director of Military Training at the War Office, and was selected to be Quartermaster-General to the Expeditionary Force. He took over the important duties of this office with the experience behind him of varied service on the Staff in many parts of the world, and with a judgment ripened by much study of war. To this ripened judgment he added a naturally strong character, further strengthened by the circumstances of his career, an immense power of work, an iron constitution, and a fund of shrewd common-sense. His judgment was tested in the very early days of the war. He says :

“ He is merely a fool who, holding a high position in war, refuses to contemplate anything but success. ‘J’ai l’habitude,’ said Napoleon, ‘de penser trois ou quatre mois d’avance, à ce que je dois faire, et je calcule sur le pire.’ Confidence is an essential element in war, and in public should always be seen on the faces of all leaders and Staff officers, while any who are not endowed with a reasonable sense of humour should make room for those who are. But confidence and cheeriness do not mean that one should be cocksure of everything going as one would wish, especially at the beginning of a war when the unexpected is so apt to be the rule. It was necessary that the Quarter-Master-General’s Staff should examine the situation from every point of view, and introduce such elasticity into the supply arrangements as would promptly afford the Commander-in-Chief the greatest possible choice of action.”

So, while most others were planning for an advance towards Brussels, whilst our troops were marching into Mons, and before the British Army had fired a shot, Robertson was conferring with the Inspector-General of Communications as to a possible change of base from Havre to the Atlantic. It was this prescience which enabled him to fulfil the hard task of feeding the Army during the retreat from Mons, while its base was being changed, it was the reputation which he so established which marked him out as Sir Archibald Murray’s successor as Chief of the General Staff at the end of 1914. He had not been long in his new position before he began to be consulted by the Government at home, and when the extension of the war to other theatres brought an almost daily increasing number of problems to perplex and vex a harassed administration, it became evident that a reorganization of the General Staff at the War Office was imperative, and the choice both of Lord Kitchener and Mr. Asquith for the post of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff fell upon Robertson.

. The quidnuncs at the time were fond of writing that Robertson

had been brought home by Ministers, and had been given unusual powers by them in order that he might control Kitchener, which they themselves were incapable of doing. This was mere gossip, for Robertson states that Kitchener informed him some time before the appointment was made that he wanted him to take up the duties of Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Robertson had devoted the interval to very careful thought as to the functions of that officer in time of war. The result of his deliberations he communicated to Lord Kitchener in a letter which is of such importance that I propose to quote from it at some length.

“DEAR LORD KITCHENER,

“You were kind enough yesterday to express your willingness to receive some observations of mine regarding the conduct of the war, with special reference to the status and duties of the Chief of the Imperial Staff.

“For a long time past I have given careful and anxious consideration to this question. Both the history of past wars and our experience in the present war show that certain conditions are normally essential to the successful conduct of military operations, though there have, it is true, been isolated instances of commanders of genius who have triumphed in the absence of these conditions.

“These conditions are—

“(1) There should be a supreme directing authority whose function is to formulate policy, decide on the theatres in which military operations are to be conducted, and determine the relative importance of these theatres. This authority must also exercise a general supervision over the conduct of the war, and must select the men who are to execute the policy on which it has decided. Its constitution must be such that it is able to come to quick decisions, and therefore as regards the conduct of the war it must be absolute.

“The War Council should be capable of performing the functions of this supreme authority, provided it is relieved of responsibility to the Cabinet as a whole as regards the conduct of military operations as a whole, and that it has real executive power, and is not merely an advisory committee.

“The War Council will frequently find itself in a position similar to that of a commander in the field—that is, that it will have to come to a decision when the situation is obscure, when information is deficient, and when the wishes and powers of our allies are uncertain. Whatever these difficulties may be, if and when a decision is required it must be made. If it is deferred success cannot be expected; the commander concerned will have a grossly unfair burden placed upon him; and in fact the absence of a decision may be little less than criminal because of the loss of life which may be entailed.

“(2) In order that the War Council may be able to come to timely decisions of the questions with which it has to deal, it is essential that it should receive all advice on matters concerning military operations through one authoritative channel only. With us that channel must be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It is his function, so far as regards military operations, to present to the War Council his reasoned

opinion as to the effect of the policy they propose, and as to the means of putting this approved policy into execution. The War Council are then free to accept or reject the reasoned advice so offered.

"Advice regarding military operations emanating from members of the Cabinet, or of the War Council in their individual capacity, or from any other individual, should be sifted, examined, and presented, if necessary with reasoned conclusions, to the War Council by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff before it is accepted by the War Council.

"(3) All orders for the military operations required to put into execution the policy approved by the War Council should be issued and signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, under the authority of the Secretary of State for War, *not* under that of the Army Council. Similarly, all communications from General Officers Commanding regarding military operations should be addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In fact, the same procedure is required in London as obtains in the field, the War Council being in the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the whole of the Imperial Land Forces and with the War Office Staff constituting the Great General Headquarters of the Empire."

Then follow three paragraphs prescribing the reorganization of the War Office required to make it such a Great General Headquarters, a reorganization which has endured till to-day. The letter then goes on :

"I need not go more fully into my reasons for the above proposals, as I am sure they will be obvious to you. It is of paramount importance in war that there should be a definite plan of operations, and that that plan should be carried out with promptness and decision. It is impossible if the War Council is itself compelled to listen to conflicting advice, and to decide between the merits of rival experts. It is equally impossible that this should be so if the War Council has to submit its plans for the conduct of the war to the decision of the whole Cabinet. The War Council is now conducting military operations in a number of different theatres of war, and has control of large reserves which may be thrown into one theatre or the other. France has no reserves left, therefore the decision of the future conduct of the war by the Western Allies rests in great measure with the War Council. It is vital, then, that it should possess the machinery both to come to timely decisions and to have its decisions executed."

This document represents, as far as my knowledge goes, the first authoritative attempt to define the respective functions of the statesman and the soldier in war under the British Constitution as it has developed in modern times. It is remarkable that no attempt should have been made to obtain such a definition until we had entered on the seventeenth month of the war. The neglect to make the attempt was, in my judgment, by far the most serious of our omissions in our preparations for a European War, and it is hard to understand how that admirable body, the Committee of Imperial Defence, to whom we owe more than is generally recognized, came

to pass by so obvious a duty. In most other respects our preparations for the kind of war which we had been led to anticipate were adequate. Our Fleet in preponderating force was at its war stations in due time, and at once secured the command of the seas to a greater degree than any General Staff had the right to anticipate. The mobilization and transport to France of our Expeditionary Force were completed with a smoothness and rapidity which completely surprised the Germans. We had accepted the French estimates of the German strength on mobilization, and we now know that these estimates were very wide of the mark, and we had formed too high an opinion of the efficiency of the French Army ; but, on the data supplied to it, the Committee of Imperial Defence was justified in believing that the military aid which we were prepared to give to France would suffice to turn the balance in favour of the Entente. Soldiers have numerous and just grounds of complaint against Ministers as regards the conduct of the war, but as regards the military preparation for war it must be remembered that Ministers were not to blame for the fact that the information supplied to them before the war was incorrect. Lord Roberts's scheme for national service for home defence was vetoed by the General Staff on military grounds.* Though opinion was divided on the subject, the ultimate decision of the General Staff in the years immediately preceding the war was that mobility was of the first importance for our Expeditionary Force, that a European war must for economic reasons be of short duration, and for these reasons it was decided not to increase our heavy and medium artillery and our supply of high explosive shell. The defects of our military preparation are, in fact, mostly traceable to an undue reliance upon French military opinion—a reliance which is pardonable, when we remember that we were to add but a small contingent to the French Army, that to all appearance France was far more vitally concerned than were we in a correct solution of the problem and was better placed to judge of its necessities. In all other respects, save only in the vital matter of supreme control, our preparations were good. The War Book, compiled in the offices of the Committee of Imperial Defence, under the supervision of Sir Maurice Hankey, largely by Lieut.-Colonel Adrian Grant Duff, who fell in command of the 1st Battalion The Black Watch on the Aisne, in September, 1914, prescribed for every Department of State what its action should be in the event of war, and, owing to this careful preparation, the nation passed from a

* See "Our Requirements for Home Defence," *The Army Review*, July, 1912. This article was written under instructions by a distinguished member of the General Staff at the War Office.—F. M.

state of peace to a state of war with remarkably little friction, not the least of the results of this preparation being that the German spy system in this country was smothered at once, and consequently the German General Staff was ignorant of the fact that the bulk of our Expeditionary Force had landed at Havre, concentrated south of Maubeuge, and advanced to Mons.

In our Dominions and dependencies plans were ready for dealing with adjacent German colonies and for the maintenance of internal order. Seeing that we had no definite alliance with France and that our co-operation with her was conjectural and depended entirely on the course of events which gave rise to war, we had provided for such obligations as we had entered into. But it appears to have occurred to no one, soldier or statesman, that, given the circumstances of our Empire, war once begun would spread to theatres which could only be foreseen vaguely, that our reserves of strength would be in Great Britain, and that upon the correct distribution of those reserves would depend in great measure the successful conduct of the war. No one had foreseen the need for a Great General Headquarters of the Empire. The supreme direction was left in the hands of a Cabinet of more than twenty members, which body was incapable of coming to those quick decisions and of preserving that secrecy essential if our resources were to be used to the best advantage. The more important members of the General Staff at the War Office took care, naturally enough, to provide themselves with appointments in France, and Kitchener was left to run a department which no one had thought of equipping and organizing for the purposes of war.

To this neglect to prepare a supreme controlling authority and to provide it with adequate means, were due the troubles of 1915. How serious the situation was at the end of that year, when Robertson came into the War Office he tells us :—

“ Though not so immediately critical as in the spring of 1918, the general military situation at the end of 1915 was darker and more complicated than at any period of the war. Russia had suffered crushing defeats at the hands of Mackensen, losing heavily in men, territory, and morale, and whether she would be able to recover from them sufficiently to be of effective assistance to the Allies in the future was at least doubtful. The Italian armies seemed unable to make material progress in expelling the Austrians from their positions beyond the Isonzo. On the West Front no tangible results could as yet be shown in return for the great expenditure of life incurred. Servia had been overrun, the remnants of her army driven out of the country, and the Anglo-French forces, sent out too late to help her, were now opposed by strong hostile forces in front, had an uncertain neutral on their flanks, and were left with no better objective than the passive defence of Salonika. The Dardanelles operations had

been partially abandoned as a failure, Anzac and Suvla having already been evacuated, and the remaining troops were clinging to Cape Helles pending a decision as to whether they were to remain there or come away. On the western frontier of Egypt the Senussi tribesmen had established themselves within striking distance of the Nile valley ; in the Sudan there were signs of trouble with the Sultan of Darfur, who had been approached by Turkish agents ; and on the east the Turks were in possession of the Sinai Peninsula, and were being promised German support in an attack on Egypt from that side, thus endangering the most vital of our Imperial communications—the Suez Canal. In Mesopotamia an Anglo-Indian force under Major-General Townshend, inadequate in strength and imperfectly organized, had retreated from Ctesiphon after the abortive attempt to capture Baghdad, and since the beginning of December had been besieged by a considerable Turkish army at Kut-el-Amara. Thus the 'one bright spot on the military horizon,' as Baghdad was thought to be by certain people only a few weeks before, had receded so far into space as to be wholly invisible. In East Africa we were unable to defend our territory, and British prestige was at its lowest ebb.

"As regards our own share in bringing about this state of affairs, it is no exaggeration to say that every mistake we had made in our wars with France a hundred years before had been repeated. We had committed ourselves to expeditions, on a vast scale and in remote theatres, which were strategically unsound, had never been properly thought out, and in the Dardanelles alone had cost us considerably over 100,000 casualties. The false direction thus given to our strategy imperilled the chances of ultimate success, and at the best was bound to hang like a millstone round our necks for the remainder of the war—as it did."

In a year a properly equipped Great General Headquarters of the Empire and a reorganized General Staff under Robertson's leadership had effected a remarkable change. By December, 1916, Russia was in possession of a supply of munitions and guns, which if not wholly adequate for her great army was vastly greater than any she had possessed before, while the successes won by Brusiloff in the Bukovina promised well for the future. Egypt had been made safe to friends, for in the west the Senoussi had been overcome, and in the east Murray had gained control of the Sinai Peninsula. In Mesopotamia the lines of communication had been properly equipped, and Maude had begun that brilliant series of operations which culminated in the occupation of Baghdad. Of Maude, whom he selected for the command, Robertson says :—

"I knew that Maude possessed a high standard of honour, a qualification without which, and historical exceptions notwithstanding, no man is fit to hold an important command. I knew also that he was careful of the interests of his men, held sound views on tactical and strategical questions, recognized the value of good organization, and in every way seemed to be the ideal man to clear up the Mesopotamian muddle and give the Turks a thrashing into the bargain."

The campaign on the Tigris was then in safe hands ; so was that in East Africa where Smuts had driven von Lettow far into the interior of the German colony. A great part of the Dardanelles Expeditionary Force, refitted by Murray in Egypt, had been transferred to the Western Front, and arrangements had been completed for further reinforcing our Armies in France from home to an extent which gave them in the Spring of 1917 the greatest combatant strength ever attained during the course of the war. On that front, too, the strain of the battles of Verdun and the Somme had sapped the strength of the German Army. As evidence of this, Robertson quotes Ludendorff's, " We were completely exhausted on the Western Front. We now urgently need a rest. The army had been fought to a standstill and was utterly worn out." Not until September, 1918, was the military situation again so favourable to the Allies. The one dark spot on the picture was that Germany, following her policy of striking at the weak, had overrun Roumania, and had once more ended the year's campaigning with a showy military success, which exercised an undue influence on the minds of the statesmen. The time had come to press home the solid advantages won at great cost, and in November, 1916, Joffre, Haig and Robertson had planned so to do.

Unfortunately, the statesmen were not at all convinced that the situation had changed for the better. Mr. Lloyd George was horrified at the heavy casualty lists of the Somme. M. Briand was far from satisfied with Joffre's handling of the battle of Verdun.

" The enemy," says Robertson, " was careful to play on the fears and nerves of those who, unacquainted with the practical side of war in general, and with the conditions of the Great War in particular, were apt to give more attention to his cunningly devised communiques than to the importance of strict adherence to sound strategical principles. In face of these circumstances it was uphill work trying to convince some of those with whom I was brought into contact, that, given perseverance in the right direction, victory was assured."

Such a statement would be received with an impatient shrug of the shoulders, as if to say, " We have heard the same story scores of times before, and are still as far from winning the war as ever we were." In fact, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand had simultaneously come to the conclusion that what was required was a more complete civilian control of the conduct of the war. Not that Robertson had ever claimed a voice in deciding policy or had overestimated the military factor in the conduct of the war. On these matters he had no illusions.

"I used to estimate that of the total effort of which the nation was capable only twenty-five per cent. was purely military, the remaining seventy-five per cent. being of a non-military nature; and when asked sometimes what our chances of winning were, I would reply: 'Why ask me with my twenty-five per cent.? Ask those who manipulate the seventy-five per cent.'"

What Robertson had insisted on was that the chosen military adviser of the Government should be left free to carry out his twenty-five per cent. of the national task in accordance with the approved policy of that Government. Mr. Lloyd George had other views. He had no faith in the competence of the soldiers and believed a civilian dictatorship to be the proper machinery for the conduct of the war. Like many other British statesmen, who have never studied military history, and political history, in so far as it touches upon the conduct of war, only superficially, he had a reverence for the Pitt tradition, confounding the methods of the elder and the younger Pitt into a brilliant gaseous nebula which bore the appearance to eyes willing to be deceived of the apotheosis of statecraft in time of war. He desired to draw his military advice from any quarter, and to frame his plans in accordance with the adviser who best suited his purpose.

Robertson's principles were diametrically opposed to those of Mr. Lloyd George:—

"It is not my purpose to enlarge upon the evils which accompany the tendency to change from one plan to another—at bewilderingly short intervals and without sufficient reason—beyond observing that it has an unsettling effect on the troops, and monopolizes much of the time of commanders and their staffs, which ought to be given to other matters. At a guess I would say that in 1917 at least twenty per cent. of the time of the General Staff at the War Office was occupied in explaining, either verbally or in writing, that the alternative projects put forward were either strategically unsound or were wholly impracticable.

"The General Staff must expect to have the same experience in future wars, and they must try neither to despair nor to become impatient, but they will not find these precepts easy to practise, and for myself I must confess to frequent failures. Much will depend on the personality of ministers and of their responsible professional advisers. . . . I say 'responsible' advisers because advice given by others, although they may be professionals, is often without value and may be positively mischievous. Such advice poses as being expert, whereas the person who gives it can seldom possess the information on which to base a reliable opinion, and as he is not responsible for the execution of his proposals his outlook is quite different from that of the person who has the responsibility. I frequently told ministers that if I were not C.I.G.S. I could produce half a dozen different plans for winning the war, quickly and at small cost; but as it was I had but one plan, and that a hard one to carry out—the defeat of the German armies on the West Front."

This conflict of views did not become apparent immediately upon the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's Government. The right course for the Prime Minister would have been either to have obtained Robertson's agreement to his method of conducting the war, or, failing that, to have changed his military adviser. Mr. Lloyd George did not at first feel strong enough to adopt either course. He endeavoured, therefore, to carry through his policy by indirect means, and without consulting his military adviser. The result was tragic. The chance of winning the war in 1917, which was very real in December, 1916, was thrown away. The plan agreed upon by Haig and Joffre was scrapped and that of Nivelle was substituted, involving a delay of many months, which allowed the Germans time to escape from their difficulties on the Somme into the Hindenburg line. The arrangement by which Nivelle was placed in control on the Western Front at the Calais Conference at the end of February, 1917, was curious.

"The proposal to make this innovation came as a complete surprise to Sir Douglas Haig and myself, as neither of us had heard anything about it before it was put forward on the evening of the 26th. The Conference was being held, so we had been given to understand, mainly in regard to another matter—transportation. Not having been consulted, and having no idea that the nomination of General Nivelle as Allied Commander-in-Chief was contemplated, Sir Douglas Haig and I had had no opportunity of considering what it involved, and our position was the more awkward because General Nivelle had, as he told me, been informed by his government beforehand of what was intended."

The proposal to place the Commander of one Army in control of another was militarily unsound, for no man with his eyes glued to the front for which he is responsible can successfully direct operations on another front. The Germans tried this method during their first march through Belgium, when they put von Kluck under von Bülow and it was one of the causes of their failure. Our soldiers were left with the alternative of resigning on the eve of a campaign, or of endeavouring to carry out the policy which the Government had forced upon them. They chose the latter course as the lesser of the two evils, for the former would have created consternation and dismay at a time when confidence was of supreme importance. But the result was certain to be to produce friction, and it did. It is possible, but improbable, that the Prime Minister's system would have given us victory in 1917; it is very probable that Robertson's system, supported whole-heartedly by the Government, would have done so. The two systems working in conflict led inevitably to the disasters of the Spring of 1918. The clash came early in that year. When the Russian Army collapsed, Robertson desired before

everything else to strengthen the Western Front. Mr. Lloyd George believed that we were "over-insured" on that front. He refused Robertson the men for whom he asked; he desired an offensive campaign in Palestine, whereas Robertson desired to economize troops in the secondary theatres in order to reinforce Haig. The conflict between policy and strategy grew more and more intense, and it culminated over the question of the Executive Military Council at Versailles. Robertson was in no way opposed to a real military "unity of command." "The creation," he says, "of a properly constituted High Command became a matter of increased importance in January, 1918." He was, however, opposed to placing a part of the forces on the Western Front in charge of a polyglot committee, every member of which had the right of appeal to the Supreme War Council, while the British member was independent both of the British Commander-in-Chief and of the British C.I.G.S.

"In my opinion it was ridiculous to think that control over the strategical reserves could be separated from control over the operations as a whole, and therefore, failing the appointment of a Generalissimo—to which the Prime Minister told Parliament he was opposed,—the duty must be performed by the Chiefs of the General Staff, the responsible executive officers of the Governments. . . . The arrangement made was, that while the C.I.G.S. should continue to be the supreme military adviser of the Government, the military representative at Versailles should 'be absolutely free and unfettered' in the advice he gave as a member of the Executive Committee."

Robertson was offered either post, but refused, because the existence of the two independent advisers of the Government was directly contrary to the principle on which he had always insisted.

"Had I seen a practicable and honourable way of filling either post I should certainly have taken it, for I naturally did not wish to forfeit the opportunity of finishing the war as C.I.G.S., or in some other responsible position, while by declining both posts I might find myself out of active employment altogether and would thereby inflict hardship upon my family by the financial loss incurred. Seeing no such way I determined to do what any average Britisher in my place would have done—act according to my convictions be the consequences what they might."

So Robertson was removed, and after his removal a kindly providence forced upon us effective unity of command, and a single system for the conduct of the war, which perforce brought policy and strategy into accord. Every cadet at Woolwich and Sandhurst learns that these two must be in agreement, but I fear that not even the terrible years of the Great War have brought the same lesson home to our statesmen or turned their thoughts to defining explicitly the respective functions of soldiers and ministers.

A NOVEL ABOUT THE EX-KAISER

A SOMEWHAT curious novel on the subject of the *ex-Kaiser* has been written by Karl Rosner, who was one of the special Press correspondents at German G.H.Q. It is possibly a piece of propaganda, for it almost makes us feel some sort of pity for the wretched man, but it undoubtedly contains accurate accounts of certain historic incidents. Its title is simply "The King" (*Der König*), and its story covers the dramatic period from the 14th to the 22nd of July, 1918, the days of the last German offensive in France and of the last hopes of victory—hopes which were dashed to the ground by Foch's *riposte* at the Chateau Thierry salient. Though Wilhelm II. is always referred to as "the King," Hindenburg as "the Field-Marshal," and Ludendorff as "the General" or "the First Quartermaster-General," there is no other attempt at disguise. The fighting generals, Below, Böhn, etc., are called by their names; and no effort is made to alter or to conceal the place-names. The descriptions of the Supreme Headquarters, the Royal train, and the visits to troops and battlefields are without doubt the work of an eye-witness; and it would seem that the author has been given some first-hand account of the interviews of the Kaiser with Hindenburg—Ludendorff, and of his conversations with his suite, for he displays an inside knowledge which could hardly be pretended to even by the most talented and imaginative writer of war reminiscences.

The scene opens with the visit of "the King" to the Supreme Command at Avesnes on the eve of the offensive which was to end the war. Hindenburg receives him with every mark of outward respect and many smooth phrases; but we are at once shown the rift between the Monarch and the man who is really commanding his armies. The First Quartermaster-General is too busy to attend the reception; so the King is taken to his room, where he awaits him, "business-like and composed, eyeglass in the right eye, a soldier—only a soldier." Standing at attention, he recites, as only a Prussian General Staff Officer can, a ceremonious report upon the situation and the proposed plans. The poor King is anxious to stay and follow events, but the great pair have no use for him,

and the Field-Marshal says, discreetly and softly breaking the silence :

“Ja—and we have had a fine observatory built for to-night’s great fireworks and propose to Your Majesty. . . .”

The General steals a glance at the clock, and the obedient War Lord accepts the hint and departs.

His anxiety is horrible, and the waiting irritates his nerves ; but he feels he must keep up “ an unshaken front, Royal calm and a soldierly certainty of victory.”

As he travels back in his motor car, his thoughts take charge of him and he recalls his unhappy youth—an unsympathetic mother,

“ interested in secret politics and many letters to England, rather than in her children . . . with never a foolish caressing motherly word for him or the younger ones ; ”

a father with contempt for, and finally “ with poisonous hatred ” of him ; all his boyish natural feelings were repressed, so that he gradually came to live a second and separate life in his thoughts, full of romantic impossibilities, but empty of a single human friend or confidant. Then as it gets dark he takes a walk with his *Hofmarschall*, tells the story of his first love for the Empress Elizabeth of Austria ; and then drifts into propaganda :—

“ we are fighting a defensive war. We want to live our own future undisturbed and unconfined, that is all. Our best objective in this war must be to learn to have mutual understanding with other nations, and so understand them, that there is never again such a catastrophe, such a hideous misfortune as another war in Europe.”

The *Hofmarschall* murmurs to himself : “ Mutual understanding, eternal peace : only the romantic boy again, the eternal idealist of the Empress Elizabeth.”

The King spends a miserable day in the observatory built for him by Hindenburg to keep him out of the way. The suite openly express their boredom, and one of them whispers : “ When is he going to have had enough of this film ? ”

The Crown Prince, “ slim, almost too slim,” arrives : the author depicts him as a clever up-to-date soldier, with wide, far-seeing military judgment. His father tries to keep him by his side so that he may have some human being that he loves near him in his agony, but the Prince says that he must go back to his command, and slips off, driving his own car, followed from the observatory by his father’s hungry eyes.

News is doled out to the King by a young General Staff captain attached to his suite, a military machine. The fighting goes against the Germans, but the All-Highest dares not telephone to Hindenburg for full particulars. He seeks refuge in his old Bible, given him by his grandfather on the day of his confirmation, and soothed by the well-known words, drops off to sleep, but not to rest. King Edward VII. and Bismarck appear to him in his dreams. The former is, of course, represented as his evil genius, the latter as the stern represser of his efforts to better the lot of his people.

As regards the war, the King feels his conscience perfectly clear. He "delayed to the utmost stretch of his dignity, left no means untried : in Vienna, with Nicky, with George . . . he is innocent of all guilt. It is on the other side that judgment must fall." No doubt, first on the Belgians.

There are little interludes of relief :—the solemn farce of the King and the officials, bowing and saluting each other in a darkened railway station, kept unlighted for fear of aeroplanes ; the anxiety of the elderly members of the suite for their meals and a game of bridge ; and a little sarcasm when a fighting soldier sent by an Army to act as guide finds himself absolutely out of place amongst the King's entourage. He disappears without warning to fight and fall with his regiment, to be replaced by an eye-glassed and grinning fop who knows nothing and agrees with everybody. The King asks if he may visit Avesnes, Hindenburg's command post, but the Field-Marshal recommends him "a nice hill near Rheims" as a coign of vantage. Eventually, the French break through : disaster is in the air, and the Field-Marshal summons his King to Headquarters.

There is a long scene between the King and Hindenburg—Ludendorff, which is one of those which seem to be something more than the work of the imagination. It ends with the King saying pointedly :—

"'Excellency, that sounds somewhat different from the things you reported to me four days ago.' Blood rises to the general's face. But he controls himself, and, with a voice only slightly harder and sharper, says, 'Sets-back are within the realms of possibility in any war. If I have lost the confidence of Your Majesty. . . .' But the King makes a decided gesture of dissent, always with the desire to heal where he has perchance hurt."

He expresses only one wish : there must be no giving up of ground, no second retreat to the Aisne after a second Marne. His people will not stand it. Then he learns that nothing but a miracle can save the Army. He has thoughts of joining the fighting troops ; but

remembers that he does not know even the words of command, and that his suite will insist on following him ; he feels that the sight of his party rushing into the fray in patent leather boots, with their many decorations jingling around them, would only cause ridicule.

The suite now, as frequently, appears as chorus :

“ If he had only had a little more luck in the war. Are good luck and ill-luck the measure of worth and worthlessness ? No, we are unjust to him. . . . He has been sinned against from his childhood up. . . . He has become what his environment wished him to be ; the nearer environment of his deferential and ever acquiescent courtiers, and the wider environment of his deferential and ever acquiescent Germans. . . . They formed a volunteer chorus, which danced rejoicing around him and dinned into him : ‘ as you are, so are you after our own hearts.’ . . . The judgment of this world will be against him. Guilt ? Weakness ? Fate ? Who can say ? The good that he wished became his misfortune.”

And we leave him in the solitude of his chamber on the Royal train, his arms stretched out on the table and his head bowed on his hands.

Herr Rosner has given us the tragedy of the later days : it is to be hoped he will draw us another picture in a different style of the early days when the Kaiser thought he was winning, and boasted, as Helfferich has told us, that his Armies had captured Rheims, and his cavalry was within thirty miles of Paris, and he was making preparations for his triumphal entry into the enemy's capital, amid a bodyguard of squadrons of white cuirassiers in silver helmets and batteries of cameras.

NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

STRATEGY

TWENTY-EIGHT years ago Lieut.-General von Moser (then Captain and recently passed out of the Kriegsakademie) wrote a clear and reliable strategical retrospect of the 1870-1 war, which ran through five editions in Germany. Since then he served as brigade, divisional and corps commander in the Great War, helping to drive us back, as related in his "Feldzugsaufzeichnungen," at Cambrai. He has been an instructor at the Kriegsakademie and conducted the "Generals' course" on the Western Front in the winter of 1917-18. His new book on the strategy of 1914-18, "Kürzer strategischer Ueberblick über den Weltkrieg" (Berlin: Mittler, 24 marks), carries, therefore, considerable authority. It is admittedly written for the German people, but seems in every way to be a very impartial and well considered summary and criticism.

The events of each year in turn are very shortly related, and the most important ones pointed out, and then follows a lengthy strategical discussion. There is also a map of Europe for each year in three colours, so that what happened can be seen at a glance. The book will prove invaluable to those who wish to study the war from the German standpoint, or for examination purposes, as it is full of sound ideas.

Under the year 1914 he admits that the Great General Staff placed too great and harmful faith in dead and gone German military leaders and writers on the art of war, and thought in the double envelopment theory it had a recipe for victory; before the war there was no attempt to co-ordinate the naval and military operations; great reliance was laid on Russia not being ready; the Emperor's control of military and political matters was nominal, with hardly an attempt to conceal that this was the case. The conduct of the war from the very first was "hand to mouth." There was no great strategic reserve in second line in order to secure a really decisive blow against the French left wing, and no attempt to exploit strategically the local successes of corps and armies. But the real cause of failure was the strategic incompetence of the Chief of the General

Staff and his first adviser (this may be the Deputy Chief, von Stein, or the Chief of the Operations Section, Tappen). With a wholly unjustifiable under-estimation of the French leaders and troops, these gentlemen planned a super-Cannae, in which the enemy's left was to be overwhelmed in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin, and his right near Toul—Epinal, without regard to the fact that the German heavy artillery, which was required to break down the French eastern fortresses, was in Belgium and Northern France, and therefore not available. It is admitted that the battle of the Marne, 1914, was a turning point in the war, but it is claimed that it was not a tactical or a strategical victory, and that the retirement was necessary, not only to evade the "possible punishment of a catastrophe," but because, on account of lack of troops and ammunition reserves and a total want of co-ordinated leading, a decisive victory near Paris "even with extreme good luck" was out of the question.

With regard to Ypres, 1914, it is suggested that, as the ground was so unfavourable for the Germans, it would have been better to have put in the Reserve Corps from Lille—that is, against the British III. Corps at Armentières—instead of near the coast, but it is admitted that the condition of the German Army after the Marne was such that the Supreme Command dared not take either tactical or strategic liberties.

"This fatal compulsion to extreme strategic and tactical caution, of which only a military genius could have shaken clear, dominated and enfeebled for long, even to 1918, the situation on the West Front and the decisions made there."

For 1915, it is suggested that it would have been the proper course—and entirely in consonance with the feelings of the German people—to have stood on the defensive against Russia and France, and turned the whole of the available force of the Reich against its hated foe, the British. The strategy pursued led to gain of territory, but failed to achieve any strategic result, and left the German Army worn and wasted (*mitgenommen*) in a high degree, and still continuously

"on the strain, without possibility of recuperation . . . but still with its moral and confidence unshaken."

Of 1916, we are told that, in spite of the wonderful efforts and successes in the East, which preserved Austria from disaster,

"on the West Front, Verdun and the Somme consumed so much of the still remaining best of German blood and nerves, that only the defensive

was possible. The strategic initiative, therefore, was entirely lost on the most important front."

General von Moser is not inclined to blame the idea of the attack on Verdun; but whether it was likely to be strategically fortunate depended on two factors: the possibility of breaking off the attack when desired, and forcing France to put her last man to defend Verdun—and neither of these factors held good.

The author considers that the retirement to the Siegfried position in 1917 saved the German Army.

"Without it Germany would hardly have survived the year on the West Front."

In spite of it, and in spite of the collapse of the Russian Army,

"At the end of the year the position of the Central Powers in nearly every theatre of war was extremely serious; the casualties and the starved condition of Germany and her allies, in contrast to the always renewed ranks and strength of the Entente, formed the greatest strategic danger for the German leaders in 1918."

Of the strategy of the last year little good is said:

"The axeblooms of the carefully collected main force of the German Western Army, brought no strategic booty of any kind whatever. When Amiens was not captured, it would have been better to have cut the loss and retired out of the salient, but the German people could not have borne such a confession of failure."

So the Supreme Command decided

"not to announce its strategic failure by abandoning the conquered ground, in the hope that by staying there and making partial attacks it would fetter strong enemy forces, and thus support most effectively the second carefully prepared blow in Flanders."

The Lys offensive after fourteen days' heavy fighting

"led only to a glorious deed of arms, the storming of the with-troops-and-weapons-larded Kemmel Hill. But the strategic situation was not improved by this local tactical success."

It was impossible to advance farther and secure Cassel, and the difficult situation at Amiens was merely reproduced, but with the difference that the German troops

"had lost their former dash in the attack, their determination, as well as their old discipline."

Of Ludendorff's black day, we are told

"the really catastrophic tank attack and the deep breach in our line on the 8th of August, brought home to the German Supreme Command—

and also to the enemy commander—the true state of affairs, and the lowered power of resistance and fighting capacity of the German troops . . . every prospect of military victory had finally disappeared. . . . Ludendorff's plan for 1918 to force the enemy peoples to a wish for peace by hard knocks and tactical successes was shattered, not on account of lack of power of the German Army, but as a result of strategic faults, in particular, the ineffective direction which the first great attack took (that is towards Amiens, instead of Boulogne—Abbeville) and the tension in the situation in May and June."

It only remained to save Germany from capitulation by retreat, and bringing all available men to the West. But Ludendorff would not give up his conquests in the East. His successor's plan was to gain time to get the heavy guns and material back to the Antwerp—Meuse position. The daily increasing numerical superiority of the Allies destroyed all hope of this, but General von Moser admits

"the energy, determination and tactical skill of the enemy leaders, were weighty factors in the final disaster."

WESTERN FRONT

General Palat's seventh volume of the History of the War on the Western Front ("La Grande Guerre sur le front occidental," Tome VII. Paris: Chapelot, 12 francs) covers a period, from the 14th of September to the 15th of October, 1914, about which little authentic information of the French operations is available. It includes the battle of the Aisne and the "Race to the Sea," with chapters on the loss of St. Mihiel and Antwerp. The book is somewhat heavy reading, and the text is not assisted by the maps, which are merely extracts of the hachured 1 : 80,000, without any indication of troops on them.

The author's general view is that the Allies ought to have done better, and with competent leading should have been able to have struck and defeated the German right flank before it became anchored on the coast. On the Aisne, Joffre's turning movement was made with insufficient force: the extension of his front to the left and northward was carried out by throwing there any formation upon which he could lay hands, without higher organization except in name; the flow of troops there was gravely interrupted by Sir John French requesting, and then insisting, that the B.E.F. should be transferred from the Aisne to the neighbourhood of Lille; the efforts made to save Antwerp by sending troops there would have been more effective if applied to the German still open flank.

The operations of the French at the Aisne are of special interest. On the immediate right of the British was the XVIII. Corps, which fought shoulder to shoulder with them, opposed to the German Seventh and First Armies; but when the Allies arrived on the Aisne on the evening of the 12th and until the 15th, in addition to the gap opposite the British closed on the 15th, there was another gap of at least six miles between the eastern flank of these Armies and von Bülow's Second Army, which for protection had echeloned back its right. Into this gap advanced Conneau's Cavalry Corps (4th, 8th and 10th Cavalry Divisions), supported by Valabrègue's Group of Reserve Divisions, our neighbours during the retreat from Mons; whilst east of these forces were the remainder of Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army (X., I. and III. Corps) in the Rheims area. Conneau was ordered "to act on the rear of the two German groups," and Valabrègue to turn the right flank of Bülow's Army. At 5 a.m. on the 14th of September when the B.E.F. and French XVIII. Corps were making this great effort to reach the Chemin des Dames, Conneau's 4th Cavalry Division, with the 8th Cavalry Division coming up in support, was at Amifontaine, six miles north of the Aisne at Berry au Bac. Menaced on the east (by the advance of Bülow's right), the two Cavalry Divisions were withdrawn by Conneau, first to Juvincourt, halfway back to Berry au Bac, and finally at 1.45 p.m. across the Aisne.

"To sum up," says the author, "the rôle of Conneau's Cavalry Corps was reduced to nearly nothing on the 14th. Possibly it could have done better." An officer who was present writes: "A double battle was developing in the mist. We execute an exhausting ride, the motive of which escapes us for the moment. The horses drop unceasingly. . . ."

As for the Group Valabrègue, "it seems merely to have remained on the defensive;" and the right of the Fifth Army could not get on, and "General d'Esperey called for the intervention of the Ninth Army (General Foch) on his right."

The Sixth Army (General Maunoury) on the left of the British was unable to effect very much, though its orders were "to break definitely the enemy's resistance and turn and envelope his right flank." Its right and centre were practically stopped (*à peu près arrêtés*), as were the British. For the great enveloping movement, there were only available the 37th Division and the IV. Corps, towards Carlepont (eight miles north of the Aisne), with Bridoux's Cavalry Corps farther north, near Péronne. General Bridoux was killed, and all his staff, except one officer, killed or wounded by their cars

being misdirected at a road fork and falling into an ambush. The delays entailed by absence of orders made the cavalry movements abortive. The 37th Division and IV. Corps made some progress on the 14th and 15th, but were eventually outflanked from the north. By the 17th of September,

“ the result of several days’ fighting disappeared. It would perhaps have been possible to have held a large part of the salient at Cuts (near Carlepont) if a larger use had been made of entrenchments.”

On the evening of the 17th, General Maunoury ordered his left wing back

“ to the line Bois St. Mard—Bailly, which we were to hold for so many years.”

General Foch on the 14th and 15th of September seems to have judged the situation like Sir J. French, for on the former day he ordered his Army

“ to push on, to continue the pursuit, and to reach, if possible, with its advanced guards the line of the Aisne (which the British reached on the 12th). For the 15th, he ordered his Army to attack with all forces, keeping the minimum of reserves.”

General Palat ascribes the check on the Aisne to lack of heavy artillery, whilst in the “ Race to the Sea,” gun ammunition ran so low that General Joffre had to warn his Army Commanders that

“ if expenditure were continued at the same rate, the war would come to an end in a fortnight for lack of ammunition.”

The version of the loss of the Fort Camp des Romaines (St. Mihiel) given is that the neighbouring forts were too far away to co-operate ; the Germans shelled it into silence, then closed up and smoked the garrison out with asphyxiating gas, introduced down the chimneys of the casemates.

General Palat is not complimentary about British assistance to Antwerp and our trying to relieve it by sending reinforcements. When we wish to take fortifications, we think a few naval guns will do the trick ; when we have to defend a fortress, we consider a few untrained men with rifles will ensure its safety.

General Dubail has published the third volume of his Diary dealing with his command of the Group of Armies of the East from the 15th of August, 1915, to the 31st of March, 1916 (“ Quatre Années de commandement 1914-18, Journal de Campagne,” Tome III. Paris : Fournier, 24 francs). It does not contain much

of interest to British readers, unless they wish to know what happened at Hartmannsweilerkopf, Eparges, Schratzmaennele, and in the fighting in the Vosges), for it is mainly a daily record of trench warfare, attempts to gain good positions for a future offensive, and the training of troops on the front from Belfort to Verdun. On the 1st of February, 1916, ten days before the great German offensive, the Verdun sector was transferred to the Group of Armies of the Centre, under General de Langle de Cary, so General Dubail only deals with the preparations to meet attack, which seem to have been scanty, owing to lack of labour.

On the 14th of October, 1915, there is the first mention of the Germans employing machine guns outside the general line of their defences, and the author suggested using 37 or 47 mm. guns to deal with them as battalion guns.

There is a good story of an artillery non-commissioned officer sent as forward observer with an infantry battalion. Being No. 1 of his gun and never having observed fire but once before, he had little idea how to perform his job, and when asked how he proposed to get information back to his commanding officer, replied, "En me rendant auprès de lui à cheval."

General Dubail seems to have spent most of his time in inspecting the defences and training of divisions out of the line for rest. Lack of training is his constant complaint.

"Speaking generally, the captains and platoon commanders don't know how to deploy a company. One must go to battalion commanders to find anyone who by previous instruction understands the tactical handling of a company. The subalterns who have entered the Service since mobilization have not been completely trained in open warfare. This lack of instruction is exhibited also in the total inability to read a map. As for the men, they are absolutely ignorant of outpost duty, which practically is only known by the battalion commander."

This was written in November, 1915.

Provision was made for the Germans attempting to pass through Switzerland by fortifying a position between Delle (the frontier station south of Belfort) and Lomont, facing the gap through which the railway passes.

There are a few notes about the Chantilly Conferences, which are of considerable historical interest. We learn that Sir John French was much hampered by his ignorance of the French language.

"The Conference, interrupted by déjeuner, was resumed immediately after it, and ended at 2 p.m. Field Marshal French did not remain for déjeuner, as he feels out of place, owing to his ignorance of the French language."

There is both history and instruction in General Regnault's "La 3^e Division d'Infanterie, août 1914" (Paris : Fournier, 7 francs). Its 300 pages describe in detail, with copies of operation orders and other documents, the doings of a French division in the Fourth Army (de Langle de Cary) between the 5th and 31st of August, 1914, most of them being devoted to the last ten days. For two years, March, 1910—May, 1912, General Regnault was Sub-Chief of the Staff of the Army, he then commanded the Seine District, and in December, 1913, was given command of the 3rd Division under General Picquart, then commanding the II. Corps. On the 31st of August, 1914, he was made one of the scapegoats for the failure of the French offensive and removed from his command on account of "une depression morale et physique." He was subsequently re-employed at Salonica.

The book, except for an appendix in which the General's correspondence with the War Office is given, merely tells a plain story, but significant enough. On the 21st of August, the II. Corps moved forward via Montmedy on Virton, in one column, the 4th Division finding the advanced guard, and the 3rd Division being in the main body. On the 22nd, whilst in column of route, and while General Regnault was actually in conversation with the Corps Commander, General Gérard, the 3rd Division was fired on, and

"found itself engaged in a battle as it left the villages where the 4th Division had passed the night and which it had quitted at daybreak."

No orders were issued, we are told, by the Corps Commander, who then left in his car, except to send out a couple of battalions as flank guard.

The Fourth Army had literally walked into the enemy.

"On the right of the 3rd Division, the Army of General Ruffey suffered the same fate."

General Regnault claims that his Division alone in the two Armies held its ground. By daybreak on the 23rd, no orders had reached him, a little later he was instructed to organize *points d'appui* and a second position. On the 24th, 25th and 26th, the Fourth Army retreated to the Meuse. Having safely crossed the river and destroyed all the bridges, General de Langle de Cary issued the following order, dated 6 p.m., 26th of August :—

"I have decided to deliver a decisive battle to-morrow to drive the enemy back beyond the Meuse.

"The Corps will be engaged *à fond* with the sole and entire purpose to conquer at all costs.

"The artillery will act massed; the entire infantry will be put in: every man must feel that he is really taking part in battle."

The order was somewhat puzzling to General Regnault, for on the ten miles of front he was covering on the left bank of the Meuse, not a single German had crossed, and inhabitants and patrols reported there were none opposite him. In fact, the enemy crossed north of his section. He was ordered, at 3 p.m. on the 27th, to take every available battalion (he collected seven) through thick trackless woods, and make a counter-attack, leading it personally. This direction was repeated six times on the telephone. By 7 p.m. he got his battalions through, and in the dark drove the Germans out of the village of Cesse. The confusion was naturally appalling, and he had to rally his men clear of the village to reorganize. In the morning his Division was ordered into reserve, and then to cover the retreat of the II. Corps:

"As at Montmédy on the 25th and at Baalon on the 26th, it is flight," he recorded.

On the 30th and 31st of August the Division was again on the defensive, for which the Corps, as usual, issued the most detailed instructions. Judging by the orders given in the book, a French Divisional General was left little initiative, and frequently had merely to pass on paragraphs from Corps orders. His staff was calculated apparently for this sort of work, for it consisted of only one major and three captains. Taken in conjunction with General Lanrezac's revelations, the higher staff work in the French Army in 1914 appears to have been, as most observers of French Staff College methods suspected it would be, singularly behind the times.

A history of the French 56th Reserve Division in the period between the 1st of August to the 2nd of October, 1914, by its Commander, "*La 56^e Division au Feu.*" Par le général F. de Dartein. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 5 francs), is of interest to us, as this Division joined General Maunoury's Sixth Army on the 29th of August from Lorraine, and was on the left of the B.E.F. during the remainder of the retreat; its movements, therefore, concern us closely.

One incident related has its lesson—General de Dartein sent a staff officer over to the British on his right, but as this officer could not speak English and those he met could not speak French, and there was no interpreter available, communication was not established. The book has 200 pages, four portraits and six maps.

Another of the many popular legends of the war—that thousands

of taxis in a few hours transported an army from the pavement of Paris to the battle line, and thus decided the battle of the Ourcq, if not that of the Marne—has been completely demolished by the publication by Commandant Henri Carré, with a preface by General Maunoury, of “*La Véritable Histoire des Taxis de la Marne* (6, 7 et 8 septembre, 1914)” (Paris: Chapelot, 4 francs). It is a very vivid account of what actually happened, with many interesting details, including the orders issued in connection with the taxis, operation orders of the Sixth Army and IV. Corps, which make a fragment of military history which is well worth reading. In reality, only the 14th Infantry Brigade (six battalions) of the newly arrived IV. Corps was transported in taxis from its detrainment area east of Paris, some twenty miles towards the left flank of the Sixth Army, its sister brigade, the 13th, following it by rail. Compared with subsequent moves in motor busses, even in the following October in Flanders, it was a small affair. On the 1st of September the organization of the cars and taxis of Paris had been taken in hand, and 150 were on duty daily. In peace time there were some 10,000 taxis on the streets, but the mobilization of the drivers of military age left only some 3000. For the move of 6000 men 1200 taxis were required, and they were secured without difficulty, and taken out in two columns by separate routes. An unnecessary amount of hardship seems to have been inflicted on the very willing and patriotic chauffeurs: they were taken out with empty cars on the night of the 6th–7th, as far as Dammartin (20 miles from the centre of Paris), then brought back halfway to pick up the troops, whom they carried up on the night of the 7th–8th. Thus, counting the return to Paris, for a short trip of about sixty miles, they were on duty nearly forty-eight hours.

BALKANS

The latest addition to the series of German General Staff monographs on battles of the war, continued since the nominal dissolution of that body with the label “Published with the co-operation of the Reichsarchiv,” is entitled “*Herbstschlacht in Macedonien*, 1916” (“The Autumn Battle in Macedonia, 1916.” Oldenburg: Stallung, 23 Marks).

Neither in style nor interest is it up to the standard of its predecessors, though better illustrated with reproductions of portraits and photographs. It deals with General Sarrail’s attack from Salonica

in September—November, 1916, when the Bulgarians and Germans were driven back twenty-five miles and Monastir was recaptured. The only object of the work seems to be to show how loyal Germany was to her allies when they required help, and what poor fighters were the Bulgarians against the Serbs. When signs of the attack were noticed, Germany sent first the equivalent of one division (of the nine-battalion type) and then a second to back up the Bulgarians. Thus there were eventually in the area in the bend of the river Cerna, south of Monastir, where the fighting took place, Serbians supported by two French divisions and a Russian brigade against the Bulgars, supported by two German divisions.

The main point of interest is whence were the Germans able to draw troops when they had the Somme and Verdun on their hands? This we are partly told. Of the first division sent, three Jäger battalions came from Champagne and the Vosges, three battalions from Rumania, three from the eastern sector in the Balkans, two battalions of heavy artillery, etc., from Verdun. Of the second division, three battalions came from Rumania and six from the Vosges. So great was the haste that the men were sent in their summer clothing to face the cold and snow of a mountain region. The German battalions in consequence had much sickness, and also suffered so heavily, that they averaged only about 150 men at the close of the period, it is stated.

Though it is admitted that the German centre was broken, it is claimed that Sarraïl's plan, which is alleged to have been to break through and march on Vienna, was frustrated. But, considering the relative numbers on either side, the mountainous nature of the country, and the extraordinary difficulties of supply and transport, as evidenced in the German monograph, the performance of the Allied troops seems to have been a very fine one. There is an excellent sketch map, which shows the progress of the advance.

GENERAL

The first volume of "Der Krieg 1914-18 in Wort und Bild" (Berlin: Bong), a much advertised illustrated history of the war, in eight volumes, at 440 marks, has now been issued. Were it not that the subject is not a matter for joking, it might with justice be called "a comic history." It has an imposing list of contributors: sailors, soldiers, professors and publicists, German and Austrian, including Graf Reventlow, Admiral Kirchhoff, General Baron von Ardenne, and there is even a Turkish contributor, but no Bulgarian

one. It is beautifully got up in imitation of "Krieg and Sieg," the memorial volume of 1870-1, with coloured plates (from drawings made at the war), views of the theatre of war, portraits and maps; and the inside of the cover is decorated with eagles and the cipher W.II. There is certainly a bad oversight in giving a map of the town and port of Scarborough without any of its batteries and fortifications, but otherwise as regards the *Bilder*, it very nearly competes with "The Times History of the War."

The text is a very different matter. That stress should be laid on German successes is comprehensible, but that the whole war should be travestied, and all sets back slurred over, reduces this expensive work to the level of propaganda, and it is obviously absurd at that.

We will give some examples of the narrative, where it touches the British Forces. The portions within brackets are the remarks of the reviewer.

"On the 23rd of August the advanced guard of the British Army, commanded by General French, well known in the Boer War, reached Thulin, halfway between Mons and Valenciennes. [The B.E.F. reached the Mons canal on the 22nd and fought there on the 23rd.] The advanced guard was formed by a Cavalry Brigade composed of the 9th Lancers, 8th Hussars and 4th Dragoons. [This is possibly meant for de Lisle's Brigade, consisting of the 4th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars.] It had no idea of the approach of Kluck's Army, which had been splendidly screened by von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps. [This Corps, as von Kluck has told us, moved westward on Tournai, when he wheeled south. It was not in contact with the British till the 26th of August at Le Cateau. It was Kluck who had no idea of the approach of the British; the R.F.C. had reported his advance.]

"General French reports that he waited for hours on this day for French parallel columns. At last in its impatience to get at the foe the cavalry brigade charged the German advanced troops." [This seems to be an echo of the charge begun by de Lisle to disengage some infantry during the retirement from Mons, but which was not persisted in.]

This is all there is about Mons. The narrative, written by Lieut.-General Baron von Ardenne, then passes on to the 27th of August, ignores Le Cateau, and does not mention the British again until the 31st, when

"General French drew up the B.E.F. opposite the German Army west of St. Quentin [passed through on the 27th] . . . with a view to enveloping the German right wing and eventually driving it from the West."

There is a fine, spirited picture of a German infantry assault, entitled "Defeat of the English under command of General French

at St. Quentin, 31st of August, 1914." Possibly it represents what might have happened had Sir John French fought at that place when near it on the 26th-27th, or had attacked from Compiègne instead of making his flank march through the forest on the 31st of August.

The battle of the Marne is described as

"a series of separate fights . . . it lost more and more as it continued, the character of a decisive battle, and served rather as a transition stage to position warfare."

It is, however, admitted that strong French reinforcements threatened a break-through opposite one of the weakest points of the line [the gap between Kluck and Bülow was opposite the British], and the front was withdrawn

"to the more favourable Aisne line, without the enemy obtaining any advantage whatever [not even moral]. Thus it came about that Rheims was evacuated by us."

The account of the battles of Ypres, 1914, is even less recognizable, although one German column is allowed to advance on Ypres; the narrative is mainly taken up with the shelling of the coast by "eleven English battleships" and a French squadron, and the battle comes to an end with the formation, "by the Allies," of the inundations, which the reader is left to assume then separated the combatants.

"With this, the last piece of the front in the Western theatre of war became included in trench warfare, to which the operations in the West had gradually turned."

Yet the battle of Ypres continued, and the attack of the German Guard took place some days after the Belgians let in the sea before their front. The battle of Ypres in April, 1915, is described without any mention of gas. A copy of the German official communiqués in a separate volume, is presented to purchasers of the eight volumes. It is a very suitable companion for them.

Two books describing life in prisoner of war camps in England, the only ones on this subject, we believe, have been published in Germany. The first "Kriegsgefangen in Skipton" (Herausgegeben unter Mitwirkung vieler Kameraden von Sachsse, Kapitän a.S. und Cossmann, früher Oberleutnant a.R. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 20.80 marks), concerns an officers' camp at Skipton; the second "Die Welt hinter Stacheldraht" (von L. Bogenstätter und H. Zimmermann. Munich: Piloty and Loehle, 25 marks)

deals with camps for other ranks at Frith Hill and Handforth. Although both books reveal how exceedingly well German prisoners of war in England were treated, they are utterly unlike in tone. The officers' book is querulous and full of petty complaints: the attitude taken up is that it is impertinent, if not impious, to detain the Kaiser's officers in captivity at all; while the men's book shows a fair spirit of making the best of things. To cite a contrast, the men took up Association football hotly, defeated their guard at the game, and played another prisoner of war camp, whilst of the officers only ten per cent. tried to play, and the complaint is made that the game "has a technique which cannot be acquired in a few weeks or by persons no longer young."

Both books describe the nature of the camps and their organization, and the general routine in considerable detail. In both camps, concerts, amateur theatricals, cards, gardening, reading and games took up most of the time, and there were properly organized courses of instruction under competent teachers among the prisoners. The men's book freely admits that they got practically everything for which they asked for recreation purposes, either officially, or as gifts from the British Red Cross Society or the Y.M.C.A. There was little work, the English were far too easy going or lazy to insist on its being done. Parties sent to cut wood

"wandered about in the bushes or lay in the sand pits and got sunburnt."

The captivity is with some justice described as "mild." Liquor was smuggled into the camps, and those who had money could manage to buy anything they wanted. "British soldiers and N.C.O.'s, and even officers, took part in the traffic," we are told, while the censorship of parcels from Germany was a farce. The Handforth men were first accommodated in a tented camp at Frith Hill and then on a ship, the *Ivernia*. As an instance of the discipline, the authors say that when they were leaving the ship a stringent order was issued that

"nothing belonging to the ship should be carried off. The result was that the prisoners packed everything useful (plates, cups, pillows, bed clothes, etc.) in parcels, marked these with all sorts of absurd names and handed them in at the railway station. There was no examination, so that numerous prisoners marched into camp well provided with such things."

The prisoners' only trouble was with their own non-commissioned officers, who appropriated the best of everything, stole from the

parcels post, and generally behaved as bullies. On this being represented to the British authorities by a strike, the camp was re-organized on a more democratic basis. There were minor *émeutes* and disturbances, and the prisoners, it is admitted, often disobeyed orders, but the authors place it on record

“ On such occasions—and they were more frequent at Frith Hill than afterwards at Handforth—use was never made of weapons by the English.”

The complaints made throughout the officers' book do not include a single serious one : the climate of Skipton is condemned as unsuitable (although in every way superior to North Germany), the huts are described as draughty, the messing—at two shillings a day—as “ not up to middle-class standard,” German newspapers were not supplied regularly, and the interpreters were ignorant of German. The last is emphasized by a story. Among themselves the prisoners were in the habit of calling one commandant, a tall aristocratic officer, “ Herr Graf ” (the Count). By inadvertence, one German called him this to his face, and on his asking the official interpreter what he had said, got the reply, “ He called you a giraffe,” and the prisoner was promptly punished for it. There are constant charges that the prisoners were robbed, and this is brought out in a rather amusing topical Anglo-German song :

“ War einst ein deutsche offizier
Halt, who comes there ?
Und jetzt taken prisoner.
All correct, sir !
The watsch and money
All souvenir
For blinking Tommy
Von German officer.”

“ England's Misuse of Hospital Ships ” (“ Englands Lazarett-schiffsmissbrauch.” Berlin : Ulrich Meyer, 10.50 marks) is the title of a pamphlet prepared from official sources by Korvetten Kapitän Friedrich Lützow, who during the war was Admiral-Staff Officer to the Commander of the U-Boats. Although he states that he has been assisted by a legal friend, Herr Dr. Willms-Bonn, he cannot be congratulated on his facts or his international law : he speaks of “ Articles ” of the Hague Conference (there are articles of Hague Conventions) ; he makes “ Admiral ” Lord Reay the senior British Naval representative at the Second Hague Conference, and though he shows that every definite charge made by the German Government with regard to misuse of hospital ships was fully

disproved—the ships accused were as a rule not at the places named, or even employed as hospital ships—thus the hospital ship *Acquitania* was accused by the German Government of leaving Liverpool with cavalry on board on the 7th of December, 1915; she was at Southampton from the 3rd to the 16th of that month, coming in with wounded and sick, and leaving empty—he insinuates that this was managed by frequently changing the names of the ships.

In one case it is claimed that hospital ships must have been conveying troops because in a sixteen days' cruise in the Aegean Sea, one U-Boat saw nothing but hospital ships.

The main charge, however, is that sick and wounded of the land armies were carried on hospital ships, which, it is claimed, may only convey naval wounded, although at the Hague Conferences no such distinction was created. Germany, however, found it convenient to assert it on the authority of the dictum of a certain Herr Meurer in a book on the Conference, which Kapitän Lützow quotes, and which translated is :—

“Simple transports that serve solely for the conveyance of sick and wounded are not hospital ships.” (They must of course be properly painted and marked, and their names notified.)

On behalf of Germany, the author also objects to the transport of medical material and medical *personnel* on transport ships.

Some of the rules which Germany made during the war for the guidance of her U-Boats *personnel* were almost Gilbertian. Thus a hospital ship lost the protection conferred by the Red Cross if it steered a zig-zag course, was not fully lighted up at night, or had an escort.

The general drift of the book shows, however, that the sinking of hospital ships was merely one of the many manifestations of “frightfulness” (for which the German is “Kultur”) in exasperation at the “hungerblockade,” the laying of mines in the North Sea, and the seizure of certain so-called hospital ships which were engaged in espionage.

In “Vom Sterben des Deutschen Offizierkorps”—“The Death of the German Officer-Korps” (Berlin: Mittler, 10 Marks), Lieut.-General C. von Altrock, with the assistance of other officers, gives some statistics of the losses by death of the officers of the German Army and Navy, and a short history of the Officer-Corps of the Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg Armies, of the Protectorate Troops and the Navy. The figures were officially compiled at the demobilization stations, and merely give the gross totals by

national contingents for the 4½ years' war, by arms for the Active Army, but lumped together for the reserve and temporary officers, who form the vast majority. Thus there is not much to be learned from them.

Of the 45,923 officers on the active list during the war, 11,357 or 24·7 per cent. fell ; of the 226,130 reserve officers, 35,493, or 15 per cent. These, with the deaths of unemployed and retired officers, which are counted in, give a total of 52,006 (excluding medical and veterinary officers and military officials), whilst 1,751,809 of other ranks fell—that is, one officer to 33 other ranks, the normal proportion.

The losses in other wars are given for comparison. They were in 1864, 163 officers ; in 1866, 804 ; and in 1870–1, 6,503.

The history of the Corps shows unmistakably that until the advent of Wilhelm I. in 1859, the officers led an easy-going life, enlivened by drink, gambling and duelling, without any attempt at scientific training.

Perthes, the publisher of the “*Almanac de Gotha*,” has issued a volume of 287 pages (“*Ehrentafel der Kriegsoffer des reichsdeutschen Adels, 1914–19*,” 24 marks), bound in the old colours of the Reich, containing the names of the members of the German nobility who fell in the great war, the revolutionary troubles and the Baltic and frontier conflicts in 1919. The family of von Bülow appears to head the list with 32 members killed, then comes von Arnim with 25, von Wedel 24, etc.

Of biographies : M. Henry Bordeaux, the novelist, who was officially employed to write episodes of the war (“*Derniers jours du fort de Vaux*,” etc.), has published a sketch of the career of Maréchal Fayolle (Paris : Crès et Cie, 3.50 francs) ; and a more intimate account of General de Castelnau was given in the two August numbers of the “*Revue des Deux Mondes*.” Both these officers passed through the French Staff College, Fayolle being subsequently an instructor there for eleven years ; while de Castelnau was employed for seven and a half years on the General Staff at Headquarters under Generals de Miribel and Boisdeffre to write the French field service regulations ; and he subsequently served in the mobilization section.

TECHNICAL

A very useful compendium with regard to the German and Austrian heavy artillery has been published under the title of “*Matériels Allemands et Autrichiens à grande puissance*” (Paris :

Berger-Levrault, 7.50 francs). No author's name is given, and it appears to have been issued by the French War Office.

It is beautifully illustrated with 111 figures and photographs in the text, some whole page, and six large plates. There are descriptions of the guns, carriages, ammunition, etc., and all the German abbreviations of the gun names are explained, *e.g.*,

S.K.	= Q.F.
K.i.S.L.	= Gun in Shielded Mounting.
Kp.	= Krupp.
K.i.R.L.	= Gun on Wheeled Carriage.
Kst.H.i.Kst. H.L.	= Coast Defence Howitzer on Coast defence howitzer mounting,
	etc.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

The Soul and Body of an Army. By General Sir IAN HAMILTON,
G.C.B. Edward Arnold. 18s. net.

GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON, while still on the Active List, made no small name for himself as poet, diarist and military historian. He was known as one of the few military writers of his time with some pretensions to be worth reading, not only for the matter, but also for the manner, of his work. This has not proved altogether an unmixed blessing from some points of view, for the Englishman—and also the English soldier—likes to be able to tell whether his reading is serious or frivolous by the style of the writer, and instinctively mistrusts the man who would make his fellow creatures wise by gilding the philosophic pill. Sir Ian's ideas often suffer from being dressed too gaudily, and his books from the fact that one can peruse them without wet towels round one's head.

In this new work of his, however, it would be well worth while to make any effort—if one were needed—to get to the bed rock ideas at the bottom; for “*The Soul and Body of an Army*” is the first crystallization of the experiences of one who has held high military office at home and high commands abroad; who has been at the closest possible quarters with modern war, alike as spectator and participant; and who has not only seen much, but also thought long and deeply about what he has seen.

In the thirteen chapters which fill these 300 pages before us the General, writing all the time from the standpoint of the British Army, and the demands which the next Great War will make upon it, discusses such matters as organization, discipline, training, numbers and the moral qualities making for success in war; and on each and all of these he has much to say which is both novel and of value. We have not sufficient space in which to deal with all Sir Ian's points, or to remark upon the various matters of controversy raised in the course of his works. Generally speaking, in the sphere of the higher organization Sir Ian is all in favour of the

supersession of the three Ministries of War, Admiralty and the Air, by a single Ministry of Defence, working with a combined United Services General Staff. This proposal has been pretty thoroughly discussed in the Press and elsewhere during the last two years, and there is nothing particularly new about it here, beyond a useful summary of the case for the innovation. The real objection to the formation of a Ministry of Defence—or rather the real cause actually preventing its formation, which is rather a different thing—is, it seems to us, not so much military as political. Somehow it is difficult to imagine a British Prime Minister, faced with a number of candidates for high offices of State considerably in excess of that of the places available for them to fill, voluntarily doing away with three of these places in order to set up a sort of superman who might well turn out to be a rival to himself. It must be remembered that the British Constitution is not made but like Topsy “just growed,” and that logic and reason have hitherto found no place in it; so why should they now?

In the matter of the reorganization of the Army itself Sir Ian Hamilton is equally a ruthless woodsman so far as concerns all that seems to him dead or moribund, and an enthusiastic supporter of the newer and less developed arms of the Service called into being by the late war. He would abolish cavalry altogether, despite their admitted usefulness against uncivilized foemen; and would build up his new Division—which he believes will take the place of the Regiment as the unit of the Army *par excellence*, to which must attach itself all the *esprit de corps* of the future—on that “mighty atom, the tank.” This seems to place him at once among the tank enthusiasts whose voice has ever since the war been so much heard in our land, and who seem now to be in peril of creating rather a reaction from, than an assent to, their main thesis in more than one quarter. Be this as it may, it seems curious that so sweeping a reformer as Sir Ian should have left almost entirely out of consideration the enormous possibilities of chemical warfare in the future. Here is a fine field of speculation for anyone who is by temperament inclined to take the longer view. But perhaps the General is saving this up for his next book.

Enough has already been said to show that the present volume is one which is packed full of good things, and must on no account be left unread by any thinking soldier. It is to be hoped that every reader of the *Army Quarterly* will secure a copy somehow and devote himself seriously to its study. The General's style will facilitate the task to the point of making it a pleasure instead of a

burden, and it is no small thing in these days to be able to combine pleasure with profit.

A History of the Great War. By J. BUCHAN. Thomas Nelson & Sons, London and Edinburgh. In four volumes, 25s. each. Vols. I. and II.

In February, 1915, Mr. Buchan began writing a history of the war and between that date and July, 1919, produced no less than twenty-four small volumes, issued at frequent intervals, often within about a year of the events they narrated. It stands to reason that a work produced with such rapidity and in such conditions could possess no serious historical value, whatever its author's literary skill might be ; indeed, it must have lacked authority even if undertaken by a man well versed both in naval and military matters and commanding attention as an expounder of strategy and tactics. However, Mr. Buchan undoubtedly achieved no small popular success. It may be that in the country of the blind the one-eyed man is King, but, nevertheless, Mr. Buchan certainly performed his task with great skill and produced a thoroughly interesting and clear account of the military operations—particularly of those in the Eastern theatre. It is perhaps unfortunate that he has now decided to reproduce his history, because the revised work will be looked upon as a definite contribution to the literature of the war, and therefore will be challenged by closer criticism than was required when it was originally published.

Although much has been written, especially in France and Germany, which puts the inquirer into the war in a much better position than was the case within the same distance of the 1870 campaign, it is somewhat daring to venture on such an attempt as that of Mr. Buchan before even the official British account of 1914 has made its appearance ; Mr. Buchan, indeed, has hardly allowed himself time to give the revised version of his history any chance of being accurate even where information is available. It is not surprising, therefore, that his work contains many inaccuracies. It is only necessary to read carefully any portion of the story of the doings of the B.E.F. between August, 1914, and March, 1915, to lose any faith which one might have had in Mr. Buchan as a serious historian. Both his maps and his text are equally open to criticism. The map of the Ypres—La Bassée fighting, for instance, places the Nonne Boschen Wood south of the Menin Road, represents the whole Seventh Division as having marched to Ypres from Bruges, whereas

all but one brigade came from Ghent, and shows the Second Corps as having advanced to the Aubers Ridge due east from Aire instead of north-east from near St. Pol. The German counter-attack on Smith-Dorrien's Corps is said to have begun on the 22nd of October, whereas Le Pilly was lost on the 20th and the Fifth Division's line broken near Lorgies on the 21st of October. Mr. Buchan's account of the Aisne entirely misrepresents the character of the German resistance on the 13th of September and describes at least one movement which was indeed ordered but not put into operation. At Mons Mr. Buchan states that it was the British right which was in danger of being outflanked on the 24th of August. The outpost affair at Maroilles (the 25th of August) is magnified into an action so serious that "the situation was saved" by the intervention of two French Reserve Divisions, while the gallant and effective stand of the 2nd Battalion of the Munster Fusiliers at Etreux two days later is not so much as mentioned. But it is the account of Neuve Chapelle which contains perhaps the worst mistakes. Mr. Buchan has a weakness for historical parallels, which leads him incidentally to include Louis XIV. in a list of "great captains": he should know that the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles, which by the way was the right battalion of the 23rd Brigade, not the left, and actually effected an entry into the German trenches, was not "the old Cameronians," but was the old 90th, Graham's famous "Perthshire Greybreeks." The Seventh Division did not attack the Moulin du Pietre (which by the way is not where Mr. Buchan's map shows it) and the 22nd Brigade did not take part in a general attack on the 10th of March. Had Mr. Buchan studied carefully Sir Frederick Ponsonby's account of the Grenadier Guards, he might have escaped several pitfalls, and his story would have been improved considerably in our opinion had he made use of Colonel Merewether's careful narrative, compiled from official sources, of the doings of the Indian Corps. We should like also to draw attention to the British line as shown on the Neuve Chapelle map. Instead of following the Rue du Bois from the "Port Arthur" cross-roads (Mr. Buchan incidentally seems to be rather original in his siting of Port Arthur), it sweeps gracefully south and apparently includes inside the British front both the Ferme du Bois and the Ferme Cour d'Avoué, the obstacles which checked our attack on the 16th of May and subsequent days.

In his second volume Mr. Buchan covers the period from the beginning of the operations in the Dardanelles to the struggle for Verdun. In his account of events in Gallipoli he seems to us to

have made use of his authorities with skill and discrimination; but his narrative of the fighting on the Western Front is less successful. His account of the second battle of Ypres, for instance, suffers owing to his attempt to mention too many details with the result that his picture is overcrowded. There are also numerous inaccuracies with regard to details in the fighting which should not appear in a serious study of the war. It may be argued that trivial inaccuracies do not mar the general truth of Mr. Buchan's story. This may be true so far as the general reader is concerned, but the soldier realizes that both in war, as also in the proper understanding of war, everything depends upon accuracy in details. The soldier, therefore, who attempts, on Mr. Buchan's facts, to form an accurate judgment with regard to the fighting in France in 1914 will often find his conclusions resting on unsound premises.

The History of the Second Division, 1914-1918. By EVERARD WYNALL.
In two vols. Vol. I. 1914-1916. Nelson, London. 21s. net.

Mr. Wynall has added to the fast-growing list of sumptuously produced and fully detailed divisional histories of the Great War a volume which is well worthy to take rank with the best. The interest of such a work must always be somewhat limited in its appeal—much as was that of the magnificent regimental history of pre-war days—what on earth would volumes like these cost nowadays?—but no doubt there will be many former members of the 2nd Division who by purchasing and perusing it will find themselves transported in memory back to “battles long ago,” and be able, while turning over these admirably written and beautifully printed pages, to dwell pleasurably on the recollection of past struggle and achievement. To any and all such, the book may be heartily recommended; but it will, we hope, not appeal to them only but also to all those who desire to gain some idea of the life and working of that newest of corporate military entities, the Division in a modern campaign. Sir Ian Hamilton in his latest book “*The Soul and Body of an Army*,” has well said that “In our Great War game the Division proved itself to be *the organic piece*,” replacing the Battalion and the Brigade as the centre of *esprit de corps*, and the formation round which first feelings and then memories learned to revolve. Hence the reader of the present day and the general student and historian of the future, will no longer have leisure for the achievements of battalions—magnificent as these were—but will devote his main attention to the division.

Splendid records indeed all these divisions have, and history will no doubt enshrine some of their epic doings—such as, to take only two examples, those of the 29th at Helles, and the 46th at the Hindenburg Line—among the immortal military achievements of all time. Yet of the 2nd Division it may truly be said that few equalled and none surpassed it in honour. It appeared at Mons, the first British battle of the Great War, as part of Sir Douglas Haig's I Corps, and took part in the subsequent retreat, being engaged at Landrecies on the 25th of August and Villers Cotterets on the 1st of September, and then in the advance across the Marne to the Aisne. After fighting hard and losing heavily on the heights beyond the latter river, it was moved with the rest of the B.E.F. to Flanders, and took part in the immortal defence of Ypres. Here, in the series of fierce battles which raged from the 19th of October to the 17th of November, the Division covered itself with glory. One of its units, the 2nd Worcesters, it is generally agreed, saved the British line from disaster at Gheluvelt on the 31st of October; other battalions of the Division took a prominent part in the repulse of the Prussian Guard on the 11th of November. These two days are now known to have been the most critical of the whole battle. There was no respite, however, for a division in those days of stress; and the 2nd Division had to go back to the trenches on the 21st of November; and what trenches! For eloquent and terrible details of that awful winter of 1914-15 and the incredible hardships undergone by our infantry, we must refer the reader to Mr. Wynall's book. Nor were the weeks of bad weather allowed to pass without serious fighting, in which the Division took its part, at Cuinchy and Givenchy, and again when the spring came at Festubert, where it was in line in the battle area for ten days on end, and delivered a series of gallant and costly, but not, alas! particularly fruitful, attacks against very strong hostile defences. At the end of September the Division was once more sent over the top in the La Bassée canal sector, this time in a holding attack in conjunction with the main operations farther south, at Loos. Thanks in large degree to the fact that our gas proved more of a hindrance than a help to the infantry, the gain of ground was nil; but as a diversion the offensive completely fulfilled its object, and later certain units of the Division, formed into a temporary brigade known as "Carter's," took a prominent part in the fighting south-west of Cité St. Elie. Early in October the whole Division came south to the main battle zone and was severely engaged around the Hohenzollern Redoubt until the fighting died down about the middle of the month.

After nine months of trench warfare, broken only by raiding activity, the battles of the Somme saw the Division engaged first in a highly successful operation at Delville Wood at the end of July, then in a series of unsuccessful attacks against Guillemont two weeks later. Here the losses were so heavy as to necessitate a prolonged period of refitment, and the Division only came into action again two months later, when it took a prominent and creditable part in the victory of Beaumont Hamel, the curtain to the 1916 Somme fighting. Some idea of the effort put forward by the Division during these two years of strenuous warfare may be gathered from the fact that its list of battle casualties between August, 1914, and December, 1916, amounted to over 20,000 all told.

Mr. Wynell has done his work well in retailing these and many other episodes of the Division's career, in a sober yet clear manner, with constant references to, and quotations from, official records and private diaries, and numerous battle and other orders are given in full—an excellent habit which we commend to other military historians.

The Fifty-Sixth Division. By Major C. H. DUDLEY-WARD, D.S.O., M.C. London: John Murray. 1921. 21s. net.

That the First London Territorial Division should be numbered the Fifty-Sixth while the Second is the Forty-Seventh is anomalous but explicable. More than half its battalions went overseas independently in 1914, and not till February, 1916, was the Division re-constituted. Before that date, its individual battalions had fought with credit in every battle from the "First Ypres" to Loos, but the Division's first battle was the attack on the Gommecourt salient on the opening day of the Somme. But if it started late the Fifty-Sixth Division saw plenty of fighting and repeatedly distinguished itself. Two episodes in particular stand out in its story: its share in repulsing the main German counter-attack of the 30th of November, 1917, round Moeuvres; its equally successful defence against an even more critical and formidable attack when it helped to keep the Germans out of Arras on the 28th of March, 1918. It had its successes on the offensive also, and in reading of its share in the final advance to victory, it is important to remember with what scanty effectives its battalions were called on to attack again and again.

Such a record was worth telling, and Major Dudley-Ward has told it well. His narratives of operations are usually lucid—

though once or twice the maps hardly help the text as much as they might. His point of view is reasonable. He knows the difficulties and services of the staff as well as what the men in the trenches had to go through. His comments and conclusions are sensible, and he has made good use of the admissions of Falkenheyn, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Perhaps he does not quite make the Division live in the way some historians of units have managed to do; the battalions are hardly distinct enough to the reader who was not a member of the Division; but he does bring out very clearly what the Division owed to General Hull, its original and its last commanding officer, to whose memory the volume is appropriately dedicated.

The Life of General the Hon. James Murray. By Major-General R. H. MAHON, C.B., C.S.I. London: John Murray. 1921. 21s. net.

The number of readers of military history to whom General James Murray's career is familiar is not extensive; he is best remembered as one of Wolfe's brigadiers at Quebec in 1789, and as the gallant but unfortunate defender of Minorca in the war of American Independence. But, as his descendant, General Mahon, shows, Murray did a great deal to complete the conquest of Canada, by no means decided by Wolfe's victory on the Plains of Abraham, and also as Governor of the newly acquired colony from 1760-1766. Left in command at Quebec in the autumn of 1759 with an inadequate and very ill-supplied force, he had a hard task in defending Wolfe's acquisition against the French counter-attack; but, though defeated by superior numbers in his attempt to drive off his enemy when the French pressed in against Quebec, he held his position until relief arrived and then took a prominent part in the threefold advance on Montreal in the summer of 1760, which was the really decisive incident in the struggle. Subsequently, as Governor, he did splendid work in adverse conditions; he helped materially to conciliate the Canadians to British rule; he anticipated the good work of Carleton in Canada, for he governed on the lines which were later embodied in the Quebec Act of 1774—in a word, he did much to retain Canada for England when the older colonies seceded.

General Mahon has made good use of unpublished sources, and throws some useful light on the oft-told story of Wolfe's disappointments and final success. He ascribes Wolfe's decision to land close to Quebec to his receiving information from traitors

in the French camp that his landing would be unopposed, a theory which, if hardly proved, is certainly not without support. He shows, moreover, that this landing close to Quebec was Wolfe's own plan, and was quite different from the scheme propounded by his brigadiers.

The Position of the Ex-Service Man. Past—Present—Future. By Ex-Sergt. F. GEORGE. May & Co., Aldershot. 2s. 6d. net.

This little book of 84 pages well deserves attention as the work of one who has for many years advocated the cause of the ex-Service man and been unremitting in his efforts to secure him his fair measure of justice at the hands of the State and the private employer. Briefly, Mr. George advocates that the Army should return to the long service system of 21 years (12 years with the colours and option to extend for the other 9); that ex-Service men should, on the completion of that service, have a statutory right to a certain proportion of the posts in Government departments, firms engaged on Government contracts, and undertakings (such as railways) enjoying monopolies by Act of Parliament; and that service in the forces should count towards a Civil Service pension. He is equally bitter against the politicians who, in his opinion, have exploited and are still exploiting ex-Service men for their own ends, as against the Trade Unions which, he maintains, place obstacles in the way of their getting work, even when fully qualified. Mr. George is probably right in saying that it is only by legislation that the problem can be solved on just and sound lines. To rely on appeals and voluntary effort is to penalize the unselfish and patriotic employer for the benefit of the grasping and greedy one. If the ex-soldier is to be helped, the task of helping him must be made either advantageous to the individual employer, or compulsory on the whole employing class. The author himself evidently favours the former of these two methods, but believes that the Government must first put its own house in order and become itself the model employer in this respect, before it can call on others to follow the same path. This is now being done to some extent—but meanwhile the ex-Service man is tramping the streets in his thousands and no time is to be lost if he is not to become a potential recruit for the armies of revolution. If lofty professions and high flying rhetoric could solve the problem, it would have been accomplished long since; but fine words not only butter no parsnips, but are not even a satisfactory substitute for bread and water. All who are

interested in this vital matter of the ex-soldier will get useful ideas and fresh light on the subject from Mr. George's little book.

The Groundwork of the War. C. H. K. MARTEN. Blackie & Sons, Ltd. 1s. 6d. net.

This short pamphlet of 50 pages forms the concluding part of a larger work entitled "The Groundwork of British History," which it brings down to 1921. One section of 10 pages deals with the Armed Peace of 1871-1914; the war is described in 32 pages and the Peace in the remaining 8. Maps and bibliographies complete the work. Within so small a compass the author has naturally had to confine himself strictly to the broadest outline, but in this confined space he has succeeded admirably in giving a very accurate and readable narrative, which can be thoroughly recommended to any one who wishes to gain a correct, but not too detailed a view of the course of events.

British Railways and the Great War : Organization, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements. By EDWIN A. PRATT. Selwyn and Blount, Ltd. 2 vols. 1921. £2 2s. net.

It is the fashion in some quarters to affirm that we entered the late war in a state of total unreadiness from a military point of view. If this assertion were generally true—and we are not disposed to consider that it is—an exception would be required in the case of the railways. In his introductory chapters Mr. Pratt sketches the measures which had been taken in Great Britain with a view to the efficient working of the railways in time of war. These measures included the creation of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps which led the way in forming an organization to deal with war problems and requirements; the formation, in 1896, of the War Railway Council, with the Deputy Quartermaster-General as President, assisted by railway managers, which became responsible among other duties for mobilization time-tables; the creation of a Railway Transport Service under the control of the Quartermaster-General; and the formation, in 1912, of the Railway Executive Committee of General Managers, to control, on behalf of the Board of Trade, such railways as would be taken over by the State in an emergency, and to keep in touch with the Government Departments in time of peace by means of a Communications Board under the Quartermaster-General, the War Railway Council being thus superseded.

When war was declared, it was this Railway Executive Committee which was available for co-ordinating and controlling the mobilization movements and the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force. And it is in no spirit of under-valuing the signal success of these initial movements when we say that their control was to prove a simple matter compared with subsequent developments which no preparations, however carefully planned, could have foreseen. For, as the war continued, the demands made on the railways became enormous. Railway men to the number of over 184,000 were spared for the forces ; and the headings to Mr. Pratt's many chapters indicate the diverse types of war activity in which the railways became engaged. Statistics in abundance are provided to show the manner in which these activities were discharged.

It is only in two chapters out of seventy-four that Mr. Pratt deals with railway work overseas. In France British Transportation, with its services of railways, roads, docks and inland waterways, directed by a competence of generals from that modest camp at "Geddesburg," grew into a giant organization. Mr. Pratt has touched only the fringe of its history ; but he gives us a useful description of some of the sources from which the organization was built up. The demands for railway *personnel* in France before April, 1915, were mainly restricted to R.E. Railway Troops for work on destroyed lines, damaged bridges, sidings and railheads. In that month it was decided to form a British Railway Operating Division for work for which previously the French authorities had undertaken full responsibility. Later, the R.E. Railway Troops expanded into the Railway Construction Corps, which constructed over 2000 miles of new lines, standard and metre gauge ; and the Military Forwarding Department, starting from modest beginnings, became a wide-spread undertaking. In regard to the provision of rolling stock, the British Railway Companies met demands which must have increased in almost geometrical progression. Originally, it was understood that the French authorities would provide all the rolling stock which the British forces might require. But transport demands and the transport resources of the French railways grew in inverse ratio ; and, eventually, nearly 30,000 wagons and over 500 locomotives were dispatched from this country overseas, though not all, of course, to France.

These are some of the features described by Mr. Pratt in chapters xlv. and xlv. But this portion of his work leaves a curiously unsatisfactory impression. We have the raw material, mainly provided by the Railway Companies at home ; but, except in some

instances, and not always the most important, we are told little of the finished product. We have much detail, for example, concerning the scheme for supplying skilled civilian platelayers behind the fighting zone; and the larger problems of actual railway organization in France are left for the most part to our imagination or our memories. But perhaps such questions fall outside the scope of a work which deals primarily with the railways in this country.

The War List of the University of Cambridge, 1914-1918. Edited by G. V. CAREY, M.A., Fellow of Clare College, late Major, Rifle Brigade and Royal Air Force. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1921. 20s. net.

The Editor may be congratulated on his work, for he appears to have produced a full and worthy record of the part played by the members of the University of Cambridge in the Great War. It is a record of which the University may well be proud. The names of 13,878 of her sons who served in some branch of His Majesty's Forces are included in the list—and of this number 2162 were killed in action or died of wounds, 308 were killed accidentally or died of illness, and 2902 were wounded. These figures are a sufficient testimony to the courage and devotion to duty of Cambridge men.

The Empire at War. Edited for the Royal Colonial Institute by Sir CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Vol. I. By the Editor. Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 1921. 15s. net.

This is the first of five volumes intended to trace the growth of Imperial co-operation in previous wars as well as to give a record of the effort made in the late war by every unit of the overseas Empire. The work is being produced with the approval and assistance of the Colonial Office, of the Dominion Governments, and of the Governors and Governments of the various Colonies. It should be a most valuable record of the military history of the Empire. We do not propose to review Sir C. Lucas's volume in this number, as it only reaches us as we are going to press. We hope to deal with it and subsequent volumes in a future number.

The Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research. Vol. I., No. 1. September, 1921. Published at the Royal United Service Institution.

Readers of the *Army Quarterly* will extend a cordial welcome to the new Society whose *Journal* has just made its début. There is certainly room for a society to undertake something of the same work for the Army as the Navy Records Society and the Society for Nautical Research discharge for the history of the Navy and for a journal "in which soldiers who have served and who are still serving . . . can ask for and receive information about matters connected with regiments—their past history, campaigns and dress or in regard to the whereabouts of old diaries and letters illustrating important events in their earlier lives." To writers and students of regimental histories in particular such a Society should be of great value and there is reason to hope that the Society's activities will prove useful to those whose main interest lies in military matters of a more general character, tactical, strategical and administrative problems. It may even be able, should it grow and prosper, to tackle the publication of works of military interest on the lines of the publications of the Navy Records Society, such as selections from State or private papers. A volume of selections from the despatches of the various British officers who commanded our troops in Sicily during the Napoleonic wars would throw valuable light on an important but obscure portion of that struggle: portions of the Journal of Marlborough's Chaplain, Francis Hare, are quoted in the Marlborough Despatches, but the whole work has never been published and—to judge by the selections—should be of extraordinary interest. The first number of the *Journal* gives some idea of the scope of the Society's work; it contains among other things interesting narratives of the battles of Culloden and Ticonderoga (1758), extracts from the correspondence of an officer of the Sixtieth Royal Americans serving in the West Indies in 1800, notes on some cavalry uniforms and conundrums propounded by persons in search of information.

A Memoir of Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Steel, D.S.O., R.H.A., R.F.A.
Compiled by his father Colonel J. P. STEEL, late R.E. London :
Simkin, Marshall & Co. 1921. 6s. net.

Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Steel was a Captain in the R.F.A. of some 14 years' service at the outbreak of war. After joining the Fourth

Division on the Aisne in September, 1914, he served in France for a year before being called home in the Autumn of 1915 to train a newly raised battery, with which he returned to France in February, 1916. He was badly wounded in September, 1916, when his new Division, the Sixteenth (Irish), was taking its turn on the Somme and had just captured Ginchy, and it was not till September, 1918, that he was passed for general service again. He was then sent out to Mesopotamia, but did not arrive till after the Armistice, and, finding no chances of active service in that quarter, accepted an appointment in Siberia to train Czecho-Slovak artillery for service against the Bolsheviks. Whilst employed in this work, in which he had displayed a wonderful energy and devotion to duty, he succumbed to influenza in October, 1919. His record in the war, though highly creditable, has no especially remarkable features, but it is just this which makes the little memoir worth reading and attention. It is a characteristic picture of a British officer of the Regular Army, who was keen on his profession, and took every opportunity of seeing service and adventure. The memoir does something to explain both what the "Old Army" achieved and what the standards were which it set up for its successors.

The Fifth Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 1914-1918. Glasgow : Maclehose, Jackson & Co. Printed for private circulation.

A battalion history may be undertaken for varying reasons. It may be intended as a serious contribution to military literature, or to extol the fame of a particular unit, or again simply to recall to the minds of those who served in it the memory of the years they spent on active service. The last, in our opinion, is usually the most attractive type of such records, and its purpose is achieved more successfully by a general description of the conditions of life and the principal incidents in each successive campaign than by a detailed catalogue of orders and operations. The history of the 5th H.L.I. is an admirable example of a book written on these lines. It contains an excellent account of service in Gallipoli, the march from the Suez Canal across the Sinai Desert, and the advance into Palestine. The battalion has a fine record, its honours list including a V.C. gained on the Western Front at Moeuvres in the last months of the war. The book is well proportioned, moderate in tone, and full of anecdotes. It should meet with the whole-hearted approval of those for whom it is primarily intended.

The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry and 14th (F. and F. Yeo.) Battrn., R. H., 1914-1919. By Major D. D. OGILVIE, with Preface by Maj.-General E. S. GIRDWOOD, C.B., C.M.G. London : John Murray. 9s. net.

Like many another yeomanry regiment, the Fife and Forfars were called upon to play several different and unexpected rôles in the war, and their history, written in a light vein, makes excellent reading. After a year's training for open warfare as cavalry, the regiment was deprived of its horses and dispatched at short notice to the trenches in the confined area of Suvla Bay. The period following the evacuation of Gallipoli was spent as dismounted cavalry in various parts of Egypt, and during this time the hope of being mounted again never wholly vanished. In 1917, however, the regiment was reconstituted on an infantry basis as a battalion of the Black Watch and served in the 74th Division, first in Palestine, and later on the Western Front. Such was the story of many yeomanry regiments. All of them acquitted themselves with distinction and proved equal to any demands made upon them. That this was the case, is a fine testimonial to the material of which they were composed and a proof of the value of a cavalry training.

Soldiers of the Prophet. By Lieut.-Colonel C. C. R. MURPHY. London : John Hogg. 10s. 6d. net.

This is a well-written book, and is of undoubted value and interest. Colonel Murphy has considerable claims to speak with authority of the Turks, for he was employed as Intelligence Officer in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia both before and during the war, and as Head of the First British Mission to Constantinople in 1918, he was also enabled to obtain access to Turkish war records. In addition to some valuable technical information with regard to the Turkish Army, the book contains interesting information with regard to minor Turkish operations before the war in parts of the world little known to the general public—operations which give the reader some idea of the enormous difficulties that always confronted the Turkish Government in the management of the Ottoman Empire and also of the extent and nature of German influence in the East. But the author's story of Kut, and his accounts of other episodes in the late war, will probably be of more general interest. Colonel Murphy, like so many other British officers who have come in contact with the Turks, has a good deal of admiration for them.

He maintains that the ill-treatment of our prisoners and the Armenian massacres were the work of individuals for which the nation as a whole should not be held responsible.

Men and Marvels. By HALBERT BOYD. London : Elkin Mathews.
7s. net.

Some of the short stories which are contained in this volume are reminiscences of the author's experiences when acting as a chaplain on the Western Front ; others are character sketches from village life at home. The stories are somewhat simple in character, but the writer possesses an agreeable literary style which gives them a good deal of charm.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS.

The Contemporary Review, October, 1921. "The Limitation of Armaments," by Major-General Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G.

The Edinburgh Review, October, 1921. "The Military Mind."

This article is an anonymous review of—

1. "The Realities of War," by Sir Philip Gibbs. Heinemann. 1920.
2. "G.Q.G., Section I.," by Jean de Pierrefeu. Paris. 1920.
3. "The General Staff and its Problems," by General Erich Ludendorff. Hutchinson. 1920.
4. "General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical Decisions," by General Erich von Falkenhayn. 1919.

The author attempts to describe and define the "military mind," and points out the danger of the friction which is engendered, especially in war, by the contact of "the military mind" and "the civilian mind." "The great bulk of the officers of the Army," he writes, "are in a way isolated from the community"; and he enters a plea for "the education of the professional soldier to a fuller comprehension of the general character of the nation to which he belongs."

The Fortnightly Review, October, 1921. (1) "Peace and the Baghdad Railway," by Damon.

This article includes a useful summary of the history of the railway.

- (2) "Some Recollections of Lord Wolseley," by Edmund

Gosse, C.B. These reminiscences are of a personal nature and of no military interest.

The Nineteenth Century and After, October, 1921. (1) "The Purpose and Nature of a Fleet," by Colonel F. J. C. Fuller, D.S.O.

This is an interesting article containing a cogent argument in favour of the close co-ordination of military, naval and air policy.

(2) "Memories of the War.—I.," by Cyril Falls.

The author describes his experiences as liaison officer to the French 37th Division at the point of junction of the British Fourth Army and the First French Army from May to August, 1918.

The National Review, November, 1921. "The Epic of Verdun," by M.C.

This article gives a detailed account of the operations before Verdun during the year 1916.

The Nineteenth Century and After, November, 1921. "Memories of the War.—II.," by Cyril Falls.

The author was G.S.O. 3 of the 36th (Ulster) Division, and in this article gives a sketch of the doings of his Division during the German offensive of March, 1918, and of his own impressions throughout the crisis.

The Journal of the Ministry of Agriculture, November, 1921. "Agriculture Behind the Lines in France," by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Forrester Addie, C.B.E., and Captain A. T. A. Dobson. (Part I.—Up to the End of the German Offensive in 1918.)

This is only a slight sketch of an interesting subject ; and further details might have been given of what was attempted in the pioneer stage of the movement before the establishment of the Directorate of Agriculture in France.

The Fortnightly Review, December, 1921. "Disarmament as a Practical Policy," by J. Ellis Barker.

The National Review, December, 1921. "The Making of a Soldier," by Professor Spenser Wilkinson.

This article is a review of Sir William Robertson's memoirs, and contains a brief history of the British share in the direction of the war.

The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1921, contains four articles of military interest.

(1) "The British Legion," by Cyril Falls, in which the author gives a useful summary of the Legion's origin and work.

(2) "The First Conquest of Palestine," by Major F. R. Radice. An account of Joshua as a military commander.

(3) "Service Experts at War Councils," by Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell, K.C.B. A reasoned discussion is presented of the question: "What exactly is the position, and what are the responsibilities, of professional advisers of the Government when they are taking part in the deliberations of the Cabinet, or of whatever body happens to be charged with deciding the naval or military policy to be followed by the fighting forces of the Crown?" This question is incidentally raised in Sir William Robertson's memoirs, and is one which was closely examined by the Dardanelles Commission.

(4) "Is Invasion a Myth?" by Rear-Admiral Sir S. Eardley-Wilmot.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

"From Private to Field Marshal." By Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd. 21s.

"A History of the Great War." By John Buchan. Published by Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. Vol. I. 25s.

"A Memoir of Lieut.-Colonel Edward Steel, D.S.O." Compiled by his father, Colonel J. P. Steel, F.R.G.S., late Royal Engineers. Published by Messrs. Simpkin Marshall, Kent & Co. 6s.

"The Position of the Ex-Service Man. Past—Present—Future." By Ex-Sergeant F. George. Published by Wm. May & Co., Ltd. 2s. 6d.

"Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research." Vol. I. No. 1. Published by The Royal United Service Institution.

"The Groundwork of the War." By C. H. K. Marten, M.A. Published by Blackie & Son, Limited. 1s. 6d. net.

"Sketch Map of the Pacific Ocean. October, 1921." Published by Sifton Praed & Co.

"The Soul and Body of an Army." By Sir Ian Hay. Published by Edward Arnold & Co. 18s.

"The Fifth Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, 1914-1918." Printed for Private Circulation by MacLehose, Jackson & Co.

"Men and Marvels." By Halbert Boyd. Published by Elkin Mathews. 7s. net.

"Malta." A Sketch-book by Gordon Home. Published by Messrs. Adam & Charles Black. 2s. 6d. net.

"Soldiers of the Prophet." By Lieut.-Colonel C. C. R. Murphy. Published by John Hogg. 10s. 6d. net.

"British Railways and The Great War." By E. A. Pratt. Published by Selwyn & Blount. Vols. I and II. 42s. net.

"A History of the Great War." By John Buchan. Published by Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. Vol. II. 25s. net.

"The 56th Division (1st London Territorial Division)." By Major C. H. Dudley Ward, D.S.O., M.C., with a Foreword by General Lord Horne, of Stirkoke, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. Published by John Murray. 21s. net.

"The History of the Second Division." By Everard Wyrall. Published by Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. Vol. I. 1914-1916. 21s.

"The Fife and Forfar Yeomanry." By Major D. D. Ogilvie. With a Preface by Major-General E. S. Birdwood, C.B., C.M.G., lately G.O.C. 74th (Yeomanry) Division. Published by John Murray. 9s.

"Life of General the Hon. James Murray, a Builder of Canada." With a biographical sketch of the family of Murray of Elibank, by his descendant, Major-General R. H. Mahon, C.B., C.S.I. Published by John Murray. 21s.

"The Prevention of Malaria in the Federated Malay States." A Record of twenty years' progress. By Malcolm Watson, M.D., C.M., D.P.H., Chief Medical Officer, Estate Hospitals Association, Klang, F.M.S., Late Senior District Surgeon, F.M.S. Medical Service, author of "Rural Sanitation" in the Tropics, etc. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Published by John Murray. 36s. net.

"The War List of the University of Cambridge, 1914-1918." Cambridge University Press. 20s. net.

"Way of Revelation." By Wilfrid Ewart. Published by Putnam. 7s. 6d. net.

"The Empire at War." Edited for the Royal Colonial Institute by Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Published by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. Vol. I. 15s. net.

"The Indian Problem." By C. F. Andrews. Published by G. A. Nateson & Co., Madras. 1 rupee.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

HOUSE OF COMMONS

SOUTH PERSIA RIFLES.—On the 26th of October the *Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, in reply to a question by *Colonel Sir C. Yate*, said that the disbandment of this force is proceeding in view of the fact that the Persian Government was unwilling to retain the British officers who were in command. "The force will have been completely disbanded towards the end of this month."

IRAQ GARRISON.—On the 26th of October the *Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies*, in reply to a question by *Major Barnes*, said: "The force stationed in Iraq has been reduced since the 31st March, 1921, by—

- 4 Cavalry Regiments.
- 2 Field Artillery Brigades.
- 1 Pack Artillery Brigade.
- 20 Infantry Battalions.

In other words, two-thirds of the garrison have already gone. The state of the country remains tranquil. . . ."

OFFICERS' RESERVE.—On the 10th of November the *Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Major Glyn*, said: "The Peace and War Establishments of the Regular Army have not yet been fixed, and consequently the number of officers required from the Reserves is not known. In the reorganization of the Special Reserve as Militia the terms to be offered to officers will receive due consideration. As regards the Reserve of Officers, officers drawing retired pay are liable for service; for other officers an additional inducement now exists in the shape of promotion in the Reserve, which was not permissible before the War."

AIR FORCE STAFF COLLEGE.—On the 10th of November the *Secretary of State for Air*, in reply to a question by *Mr. A. T. Davies*, said that it was proposed to establish a Royal Air Force Staff College at Andover, where buildings (and an aerodrome) are already available. The original scheme was to establish this college at the Royal Air

Force training centre at Halton, but this would have necessitated a large building programme.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (STAFFS).—On the 1st of November, *the Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Colonel Newman*, said that the whole matter of the military staffs of divisions and brigades, Territorial Army, was under consideration at the War Office.

TERRITORIAL VOLUNTARY AID DETACHMENT.—On the 31st of October *the Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Pinkham*, announced that the Army Council had approved the principles of a new scheme, the details of which were to be considered by a committee on which the British Red Cross Society and other authorities concerned would be represented.

WAR GRAVES.—On the 9th of November *the Secretary of State for War*, in reply to a question by *Captain Thorpe*, said that since the Armistice the whole battlefield area in France and Flanders had been systematically searched for bodies at least six times. In view of the thoroughness of the search, the Army Council had now issued instructions for the withdrawal of the military exhumation parties ; but the existence of any additional bodies which would certainly be found in the future in the course of reconstruction and of clearing the *débris* would, in accordance with agreements made with the French and Belgian civil authorities, be reported to local representatives of the Imperial War Graves Commission, by whom arrangements would be made for interment in the existing military cemeteries. Special search would be made by the Commission in cases where satisfactory evidence could be produced that a particular body might be found in some definite locality.

NOTES FROM A STUDENT'S SCRAPBOOK

Maréchal Foch and the Legend of Morhange, the 20th of August, 1914.

Maréchal Foch in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, referring to the legend that on the 20th of August, 1914, when he was commanding the XX Corps, the disaster to the French Second Army was brought about by his sending the 39th Division recklessly to attack at dawn and his Corps retreating in confusion, writes that he made no such attack, as he was anticipated by the Germans, that his Divisions only retired when ordered to do so by the Army Commander, and then in good order. He had, however, been invited to attack, and he quotes the following illuminating General Instruction of General de Castelnau, dated the 18th of August :—

“The enemy is giving way before us : in particular he has abandoned Sarrebourg and Chateau Salins.

“In the general interest, he must be pursued with the utmost vigour and the greatest rapidity.

“The General commanding the Second Army counts on the energy and on the élan of all to achieve this result.

“He invites the Corps Commanders to inspire their troops with the proper frame of mind, which is different from the spirit of method which is necessary when faced by carefully prepared defences.

“Following up this line of thought, all heavy material which may delay the march, will be sent to the tail of the columns, until its entry into action becomes necessary.”—Maréchal Foch in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1st of September, 1921.

The Supreme War Council and Unity of Command.

“It seems clear that, in setting up the Council, the real object of Ministers was not so much to provide effective unity of military command as to acquire for themselves greater control over the military chiefs. That there was no intention of unifying the command by the appointment of an Allied Commander-in-Chief seems equally evident, not only from the constitution of the Council itself, but also from the fact that a few days later the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons that he was ‘utterly opposed’ to the appointment of a Generalissimo, as it ‘would produce real friction

and might create prejudice not merely between the Armies but between nations and Governments.'"—From "Private to Field-Marshal," by Sir William Robertson, p. 329.

A Peace of Understanding in 1917.

At the interview of the German Parliamentary party leaders with the ex-Kaiser on the 20th of July, 1917 :—

"To general astonishment, the Kaiser said amongst other things, it was good business that the Reichstag desired a 'Peace of Understanding' (as a matter of fact, the Reichstag Resolution did not contain this very ambiguous phrase, the use of which was stoutly demanded by the Supreme Command); the word 'Understanding' (*Ausgleich*) was excellent, that fellow over there—pointing with his cigarette towards the Vice-Chancellor Helfferich—invented it. 'Understanding' merely meant that we took over money, raw material, minerals, cotton, oil, etc., from our enemies and transferred them from their pockets to our own. It was a really splendid (*ganz famoses*) word. The members of the Majority Party saw to their horror that not only did the Kaiser not comprehend what they wished, but actually made them ashamed of his utterances."—From Erzberger's "Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg," p. 53.

Prussia.

"Prussia has never been taught anything except by blows."—From "Von kommenden Dingen," by Walter Rathenau, p. 185.

The Ex-Kaiser in Exile.

"Many princes have suffered imprisonment, and worse, at the hands of an outraged world. Few, we think, have undergone it in such pleasant circumstances, surrounded by people whose sympathy cannot be doubted. Pity, therefore, need not be accorded to him."—From "The Ex-Kaiser in Exile," by Lady Norah Bentinck, p. 175.

Civilization.

"The Europeans and Americans have introduced coffee, manioc, vanilla, oxen, goats, mice, mosquitoes, fleas, bicycles, sewing machines, telephones, ice-works, concertinas, cotton frocks, corrugated iron, Christianity, Mormonism, Munyon's remedies,* mouth organs, milk shades, tuberculosis, syphilis and other amenities, which have flourished exceedingly in the virgin soil, and caused a number of modifications in the life of the natives, known collectively as Civilization."—From "Tahiti," by Tihoti (George Calderon), p. 17.

* The American equivalent of Holloway, Beecham, Warner, etc.

APPENDIX

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I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt., M.P., *Secretary of State for War (President of the Army Council)*.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. A. Sanders, Bt., T.D., M.P., T.F. Res., *Under Secretary of State for War (Vice-President of the Army Council)*.

Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ulster Rifles, *p.s.c.*, *Chief of the Imperial General Staff*.

Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces*.

Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *Quarter-Master General to the Forces*.

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master General of the Ordnance*.

Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff*.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. G. F. Stanley, C.M.G., M.P., *Parliamentary and Financial Secretary (Finance Member)*

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.; Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B., *Secretaries and Members of Council*.

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bt., M.P.

Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.

Lieutenant-General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Judge Advocate-General.

Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ulster Rifles, *p.s.c.*

Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Director of Military Operations.

Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Military Intelligence.

Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*

Director of Staff Duties.

Major-General Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Adjutant General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
p.s.c.

<i>Director of Organisation.</i>	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) I. L. B. Vesey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Personal Services.</i>	Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director-General Army Medical Service.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir T. H. J. C. Goodwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Deputy Quarter-Master General

Major-General Sir G. F. Ellison, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*

<i>Director of Movements and Quatering.</i>	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) R. S. May, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Remounts.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. E. G. Norton, C.S.I., A.D.C.
<i>Director of Supplies and Transport.</i>	Colonel (temp. Major-Gen.) P. O. Hazelton, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C.
<i>Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.</i>	Major-General Sir H. D. E. Parsons, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Director-General Army Veterinary Service.</i>	Major-General Sir L. J. Blenkinsop, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Commdt. R.A.

<i>Director of Artillery.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) B. R. Kirwan, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Director of Fortifications and Works.</i>	Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Director General of Factories.</i>	H. Mensforth, Esq., C.B.E.

Under Secretary of State for War

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. A. Sanders, Bt., T.D., M.P., T.F. Res.

<i>Director-General of Territorial and Volunteer Forces.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. N. Birch, K.C.M.G., C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A.
<i>Director-General of Lands.</i>	Sir Howard Frank, Bt., K.C.B.

Finance Member

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. G. F. Stanley, C.M.G., M.P.

Joint Secretary of the War Office and Accounting Officer.

Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B.

Directors of Finance.

N. F. B. Osborne, Esq., C.B.; H. H. Fawcett, Esq., C.B.; J. B. Crosland, Esq.

Director of Army Contracts.

J. A. Corcoran, Esq., C.B.

Joint Secretary of the War Office

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.

*Assistant-Secretary.
Chaplain-General.*Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.
Rt. Rev. Bishop J. Taylor-Smith, C.B.,
C.V.O., D.D.**3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME****A.—ALDERSHOT COMMAND***General Officer Commanding.*

Lieutenant-General F. R., Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., M.V.O., A.D.C.

*Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.*Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) W. M. St. G. Kirke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.**Major-General in charge of Administration.*Major-General B. F. Burnett-Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.**1st Cavalry Brigade.*

Colonel Commandant A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O.

*1st Division.*Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*, *g.s.**1st Infantry Brigade.*

Colonel Commandant J. McC. Steele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

*2nd Infantry Brigade.*Colonel Commandant A. C. Daly, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.**3rd Infantry Brigade.*

Colonel Commandant W. H. Kay, C.B., D.S.O.

*C.R.A. 1st Division.
2nd Division.*Major-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.**5th Infantry Brigade.*Colonel Commandant H. C. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.**6th Infantry Brigade.*

Colonel Commandant F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

C.R.A. 2nd Division.

Colonel Commandant H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G.

B.—EASTERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	General The Lord Horne, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt., R.A., A.D.C.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. W. Gwynn, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General Sir A. F. Sillem, K.C.M.G., C.B., <i>p.s.c., q.s.</i>
<i>4th Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant N. W. Haig, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>4th Division.</i>	Major-General Sir C. D. Shute, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>11th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant C. H. T. Lucas, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>12th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant A. H. Marindin, C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 4th Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant S. F. Metcalfe, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>54th (East Anglian) Division T.F.</i>	Major-General Sir S. W. Hare, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Essex Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel E. C. Da Costa, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. J. M'Neill, D.S.O.
<i>East Midland Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel T. W. Visct. Hampden, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>C.R.A. 54th Division.</i>	Colonel H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>44th (Home Counties) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir J. R. Longley, K.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>Surrey Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. H. Mangles, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Kent Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel P. M. Robinson, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Middlesex and Sussex Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. J. Ross, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 44th Division.</i>	Colonel Sir H. D. White-Thompson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

C.—IRISH COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Forces in Ireland.</i>	General Rt. Hon. Sir C. F. N. Maccready, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. B. Wroughton, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>3rd Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. A. Weir, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>1st Division.</i>	For H.Q. Staff, <i>see</i> Aldershot Command.
<i>15th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. T. C. Carter-Campbell, C.B., D.S.O.

IRISH COMMAND—*continued*

5th Division.	Major-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine, K.C.B.
13th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
14th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant P. C. B. Skinner, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Galway Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O.
C.R.A. 5th Division.	Colonel Commandant W. B. R. Sandys, C.B., C.M.G.
6th Division.	Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
16th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
17th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O.
18th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant T. A. Andrus, C.M.G.
Kerry Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant C. Yatman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 6th Division.	Colonel Commandant W. P. L. Davies, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Dublin District.	Major-General G. F. Boyd, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M., <i>p.s.c.</i>
24th Provisional Brigade.	Colonel Commandant R. D. F. Oldman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
25th Provisional Brigade.	Colonel Commandant C. C. Onslow, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
26th Provisional Brigade.	Colonel Commandant W. H. L. Allgood, C.M.G., D.S.O.

D.—LONDON DISTRICT

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.B., C.M.G.
General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.	Captain L. M. Gibbs, D.S.O., M.C.
Colonel in charge of Administration.	Colonel J. B. Wells, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
4th Infantry Brigade (Guards).	Colonel Commandant A. B. E. Cator, D.S.O.
56th (The London) Division.	Major-General Sir C. E. Pereira, K.C.B., C.M.G.
1st London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. S. de' E. Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. Maxwell, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
3rd London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel B. L. G. Anley, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
C.R.A. 56th (The London) Division.	Colonel J. A. Tyler, C.B., C.M.G.
47th (The London) Division.	Major-General Sir N. M. Smith, V.C., K.C.B.
4th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel F. G. Lewis, C.B., C.M.G., T.D.

LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

5th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. B. Hubback, C.M.G., D.S.O.
6th London Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. J. Kentish, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 47th (The London) Division.	Colonel H. E. T. Kelly, C.B., C.M.G.

E.—NORTHERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir F. I. Maxse, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., <i>q.s.</i>
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Colonel R. W. Hare, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , <i>q.s.</i>
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
10th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant W. J. Dugan, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Yorkshire and Notts Mounted Brigade.	Colonel H. F. Wickham, C.I.E.
Midland Mounted Brigade.	Colonel D'A. Legard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
50th (Northumbrian Division).	Major-General Sir P. S. Wilkinson, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Durham Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. O. Spence, C.B., D.S.O., T.D.
Northumberland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. P. A. Riddell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
York and Durham Infantry Brigade.	Colonel B. G. Price, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.	Colonel J. W. F. Lamont, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
49th (West Riding) Division.	Major-General H. R. Davies, C.B.
1st West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. L. Mackenzie, C.I.E., D.S.O.
2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Sir G. A. Armytage, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O.
3rd West Riding Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. M. Withycombe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 49th West (Riding) Division.	Colonel Sir E. N. Whitley, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
46th (North Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir A. R. Hoskins, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Lincolnshire and Leicestershire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. Gordon, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Staffordshire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel V. W. de Falbe, C.M.G., D.S.O.
The Sherwood Foresters (Notts and Derby) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. D. Goodman, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
C.R.A. 46th (North Midland) Division.	Colonel Sir S. H. Child, Bt., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer 1st Grade.</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. St. John, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) J. A. Strick, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>51st (Highland) Division.</i>	Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Argyll and Sutherland Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Sir W. M. Thomson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C.
<i>Cameron and Seaforth Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. W. Sandilands, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Black Watch and Gordon Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel G. S. G. Crauford, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>C.R.A. 51st (Highland) Division.</i>	Colonel H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>52nd (Lowland Division).</i>	Major-General Sir P. R. Robertson, K.C.B., C.M.G.
<i>South Scottish Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. H. W. Pollard, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Royal Scots Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel W. B. Lesslie, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Scottish Rifles and Highland Light Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. M. Findlay, D.S.O., T.D.
<i>C.R.A. 52nd (Lowland) Division.</i>	Colonel G. N. Johnston, C.M.G., D.S.O.

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Harper, K.C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P. Deedes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General Hon. Sir A. R. Montagu-Stuart Wortley, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>2nd Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>3rd Division.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>7th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant G. V. Hordern, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>8th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant S. E. Hollond, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>9th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant E. S. Girdwood, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>C.R.A. 3rd Division.</i>	Colonel Commandant L. C. L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

SOUTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

48th (South Midland) Division.	Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Warwickshire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. Mudge, C.M.G.
Gloucestershire and Worcs. Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
South Midland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. J. F. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 48th (South Midland) Division.	Colonel A. T. Anderson, C.M.G.
43rd (Wessex) Division.	Major-General Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Devon and Cornwall Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. L. J. P. Butler, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
South Wessex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. Bonham-Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Hampshire Infantry Bgde.	Colonel L. F. Philips, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
C.R.A. (Wessex) Division.	Colonel G. H. W. Nicholson, C.M.G.

H.—WESTERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding.	Lieutenant-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel R. J. F. Hayter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) Sir C. C. M. Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
53rd (Welch) Division.	Major-General Sir A. A. Montgomery, K.C.M.G., C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
North Wales Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. R. N. Madocks, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Welch Border Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. J. Brock, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
South Wales Infantry Brigade.	Colonel N. A. Thomson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 53rd (Welch) Division.	Colonel L. A. Smith, D.S.O.
55th (West Lancashire) Division.	Major-General Sir C. L. Nicholson, K.C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
North Lancashire Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. G. Parker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
Liverpool Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
South Lancashire and Cheshire Infantry Bgde.	Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 55th (West Lancashire) Division.	Brevet-Colonel C. E. G. G. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O.

WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

42nd (East Lancashire) Division. Major-General T. H. Shoubridge, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Manchester Infantry Bgde. Colonel H. C. Darlington, C.M.G., T.D.
East Lancashire and Border Infantry Brigade. Colonel R. J. Woulfe-Flanagan, D.S.O.
Lancashire Fusiliers Bgde. Colonel M. L. Hornby, C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 42nd (East Lancashire) Division. Colonel E. M. Birch, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
p.s.c.

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS.

Guernsey and Alderney District :

Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops. Major-General Sir J. E. Capper, K.C.B.,
K.C.V.O.

Jersey District :

Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops. Major-General Sir W. D. Smith, K.C.B.,
K.C.V.O.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Life Guards	Regent's Park	Lt.-Col. Hon. E. S. Wyndham, D.S.O.	
2nd Life Guards	Hyde Park Barracks, S.W.	Lt.-Col. H. C. S. Ashton.	
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Lord Tweedmouth, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. H. J. Williams, D.S.O.	
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards)	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. C. S. Rome, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd Dragoon Guards (Prince of Wales's)	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. C. L. Rome, D.S.O.	
4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards	India	Lt.-Col. C. F. Hunter, D.S.O.	
5th Dragoon Guards (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Palestine	Lt.-Col. T. H. S. Marchant, D.S.O.	
The Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards)	Curragh	Lt.-Col. H. Sadler.	
7th Dragoon Guards (Princess Royal's)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. B. G. Clay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	

Cavalry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st The Royal Dragoons	Ballinasloe	Lt.-Col. H. A. Tomkinson, D.S.O.	For Egypt
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Palestine	Lt.-Col. W. M. Duguid-McCombie, D.S.O.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Constantinople	Lt.-Col. P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	India	Lt.-Col. W. Neilson, D.S.O.	
The Inniskillings (6th Dragoons)	York	Lt.-Col. C. R. Terrot, D.S.O.	
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Mhow	Lt.-Col. H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	Iraq	Lt.-Col. J. Van der Byl, D.S.O.	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Hare Park, Curragh	Lt.-Col. A. G. Seymour, M.V.O., D.S.O.	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	India	Lt.-Col. W. J. Lockett, D.S.O.	
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Curragh Camp	Lt.-Col. C. M. Truman, D.S.O.	
13th Hussars	Longford	Lt.-Col. E. F. Twist.	
14th King's Hussars	Rhine	Lt.-Col. J. G. Browne, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
15th The King's Hussars	Dublin	Lt.-Col. F. C. Pilkington, D.S.O.	
16th The Queen's Lancers	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
17th Lancers (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Galway (temp.)	Lt.-Col. B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. E. C. Jury, C.M.G., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	

B.—Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery

Stations of Units.

Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	Battery.	—	Brig.	Battery.	—
1	H.-Q. A B M	Egypt Iraq Egypt Egypt	3 (con.)	D J	Delhi (for Palestine) Secunderabad (for Egypt)
2	H.-Q. K C H	Risalpur Risalpur Meerut Sialkot	4	F H.-Q. N	Palestine India S. John's Wood
3	H.-Q.	Lucknow (for Egypt)	5	I, L H.-Q., E, G, O	India Aldershot

Royal Field Artillery.

1	H.-Q. 11, 146 (H) 98 136	Kilkenny Clonmel Fethard	18	H.-Q. 59, 93, 95 (H) 94	Kirkee Belgaum
2	21, 42, 53, 87 (H)	Fermoy	19	39, 96, 97, 131 (H)	Egypt (for Constantinople)
3	18, 62, 75, 65 (H)	Rhine	20	H.-Q. 67, 145 (H)	Bangalore
4	7, 14, 66 4 (H)	Shorncliffe	21	99, 133 H.-Q. 101, 148 (H)	Secunderabad Meerut
5	63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	Bordon		102 103	Ambala Agra
6	69, 74, 77 79 (H)	Ewshott	22	H.-Q. 104 35 (H)	Lahore
7	24, 34, 72, 60 (H)	Larkhill		105 106	Jullundur Ferozepore
8	137, 138, 139, 82 (H)	Deepcut	23	H.-Q. 108, 109	Neemuch
9	19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	Deepcut	24	107, 100 (H) H.-Q. 110, 111, 43 (H)	Mhow Jubbulpore
10	46, 51, 54, 30 (H)	Black Sea (for U.K.)	25	112 H.-Q. 40 113	Kamptee Fyzabad Lucknow
11	H.-Q. 83, 84 78 (H), 85	Ipswich Norwich		115 114 (H)	Bareilly Allahabad
12	6, 23, 49, 130 (H)	Aldershot	26	H.-Q. 116 141 (H)	Jhansi
13	2, 8, 44, 132 (H)	Woolwich		117 118	Cawnpore Nasirabad
14	H.-Q. 38, 68, 88 61 (H)	Colchester	27	119, 120, 37 (H)	Nowshera
15	52, 80, 143, 144 (H)	Bulford		121 H.-Q., 125, 126, 128 (H)	Peshawar Rawalpindi
16	89, 90, 91, 140 (H)	Woolwich	29	127	Campbellpore
17	92, 10 (H) 13, 26	Iraq (for Egypt)			

Royal Field Artillery—continued

Brig.	Battery.	—	Brig.	Battery.	—
30	9, 17, 16	Kildare	34	22, 50, 70 56 (H)	Brighton
31	47 (H) H.-Q. 41, 45, 129 (H)	Cahir	35	12, 25, 58, 31 (H)	Bulford Porton
32	29 H.-Q. 134, 86 (H)	Clonmel Hyderabad (Sind)	36	H.-Q. 71 142 (H) 15	Newbridge
	135 27	Karachi Quetta	37	48 1, 3, 5, 57 (H)	Kildare Aldershot
33	32, 36 55 (H) 33	Dundalk Dublin			

Allotment of Batteries to Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
1	37th	23	12th	45	31st	67	20th	89	16th	111	24th	136	1st
2	13th	24	7th	46	10th	68	14th	90	"	112	"	137	8th
3	37th	25	35th	47	30th	69	6th	91	"	113	25th	138	"
4	4th	26	17th	48	36th	70	34th	92	17th	114	"	139	"
5	37th	27	32nd	49	12th	71	36th	93	18th	115	"	140	16th
6	12th	28	9th	50	34th	72	7th	94	"	116	26th	141	26th
7	4th	29	31st	51	10th	73	5th	95	"	117	"	142	36th
8	13th	30	10th	52	15th	74	6th	96	19th	118	"	143	15th
9	30th	31	35th	53	2nd	75	3rd	97	"	119	27th	144	"
10	17th	32	33rd	54	10th	76	9th	98	1st	120	"	145	20th
11	1st	33	"	55	33rd	77	6th	99	20th	121	"	146	1st
12	35th	34	7th	56	34th	78	11th	100	23rd	125	29th	148	21st
13	17th	35	22nd	57	37th	79	6th	101	21st	126	"		
14	4th	36	33rd	58	35th	80	15th	102	"	127	"		
15	36th	37	27th	59	18th	81	5th	103	"	128	"		
16	30th	38	14th	60	3rd	82	8th	104	22nd	129	31st		
17	"	39	19th	61	14th	83	11th	105	"	130	12th		
18	3rd	40	25th	62	3rd	84	"	106	"	131	19th		
19	9th	41	31st	63	5th	85	"	107	23rd	132	13th		
20	"	42	2nd	64	"	86	32nd	108	"	133	20th		
21	2nd	43	24th	65	3rd	87	2nd	109	"	134	32nd		
22	34th	44	13th	66	4th	88	14th	110	24th	135	"		

C.—Royal Garrison Artillery Pack Brigades

Brigades.	British Pack Batteries.			—
I.	2, 3, 4, 15	Bulford
II.	5, 7, 9	Longmoor
V.	1	Palestine
	13	Palestine
	14	Egypt
	16	Aden
VI.	10	Jutogh
VII.	12	Rawal Pindi
VIII.	8	Landi Kotal
IX.	17	Rawal Pindi
X.	11	Quetta
XI.	6	Waziristan

Royal Garrison Artillery Medium Brigades.

Brig.	Batteries.	—	Brig.	Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q. 1 2 (H)	Malta	5	17, 18 (H) 19(H), 20 (H)	Tallaght
2	3 (H), 4 (H) H.-Q. 7 (H) 11 (H) 12 (H) 23 (H)	Gibraltar } (for Home) Agra (for Delhi) Delhi Multan } (for Ferozepore) Ferozepore } Gibraltar Peahawar	7	25, 26 (H), 27 (H), 28 (H)	Moore Park, Fermoy
3	H.-Q. 9, 10 (H) 8 (H) 21 (H) 24 (H)	Malta Allahabad (for Karachi) Roorkee Nowgong	8	H.-Q. 5 (H), 31 (H), 32 (H) 29	Exeter Rhine
4	13, 14 (H), 15 (H) 16 (H)	Roorkee Nowgong (for Calcutta) Allahabad	9	33, 34 (H), 35 (H), 36 (H)	Bordon
			10	H.-Q. 37 38 (H) 6 (H), 40 (H)	Larkhill

D.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham	13th Co. (Survey), York
Electric Light School, Gosport	14th Co. (Survey), Dublin
Training Battalion R.E., Chatham	15th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
Depot Battalion R.E., Chatham	16th Co. (Fortress), North Shields
R.E. Mounted Depot, Aldershot	17th Co. (Field), Curragh
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot	19th Co. (Survey), Southampton
4th Field Troop, Egypt	20th Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
2nd Co. (Field), Egypt	22nd Co. (Fortress), Gosport
3rd Co. (Fortress), Dover	23rd Co. (Field), Aldershot
4th Co. (Fortress), Gosport	24th Co. (Fortress), Malta
5th Co. (Field), Aldershot	26th Co. (Field)
6th Co. (Fortress), Belfast	27th Co. (Fortress), Bermuda
7th Co. (Field), Rhine	28th Co. (Fortress), Malta
8th Co. (Railway), Longmoor	29th Co. (Army Troops), Black Sea
9th Co. (Field), Colchester	30th Co. (Fortress), Plymouth
10th Co. (Railway), Longmoor	31st Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
11th Co. (Field), Aldershot	33rd Co. (Fortress), Cork
12th Co. (Field), Limerick	34th Co. (Fortress), Guernsey

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units—*continued*

35th Co. (Fortress), Pembroke	54th Co. (Field), Bordon
36th Co. (Fortress), Sierra Leone	55th Co. (Field), Black Sea
38th Co. (Field), Moore Park, Fermoy	56th Co. (Field), Bulford
39th Co. (Fortress), Sheerness	57th Co. (Field), Bulford
40th Co. (Fortress), Hong Kong	58th (Porton) Co., Porton
41st Co. (Fortress), Singapore	59th Co. (Field), Curragh
42nd Co. (Army Troops), Palestine	1st Pontoon Park, Chatham
43rd Co. (Fortress), Mauritius	Experimental Bridging Co., Christchurch
44th Co. (Fortress), Jamaica	Camouflage Experimental Section, Salisbury
45th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar	1st A. A. Bn. R.E., Blackdown
49th Co. (Fortress), North Queens-ferry	

E.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. B. N. Sergison Brooke, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. Hon. E. M. Colston, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
3rd ditto	Warley	Lt.-Col. Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O.	
1st Coldstream Guards	Wimbledon	Lt.-Col. J. E. Gibbs, M.C.	
2nd ditto	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. C. P. Hey- wood, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
3rd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Scots Guards	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. F. G. Alston, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. B. H. S. Romilly, D.S.O.	
1st Irish Guards	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Hon. T. E. Vesey.	
1st Welsh Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. T. R. C. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Scots	Rangoon	Lt.-Col. G. H. F. Win- gate, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Ennis	Lt.-Col. H. E. P. Nash, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	Kilworth	Lt.-Col. H. C. Whin- field.	
2nd ditto	Ladha	Lt.-Col. E. B. Mathew- Lannowe, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bn. The Buffs (East Kent Regi- ment)	Fermoy	Lt.-Col. R. McDouall, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Iraq	Lt.-Col. W. H. Trevor, D.S.O.	For Aden
1st Bn. The King's Own Royal Regi- ment (Lancaster)	Dublin	Bt.-Col. H. R. Head- lam, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Maymyo	Bt.-Col. O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	Carlow	Lt.-Col. A. C. L. H. Jones	
2nd ditto	Dinapore	Lt.-Col. H. R. Sandilands, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Newcastle West	Bt.-Col. H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Nowshera	Lt.-Col. D. A. L. Day.	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Killarney	Lt.-Col. L. F. Ashburner, D.S.O., M.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For the Rhine
2nd ditto	Aden	Lt.-Col. M. P. Hancock, D.S.O.	For Home
3rd ditto	Killaloe	Lt.-Col. A. C. Jeffcoat, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
4th ditto	Jullundur	Lt.-Col. H. A. Walker, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bn. The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Bantry	Lt.-Col. L. M. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Khartoum	Lt.-Col. F. Hyslop, C.B.E.	For Hong-Kong
1st Norfolk Regiment	Belfast	Lt.-Col. F. R. Day, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bareilly	Lt.-Col. W. F. L. Gordon, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Iraq
1st Lincolnshire	Tipperary	Lt.-Col. R. H. G. Wilson.	
2nd ditto [Regiment]	Poona	Lt.-Col. C. Toogood, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Waterford	Bt.-Col. E. D. Young, C.M.G.	
2nd ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. W. M. Goodwyn	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. F. T. D. Wilson.	
2nd ditto	Curragh	Lt.-Col. A. S. Peebles, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Somerset Light Infantry, (Prince Albert's)	Holywood, Belfast	Lt.-Col. A. H. Yatman, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. W. J. Bowker, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Kinsale	Bt.-Col. G. D. Price, C.M.G.	
2nd ditto	Peshawar	Bt.-Col. T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O.	
1st East Yorkshire	Mullingar	Lt.-Col. T. A. Headlam.	
2nd ditto [Regiment]	Iraq	Lt.-Col. F. H. Harvey, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment	Sligo	Lt.-Col. W. Allason, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. G. D. Jebb, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Athlone	Lt.-Col. E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Leicestershire Regiment	Delhi	Lt.-Col. C. H. Haig, D.S.O.	For Home
1st Royal Irish Regiment	Silesia	Bt.-Col. A. J. G. Moir, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Chakrata	Lt.-Col. G. A. Elliot, M.C.	
1st Bn. The Green Howards (Alexandra Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. C. V. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For the Rhine
2nd ditto	Tipperary	Lt.-Col. G. B. de M. Maris, D.S.O.	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Dublin	Lt.-Col. C. de Putron.	
2nd ditto	Lahore	Lt.-Col. C. J. Griffin, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
[Fusiliers]			
1st Royal Scots	Tullamore	Lt.-Col. F. E. Buchanan.	
2nd ditto	Dum Dum	Lt.-Col. R. K. Walsh, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Rathdrum	Lt.-Col. B. H. Chetwynd-Staplyton, <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Ballyvonare	Lt.-Col. A. Crookenden, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. C. S. Owen, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Limerick	Lt.-Col. C. C. Norman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Egypt
1st South Wales Borderers	Dunslaughlin	Lt.-Col. A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Bt.-Col. C. C. Taylor, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Agra	Lt.-Col. A. J. Welch.	
2nd ditto	Bere Island	Lt.-Col. E. N. Broadbent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Curragh	Bt.-Col. J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Parachinar	Lt.-Col. R. Oakley, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. J. N. Crawford, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Lt.-Col. G. C. Grazebrook, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Kanturk	Lt.-Col. J. R. Wethered, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Gharial	Lt.-Col. R. P. Jordan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Nasirabad	Lt.-Col. H. A. Fulton, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. H. A. Carr, D.S.O.	
3rd ditto	Fyzabad	Bt.-Col. G. W. St. G. Grogan, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.	
4th ditto	Galway	Bt.-Col. H. Needham, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Jamaica	Lt.-Col. J. E. Green, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Buttevant	Lt.-Col. G. E. M. Hill, D.S.O.	
1st East Surrey Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. C. C. G. Ashton, O.B.E.	
and ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. R. H. Baldwin, D.S.O.	
1st Duke of Cornwall's Lgt. Infantry	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. A. M. Collard, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. R. M. Wetherell, C.M.G.	For the Rhine
1st Bn. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Curragh	Lt.-Col. R. K. Healing.	For the Rhine
and ditto	Collinstown	Lt.-Col. C. L. Smith, V.C., M.C.	
1st Border Regiment	Karachi	Lt.-Col. H. Nelson, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Castlebar	Lt.-Col. G. de la P. B. Pakenham, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Carrick-on-Shannon	Lt.-Col. R. Bellamy, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Malta	Bt.-Col. A. E. Glasgow, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Hampshire Regiment	Black Sea	Lt.-Col. A. E. Andrews, O.B.E.	For Egypt
and ditto	Cork	Bt.-Col. C. N. French, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Singapore	Bt.-Col. R. W. Morgan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For Rangoon
and ditto	Cork	Lt.-Col. M. B. Savage, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. A. L. Moulton-Barrett, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. F. W. Radcliffe, C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Soudan
1st Bn. The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Dublin	Lt.-Col. W. B. Ritchie, D.S.O.	
and ditto	Palestine	Lt.-Col. D'O. B. Dawson.	
1st Welch Regiment	Ferozepore	Lt.-Col. L. I. O. Robins.	
and ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. A. Derry, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st Bn. The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Allahabad	Lt.-Col. S. H. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
and ditto	Silesia	Bt.-Col. A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.	For Home
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Limerick	Lt.-Col. F. H. Stapleton, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
and ditto	Tipperary	Lt.-Col. E. R. Clayton, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For the Rhine

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Essex Regiment	Kinsale	Lt.-Col. F. W. Moffit, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Malta	Lt.-Col. A. P. Churchill	For the Black Sea
1st Bn. The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment)	Skibbereen	Lt.-Col. B. G. V. Way, C.B.E., M.V.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. R. J. F. Taylor, C.B.E.	
1st Bn. The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. F. W. Woodward, D.S.O.	For the Black Sea
2nd ditto	Tralee	Lt.-Col. R. E. Berkeley, D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Templemore	Lt.-Col. C. R. J. Mowatt, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Landi Kotal	Lt.-Col. L. G. W. Dobbin, D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Iraq	Bt.-Col. S. G. Francis, D.S.O.	For India
2nd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. W. B. Thornton, D.S.O.	
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent	Calcutta	Lt.-Col. G. D. Lister.	
2nd ditto [Regiment]	Dublin	Lt.-Col. C. E. Kitson, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry	Tuam	Lt.-Col. H. E. Trevor, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For the Rhine
2nd ditto	Dundalk	Bt.-Col. J. B. G. Tulloch, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st The King's Shropshire Light Infantry	Bombay	Lt.-Col. H. M. Smith, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Curragh	Lt.-Col. G. Meynell, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Cootehill	Lt.-Col. R. M. Heath, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. E. Swainson	For Singapore
3rd ditto	Silesia	Bt.-Col. W. D. Wright, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Home
4th ditto	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. O. H. Delano-Osborne, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Egypt
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. R. G. Jelf, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Clones	Bt.-Col. H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd ditto	Mhow	Lt.-Col. B. J. Majendie, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. Sir H. Wake, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Dublin	Bt.-Col. R. D. F. Oldman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
and Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Hongkong	Lt.-Col. J. R. Wyndham.	For India
1st Manchester Regiment	Ballincollig	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dorling, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Kamptee	Lt.-Col. B. A. Wright, D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's)	Lichfield	Lt.-Col. H. C. Tweedie D.S.O., O.B.E.	For Gibraltar
2nd ditto	Nenagh	Bt.-Col. L. J. Wyatt, D.S.O.	
1st York & Lancaster Regiment	Clonmel	Lt.-Col. G. H. Wedgwood, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Iraq	Lt.-Col. G. E. Bayley, C.M.G., D.S.O.	For India
1st Durham Light Infantry	Silesia	Lt.-Col. H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O.	For Home
2nd ditto	Ahmednagar	Lt.-Col. E. Du. P. H. Moore	
1st Highland Light Infantry	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. T. C. Singleton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Seaforth Highlanders, (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's)	Belfast	Lt.-Col. H. F. Baillie, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Meerut	Lt.-Col. L. Holland, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Black Sea	Lt.-Col. C. Ogston, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Malta
2nd ditto	Maryborough	Lt.-Col. P. W. Brown, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	Kuldana	Lt.-Col. E. Craig-Brown, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Queenstown	Lt.-Col. G. C. M. Sorel-Cameron	
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles	Parkhurst, Isle of Wight	Lt.-Col. H. R. Charley, C.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. A. D. N. Merriman, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. C. W. H. Wortham, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. R. G. Shuter, D.S.O.	
1st Connaught Rangers	Rawalpindi	Lt.-Col. W. N. S. Alexander, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Lt.-Col. H. F. N. Jourdain, C.M.G.	
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Poona	Lt.-Col. H. H. G. Hyslop, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Claremorris	Lt.-Col. W. J. B. Tweedie, C.M.G.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Bn. The Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)	Wellington	Bt.-Col. E. T. Humphreys, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Silesia	Lt.-Col. R. A. H. Orpen-Palmer, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Munster Fusiliers	Silesia	Lt.-Col. J. A. F. Cuffe, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. H. S. Jervis, M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers	Bordon	Lt.-Col. C. N. Perreau, C.M.G.	
2nd ditto	Multan	Lt.-Col. G. S. Higginson	
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Cawnpore	Bt.-Col. A. T. Paley, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Ballyshannon	Lt.-Col. W. E. Davis, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
3rd ditto	Dublin	Lt.-Col. J. Harrington, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. W. W. Seymour, <i>p.s.c.</i>	For Gibraltar

5. TANK CORPS

1st (Depot) Tank Battalion	Wool, Dorset.
Lieut.-Col. T. C. Mudie, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
2nd Tank Battalion	Farnborough.
Bt.-Col. E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.		
3rd Tank Battalion (Cadre)	Dublin.
Lieut.-Col. W. J. Shannon, C.M.G., D.S.O.		
4th Tank Battalion (Cadre)	Wareham.
Lieut.-Col. H. G. R. Burges-Short, D.S.O.		
5th Tank Battalion	Wareham (for Salisbury Plain).
Lieut.-Col. K. M. Laird, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>		
Rhine Tank Company	Cologne.
Major A. G. Kenchington, M.C.		
Tank Workshops Training Battalion	Wool.
Lieut.-Col. N. Hudson, D.S.O., <i>p.a.c.</i>		
Central Schools Tank Corps	Wool.
Lieut.-Col. H. K. Woods, D.S.O.		
1st, 2nd, Armoured Car Companies	Iraq.
3rd and 4th	" "	Egypt.
5th	" "	Dublin.
6th	" "	Iraq.
7th	" "	Peshawar.
8th	" "	Lahore.
9th	" "	Secunderabad.
10th	" "	Bareilly.
11th	" "	Wareham (for India).
12th	" "	Wareham.

II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

Army Headquarters

Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., *p.s.c.*

General Staff Branch

C.G.S. General Sir C. W. Jacob, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., I.A.
D.C.G.S. Major-General Sir A. A. Montgomery, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*, B.S.
D.M.O. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, British Service.
D.M.T. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) F. J. Marshall, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.
D.S.D. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) J. R. E. Charles, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

MILITARY OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

D.D. (Intell.) Colonel W. H. Beach, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.

ATTACHED TO GENERAL STAFF

Major-General, Cavalry. Major-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.
Major-General, Artillery.
Major-General, Engineers. Major-General S. H. Sheppard, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Adjutant-General's Branch

A.G. Lieut.-General Sir W. S. Delamain, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., I.A.
D.A.G. Major-General H. F. Cooke, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., I.A.
D.P.S. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) J. Whitehead, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
D.M. and R. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) A. H. P. Harrison, C.S.I., I.A.

Quartermaster-General's Branch

<i>Q.M.G.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir G. F. MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
<i>D.Q.M.G.</i>	Major-General Sir H. C. Holman, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
<i>D.M. and Q.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) Sir P. O. Hambro, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
<i>Military Secretary.</i>	Major-General W. C. Black, C.I.E., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.

Headquarters, Northern Command

(MURREE)

<i>G.O.C.-in-Chief.</i>	General Sir W. R. Birdwood, Bart., G.C.M.G. K.C.B., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A.
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) C. M. Wagstaff, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , R.E.
<i>D.A. and Q.M.G.</i>	Major-General H. C. Tytler, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

Headquarters, Peshawar District

(PESHAWAR)

<i>Commander.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Risalpur)

Brigade Commander.

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Landikotal)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. A. Holdich, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 2ND INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ali Masjid)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Bt.-Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. F. Orton, <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 3RD INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Peshawar)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. C. Luard, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.
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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

Peshawar District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Nowshera)

Brigade Commander Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) J. W. O'Dowda, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

Headquarters, Kohat District

(KOHAT)

Commander. Major-General Sir A. Skeen, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Darsamand)

Brigade Commander Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) S. G. Loch, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.
(Temp.)

HEADQUARTERS, 6TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Kohat)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. A. Fagan, C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Dardoni)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. J. P. Browne, C.B., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 8TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Bannu)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. Prissick, I.A.

Headquarters, Rawalpindi District

(MURREE)

Commander. Major-General Sir H. C. C. Uniacke, K.C.M.G., C.B., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 2ND INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Sialkot)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. H. Rankin, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Rawalpindi District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 11TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Abbottabad)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. R. P. Boileau, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 13TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Jhelum)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. D. DePree, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 12TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Rawalpindi, temporarily)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) L. W. Y. Campbell, C.M.G., I.A.

*Headquarters, Lahore District**(Dalhousie)*

Commander. Major-General Sir S. T. B. Lawford, K.C.B., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 16TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ferozepore)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. J. Poole, C.M.G., B.S.

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE AREA

(Jullundur)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. F. Bainbridge, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, LAHORE BRIGADE AREA

(Lahore)

Area Commander. Major-General A. LeG. Jacob, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

AMBALA BRIGADE AREA

(Ambala)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. C. Wooldridge, I.A.

Headquarters, Western Command

(KARACHI)

<i>G.O.C.-in Chief.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
<i>Colonel on the Staff,</i> <i>General Staff.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) W. S. Leslie, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
<i>D.A. and Q.M.G.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) J. C. Harding-Newman, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.

Headquarters, Baluchistan District

(QUETTA)

<i>Commander.</i>	Major-General Sir D. G. M. Campbell, K.C.B., B.S.
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HEADQUARTERS, 14TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Quetta)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. L. Tarver, C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, 15TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

(Quetta)

<i>Brigade Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. J. Bridford, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.
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BALUCHISTAN-ZHOB AREA

(Quetta)

<i>Area Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. B. D. Baird, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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Headquarters, Sind-Rajputana District

(KARACHI)

<i>Commander.</i>	Major-General C. W. G. Richardson, C.B., C.S.I., <i>p.s.c.</i> , I.A.
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HEADQUARTERS, NASIRABAD BRIGADE AREA

(Mount Abu)

<i>Area Commander.</i>	Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. H. Hare, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , B.S.
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Headquarters, Waziristan Force

(DERA ISMAIL KHAN)

<i>Commander.</i>	Major-General T. G. Matheson, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.
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Waziristan Force—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ladha)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. Gwyn-Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 10TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Manzai)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. M. Orr, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 21ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Sargodha)

Commander (Temp.). Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. J. Mitchell, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, WANA COLUMN

(Sarwekai)

Column Commander. Brevet-Col. (Temp. Col. Commandant) O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., B.S.

*Headquarters, Eastern Command**(Naini Tal)*

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir H. Hudson, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., I.A.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) G. H. N. Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) J. Charteris, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, R.E.

*Headquarters, United Provinces District**(Mussoorie)*

Commander. Major-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B. K.C.V.O., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 3RD INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Meerut)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. L. Gregory, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Lucknow)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) L. C. Jones, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

United Provinces District—continued

HEADQUARTERS, 17TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Dehra Dun)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Isacke, C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 18TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Bareilly)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. N. Macmullen, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, 19TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Lucknow)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. De C. O'Grady, C.I.E., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

HEADQUARTERS, DELHI BRIGADE AREA

(Delhi)

Area Commander. Major-General S. R. Davidson, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.

Presidency and Assam District

(Shillong)

Commander. Major-General T. A. Cubitt, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

ALLAHABAD BRIGADE AREA (INDEPENDENT)

(Allahabad)

Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. G. Stewart, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

Headquarters, Southern Command

(Poona)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Marshall, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., B.S.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. H. Norman, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General Sir W. C. Knight, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, I.A.

Headquarters, Central Provinces District

(Mhow)

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Central Provinces District—continued

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(Jhansi)

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HEADQUARTERS, JUBBULPORE BRIGADE AREA

(Jubbulpore)

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Headquarters, Poona District

(Poona)

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(Bombay)

Commander. Major-General W. B. James, C.B., C.I.E., M.V.O., I.A.

Headquarters, Madras District

(Wellington)

Commander. Major-General J. T. Burnett-Stuart, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, B.S.

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(Bangalore)

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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

*Headquarters, Burma Independent District**(Maymyo)**Commander.*Major-General Sir V. B. Fane, K.C.B.,
K.C.I.E., I.A.

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D.S.O., I.A.*South Persia Rifles**I.G.*Lieut.-Colonel W. A. K. Fraser, D.S.O.,
M.C.

FARS BRIGADE

*O.C.*Lieut.-Colonel W. A. K. Fraser, D.S.O.,
M.C.

KIRMAN BRIGADE

O.C.

III. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

1.—Air Council

<i>President of the Air Council.</i>	Captain the Rt. Hon. F. E. Guest, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
<i>Vice-President of the Air Council.</i>	The Rt. Hon. Lord Gorell, C.B.E., M.C., Under Secretary of State for Air.
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2.—Air Ministry

<i>Secretary of State for Air.</i>	Captain the Rt. Hon. F. E. Guest, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.P.
<i>Parliamentary Private Secretary.</i>	T. A. Lewis, Esq., M.P.
<i>Air Secretary and Private Secretary</i>	Group Captain A. J. L. Scott, C.B., M.C., A.F.C.
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<i>Under Secretary of State for Air.</i>	The Rt. Hon. Lord Gorell, C.B.E., M.C.
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<i>Secretary of the Air Ministry.</i>	W. F. Nicholson, Esq., C.B.
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pensation Officer.*

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E. H. Coles, Esq. (Dep. Dir.-Gen)

Colonel H. F. Cobb, O.B.E.

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Stores.**Director of Medical
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C.B.E. [D.S.O., O.B.E.]

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Research :—*Director-General of
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Brig.-General R. K. Bagnall-Wild, C.M.G.,
C.B.E.Wing-Commander E. F. Briggs, D.S.O.,
O.B.E.

Air Ministry—continued

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Deputy Director of Instruments. Wing-Commander J. B. Bowen, O.B.E.

Director of Aircraft Supplies. R. P. Wilson, Esq., C.B.E., M.Inst.C.E., M.I.E.E.

Director of Aeronautical Inspection.

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Controller of Information.

Controller of Communications. Lieut.-Colonel L. F. Blandy, D.S.O., R.E.

Controller of Aerodromes and Licensing. Brig.-General F. L. Festing, C.B., C.M.G. (acting).

Director of Meteorological Office. G. C. Simpson, Esq., C.B.E., D.Sc., F.R.S.

3.—Air Commands**A.—UNITED KINGDOM****(a) Inland Area**

The Inland Area comprises all units in Great Britain, with the exception of those units comprising the Coastal Area, and the Cranwell and Halton Commands.

Headquarters : Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.

Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Uxbridge.

Telephone No. : Uxbridge 231/2/3/4/5/6.

Air Vice-Marshal. .. Sir John Maitland Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain Philip L. W. Herbert, C.M.G., C.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Group</i>	Kenley.
No. 24 Squadron
„ 25 „ Hawkinge.
„ 1 Stores Depot Kidbrooke.
„ 4 „ „ Ruislip.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(a) *Inland Area—continued*

The Packing Depot	Ascot.
Medical Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
Armament and Gunnery School (cadre)	Eastchurch.
Instrument Design Establishment ..	Biggin Hill.
Signal Co-operation Flight	" "
School of Technical Training (Men) ..	Manston.
No. 6 Flying Training School	" "
Central Pay Office	Woking.
General Services Pay Officer	Norway House, Cockspur Street, S.W.1.
Record Office	Ruislip.
No. 39 Squadron	Spittlegate, Grantham.
" 207 Squadron	Bircham Newton.
" 2 Flying Training School	Duxford.
" 3 " " " (cadre)	Digby.
Aeroplane Experimental Establishment	Martlesham Heath.
<i>Headquarters, No. 7 Group</i>	Andover.
No. 4 Squadron	South Farnborough.
School of Photography	" "
Experimental Section, R.A.E.	" "
School of Army Co-operation	Old Sarum.
Air Pilotage School (cadre)	Andover.
Central Flying School	Upavon.
No. 1 Flying Training School	Netheravon.
Electrical and Wireless School	Flower Down and Worthy Down.
No. 5 Flying Training School	Shotwick.
School of Balloon Training	Larkhill.
No. 3 Stores Depot	Milton, Berks.
<i>Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—</i>	
R.A.F. Depot	Uxbridge.
R.A.F. Central Band	"
School of Physical Training and Drill	"
Inland Area Medical Headquarters ..	Uxbridge.
R.A.F. Central Hospital	Finchley.
Research Laboratory and Medical Officers' School of Instruction	Holly Hill, N.W.3.
Aviation Candidates and Central Medical Board	"
M.T. Repair Depot	Shrewsbury.
Inland Area Aircraft Depot	Henlow, Beds.

(b) *Coastal Area*

The Coastal Area comprises Stations, etc., as follows: Calshot, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport, Isle of Grain, Cattewater, Donibristle, Leuchars, Smoogroo, Felixstowe. Also all Aircraft-Carriers and

(b) Coastal Area—continued

Units afloat in Fighting Ships in Home Waters, and all Airship Stations.

Headquarters : 33-34 Tavistock Place, W.C.1.

Telegraphic Address : Airgenarch, Kincross, London.

Telephone No. : Museum 7840.

Air Vice-Marshal.

Arthur V. Vyvyan, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain.

Frederick W. Bowhill, C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 10 Group</i>	Lee-on-Solent.
R.A.F. Base	Gosport.
(a) Headquarters	"
(b) No. 210 Squadron	"
(c) Observers' Training Flight	"
(d) Composite Flight	"
(e) Development Flight	"
No. 238 Squadron (cadre)	Cattewater.
School of Naval Co-operation and			
Aerial Navigation	Calshot.
Marine Training Section	"
Seaplane Training School	Lee-on-Solent.
<i>Headquarters, No. 29 Group</i>	Donibristle.
R.A.F. Base	Leuchars.
(a) No. 3 Squadron	"
(b) " 205	"
(c) " 203	"
Coastal Area Aircraft Depot	Donibristle.
H.M.S.'s <i>Argus</i> , <i>Furious</i> and <i>Ark Royal</i> (Aircraft-carriers).			

Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.

R.A.F. Airship Base	Howden.
Marine and Armament Experimental			
Establishment	Isle of Grain.
No. 230 Squadron	Felixstowe.
Inspector of Recruiting, R.A.F.	Henrietta Street, W.C.2.
Air Ministry Wireless Section..	Kingsway, W.C.2.
London M.T. Section	War Office Garage, Ebury Bridge Rd., S.W.1.

(c) No. 11 (Irish) Wing

This Command comprises all units in Ireland. For operations these units are controlled by the General Officer Commanding, Irish Command.

Headquarters : Baldonnell, Clondalkin, Co. Dublin.

Telegraphic Address : Wing Aeronautics, Clondalkin.

Telephone No. : Clondalkin 22.

(c) No. 11 (Irish) Wing—*continued**Group Captain.*

Ian M. Bonham-Carter, O.B.E., Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader.

C. S. Wynne-Eaton, D.S.O., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follows :—

No. 100 Squadron	Baldonnell and Oranmore.
No. 2 Squadron	Fermoy.
Irish Stores and Repair Unit	Baldonnell.

(d) Cranwell

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Cranwell, is Commandant of the R.A.F. (Cadet) College and commands all units at Cranwell.

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.*Telegraphic Address :* Aircoll, Sleaford.*Telephone No. :* Sleaford 64/5/6/7.*Air Commodore.*

Charles A. H. Longcroft, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.

Wing-Commander.

Arthur L. Godman, C.M.G., D.S.O., Administrative Duties.

Units as follows :—

R.A.F. (Cadet) College.

(a) Ground Wing.

(b) Flying Wing.

Boys' Wing.

Band.

R.A.F. Hospital.

(e) Halton

The Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Halton, is Commandant of No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) and commands all units at Halton.

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.*Telegraphic Address :* Aeronautics, Halton.*Telephone No. :* Aylesbury 161/2 ; Wendover 72/4.*Air Commodore.*

Francis R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Units as follows :—

No. 1 School of Technical Training

(Boys).. .. . Halton.

R.A.F. Hospital "

B.—OVERSEAS

(a) Middle East Area

Headquarters : Cairo.*Air Vice-Marshal.*Sir William G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, Air Officer Commanding.*Group Captain.*Bertie C. H. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*, Chief Staff Officer.

(a) Middle East Area—continued

Units as follows :—

Administered direct by Area Headquarters.

Egypt Stores Depot	Aboukir.
„ Engine Repair Depot	Abbassia, Cairo.
„ Aircraft Depot	Aboukir.
„ Base Pay Office	Cairo.
Aden Flight	Aden
<i>Headquarters, Egyptian Group</i>	Heliopolis.
No. 45 Squadron	Almaza, Cairo.
„ 70 „	Heliopolis.
„ 216 „	„
„ 47 „	Helwan.
„ 56 „	Aboukir.
<i>Headquarters, Palestine Group</i>	Ismailia.
No. 14 Squadron	Ramleh, Palestine.
„ (a) Detachment	Amman (Trans-Jordania).
„ 208 Squadron	Moascar, Ismailia.
„ 4 Flying Training School	Abu Sueir.
<i>Headquarters, Iraq Group</i>	Baghdad City.
No. 1 Squadron	Hinaidi, Baghdad.
„ 6 „	Baghdad West.
„ 8 „	„ „
„ 55 „	Mosul.
„ 30 „	Baghdad West.
„ 84 „	Shaibah.
Aircraft Park	Baghdad and Basrah.
Central Air Communication Section	Shaibah.

(b) R.A.F. India

*Headquarters : Ambala.**Air Commodore.*Tom I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G., Air
Officer Commanding.*Wing-Commander.*Reginald P. Mills, M.C., A.F.C., Air Staff
Duties.

This Command comprises all R.A.F. Units in India grouped as follows :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing</i>	..	Peshawar.
No. 28 Squadron	..	Kohat.
„ 31 „	..	Peshawar.
<i>Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing</i>	..	Ambala.
R.A.F. School	..	„
No. 20 Squadron	..	„
<i>Headquarters, No. 3 Indian Wing</i>	..	Quetta.
No. 5 Squadron	..	„
<i>Headquarters, No. 4 Indian Wing</i>	..	Risalpur.
No. 27 Squadron	..	„
„ 60 „	..	„

(b) R.A.F. India—*continued*.

Units administered direct by Headquarters, R.A.F. India :—

Aircraft Depot	Karachi.
„ Park	Lahore.

(c) Mediterranean Group

Headquarters : Valetta, Malta.

This Command comprises all units in the Mediterranean Sea Area co-operating with the Navy.

Group Captain. Charles R. Samson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.,
Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader. Harry F. A. Gordon, O.B.E., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follows :—

No. 267 Squadron Calafra, Malta.

Seaplane Repair Base Feneraki, nr. Constantinople.

Aircraft-Carrier :—H.M.S. *Pegasus*.

(d) R.A.F. with the Army of the Rhine

No. 12 Squadron Bickendorf.

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